Chapter 7. The Mind-Body ProblemChapter 7. The Mind-Body Pro.docx

Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7
The Mind-Body Problem
During week 6 read the second half (Sections 6-end).
Copyright by Paul Herrick, 2020. For class use only. Not for
distribution. This chapter: 32 pages of reading.
1. Are You Your Brain?
Sometimes we refer to our brains; other times we refer to our
minds. BJ the Chicago Kid titled his second album In My Mind.
But Screeching Weasel titled its third studio album My Brain
Hurts. Are the mind and the brain two different things? Or are
they one and the same? To put the question another way: Are
thoughts, sensations, mental images, and such nothing more
than physical events or processes of the physical brain? Are
they just neurons (brain cells) firing or something like that? Or
is the mind an immaterial, nonphysical entity distinct from the
brain but interacting in some way with it? In philosophy, these
and related questions make up the mind-body problem.
Since ancient times, the common view has been that the mind—
the part of us that is conscious, that thinks, that makes choices,
that bears moral responsibility—is immaterial and cannot be
physically seen, touched, weighed, or otherwise directly
detected by instruments. On this view, the mind--often called
the “soul,” “spirit,” or “self”—is not the brain or any part of the
body or any physical thing at all. However, since mind and body
obviously interact, the common view has long been that the
mind or soul can affect the body and the body can affect the
mind. More specifically, the immaterial mind can cause changes
in the physical body, through the interface of the physical brain,
and the brain can cause changes in the mind.

In philosophy, this traditional view is called “mind-body
dualism” (“dualism” for short) because it claims that mind and
body are two distinct things. The common view is sometimes
also called “mind-body interactionism” because it claims that
mind and body, though distinct, interact. Philosophical dualists
argue that the universe divides into two radically different kinds
of substances—mindless matter and thinking mind or, as some
prefer to put it, matter and spirit, or as still others put it, matter
and consciousness.
Most religions of the world teach a dualist account of human
nature. Each human being, they generally claim, is composed of
an immaterial mind or soul joined to a material body. On the
religious view, the mind, or soul, rather than the material body
is the part that will be judged by God in the end. As the basis of
moral responsibility, the soul is the root of one’s identity as a
person. In other words, the soul is the true self; the material
body is merely the soul’s temporary lodging place during its
journey on earth. Most religions also teach a doctrine of
immortality, or survival—the claim that the immaterial soul
lives on in a higher realm after the death and disintegration of
the material body.
If dualism is true and your immaterial mind, or soul, is the seat
of your identity—the real you--then your soul, not your brain or
any part of your body, is what you refer to when you use the
word I. If each of us is an immaterial soul, then we are not what
we initially appear to be from the outside—a merely physical
being composed of nothing but matter.
Although dualism has been the common view throughout
history, more and more people today reject dualism and accept
“materialism” (also called “naturalism” and sometimes
“physicalism”). Essentially this is the view that nothing but
matter exists, with matter defined as that which science in
principle recognizes—atoms, subatomic particles, molecules,
quanta of energy, forces, fields, and everything composed of
such things. Some opponents of dualism put the claim this way:

Nothing exists outside the system of nature recognized by
science. Still others put it this way: Nothing but physical
objects exist. According to materialism (or naturalism or
physicalism), nothing supernatural exists: There is no such
being as God; and heaven, immaterial souls, spirits, angels and
such things do not exist. On the materialist view, the mind is
nothing more than the physical brain or (as some materialists
put it) the functioning of the brain or (as still others claim)
observable behavior caused by the brain.
Many materialists today identify the self with the brain. On this
view, when we say “I,” we are referring to our physical brains.
When we say, “I did it,” we are in effect saying, “My brain did
it.” (But notice that the very word My in the sentence “My brain
did it” implies that the self is not the brain but rather is
something distinct from the brain that “owns” the brain, which
reflects a dualist view of the self.)
Our discussion will begin with the dualist position. Socrates and
Plato gave philosophical arguments for mind-body dualism, and
for survival (the immortality of the soul). But the big arguments
under discussion today in universities across the world
originated in Europe during the early modern period (i.e., the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The first historically
significant modern argument for dualism was given by the
French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of
modern philosophy.
2. The Case for Dualism
In his Meditations—the book that broke with the past and
launched the modern era in philosophy--Descartes observes that
there is a great difference between a mind and a body, because
the body, by its very nature, is something divisible, whereas the
mind is plainly indivisible. For in truth, when I consider the
mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a
thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very
clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire;
and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole
body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am

conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind; nor can
the faculties of willing, perceiving, conceiving, etc., properly
be called its parts, for it is the same mind that is exercised in
willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving, etc. But quite the
opposite holds in corporeal or extended things; for I cannot
imagine any one of them which I cannot easily sunder in
thought. This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind, or
soul, of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not
already been apprised of it on other grounds.
This famous line of reasoning, known today as “Descartes’s
divisibility argument,” makes more sense once it has been
fleshed out in contemporary terms.
Descartes’s Divisibility Argument
1. The human mind has a property (an attribute or
characteristic) that the human brain—and any other physical or
material object—lacks.
2. Necessarily, for any x and for any y, if x has a property that y
lacks, then x and y are not one and the same entity; rather, they
must be two distinct entities.
3. Therefore, the human mind and the human brain are not one
and the same entity; rather, they must be two distinct entities.
4. It also follows that the human mind is not identical to any
physical or material part of the brain, the body, or the material
world.
5. Therefore, mind-body dualism is certainly true.
The presence of the word certainly indicates that Descartes’s
argument is deductive. His claim is therefore that if the
premises are true, the conclusion must be true. In addition, the
argument is clearly valid. That is, its conclusion must indeed be
true if all its premises are true. The only way to attack
Descartes’s argument, then, is to give an argument against one

of its premises, that is, an argument for the conclusion that one
of his premises is false. But before we proceed, each premise
can be supported by a subargument.
Argument for premise 1
I am assuming here that by “part” Descartes means a “stand-
alone” part—a part of a whole that can be detached so as to
stand apart from the whole.
1a. Every macroscopic part of the human body—including every
part of the human brain—is divisible into stand-alone parts.
1b. The human mind is not divisible into stand-alone parts.
1c. Therefore, premise 1 is true.
2a. Necessarily, for any x and for any y, if x and y are
numerically identical (are one and the same entity), then every
property of x is a property of y, and every property of y is a
property of x.
2b. Therefore, premise 2 is true.
Argument for premise 1a
This premise is not controversial. Each cell in the brain, like
every cell in the rest of the body, can be removed and placed on
a microscope slide to be viewed at high magnification. The
same can be said for each subcellular part of the brain and each
subcellular part of the rest of the body.
Argument for premise 1b
The ordinary parts of the mind—thoughts, beliefs, hopes,
images, ideas, wishes, sensations, and the like—have never been
surgically removed from the mind and placed on a lab bench or

microscope slide to be viewed apart from the mind. No scientist
has ever claimed to have removed a patient’s belief—for
instance a belief that 1 + 1 =2--from the patient’s mind and
placed it on a microscope slide. No scientist has ever claimed to
have removed a patient’s hope—for instance a hope that
tomorrow will be sunny--from the patient’s mind and placed it
in a test tube. Indeed, the very idea of such a thing happening is
conceptually incoherent. Therefore, conscious mental states
cannot possibly be physically removed from the mind, mounted,
and studied using scientific instruments. The mind’s parts are
not stand-alone parts.
Before we assess this argument, the term numerical identity
needs to be clarified and the second premise needs an
explanation. As many people know, Bob Dylan (born in Duluth,
Minnesota, on May 24, 1941) and Robert Zimmerman (born in
Duluth, Minnesota, on May 24, 1941) are one and the same
person; they are not two different people. In logic, x and y are
numerically (or quantitatively) identical if they are one and the
same entity and not two different entities. Bob Dylan and
Robert Zimmerman are thus numerically identical, for they are
one and the same entity.
Contrasts are always important when learning an abstract
concept. Be careful not to confuse numerical identity with
qualitative identity. Two things x and y are qualitatively
identical if they have exactly the same properties, or qualities.
Two separate whiteboard dry erase markers that look exactly
alike (same color, same shape, same brand, etc.) are
qualitatively identical, although they are not numerically
identical (because they are two distinct markers, not one and the
same marker).
Now to Premise 2. This premise is a theorem of the branch of
logic called “quantificational logic with identity.” An
application will help make the premise clear. Suppose that the
police claim that Joe Doakes robbed the local bank and they
offer video surveillance footage to prove it. Now suppose that

