1. Legislation and Anticorruption
in EU Accession and
Membership:
What can be learned from Slovakia’s
experience?
Erik Láštic
Comenius University, Bratislava
2. Montenegro 2011 Progress Report
• capacity needs to upgraded
• the role to be further developed
• cooperation further enhanced, weak
coordination in EU affairs
• capacity of ministries to produce high-quality
legislation and Impact assessment remains
limited
3. Slovakia 2012: State of
membership report (fictional)
• capacity needs to upgraded
• the role to be further developed
• cooperation further enhanced
• weak coordination in EU affairs
• capacity of ministries to produce high-quality
legislation and Impact assessment remains
limited
5. Slovakia and EU
Cabinets
- V. Mečiar (1994- 98)
- M. Dzurinda I. (1998-2002)
- M. Dzurinda II. (2002-2006)
- R. Fico (2006-2010)
6. Mečiar [1994- 1998]
• inability to fulfill Copenhagen political criteria
•criticized by EU of being too powerful and
disrespectful: bully type
•making friends with unpopular guys
•lost election in 1998
7. M. Dzurinda I. (1998-2002)
• catching-up period, Slovakia as obedient dog
•Pledged loyalty to the EU and NATO family
•Respected the rights of the opposition and rule of law
•Was making friends with right guys
•Listened very carefully
8. M. Dzurinda II. (2002-2006)
• grateful new member state BUT
•Old v. New Europe- Iraq War
•“Neoliberal” economic turn: flat
rate tax, flexible labor code, mantra
of FDI (PSA Peugot-Citroen, KIA-
Hyundai)
•Cultural&Ethical Issues and EU
Constitution making
•Non-binding accession
arrangements revisited
9. R. Fico (2006-2010)
• in opposition very critical
• of accession conditions
•of neoliberal turn
•of Slovakia’s position in Iraq
•of Euro zone entry
2002 Elections bilboard: To the
European Union! But not with
bare asses...
10. R. Fico (2006-2010)
• as the PM- From Bored to Death to Pragmatist
•12/2006, first EU summit, bored and
“uncleless”
•two unwanted gifts from Dzurinda: Schengen
and Euro zone application
•scared of Euro, but listened to Central Bank
and big businesses
•able to use EU “social standards” as reasoning
for some changes
•EU matters not a priority, but EU money yes
11. Influence of history
• accession as catching up (political and
technical)
• core administrative structures (dozens of
people, not many more)
• one way street (from EU to Slovakia)
12. Legislation, Technical solution(s)
• Frequent use of fast track legislative
procedure in 1998-2002
• 2001 Amendment of the Constitution:
Executive’s Approximation decrees to
accelerate the transposition of the acquis
communautaire
13. Executive’s Approximation Decrees
(2001)
• Decrees in order to execute the European Agreement on
Association and to execute international treaties stipulated in
Article 7 section 2 of the Constitution.
• “TO REDUCE” workload of the Parliament
• Duties on individuals and legal entities can be imposed by this
type of decree
• Law and following amendments increased number of policy
areas
• From temporary measure to permanent one (prolonged
indefinitely in 2004)
14. EU
Total n.
Vetoed decrees
Elector of Cabinet MP Fast track Reject
by ,
al bills propos propos procedure ed
preside approv
Term approv ed ed *** drafts
nt ed by
ed
cabinet
I. 1994
313 258 55 46 142 32 -
- 1998
II.
1998 - 532 406 126 104 252 72 -
2002
III.
2002 - 550 458 92 36 216 60 437
2006
15. Period No. of issued Period No. of issued
approximation approximation
decress decress
I. half 2002 23 II. half 2006 28
II. half 2002 11 I. half 2007 75
I. half 2003 87 II. half 2007 30
II. half 2003 90 I. half 2008 23
I. half 2004 40 II. half 2008 34
II. half 2004 15 I. half 2009 33
I. half 2005 21 II. half 2009 29
II. half 2005 28 I. half 2010 26
I. half 2006 127 II. half 2010 22
Celkom: 742
18. Implementation after 2004
• formally so far so good
– legacy of accession
– EU decrees as an powerful instrument
– no influence of interest groups?
– very legalistic
• implementation in real life (dead letters?)
