Greg Ferris – Executive Director, Morgan Stanley
John Odermatt – Corporate Director, Citigroup
Peter Poulos – Director, Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB)
Workshop: Lessons in Risk Assessment
2
Workshop Overview
1. Introductions
2. Business Continuity Risk Assessment – Firm
Perspectives in Approach
• Morgan Stanley
• Citigroup
• Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB)
3. Questions & Answers
3
Business Continuity Risk Assessment –
Firm Perspectives in Approach
Morgan Stanley
4
Crit 2 Crit 1
Crit 2Crit 3
Life safety mitigation and
response will be constant
in all locations
Prioritize business risks:
Crit 1 – Mitigation and
response solutions in place
for all risks
Crit 2 – Mitigation solutions
in place for some risks.
Response solutions in place
for all.
Crit 3 – No mitigation
solutions in place.
Response solutions in place
for all.
Analysis performed at the
regional and divisional
level
Probability
Impact
The Macro View: Prioritizing Risk – Determining
What Matters Most
5
Identifying Risks
– Think about the events (natural and man made) that could interrupt the normal flow of
operations and/or threaten the well being of employees
– Don’t focus purely on disasters in the classic sense
– Try to focus on the effect of the problem as opposed to it’s cause
Assessing Risk
– Assess the probability/impact of each risk statement
– Provide a criticality ranking for each
The Macro View: Cataloging and Assessing Risk
6
Probability Scoring
1 Greater than 66 percent chance of occurrence (will happen or is very likely to happen)
2 33 to 65 percent chance of occurrence (likely to happen)
3 Less than 33 percent chance of occurrence (not likely to occur)
Impact Scoring
1 Outage will result in inability to meet regulatory requirements and introduce excessive risk
2 Outage will not impede ability to meet regulatory requirements or excessive risk, but will
impact client service functions
3 Outage will not affect critical functions and/or critical functions are easily failed over
Getting Started: Assessing Probabilities and
Impacts
7
Probability Scoring
1 Greater than 66 percent chance of occurrence (will happen or is very likely to happen)
2 33 to 65 percent chance of occurrence (likely to happen)
3 Less than 33 percent chance of occurrence (not likely to occur)
Impact Scoring
1 Outage will result in unacceptable risk to New Jersey’s citizens and/or assets
2 Outage will not result in unacceptable risk to New Jersey’s citizens and/or assets, but will
impact continuity of government and/or the ability to communicate with all levels of
government
3 Outage will not affect critical functions and/or critical functions are easily failed over
The Macro View: Assessing Risk
8
Criticality Assessment
1 Probability Score 3 to 1 - Impact Score 1
2 Probability Score 2.5 to 1 - Impact Score 2
3 Probability Score 3 to 2.5 – Impact Score 2; Probability Score 3 to 1 –
Impact Score 3
The Macro View: Prioritizing Risk
9
Business Continuity Risk Assessment –
Firm Perspectives in Approach
Citigroup
10
Sub-processes,
Recovery Strategies
& Requirements
Sub-processes,
Recovery Strategies
& Requirements
Threat & Vulnerability Assessment (TVA)
BIA
Business Impact
Analysis
TVA
Threat & Vulnerability
Assessment
SRA
Sector Risk Assessment
SRA
Sector Risk Assessment
BIA
Business Impact
Analysis
The purpose of the TVA is to:
• Determine standard threat scenarios and planning
constraints
• Identify vulnerability, symbolic value, single point of failure,
or concentration of resources
• Composite Resilience Rating
11
Cross Functional Collaboration
• Perimeter security
• VIP security
• Proximity to other known militant targets
• Utility diversity
• Fire suppression
• Electrical grids
• UPS and generators
• Egress and risers
• Dual paths
• Data Center strategy
• Concentration of Infrastructure
• People Strategy
• Single point of failure
• Perimeter security
• VIP security
• Proximity to other known militant targets
• Utility diversity
• Fire suppression
• Electrical grids
• UPS and generators
• Egress and risers
• Dual paths
• Data Center strategy
• Concentration of Infrastructure
• People Strategy
• Single point of failure
SecuritySecurity