upon further investigation, the police determine that the robber
in the video is six feet tall, while Joe Doakes is only five feet
tall. In this case, Doakes has a property or attribute that the
robber lacks, namely, the property of being five feet tall.
Common sense says that if the robber has an attribute (being six
feet tall) that Joe Doakes lacks (he is only five feet tall), the
robber and Joe Doakes must be two different people, not one
and the same. Despite its technical appearance, premise 2 is
simply a formal logical expression of a commonsense idea
employed in everyday life.
The supporting premise 2a is an axiom of logic known as
“Leibniz’s law” (it is also known as the “principle of the
indiscernibility of identicals”). The name sounds forbidding, but
the principle is actually common sense. In plain terms,
Leibniz’s law states that if x and y are numerically identical
(are one and the same thing), then any property possessed by x
is also possessed by y and vice versa. The claim sounds self-
evident, doesn’t it? For a fictional example, since Clark Kent
and Superman are numerically identical (one and the same
person), then any property possessed by one is possessed by the
other. So, if Clark Kent is standing, then Superman is standing,
if Clark Kent has black hair, then Superman has black hair, and
so forth. It can be proved using modern symbolic logic that
premise 2 is logically implied by Leibniz’s law.
The second premise is on very solid logical ground. Descartes’s
argument is complete.
Objections from Cognitive Scientists
Some cognitive scientists challenge the supporting premise 1b--
the claim that the mind cannot be divided into stand-alone parts.
Their argument goes like this:
1. The mind contains ideas, memories, thoughts, and sensations.
2. Each of these can be thought of or imagined (and then
studied) in some sense apart from the mind itself.
3. Therefore, the mind, too, contains stand-alone parts, and 1b
is false.

4. But if 1b is false, then premise 1 lacks support.
5. Therefore, Descartes’s first premise lacks support, and his
argument fails.
This line of reasoning sounds promising until it is examined. It
is true that the parts of the mind cited—thoughts, ideas,
memories, feelings, hopes, and the like—can be thought of and
studied analytically. However, thoughts, hopes, memories, and
such cannot be surgically removed from a mind and physically
placed on microscope slides to be viewed outside that mind.
Your memory of last Christmas cannot be surgically removed
from your mind and placed in a test tube. The very idea of a
hope or a belief separated from a mind and sitting all by itself
on a lab bench or mounted on a microscope slide is conceptually
incoherent. The reason for this is intriguing. It makes no sense
at all to imagine an ownerless thought standing completely apart
from a mind currently thinking it. A thought that is not part of a
mind, sitting alone by itself on a table, makes no sense at all.
So, if the mind has parts, the way in which it has parts is
radically different from the way in which the brain has parts, in
which case it still follows that the mind has properties the brain
lacks. If so, then the mind and the brain must be two distinct
entities. It also follows that the mind is not numerically
identical to any other part of the body or to any material,
natural, or physical object.
Descartes’s central claim--that the mind cannot be divided into
stand-alone parts--has also been challenged by scientists who
put forward dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality
disorder) and split-brain syndrome as counterexamples. They
argue that in these cases, the mind appears to split into separate
parts that can be studied individually. Does this imply that 1b is
false? Let’s examine.
Split-brain syndrome occurs when the corpus collosum (a
bundle of nerve fibers connecting the two hemispheres of a
person’s brain) is damaged or severed and the individual

experiences what seem to be two separate streams of
consciousness, each wholly or partly unaware of the other. In a
case of dissociative identity disorder, the mind appears to
divide into two or more separate personalities, or streams of
consciousness, each wholly or partly unaware of the other.
According to these critics, both disorders are cases in which the
mind breaks down into stand-alone parts—contrary to
Descartes’s claim. Their argument goes about like this:
1. In cases of dissociative identity disorder, the mind appears to
divide into two or more separate personalities, or streams of
consciousness, each wholly or partly unaware of the other;
2. In cases of split-brain syndrome, the mind appears to divide
into two separate streams of consciousness;
3. Both disorders are therefore cases where the mind breaks
down into stand-alone parts;
4. If the mind can break down into stand-alone parts, then
Descartes’s premise 1b is false;
5. Therefore, Descartes’s premise 1b is false.
Not so fast, reply Descartes’s defenders. In the split-brain
cases, the two streams of consciousness cannot be physically
removed, separated, stained, and placed on different microscope
slides; nor can they be mounted side by side on a lab bench.
Indeed, it makes no sense to think of a stream of consciousness
physically sitting on a table like a beaker full of chemicals. If
there are two separate streams of consciousness within one
mind, they cannot physically stand alone in isolation from the
mind they belong to. Likewise, for cases of multiple personality
disorder: the different personalities cannot be physically
removed from the mind they belong to and placed side by side
in separate test tubes on a lab bench for close viewing. The very
idea of a personality, or even a part of a personality, sitting on a
table apart from a mind, makes no sense at all.

It follows, again, that the way in which the mind has parts is
radically different from the way in which a material object such
as the brain has parts. Therefore, the mind has properties the
brain lacks. But if so, it logically follows, by the deductive
reasoning we have examined, that the mind and the brain are
two distinct substances, and mind-body dualism must be true.
Princess Elisabeth’s Famous Question
Shortly after Descartes’s Meditations was published, he
received a letter from an avocational philosopher who was also
a member of the royalty. “Tell me please,” wrote Princess
Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680), “how the soul of a human
being (it being only a thinking substance) can [move] the bodily
spirits and so bring about voluntary actions.” In other words,
how can two substances interact if they are as radically
different as mind and body are said to be? How can an
immaterial soul possessing no solidity shape, or weight move a
solid physical object such as the brain? What great questions!
4. Five More Aspects of Consciousness That Defy Materialist
Explanation
During the twentieth century philosophers identified many
additional aspects of consciousness that cannot in principle be
explained materialistically, that is, in terms of nothing but
particles of matter and quanta of energy in motions governed by
the laws of physics and chemistry. The following are five being
discussed by experts in the philosophy of mind today, including
such leading researchers as Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and
Frank Jackson.
e "Mental-Image Argument" Qualia
Close your eyes and imagine a stop sign. What color is the
experienced image? If you imagined an ordinary stop sign, the
image in your mind is experienced as red (and white). You are
aware of its color directly, from the inside of your
consciousness. Philosophers call experiential mental states such
as the experienced color of a sunset, the taste of chocolate, the

smell of a rose, the sound of a bell, and the feel of velvet
“qualia” (singular: “quale”). Now, as you experience this red
image in your mind—this quale--certain physical things are
occurring in your brain at the same time. However, if a brain
surgeon were to open your brain at the moment you are
experiencing the red image, she would not see a red spot shaped
like a stop sign physically in, or on, some part of your brain
like an image on a movie screen. Your brain is normally gray.
Nothing in your brain turns from gray to red when you form and
experience a red image in your mind. It follows, by the theorem
of logic which states that if x has a property that y does not
have, then x and y are two different entities, that the quale—the
red image you directly experience inside your consciousness—is
not numerically identical to any physical part of your brain. The
image is a part of your mind but not a part of your brain.
Therefore, your mind has a property that your brain does not
have. It follows that your mind and your brain are two different
entities, not one and the same thing. It follows, in short, that
mind-body dualism is true. More formally:
The Qualia Argument against Materialism and for Dualism
1. When I form an image in my mind of a red stop sign, I
directly experience within my consciousness an image of a red
stop sign.
2. But a red stop sign that can be observed by scientists does
not appear visibly on the surface of my brain or anywhere inside
my brain.
3. Therefore, when I form an image in my mind of a red stop
sign, my mental image has properties (experienced redness and
the experienced shape of a stop sign) that no part of my brain
possesses and that no other part of my body possesses.
4. Therefore, my mind has properties that my brain lacks and
that any other part of my body lacks.