19. The Parliament strikes back
• The constitutional law on cooperation between the
cabinet and the legislature in EU matters [2004]
– the Cabinet is obliged to have its position in EU-related
matters approved by the Parliament, or its EU committee
(PCEU)
– pre-selection of positions
– If PCEU decides to discuss it, it can change the Cabinet’s
position and oblige the Cabinet to follow its opinion
– informal rules prevail
20. VEZ- Výbor NR SR pre európske záležitosti; OEZ- Odbor pre európske záležitosti NR SR; RKS- Rezortná koordinačná skupina; KEÚ 1 a 2- Komisia pre záležitosti EÚ 1 a 2; ÚOŠŠ-
Ústredný orgán štátnej správy; EK- Európska komisia; COREPER I, II- Výbor stálych predstaviteľov; SCA- Špeciálny výbor pre poľnohospodárstvo; PS- Pracovná skupina
Rady EÚ
21. Anti-corruption (accession/
membership)
• Mostly outside of acquis communitaire, but
essential part of conditionality
• Not only about measures, but also credibility
• Role of domestic actors (NGO, courts)
• Freedom of information act in Slovakia as best
anti-corruption instrument
22. Free Access to Information
• Constitutional Article on freedom of expression
included right to information (1992)
• Freedom of Information Act (2000) as a product of
– After 1998 election
– Coalition of willing- politicians and NGOs
– Broader policy context - first policy initiative by
NGOs
23. Basic features of law
• maximum disclosure
• limited scope of exceptions
• obligation to inform
• processes to facilitate access- judicial
review
• limited costs
• review opportunities
24. Implementation Phase
• NGOs’ role
– explaining and educating (administration and
public)
– monitoring- building of a precedent law
• Courts’ Role
– role of DA, AG
– confirming law authors intentions (scope,
obligations)
– obligation to explain withholding of information
(secrecy- state, business)
25. Impact
• it increases transparency- what about
accountability?
• as a tool for policy reviews and alternative
proposal
• is essential to the right to participate in the
administration of public affairs- a possibility
for an informed decision by citizens
26. Challenges: past and ahead
• Completion of membership (Schengen, free
movement)
• Sustainability of changes after accession
• Split between political and administrative EU
matters, coordination
• Limited capacity to upload preferences to EU
• High turnout in personnel (? of capacity)
• EU funds and corruption
• Size and time
Editor's Notes
big differences between law in the books and law in the real world in-effective justice system big-time corruption goes unpunished? limited/no control of how political parties are financed
History- how it influenced accession and first years of membership-
"Neviem prečo ťahajú premiérov na diskusie, ktoré môžu vyriešiť ministri," hovoril nahnevane premiér Robert Fico vo štvrtok v noci na schôdzke lídrov Európskej únie. Do Bruselu prišiel na svoj prvý summit vo funkcii. Témy ako migrácia mohli podľa Fica pokojne riešiť ľudia na nižšej úrovni. Kritizoval aj efektivitu európskych inštitúcií a myslí si, že nové členské štáty túto otázku otvoria. "To je pekné, keď diskutujeme o Darfúre, ale tam zatiaľ zomierajú ľudia," povedal príklad. Kritizoval tiez Dzurindu za to, ze hlasoval podla toho, ako to robili velki stryckovia, ja ziadneho nemam povedal
as political- offer a new, compelling story about Slovakia and its willingness to change after 1998, goes together with NATO accession as technical- transposition of acquis- effectiveness as word of the day- parliament catching up, one of the lesson learned is that our accession was dominantly about government and ministries, parliament involved politically, but hardly technically,
More than one year PCEU existed on provisional basis [4/04-5/05] PCEU left discretion on what is important on the ministries PCEU membership (fluctuation) No ex post evaluation mechanism exists
Completion of membership (Schengen, free movement) Sustainability of changes after accession (civil service, local administration, deregulation) Split between political and administrative EU matters, coordination (limited interest from domestic politics about EU affairs, unless money are involved, administrators are often left on their own) High turnout in personnel (? of capacity)- influences capacity to upload, lacking institutional memory influences capabilities of expression, invest into your people, use your people in Brussels EU funds and corruption- Size and time- realism necessary, clear preferences needed, to decide early what is important and what can be left, find big uncles, form partnerships, use previous experiences, Time- specific timetable make governing in EU like not other thing, domestic rhythm of governing has to accommodate EU rhythm