FacilitiesFacilities
TechnologyTechnology
HRHR
• Physical security• Physical security
• Physical plant resilience• Physical plant resilience
• Infrastructure resilience• Infrastructure resilience
• Personnel• Personnel
Team Lead: Office of
Business Continuity
TVA Team Expertise Example Components
12
TVA: Threats For a Facility include …
• Vulnerability
– low, medium, or high
• Symbolic Value as a Target
– low, medium, or high
• Single Points of Failure
– resources that do not have
redundancy at another
Citigroup facility
13
TVA: Threats at a Facility (continued)
Threats include:
• Regional Blackout
• Civil Unrest
• Telecom Utility Interruptions
• Epidemic
• Hurricane
• Flood
• Earthquake
• Bomb
• Terrorist Event
• Sabotage
14
TVA: Threat at a Facility (continued)
• For each potential threat the worst-
case scenario is considered:
Outage duration range
days, weeks, or months
Radius impacted
<30 miles or >30 miles (50 km)
Loss probability
low, medium, or high
• Then a composite resilience rating is
calculated by the team
15
TVA: Consistent Output (continued)
Standard
Threats,
scenarios, and
planning
constraints
Vulnerability,
symbolic value,
single point of
failure, proximity,
or concentration
of resources
Composite
Resilience
Rating
Threats
Outage
Duration
Range Radius Impacted
Scope of
Infrastructure
Services
Affected
(Potential)
Regional Blackout Days >30 miles Many
Civil Unrest Days >30 miles Some
Telco Interruption Days <30 miles Few
Health Epidemic Weeks >30 miles Many
Terrorist Event (multiple) Weeks >30 miles Many
Sabotage of Facilities Weeks <30 miles Some
Hurricane/ Typhoon Weeks >30 miles (Cat 4/5) Some
Tornado Weeks-Mos >30 miles (F 4/5) Some
Flood Weeks-Mos >30 miles Some
Earthquake Weeks-Mos >30 miles (>6.0) Many
Bio/chemical release Months <30 miles Many
Dirty Bomb Months <30 miles Some
16
Business Continuity Risk Assessment –
Firm Perspectives in Approach
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB)
17
CSFB Business Continuity Prioritization of
Processes / Products
Tier 1 – Critical
Process(es) and/or associated products which are required for the bank to survive or whose
unavailability would cause irreparable damage to the bank. This includes all core technology
infrastructure systems and facilities on which all applications and data are dependent to conduct
these processes. (e.g., funding the bank and associated settlement risks, safeguarding firm and
customer assets, manage market and credit risks, etc.)
Tier 2 – Required
Process(es) and/or associated products whose availability is mandated by either regulatory
requirements, customer or market obligations and/or business priorities.
Tier 3 – Less Critical
Process(es) and/or associated products that either have a delayed recovery timeframe or for
which recovery can be deferred.
18
Risk Weighting Criteria Used by CSFB
CSFB takes into consideration two key factors by location in weighing business continuity risks. The first
is the relative importance of a physical location from a business perspective and the second is the
associated threat(s) at that location.
Business Importance by Location
1. Financial Exposures
a) Revenue Exposure or Opportunity Cost (foregone revenues due to inability to execute trades)
b) Market Exposure or Value at Risk (capital loss on principal positions due to adverse market
movements)
c) Contractual and Reputation Exposure (costs of inability to perform contractual obligations and long-
term impact of damaged customer franchise)
2. Presence of Business Functions/Processes and Products transacted
3. Presence of Technology Infrastructure supporting Business Functions/Processes and Products
Threats Associated by Location
1. Environmental Risk
a) Physical Threats (e.g., inclement weather, earthquakes, civil unrest, etc.)
b) Municipal Utility Infrastructure (e.g, power, water)
c) Telecommunications Infrastructure
d) Transportation Infrastructure
e) Health Care Infrastructure
2. Staff Concentration Risk
3. Technology Risk
4. Facility Risk
19
Business Continuity Impact Scenarios Assumed
by CSFB
Partial Loss
Planning Time Horizon: Intraday (Up to start of next business day)
Assumes no physical destruction of facilities or systems.