5. If x has a property that y lacks, then x and y are two different
entities and not one and the same thing.
6. Therefore, my mind and my brain must be two different
entities.
7. Furthermore, it also follows that my mind is not identical to
any other physical part of my body.
8. If the mind is not identical to the brain or to any part of the
body, then mind-body dualism is true.
9. Therefore, dualism is most certainly true.
In What Does It All Mean?, Thomas Nagel argues that science
will never show, and cannot possibly show, that mental images
and other mental states are numerically identical to brain states
or that the mind simply is the brain.
When we discover the chemical composition of water, for
instance, we are dealing with something that is clearly out there
in the physical world . . . When we find out it is made up of
hydrogen and oxygen atoms, we’re just breaking down an
external physical substance into smaller physical parts. It is an
essential feature of this kind of analysis that we are not giving a
chemical breakdown of the way water looks, feels, and tastes to
us. Those things go on in our inner experience, not in the water
that we have broken down into atoms. The physical or chemical
analysis of water leaves them aside. But to discover that tasting
chocolate was really just a brain process, we would have to
analyze something mental—not an externally observed physical
substance but an inner taste sensation—in terms of parts that are
physical. And there is no way that a large number of physical
events in the brain, however complicated, could be the parts out
of which a taste sensation was composed. A physical whole can
be analyzed into smaller physical parts, but a mental process
can’t be. Physical parts just can’t add up to a mental whole.

Intentionality
Some kinds of mental states possess a property that
philosophers of mind call “intentionality.” (This property is
also called “aboutness.”) This is a very difficult notion to
understand. A mental state is intentional if it is about
something. That which an intentional mental state is about is
called that state’s “intentional object.” For instance, my belief
that Sir Paul McCartney lives in Scotland is about Paul
McCartney, and Sir Paul is the intentional object of my belief.
My hope that tomorrow will be sunny is about tomorrow’s
weather. The aboutness of thought is a directly experienced
mental property that is hard to deny. The problem for
materialists is that for a number of reasons it seems certain that
intentionality, or aboutness, cannot possibly be a property of a
purely material, or physical, object. Why?
First, the aboutness, or intentionality, of a thought is not a
property recognized within current physics. Aboutness does not
appear in any of the physics manuals listing measured physical
properties. Furthermore, the latest science indicates that the
physical nature of any material object will one day be fully
explained in terms of standard physical properties without
mentioning intentionality at all or anything remotely like it.
Think about it: an atom, or clump of atoms, or a quanta of
energy, or a force field, considered merely as a physical object,
isn’t about anything; it just is.
A word of caution is called for here. The word “intentional” in
philosophy of mind has nothing to do with “intending” to do
something or with having a “purpose.” The intentionality of the
mental is merely the property of being about something, as in
“My thoughts are about you at the moment” or “I was thinking
about last week.”
The question dualists put to materialists is therefore this: How

can an atom, or a neuron, or a chemical in someone’s brain, or a
clump of nerve fibers in a person’s frontal lobe, be about Paul
McCartney? Or about tomorrow? Which physical properties
would make a bundle of neurons a belief about McCartney
rather than about Ringo Starr? About tomorrow rather than
about next week? No one in neuroscience has the slightest idea.
No one in neuroscience has ever successfully explained how
intentionality can be reduced to (explained solely in terms of)
neurons, electrochemical brain signals, molecules, chemicals, or
any other purely physical objects. Laurence BonJour writes:
There is no reason at all to think that the internal structure of
my physical and neurophysiological states could somehow by
itself determine that I am thinking about the weather rather than
about the Middle East or the stock market.
These thoughts give rise to another argument for dualism:
The Intentionality Argument Against Materialism and for
Dualism
1. Some mental states possess intentionality but nothing in the
brain or body possesses intentionality.
2. If x has a property not possessed by y, then x and y are not
numerically identical.
3. Therefore, the mind is not the brain or any part of the brain
or body.
4. If so, then mind-body dualism is true.
Argument for premise 1:
1a. Many kinds of mental states are intentional—they are about
something.

1b. No physical states are intentional.
1c. Therefore, premise 1 is true.
Materialists agree that science has not yet explained
intentionality. However, they argue, hopefully scientists will
someday succeed, and we will then see that the supporting
premise 1b is false. BonJour replies:
Here we have a piece of materialist doctrine that again has a
status very similar to that of a claim of theology. It is obvious
that no one has even the beginnings of an idea of how to
actually carry out an investigation that would yield a result of
this kind—that the only reason for thinking that this could be
done is the overriding assumption, for which we have found no
cogent basis, that materialism must be true.
Subjectivity
In recent years, Nagel, Jackson, and other prominent
philosophers specializing in the study of consciousness have put
forward a new argument for dualism. Their case begins with the
claim that mental states have a directly experienced, subjective
quality that cannot be fully expressed quantitatively, that is,
objectively in the language of any of the physical sciences. In
the case of any conscious mental state, they argue, there is
something it is like to be in that state. For instance, there is
something it is like to feel nostalgic, to taste chocolate, to
remember last summer fondly, to hope for snow, to be in love.
Nagel calls this subjective aspect of consciousness the “what it
is like” quality of the mental.
However, these contemporary dualists argue, this subjective,
experienced aspect of consciousness cannot possibly be reduced
to (explained without remainder in terms of) particles of matter
and quanta of energy moving in space and time under the

governance of the laws of physics and chemistry alone. It
follows, they argue, that the conscious mind and the physical
brain are not one and the same thing. It also follows that the
mind is not identical to any physical object.
Nagel argues that the reason why science has not, and never
will, explain the subjective nature of consciousness is that
science, by its very nature, explains everything from an
objective or third-person, public perspective. But the
subjectivity of consciousness can only be understood from
within a first-person perspective.
Contemporary dualists describe the subjectivity of the mental in
depth in their philosophical writings; one must read their books
and scholarly articles to get the full idea. There is no doubt that
they are right on one crucial point: The subjective or “what it is
like” quality of the mental is not one of the recognized
properties of matter. It does not appear in any of the handbooks
of physics or chemistry. This makes sense: How can a physical
pile of atoms, or a quark or field, have a subjective, qualitative
awareness? How can there possibly be “something it is like” to
be a proton, an atom, a sugar molecule, or a potassium ion?
Scientists haven’t the foggiest idea. The subjective aspect of
consciousness appears to be yet another mental property that
cannot be reduced to matter in motion governed by the laws of
physics and chemistry as they apply to the brain. More
formally:
The Subjectivity Argument against Materialism and for Dualism
1. Conscious mental states have a subjective, qualitative, first-
person aspect.
2. No atom, clump of atoms, material object, or physical part of
the body has this subjective or qualitative aspect.
quantitatively identical.
4. Therefore, the mind is not the brain or any part of the body.

5. If so, then mind-body dualism is certainly true.
6. Therefore, mind-body dualism is true.
Privacy
It is common sense that our mental states are private while our
brain states are publicly observable. I am the only one who has
immediate access to my thoughts, feelings, sensations, and other
mental states; and you are the only one who has immediate
access to your thoughts and other mental states. More
specifically, no one can literally have my thoughts, although
others can ask me what I am thinking. And no one can literally
have your thoughts. If I take a bite of a Hershey bar, I taste
chocolate. No one else can literally have or experience my taste
of chocolate, although they can take a bite of my candy bar and
experience their own taste of chocolate. Some philosophers sum
up the point this way: Each of us has private, or privileged,
access to the directly experienced contents of our mind. Brain
scientists can ask us what we are thinking about as they
stimulate one of our brain cells, but they must take our word for
it; they cannot literally experience our thoughts and sensations.
However, each physical part of the brain can be publicly
examined in a lab by a team of scientists. Every physical aspect
of the brain can be observed and fully described publicly, in the
third person—in the language of science—without using the
word I.
Now, if the mind is private, in the sense defined, while the
brain is public, in the sense defined, then the mind and the brain
have differing properties. It follows that the mind and the brain
must be two distinct substances, and dualism in one form or
another is true.
The Privacy Argument against Materialism and for Dualism
1. The brain (like every material object and physical part of the
body) is publicly accessible.
2. The mind is private--not publicly accessible.

4. Therefore, the mind is not the brain or any part of the body.
5. If so, then mind-body dualism is true.
***
Time to sum up. The arguments we’ve examined indicate that
the physical brain, a part of the brain, a part of the body, or
anything material, simply cannot possibly possess the
fundamental properties of consciousness—the experienced color
of a mental image, the essential aboutness of the mental, the
subjective nature of consciousness, or the privacy of the mental.
The main arguments for dualism considered here remain
standing despite numerous attempts to knock them down. No
scientific experiment, or series of experiments, has ever proved
that dualism is false and that materialism is true.
In the rest of this chapter, we’ll consider the three most recent
attempts to explain consciousness materialistically, that is, in
terms of matter in motion governed by the laws of physics and
chemistry alone, without reference to anything immaterial such
as a soul or immaterial mind. Although each theory failed to
explain consciousness, the way each failed teaches us about the
nature of the mind. The first of these theories was proposed by a
group of psychologists. The mind, argued the behaviorists, is
not an immaterial soul. It is not something inside us. It is not an
object at all. Rather, the mind is nothing more than (observable)
behavior caused by the brain. When we talk about our thoughts
and feelings, these scientists claimed, we are really only talking
about our observable behavior.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 7.1
1. State the mind-body problem in your own words.

2. What does mind-body dualism claim?
3. What does materialism claim with respect to the mind?
4. Does Descartes’s argument make a good case for mind-body
dualism? Discuss.
5. Explain the causal interaction objection. How might a dualist
reply?
6. Explain the ghost objection. How might a dualist reply?
7. At this point in the discussion, what is your position on the
mind-body problem? Argue for your view.
8. In your own words, explain the mental image argument.
9. In your own words, explain the subjectivity of the mental.
10. In your own words, explain the privacy of the mental.
11. In your own words, explain the unity of the mental.
5. Behaviorism, the First Modern Materialist Attempt to Explain
Consciousness
Modern psychology as an academic subject emerged in Europe
during the nineteenth century. The behaviorists were an early
group of psychologists who sought to turn the new subject into
a physical science complete with lab experiments, precise
measurements, and empirical tests. But to be empirically
testable, a hypothesis must make predictions about entities that
can be observed. The problem, as the first behaviorists saw it,
was that the inner mental states referred to by existing
psychological theories—mental images, thoughts, feelings, the
id, the ego, repressed desires, wish-fulfillment complexes, and

so on—are not publicly observable. If psychology is going to
become a science, they reasoned, its theories must refer only to
publicly observable entities.
What, then, should a scientific psychology study? Behavior,
they answered. This made sense, for behavior is public in the
required sense, and it can be measured, predicted, and so forth.
The new methodology for psychology would therefore be this:
explain consciousness solely by reference to measurable
patterns of observable behavior.
Now, as we all know, science attempts to discover the causes of
things. The behaviorists therefore asked, “What are the ultimate
causes of human behavior?” Since behaviorist theories can refer
only to observable things, it followed that the ultimate causes of
a person’s behavior must be observable, at least in principle.
The cause of a person’s behavior thus cannot be allegedly
invisible mental events occurring inside consciousness—events
such as choices, beliefs, desires, or the activity of something
called “the will,” for these are not publicly observable. Where
else should the scientist look for the ultimate causes of human
behavior? The answer was obvious: (a) the individual’s physical
and genetic structure, and (b) the individual’s external
environment. The behaviorist methodology thus suggested the
hypothesis that a human being is simply a material object
moved here and there by the external and internal physical
forces acting on it, like a puppet on strings.
In the beginning, classical behaviorism was nothing more than a
research program—a thesis about the proper way to conduct
psychological research. All psychological research, according to
the behaviorist methodology, should be conducted by observing
behavior while avoiding all mention of invisible inner mental
states such as thoughts, desires, and the will. In line with this
program, behaviorists talked only about behavior and made no
claims about the fundamental nature of consciousness. This
form of behaviorism is called methodological behaviorism
because it is a thesis solely about the methodology or practice
of psychological science.

However, according to Jerry Fodor, professor of philosophy at
MIT and a major researcher in the philosophy of mind, the
behaviorists eventually added three philosophical theses that
went well beyond their data:
1. Human behavior has no inner mental causes (such as
thoughts, beliefs, hopes, acts of will, and choices).
2. Inner mental causes do not even exist.
3. All human behavior is ultimately caused by external and
internal physical conditions.
Let us call behaviorism supplemented with these three claims
philosophical behaviorism. If philosophical behaviorism is true,
then there is no such thing as an immaterial “mind” inside your
head. Whether you realize it or not, when you refer to your
(alleged) mind, you are really only referring to your outward
behavior. And your behavior is fully caused by your genes and
external physical factors. Your actions are therefore not caused
by something inside you called your “will,” your “mind,” your
“soul” or “self.” There is no “self,” there is no “mind.” There is
only behavior caused ultimately by genes, environment, and
other material causes and effects stretching in a causal regress
that goes back billions of years before you were born.
Consider what this implies. Your actions are not directed or
influenced by things in your mind called “beliefs,” “desires,”
“intentions,” and so forth, for these literally do not exist. You
are not the cause of your actions. Rather, you are a physical
input-output mechanism that takes in inputs from its
environment, processes them in accord with internal (physical)
hardwiring, and then outputs predictable behavioral responses,
with no invisible mental states such as beliefs and desires and
acts of will intervening between the inputs and outputs.
Notice how radically these implications of behaviorism conflict

with our commonsense understanding of ourselves. We naturally
speak of our beliefs and desires, intentions and plans. And we
routinely suppose these cause or at least guide our behavior. We
say things like this: “She moved to Seattle because she wanted
to pursue a career in technology, and she believed that Seattle
had more opportunities.” But if philosophical behaviorism is
true, our behavior is not influenced by our beliefs and desires,
for they do not exist. Rather, our behavior is completely caused
by physical factors acting on our internal wiring. The point
deserves emphasis: If philosophical behaviorism is true, there is
no such thing as a self. Rather, each human being is a puppet on
strings that are attached to its physical environment. For some
reason, this view is attractive to many people today.
Philosophical behaviorism was the first modern materialist
theory of the mind. The philosophical behaviorists sought to
explain consciousness without reference to anything but
material factors that ultimately reduce to atoms moving in
accord with the abstract laws of physics and chemistry. These
behaviorists simply assumed materialism is true—not one
behaviorist psychologist ever gave a serious argument for
materialism. Yet on that unargued basis, they rejected
Descartes’s mind-body dualism.
During the twentieth century, as philosophical behaviorism and
other scientific explanations of human behavior grew in
popularity, support for mind-body dualism declined. The new
“scientific” explanations led many intellectuals to believe that
the individual is not the cause of his own actions. A human
being is a complex machine whose behavior is determined by its
genes and the external forces of the universe.
Taking this a step further, some behaviorists reasoned that since
the individual does not cause his own actions, he does not have
free will. And if the individual does not have free will then he
is not morally responsible for anything he does. The implication
was obvious: Human behavior can be manipulated and