Business unit staff would either wait for IT and/or facilities
disruption to be remediated or invoke business continuity
plans. Internal outages/failures; examples: partial power
outage or hardware/software failure.
Denial of Access
Planning Time Horizon: Up to 3 days
Assumes no physical destruction of facilities or systems.
Business unit staff would need to evacuate or be denied access
to their primary office space. Examples: Transit strike, inclement
weather, bomb scare, gas leak, civil unrest.
Total Loss
Planning Time Horizon: Up to 1 month or longer *
Assumes physical destruction of facilities, systems and/or
people. Examples: Terrorist attack, earthquake, catastrophic fire,
flood.
Loss of Key External Interdependencies
Planning Time Horizon: Variable dependent on whether impact to
CSFB is a Partial Loss, Denial of Access or Total Loss
Assumes interruption of service provided by Third Party Service
Providers, Exchanges, Industry Utilities, Clearing Corporations,
and/or Market Data Systems (e.g., pricing/news/market analysis
information, communications, trade execution/deal capture,
etc.). Also assumes interruption of services provided by CSFB.
* If the event is a Total Loss of primary data center collocated with people, then impact duration starts on Day 1. However, if the
event is a Denial of Access to a data center facility lasting more than 3 days, then it is considered a Total Loss event.
20
Business Recovery/Resiliency Strategy
Options – Considerations for Risk Mitigation
Impact Scenario Probability
of
Occurrence
Business Recovery / Resiliency Strategy Option Estimated
Recurring
Cost
Speed Of
Recovery
Difficulty of
Recovery
Split/Shared Production L H L
Transference L H M
Displacement Seating L M L
Remote* L M M
Manual Workarounds L M M
Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Trading H M M
Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Non-Trading H M M
Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Shared Non-Trading H M M
Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Dedicated Non-Trading H M M
Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Shared Non Trading M L H
Split/Shared Production L H L
Transference L H M
Displacement Seating L M L
Remote* L M M
Manual Workarounds L M M
Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Trading H L H
Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Non-Trading H L H
Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Shared Non-Trading H L H
Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Dedicated Non-Trading H L H
Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Shared Non Trading M L H
Split/Shared Production L H L
Transference L H M
Displacement Seating L M M
Remote* L M M
Manual Workarounds L M M
Total Loss Low
Relative
Partial Loss High
Denial of Access Medium
Legend
H = High
M = Medium
L = Low
Remote* - Availability, functionality and capacity of key systems varies by business and by type of remote access
21
New York Downtown
Campus
Jersey City
Site A
Jersey City
Site B
Central NJ
Office and
Data
Center
Jersey City
Site C
Jersey City
DR Data
Center
Current State
New York Downtown
Campus
Proposed Interim State Proposed Future State
BAU
Assets
BCP/
DR
Assets
Through the use of optimized traditional and alternative recovery and resiliency
strategies, utilization of Business-As-Usual (BAU) firm assets (people, facilities and
technology) increase while physical concentration risks are mitigated and DR-only
overhead costs are reduced.
Traditional Recovery – Dedicated or shared contingency seats
(internally managed or third party)
Alternative Recovery – Displacement, remote computing,
transference, split production
BAU Assets
BCP/DR Assets
Legend
Jersey City
Site A
Jersey City
Site B
Southeastern
US Office
Jersey City
DR Data
Center
Southeastern
US Office and
Data Center
Asia New York Downtown
Campus
LondonAsia
Midtown
Office
Midtown
Office
Northern NJ
DR Data
Center
Northern NJ
DR Data
Center
London
Central NJ
Office and
Data Center
Central NJ
Office and
Data Center
London
Business Continuity Risk Mitigating Strategies –
Illustrative Optimization Over Time
Jersey City
Site A
Midtown
Office

2005_SIA_BCP_Conf

  • 1.