channeled in the right direction by external factors controlled
by behaviorist experts armed with sufficient power. No wonder
B. F. Skinner, one of the most famous of the behaviorists, titled
his 1971 best seller Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Skinner
argued that free will is an illusion and that no one possesses the
dignity of moral autonomy or responsibility. Previsioning the
movie The Matrix by three decades, Skinner proposed that the
government—with advice from behaviorist psychologists, of
course—should set up a totalitarian system of behavior control
to channel human behavior in the right direction so as to create
a happy future for all mankind. We’ll examine questions of free
will and moral responsibility in the next chapter.
Gilbert Ryle Attacks Dualism’s “Ghost in the Machine”
In 1949, Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), professor of philosophy at
Oxford University, published one of the most influential
philosophical books of the 1950s—The Concept of Mind. In this
book, Ryle attacks Descartes’s mind-body dualism and argues
for philosophical behaviorism. Cartesian dualists, he claims,
believe that the mind is an invisible, immaterial soul
mysteriously located inside the body or brain like a ghost inside
a machine. But this view—the idea that our bodies are activated
by an invisible and therefore “ghostly” soul--is literally
nonsense. Belief in ghosts is for children. Dualism is a fairy
tale, it is the “myth of the ghost in the machine.”
However, this left Ryle with a problem: If an immaterial mind
or soul does not exist, then what are we referring to when we
talk about our thoughts, beliefs, hopes, feelings, and other
mental states? We ordinarily assume we are referring to internal
mental states. Ryle gave the usual behaviorist answer. When we
talk about our thoughts, feelings, and minds, we are merely
referring to our external behavior. Mental statements such as “I
feel happy” and “I believe in democracy” are simply indirect
ways of talking about publicly expressed behavior.
But this claim faced an obvious objection. I can talk about my
hope that the sun will come out without saying anything about

my publicly observable behavior. In addition, I can hope it will
be sunny without exhibiting any actual “hoping-for-sun”
behavior. I can describe my toothache as “dull,” “throbbing,” or
“intense” without saying anything about my behavior. And I can
feel a toothache inside my consciousness without behaving as if
I am in pain. So, how can talking about my mental states and
sensations really be nothing more than talking about my
outward behavior?
These thoughts led Ryle to modify his theory. After applying
logical analysis to mental statements, he claimed to have made a
startling philosophical discovery: statements about our
allegedly internal mental states are not about actual behavior, as
behaviorists before him had asserted. Rather, when properly
analyzed, they are about tendencies to behave in certain ways,
which he called “dispositions.” To say you have a toothache is
merely to say you have a tendency or disposition to behave as if
your tooth hurts. Notice that you can have a tendency to behave
in a certain way without actually behaving in that way at the
moment.
Thus, according to Ryle’s theory, to say that I feel happy is just
to say that I have a tendency to smile, a tendency to say that I
feel happy, a tendency to laugh, and so forth—whether or not I
am smiling, laughing, or talking at the moment. Mental
statements such as “I am happy” and “I have a sore tooth” are
thus nothing more than statements about potential or possible
patterns of future behavior.
By the end of the 1950s, Ryle’s philosophical behaviorism was
the dominant theory of the mind among academic philosophers
specializing in the study of consciousness. Proponents claimed
that three major considerations favored Ryle’s theory. First,
adopting Ryle’s theory allowed them to reject mind-body
dualism. Second, Ryle’s theory could be integrated with natural
science. Third, philosophical behaviorism was consistent with
materialism. Ryle’s theory certainly does contradict mind-body
dualism. It is indeed a materialist theory of the mind. But is it
true?

6. Arguments That Sank Behaviorism
The Perfect Pretenders and Tough Guys Thought Experiments
The philosopher Ian Ravenscroft offers two counterexamples to
Ryle’s theory and to behaviorism in general. First, we are asked
to imagine a community of “perfect pretenders”—people who
have been taught from birth to pretend they are in pain when
they really are not in pain. These people are experts at behaving
as if they are in pain when they actually feel no pain. This is a
coherent possibility. According to Ryle’s behaviorism, the
perfect pretenders actually feel pain because their tendency to
behave as if they feel pain is pain. Remember that according to
Ryle, there is nothing more to being in pain than having a
tendency to behave as if you are in pain. Yet these pretenders
feel no pain (when they pretend to feel pain). The coherent
possibility of perfect pretenders is in itself a counterexample to
behaviorism. The very possibility of the perfect pretenders
implies that a tendency, or disposition, to behave as if you are
in pain is not the same thing as being in pain. Thus:
1. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then the case of the
perfect pretenders is not a coherent possibility;
2. But the case of the perfect pretenders is a coherent
possibility;
3. Therefore, philosophical behaviorism is most certainly false.
Ravenscroft next reverses the thought experiment and asks us to
imagine a community of “tough guys” who have been trained
from birth to act as if they feel no pain when, in fact, they do
feel pain. These people feel pain but never exhibit any pain
behavior. This too seems to be a coherent possibility. According
to Ryle’s behaviorism, the tough guys never feel any pain, since
pain is nothing more than a tendency to behave as if a person

feels pain. Yet the tough guys do feel pain—they simply never
show it. The mere possibility of the tough guys implies that
behaving as if you are not in pain is not the same thing as not
being in pain. In general, then, a behavior pattern, even a
lifelong one, is not the same as the corresponding mental state.
But if one can be in a mental state and at the same time not have
any tendency to behave in any particular way, then
philosophical behaviorism is false.
1. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then the case of the
tough guys is not a coherent possibility.
2. But the case of the tough guys is a coherent possibility.
3. Therefore, philosophical behaviorism is certainly false.
Counterarguments like these convinced most philosophers that
philosophical behaviorism is simply a false theory of mind. (I
know of no serious researcher in philosophy of mind today who
defends philosophical behaviorism.)
The Qualia Objection
Think about what is going on in your consciousness when you
have a toothache. Aren’t you directly aware of a very real
sensation occurring within your mind? Isn’t this sensation real
as well as private? Yet doesn’t it exist prior to, and apart from,
any pattern of outward behavior? In short, can’t you have a
toothache without exhibiting any toothache behavior?
Furthermore, this inner sensation we call a “toothache”
certainly seems to have its own intrinsic qualities. For instance,
a toothache can be mild, intense, dull, or throbbing. Nagel
makes this point by saying, “There is something it is like to
have a toothache.” We can take this further by thinking about
what is going on inside us when we taste chocolate, experience
the smell of a rose, or hear the sound of a bell ringing. In each

case, we are experiencing a real something inside our
consciousness—a definite something that possesses its own
intrinsic qualities apart from any present or future behavior.
As we have seen, philosophers call these experienced sensations
“qualia.” The existence of qualia, such as toothaches and
headaches, is a matter of common sense. The problem for
philosophical behaviorism is that if behaviorism is true then
qualia do not exist. For qualia cannot be reduced to behavior
patterns or to anything quantitatively measurable or expressible
in the language of physics or neurophysiology. The arguments
for nonbehavioral qualia have stood the test of time—none has
been decisively answered. But if qualia do exist, as they most
certainly do, then philosophical behaviorism is false.
Let’s look at this one more way. Suppose you have a sore
elbow. According to behaviorism, a sore elbow is nothing more
than a tendency, or disposition, to behave in certain ways. But
as Ravenscroft observes, a sore elbow hurts. How, he asks, can
a potential pattern of behavior (that has not even occurred yet)
hurt?
Based on such observations, critics of behaviorism argue as
follows:
The Qualia Argument against Philosophical Behaviorism
1. Qualia (mental images, pains, tastes, smells, and so forth) are
real but private mental states occurring inside our stream of
consciousness.
2. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then qualia do not exist.
3. Therefore, philosophical behaviorism is certainly false.
Support for 1:
a. We directly and vividly experience qualia from inside our
subjectivity, and they seem to have their own intrinsic qualities,
apart from all present and future behavior.
b. Therefore, premise 1 is true.

Downfall of Philosophical Behaviorism
The philosophical behaviorists rejected dualism and sought to
explain consciousness in materialistic terms alone, in terms of
observable behavior. Although their approach was popular
among academics in the 1950s, it fell out of favor during the
1960s for two reasons: first, the philosophical behaviorists
never successfully showed that even one mental state can be
specified accurately as a mere behavior pattern or tendency to
behave in a certain way; second, psychologists found that they
could not explain consciousness without reference to
unobservable internal mental states existing apart from
behavior.
The first materialist attempt to explain the mind was thus a
failure. It is worth studying the arguments that sank
behaviorism, though, for in seeing why they failed, we learn
important things about the mind.
The failure of philosophical behaviorism coincided with the rise
of the next important materialist attempt to explain
consciousness, the mind-brain identity theory.
1. Why did the behaviorists believe that psychology, as it was
practiced before behaviorism, was unscientific?
2. Explain the basic theory of behaviorism and an argument for
it.
3. Why is behaviorism compatible with naturalism?
4. Why is behaviorism incompatible with mind-body dualism?
5. How does behaviorism explain consciousness?
6. Is behaving as if you are conscious all there is to being
conscious? Discuss.
7. When you talk about your mind, are you really just talking

about your behavior? Discuss.
8. Explain an argument against the behaviorist theory.
9. What is a quale?
10. In what way does behaviorism conflict with belief in qualia?
11. Is belief in qualia part of our commonsense view of
ourselves? Discuss.
12. Would the existence of qualia prove that behaviorism is
false? Discuss.
13. What thoughts led to the demise of behaviorism?
7. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory—The Second Modern
Materialist Attempt to Explain Consciousness
During the 1960s, a second attempt was made to explain the
mind in terms consistent with materialism.
While philosophical behaviorism had denied the existence of
inner mental events and states, advocates of the mind-brain
identity theory (the “identity theory” for short) affirmed their
existence: Inner mental events do exist inside us, they argued.
However, they do not occur within an immaterial mind, or soul,
as Descartes believed. Rather, they are nothing more than
physical events and physical states of the brain. (From here on,
mental events will be shorthand for “mental events, states, and
processes,” and brain events will abbreviate “brain events,
states, and processes.”) The mind, in other words, is
numerically identical with the physical brain.
Keep in mind, as we discuss this theory, the precise logical
meaning of numerically identical. To claim that the mind and
the brain are numerically identical is to claim that they are one
and the same thing, not two different things. Again, Bob Dylan
is numerically identical to Robert Zimmerman—they are one
and the same person. Ringo Starr is numerically identical to
Richard Starkey—they are one and the same drummer. Of
course, if the mind and the brain are numerically identical, then
any property of the mind is a property of the brain, and any
property of the brain is a property of the mind—that follows
from the axiom of logic we examined earlier in this chapter.

Two major arguments for the new theory of mind were given:
one based on neuroscience, a second based on Ockham’s Razor.
Turning to the first argument, it is commonly believed today
that neuroscience has proved the identity theory true. The
argument from neuroscience relies on laboratory studies that
reveal correlations between observed brain events and reported
mental events.
The Argument from Neuroscience
1. Brain science has discovered correlations between reported
mental events and observed brain events. For instance, every
time a patient reports feeling a pain in the arm, neurons x, y,
and z light up at the same time; every time a patient reports
seeing red, neurons x,’ y,’ and z’ activate at the same time, and
so forth.
2. In addition, when one part of the brain is damaged, a specific
mental function is lost.
3. If reported mental events can be correlated with observed
brain events occurring at the same time, and if the loss of a
mental function can be correlated with the loss of a physical
function, then each mental event is (numerically) identical to a
brain event, and the mind simply is the brain.
4. Therefore, the mind-brain identity theory must be true (and
dualism is false).
This popular argument may seem compelling at first glance, but
it has severe problems. To begin with, the third premise is false.
Here is why. First, correlation is not the same as, and certainly
does not prove, numerical identity. The mere fact that A and B
occur at the same time within a complex system does not prove
that A and B are one and the same thing!
Second, the two sides of the correlation—reported mental
events and observed brain events—have radically different

properties, for (as we have seen) mental states are subjective,
private, qualitative, and intentional, while brain states are none
of the above. But if the two sides of a correlation have radically
different properties, then the correlation most certainly does not
establish numerical identity. Thus, the philosophers Riccardo
Manzotti and Paolo Moderato note that it is one thing to show
that
a neural process plays a role in tuning, enabling, and modifying
a moment of consciousness. In this regard, any empirical
evidence of this kind is scientifically of high interest . . . But,
per se, it does not tell us anything about the nature of conscious
experience itself. Consider the heating system in Jane’s flat. . . .
[I]n the basement, Jane discovers a control device that allows
her to enable and tune heating. Jane also discovers that there are
reliable correlations between the state of the control device
switches and the resulting heating. Is the control device actually
doing the heating? Of course not. Right now, most of
neuroscientific data about consciousness are akin to the relation
between Jane’s control device and heating. There is a
correlation, but scientists do not have a clue as to why such
neural activity should [correlate with] conscious experience.
In short, brain studies that correlate reported mental states and
observed brain states do not rule out the possibility that the
mental state and the physical state are distinct entities occurring
at the same time within a bigger system.
The third reason the laboratory correlations do not establish the
identity theory is that mind-body dualism actually predicts the
mental state-brain state correlations discovered in the lab. Thus,
dualism and materialism both predict the same experimental
data. The point is so important that some elaboration is called
for.
Mind-body dualism claims that brain and the mind causally

interact: minds cause changes in brains and brains cause
changes in minds. Therefore, if mind body dualism is true, we
should logically expect that a brain event will occur each time a
mental event occurs, and vice versa. Thus, if dualism is true,
then, a mental event—such as experiencing the taste of
chocolate while eating a candy bar—will always be found to be
correlated with a predictable set of physical events occurring in
the brain at the same time. If this sounds wrong, consider that
on the dualist view, the brain is the cause and effect interface
between the immaterial mind and the physical world. Mind and
brain, according to dualism, are constantly interacting, each
causing changes in the other.
The upshot is that the correlations between reported mental
events and observed brain events discovered in the lab are
expected if materialism is true, but they are also expected if
dualism is true. If the correlations are predicted equally by both
theories, then they neither prove nor disprove either theory.
This popular argument for materialism fails. The next argument
is a slight improvement.
The Ockham’s Razor Argument
The philosopher J. J. C. Smart, one of the most prominent
defenders of the identity theory during the 1960s, wrote, “Why
do I wish to resist [dualism] [and accept the identity theory]?
Mainly because of Ockham’s razor.”
Here is his argument:
1. Both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory explain the
same data.
2. But the identity theory is simpler than dualism.
3. Ockham’s razor recommends adopting the simpler of two
theories when both theories explain the same data.
4. Therefore, the identity theory is probably true.
Smart doesn’t give an argument for premise 1; he simply