    Greg Ferris –Executive Director, Morgan Stanley John Odermatt – Corporate Director, Citigroup Peter Poulos – Director, Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) Workshop: Lessons in Risk Assessment
  • 2.
    2 Workshop Overview 1. Introductions 2.Business Continuity Risk Assessment – Firm Perspectives in Approach • Morgan Stanley • Citigroup • Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) 3. Questions & Answers
  • 3.
    3 Business Continuity RiskAssessment – Firm Perspectives in Approach Morgan Stanley
  • 4.
    4 Crit 2 Crit1 Crit 2Crit 3 Life safety mitigation and response will be constant in all locations Prioritize business risks: Crit 1 – Mitigation and response solutions in place for all risks Crit 2 – Mitigation solutions in place for some risks. Response solutions in place for all. Crit 3 – No mitigation solutions in place. Response solutions in place for all. Analysis performed at the regional and divisional level Probability Impact The Macro View: Prioritizing Risk – Determining What Matters Most
  • 5.
    5 Identifying Risks – Thinkabout the events (natural and man made) that could interrupt the normal flow of operations and/or threaten the well being of employees – Don’t focus purely on disasters in the classic sense – Try to focus on the effect of the problem as opposed to it’s cause Assessing Risk – Assess the probability/impact of each risk statement – Provide a criticality ranking for each The Macro View: Cataloging and Assessing Risk
  • 6.
    6 Probability Scoring 1 Greaterthan 66 percent chance of occurrence (will happen or is very likely to happen) 2 33 to 65 percent chance of occurrence (likely to happen) 3 Less than 33 percent chance of occurrence (not likely to occur) Impact Scoring 1 Outage will result in inability to meet regulatory requirements and introduce excessive risk 2 Outage will not impede ability to meet regulatory requirements or excessive risk, but will impact client service functions 3 Outage will not affect critical functions and/or critical functions are easily failed over Getting Started: Assessing Probabilities and Impacts
  • 7.
    7 Probability Scoring 1 Greaterthan 66 percent chance of occurrence (will happen or is very likely to happen) 2 33 to 65 percent chance of occurrence (likely to happen) 3 Less than 33 percent chance of occurrence (not likely to occur) Impact Scoring 1 Outage will result in unacceptable risk to New Jersey’s citizens and/or assets 2 Outage will not result in unacceptable risk to New Jersey’s citizens and/or assets, but will impact continuity of government and/or the ability to communicate with all levels of government 3 Outage will not affect critical functions and/or critical functions are easily failed over The Macro View: Assessing Risk
  • 8.
    8 Criticality Assessment 1 ProbabilityScore 3 to 1 - Impact Score 1 2 Probability Score 2.5 to 1 - Impact Score 2 3 Probability Score 3 to 2.5 – Impact Score 2; Probability Score 3 to 1 – Impact Score 3 The Macro View: Prioritizing Risk
  • 9.
    9 Business Continuity RiskAssessment – Firm Perspectives in Approach Citigroup
  • 10.
    10 Sub-processes, Recovery Strategies & Requirements Sub-processes, RecoveryStrategies & Requirements Threat & Vulnerability Assessment (TVA) BIA Business Impact Analysis TVA Threat & Vulnerability Assessment SRA Sector Risk Assessment SRA Sector Risk Assessment BIA Business Impact Analysis The purpose of the TVA is to: • Determine standard threat scenarios and planning constraints • Identify vulnerability, symbolic value, single point of failure, or concentration of resources • Composite Resilience Rating
  • 11.
    11 Cross Functional Collaboration •Perimeter security • VIP security • Proximity to other known militant targets • Utility diversity • Fire suppression • Electrical grids • UPS and generators • Egress and risers • Dual paths • Data Center strategy • Concentration of Infrastructure • People Strategy • Single point of failure • Perimeter security • VIP security • Proximity to other known militant targets • Utility diversity • Fire suppression • Electrical grids • UPS and generators • Egress and risers • Dual paths • Data Center strategy • Concentration of Infrastructure • People Strategy • Single point of failure SecuritySecurity FacilitiesFacilities TechnologyTechnology HRHR • Physical security• Physical security • Physical plant resilience• Physical plant resilience • Infrastructure resilience• Infrastructure resilience • Personnel• Personnel Team Lead: Office of Business Continuity TVA Team Expertise Example Components
  • 12.
    12 TVA: Threats Fora Facility include … • Vulnerability – low, medium, or high • Symbolic Value as a Target – low, medium, or high • Single Points of Failure – resources that do not have redundancy at another Citigroup facility
  • 13.
    13 TVA: Threats ata Facility (continued) Threats include: • Regional Blackout • Civil Unrest • Telecom Utility Interruptions • Epidemic • Hurricane • Flood • Earthquake • Bomb • Terrorist Event • Sabotage
  • 14.
    14 TVA: Threat ata Facility (continued) • For each potential threat the worst- case scenario is considered: Outage duration range days, weeks, or months Radius impacted <30 miles or >30 miles (50 km) Loss probability low, medium, or high • Then a composite resilience rating is calculated by the team
  • 15.
    15 TVA: Consistent Output(continued) Standard Threats, scenarios, and planning constraints Vulnerability, symbolic value, single point of failure, proximity, or concentration of resources Composite Resilience Rating Threats Outage Duration Range Radius Impacted Scope of Infrastructure Services Affected (Potential) Regional Blackout Days >30 miles Many Civil Unrest Days >30 miles Some Telco Interruption Days <30 miles Few Health Epidemic Weeks >30 miles Many Terrorist Event (multiple) Weeks >30 miles Many Sabotage of Facilities Weeks <30 miles Some Hurricane/ Typhoon Weeks >30 miles (Cat 4/5) Some Tornado Weeks-Mos >30 miles (F 4/5) Some Flood Weeks-Mos >30 miles Some Earthquake Weeks-Mos >30 miles (>6.0) Many Bio/chemical release Months <30 miles Many Dirty Bomb Months <30 miles Some
  • 16.
    16 Business Continuity RiskAssessment – Firm Perspectives in Approach Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB)
  • 17.
    17 CSFB Business ContinuityPrioritization of Processes / Products Tier 1 – Critical Process(es) and/or associated products which are required for the bank to survive or whose unavailability would cause irreparable damage to the bank. This includes all core technology infrastructure systems and facilities on which all applications and data are dependent to conduct these processes. (e.g., funding the bank and associated settlement risks, safeguarding firm and customer assets, manage market and credit risks, etc.) Tier 2 – Required Process(es) and/or associated products whose availability is mandated by either regulatory requirements, customer or market obligations and/or business priorities. Tier 3 – Less Critical Process(es) and/or associated products that either have a delayed recovery timeframe or for which recovery can be deferred.
  • 18.
    18 Risk Weighting CriteriaUsed by CSFB CSFB takes into consideration two key factors by location in weighing business continuity risks. The first is the relative importance of a physical location from a business perspective and the second is the associated threat(s) at that location. Business Importance by Location 1. Financial Exposures a) Revenue Exposure or Opportunity Cost (foregone revenues due to inability to execute trades) b) Market Exposure or Value at Risk (capital loss on principal positions due to adverse market movements) c) Contractual and Reputation Exposure (costs of inability to perform contractual obligations and long- term impact of damaged customer franchise) 2. Presence of Business Functions/Processes and Products transacted 3. Presence of Technology Infrastructure supporting Business Functions/Processes and Products Threats Associated by Location 1. Environmental Risk a) Physical Threats (e.g., inclement weather, earthquakes, civil unrest, etc.) b) Municipal Utility Infrastructure (e.g, power, water) c) Telecommunications Infrastructure d) Transportation Infrastructure e) Health Care Infrastructure 2. Staff Concentration Risk 3. Technology Risk 4. Facility Risk
  • 19.