assumes it. Here is an argument for premise 2:
2a. The identity theory explains the mind in terms of one
ultimate kind of substance (matter), while dualism posits two
radically different kinds of substances (an immaterial mind and
a physical brain).
Smart is right: the identity theory is theoretically simpler than
dualism, at least in the sense that it posits only one kind of
substance—matter—while dualism posits two radically different
kinds of substances (mind and matter).
However, dualists have a response. They argue that their theory
explains many aspects of consciousness that the identity theory
cannot explain, including qualia, intentionality, subjectivity,
and the privacy of the mental. (We have already examined the
arguments for this claim.) If the dualists are right and their
theory explains more data than materialism explains, then
premise 1 is false. But if so, then Ockham’s razor does not
favor the identity theory, for Ockham’s razor only favors the
simpler of two theories when both theories explain the very
same data. The reader can draw his or her own conclusion.
8. Arguments That Sank the Identity Theory
Recall the mental image, intentionality, and subjectivity
arguments for dualism. If either argument is sound, the identity
theory is false. Therefore, each argument can be reconfigured as
an argument against the identity theory.
The e "Mental-Image Argument" Mental Image Argument
against the Identity Theory
1. When we form an image in our mind of a red stop sign, the
image has an experienced property (redness) that our physical
brain states lack.
2. If x has a property that y lacks, then x is not numerically

identical with y.
3. Therefore, the mental image is not identical with any
physical state of our brain.
4. If the identity theory is true, each mental state is numerically
identical with a brain state.
5. Therefore, the identity theory is certainly false.
1a. When we form an image in our mind of a red stop sign, we
directly experience the image’s redness and shape, but no
physically observable part of our brain turns red or takes on the
shape of a stop sign.
The Intentionality Argument against the Identity Theory
1. Mental states are essentially intentional, but no brain state is
essentially intentional.
numerically identical.
3. Therefore, the mind is not the brain.
4. If the identity theory is true, the mind and the brain are one
and the same thing.
5. Therefore, the identity theory is certainly false.
The Subjectivity Argument against the Identity Theory
1. Mental states have a directly experienced subjective, or
qualitative, aspect.

2. No atom or clump of atoms or any part of the brain has a
subjective, or qualitative, aspect.
4. Therefore, the mind is not the brain.
5. If the identity theory is true, the mind and the brain are one
and the same thing.
6. Therefore, the identity theory is surely false.
Downfall
Like its predecessor, behaviorism, the identity theory, the
second materialist attempt to explain the mind, also ended in
failure. Although the identity theory was popular in philosophy
during the 1960s and 1970s, it fell out of favor and has now
been abandoned by most academic philosophers of mind, for
reasons we’ve examined. A better theory was needed.
The next big theory of the mind, the one currently favored by
many if not most materialists, likens mental states to the
programmed states of a digital computer. What makes
something a mind is not the material it is made of nor the way it
is structured. What makes something a mind is simply the way it
functions. According to the next theory, sometimes called
“functionalism,” if a machine such as a computer behaves, or
functions, the way a conscious being behaves, it is conscious,
and it has a mind. For a mind is simply a function.
1. Explain the basic claim of the identity theory.
2. What do identity theorists mean by identity?
3. Why did many philosophers initially see the theory as an
improvement over behaviorism?
4. Explain one of the arguments for the identity theory.
5. Explain one of the objections to the identity theory.

6. Do brain studies prove that the identity theory is true? Argue
for your answer.
7. Can you think of a case in which A and B are correlated but
are not quantitatively identical? Does correlation alone prove
identity? Discuss.
8. Could a space alien with a radically different physical design
plan and inner constitution have a mind and think and reason?
Discuss.
9. Why have most philosophers rejected the identity theory?
10. Is the identity theory a metaphysical theory? Discuss.
11. At this point in the discussion, are you a dualist or a
materialist? Support your view with a philosophical argument.
9. Functionalism--The Third Modern Materialist Attempt to
Explain Consciousness
The initial idea underlying the latest materialism-friendly
theory of the mind—a theory logically consistent with
materialism--can be introduced with a question. What is a
clock? Upon reflection, it is clear that the concept of a clock
cannot be defined in terms of the materials out of which a clock
is constructed, for some clocks are made of metal, others of
wood, or plastic; some are even made of paper. The concept of a
clock also cannot be defined in terms of how a clock is
structured. Some contain gears and springs, wheels, cogs, hands
and numbers; others do not. (Digital clocks have circuits but
neither cogs nor gears; water clocks have basins and tubes, and
so forth.) Upon reflection, then, the only thing all clocks have
in common is the way they function. No matter what they are
made of or how they are structured, clocks are devices that tell
time. So, although a clock cannot be defined in terms of any one
type of physical substance (wood or metal) or physical
organization (gears or silicon chips), it can be defined in terms
of the way it functions, that is, the way it behaves.

Now think about the behavior, or function, of a clock, apart
from any material embodiment or physical structure. The clock
function, like a computer program, is typically “realized
within,” or “run on,” a physical medium or platform. If a clock
is constructed of metal and glass with gears and springs, its
function is realized within the medium of metal, glass, gears,
and springs. If a clock is constructed of wooden parts, its
function is being run on a wooden platform, and so on. The
clock function is thus “multiply realizable”—it can be realized
or run on many different material substances. Put another way,
it can be run on many different platforms.
Functionalism’s big idea—put somewhat crudely—is that the
mind is not any particular substance, nor is it a particular
organization of stuff. It is simply a function. Like a clock, the
conscious mind cannot be defined in terms of the material out of
which it is composed or the way that material is put together; it
can only be defined in terms of its function. The mind is simply
an abstract function running on an underlying platform.
Big consequences follow. If the mind, like a clock, is nothing
more than an abstract function, then the mind function can be
realized on many different kinds of media, or platforms.
Thought of in this way, there is no reason why the
consciousness function can’t be realized on, or run upon, a
purely physical platform such as a digital computer. Thus, if a
computer functions the way a conscious mind functions, the
computer is a conscious mind. If a computer-controlled robot
behaves the way a conscious person behaves, the robot is
conscious. In the computer’s case, the mind function is being
run on a silicon chip. In the human case, functionalists who are
materialists believe that the mind function is realized on the
medium of a physical brain. This gives us the following
argument:
1. Consciousness is a function that can be realized or run on
many different media.
2. To be conscious is to function or behave like a conscious

being functions or behaves.
3. Therefore, if a machine functions or behaves the way a
conscious being functions or behaves, then it is conscious, no
matter what it is composed of and no matter how it is
structured.
4. Many computers function as if they are conscious and
thinking.
5. Therefore, many computers are conscious and possess
conscious minds.
The functionalist idea can also be broken down and applied to
specific mental states. On the functionalist view, a mental state
such as a belief or a wish is constituted solely by its functional
role within a larger system of functions of which it is a part. So,
if a computer functions the way a human being functions when
the person believes in Santa, then the computer is conscious and
actually believes in Santa. The computer is not simply behaving
as if it believes in Santa, it actually does believe in Santa. If a
computer functions the way a person functions when he or she
is in love, then the computer is conscious and is actually in
love. The computer is not just simulating loving behavior; it
really is in love. If a computer functions the way a person
functions when the person has an itch, the computer actually
feels an itch.
The computer scientist John McCarthy (1927–2011), recipient
of the prestigious Turing Award for research in artificial
intelligence, illustrated the idea using his thermostat. His
thermostat, he claimed, is a conscious mind that has three
alternating beliefs:
· It’s too hot in here, so I had better turn off the furnace.
· It’s too cold in here, so I had better turn on the furnace.
· It’s just right so better not do anything.
His reasoning is simple: since his thermostat behaves as if it
believes, it really does believe (and is therefore conscious since