    19 Business Continuity ImpactScenarios Assumed by CSFB Partial Loss Planning Time Horizon: Intraday (Up to start of next business day) Assumes no physical destruction of facilities or systems. Business unit staff would either wait for IT and/or facilities disruption to be remediated or invoke business continuity plans. Internal outages/failures; examples: partial power outage or hardware/software failure. Denial of Access Planning Time Horizon: Up to 3 days Assumes no physical destruction of facilities or systems. Business unit staff would need to evacuate or be denied access to their primary office space. Examples: Transit strike, inclement weather, bomb scare, gas leak, civil unrest. Total Loss Planning Time Horizon: Up to 1 month or longer * Assumes physical destruction of facilities, systems and/or people. Examples: Terrorist attack, earthquake, catastrophic fire, flood. Loss of Key External Interdependencies Planning Time Horizon: Variable dependent on whether impact to CSFB is a Partial Loss, Denial of Access or Total Loss Assumes interruption of service provided by Third Party Service Providers, Exchanges, Industry Utilities, Clearing Corporations, and/or Market Data Systems (e.g., pricing/news/market analysis information, communications, trade execution/deal capture, etc.). Also assumes interruption of services provided by CSFB. * If the event is a Total Loss of primary data center collocated with people, then impact duration starts on Day 1. However, if the event is a Denial of Access to a data center facility lasting more than 3 days, then it is considered a Total Loss event.
  • 20.
    20 Business Recovery/Resiliency Strategy Options– Considerations for Risk Mitigation Impact Scenario Probability of Occurrence Business Recovery / Resiliency Strategy Option Estimated Recurring Cost Speed Of Recovery Difficulty of Recovery Split/Shared Production L H L Transference L H M Displacement Seating L M L Remote* L M M Manual Workarounds L M M Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Trading H M M Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Non-Trading H M M Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Shared Non-Trading H M M Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Dedicated Non-Trading H M M Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Shared Non Trading M L H Split/Shared Production L H L Transference L H M Displacement Seating L M L Remote* L M M Manual Workarounds L M M Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Trading H L H Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Dedicated Non-Trading H L H Internal Recovery/ Contingency Seating – Shared Non-Trading H L H Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Dedicated Non-Trading H L H Third Party Provider Recovery/ Contingency Seating - Shared Non Trading M L H Split/Shared Production L H L Transference L H M Displacement Seating L M M Remote* L M M Manual Workarounds L M M Total Loss Low Relative Partial Loss High Denial of Access Medium Legend H = High M = Medium L = Low Remote* - Availability, functionality and capacity of key systems varies by business and by type of remote access
  • 21.
    21 New York Downtown Campus JerseyCity Site A Jersey City Site B Central NJ Office and Data Center Jersey City Site C Jersey City DR Data Center Current State New York Downtown Campus Proposed Interim State Proposed Future State BAU Assets BCP/ DR Assets Through the use of optimized traditional and alternative recovery and resiliency strategies, utilization of Business-As-Usual (BAU) firm assets (people, facilities and technology) increase while physical concentration risks are mitigated and DR-only overhead costs are reduced. Traditional Recovery – Dedicated or shared contingency seats (internally managed or third party) Alternative Recovery – Displacement, remote computing, transference, split production BAU Assets BCP/DR Assets Legend Jersey City Site A Jersey City Site B Southeastern US Office Jersey City DR Data Center Southeastern US Office and Data Center Asia New York Downtown Campus LondonAsia Midtown Office Midtown Office Northern NJ DR Data Center Northern NJ DR Data Center London Central NJ Office and Data Center Central NJ Office and Data Center London Business Continuity Risk Mitigating Strategies – Illustrative Optimization Over Time Jersey City Site A Midtown Office