a belief is a conscious mental state). The fact that it is a strip of
copper inside a plastic housing with a few wires attached is
irrelevant—all that matters is the way the device behaves.
This will sound surprising at first: Functionalism is actually
logically consistent with both mind body dualism and
materialism. Functionalists who are mind body dualists say that
in the human case the mind function is being run on an
immaterial platform (the soul or immaterial mind).
Functionalists who are materialists may claim that the mind
function is realized on the medium of a physical brain. Most
functionalists, however, are materialists.
Functionalism is attractive to modern materialists for two
reasons. First, it is logically consistent with materialism even
though it does not imply materialism. Second, functionalism
holds out hope that consciousness will someday be explained in
scientific or materialistic terms alone. An intriguing theory. But
is it true?
10. Problems for Functionalism
Searle’s Chinese Room
In a now famous article, “Minds, Brains, Programs,” in the
journal Brain and Behavioral Science, John Searle, professor of
philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, proposed
a thought experiment that he claimed shows vividly that
functionalism is false.
Imagine that someone who does not understand Chinese is
placed in a windowless room with one door. Inside the room is a
large pile of instructions written in English, which the person
understands. Each instruction states that when a piece of paper
with a symbol of such and such a shape is passed into the room
through a thin slot in the door, a piece of paper with a symbol
of a different shape is to be passed back. The instructions are
phrased solely in terms of the physical shapes of the symbols,
described in English, not in terms of the meanings of the

symbols. Unbeknownst to the person inside the room, the shapes
are Chinese characters.
With everything set to go, pieces of paper containing Chinese
characters are passed into the room through the slit in the door,
and the person returns pieces of paper containing other Chinese
characters, following the instruction book, which is written in
English. To an observer outside the room who speaks Chinese,
the flow of characters in and out of the room is
indistinguishable from what it would be if the person inside the
room understood Chinese. The flow of characters exactly
simulates an intelligible conversation in Chinese.
From the outside, then, the behavior of the person in the room is
indistinguishable from that of a Chinese speaker. Therefore, if
functionalism is true, the person inside the room
understandsChinese. For the person in the room behaves or
functions exactly as if he understands Chinese. However, the
person inside the room (by hypothesis) does not speak a word of
the language. It follows that functionalism is false. It also
follows that there is more to consciousness than merely
following a program or rule book that makes one function (or
behave) in a certain way. Thus:
1. If functionalism is true, the person in the Chinese room
understands Chinese.
2. But the person in the room does not understand Chinese.
3. Therefore, functionalism is false.
In Searle’s analogy, the room as a whole corresponds to a
computer, the person inside the room corresponds to the central
processing unit (CPU) of the computer, and the pile of
instructions written in English corresponds to the computer’s
program (software).
Searle’s thought experiment raises an important question: What
is the difference between a conscious mind processing
information and a computer that is behaving like a conscious

mind that is processing information? Both process symbols:
computers take in electrical impulses and output electrical
impulses; minds process words and other kinds of linguistic
symbols and output words and other kinds of linguistic symbols.
The difference, Searle argues, is that a real mind processes
symbols by reference to what they mean, which it accomplishes
by knowing what they are about. The symbols processed by a
real mind thus mean something to the mind. Although a
computer also processes symbols, the items it crunches
(electrical impulses) mean nothing to it, for it manipulates them
in terms of their physical properties alone, not by reference to
their meanings or what they are about.
To elaborate, the symbols being processed by a digital computer
are streams of electrons flowing through logic circuits. They are
processed as electrical impulses, not as bits of meaning. Put
another way, the electrical pulses processed by a computer are
not processed as symbols standing intentionally for something.
To the computer, the electrons passing through its circuits are
not about anything at all.
If Searle is right, then, no digital computer will ever be a
conscious mind, no matter how closely it mimics conscious
behavior, because all computers ever do is process electrical
impulses on the basis of the physical properties of those signals,
with no reference to any meanings, while real minds process
symbols by reference to what they mean and are about.
<Sidebar> Scientists in the field of artificial intelligence, or
“AI,” attempt to create machines that mimic intelligent
behavior. Philosophers distinguish two schools of thought
within the field. Advocates of “strong AI” believe that if a
computer behaves as if it is conscious, then it really is
conscious. In contrast, advocates of “weak AI” make a more
modest claim: computers are not conscious minds; they merely
behave as if they are conscious. Searle’s argument is an attack
on strong AI; it is not directed at weak AI. <End sidebar>
Ned Block’s Gigantic Minde "China-Mind Argument"

Ned Block, professor of philosophy at MIT, proposed another
famous counterexample to functionalism, which I will simplify
and condense. According to functionalism, if a system behaves,
or functions, exactly the way someone who believes in Santa
Claus behaves, then the system (no matter what it is made of) is
conscious and actually believes in Santa. With this in mind,
Block asks us to imagine a program that causes any system
running it to behave exactly like someone who believes in Santa
Claus behaves. Call this the “belief in Santa program.” If
functionalism is true, it is theoretically possible to write such a
program. The pattern of inputs and outputs of any platform
running this program will exactly match the input-output pattern
(behavior) of a human believer in Santa. If functionalism is
true, any system running this program is actually a conscious
mind that believes in Santa.
This is a simplification, but a computer chip consists of
millions of tiny circuits (called “logic gates”) that open and
close corresponding to the (millions of) 1’s and 0’s produced by
a computer program. Block asks us to suppose that a billion
people have been choreographed to stand and sit in a sequence
that exactly mimics, in the right order, the 1’s and 0’s of a
belief in Santa program. In other words, these people have been
choreographed to stand and sit in a way that functionally
imitates the opening and closing of the logic gates of a
computer running a belief in Santa program. This is in theory
possible. Standing might correspond to 1, sitting to 0. This
group of one billion people would then constitute a platform
realizing the belief in Santa program.
If functionalism is true, this group of people standing and
sitting in accord with the 1’s and 0’s of the Santa program
constitutes a giant mind that actually believes in Santa—even
though no individual in the group actually believes in Santa.
Block asks: Is it reasonable to believe that if a billion people

were to behave in this way, a giant mind that believes in Santa
would suddenly come into existence? This implication of
functionalism, he argues, is simply absurd. But if a theory has
an absurd consequence, that is a good reason to reject the
theory. Thus:
1. If functionalism is true, then a giant mind that believes in
Santa Claus suddenly comes into existence when a billion
people stand up and sit down so as to realize, or run, a belief in
Santa program.
2. It is absurd to suppose that a giant mind could come into
existence in this way.
3. Therefore, functionalism is clearly false.
Chalmers’s Philosophical Zombies
The Australian philosopher David Chalmers, a leading figure in
the philosophy of mind today, proposed an influential argument
against functionalism based on the philosophical concept of a
zombie. In philosophy, a zombie is defined as a being who
functions exactly like a conscious person but who nevertheless
has no conscious internal mental states whatsoever. Zombies, he
argues, are conceivable without self-contradiction. But if they
are conceivable without self-contradiction, then they are
logically possible. (One standard principle of modern logic and
mathematics is the idea that if something is conceivable without
self-contradiction then it is logically possible.) However, if
functionalism is true, zombies are not logically possible, for
according to functionalism, if something functions exactly like
a conscious being, it necessarily is conscious. Put another way,
according to functionalism, it is impossible that something is
not conscious and yet functions exactly like it is conscious.
Thus,
1. Let a zombie be defined as a being who functions exactly like
a conscious person but who nevertheless has no conscious
mental states whatsoever.

2. It is logically possible that a being that has no conscious
mental states nevertheless functions exactly like a conscious
being functions.
3. Zombies are therefore conceivable without self-contradiction.
4. Therefore, zombies are logically possible.
5. If functionalism is true, zombies are not logically possible.
Applied to neuroscience, Chalmers’s zombie argument raises a
difficult question: Why is the neurological functioning of a
living human brain accompanied by conscious experiences,
rather than by no consciousness at all? As Chalmers puts it, why
doesn’t all the neurological functioning inside the brain go on
in the dark, so to speak, without any attendant conscious mental
states? Why is neurological functioning accompanied by a
stream of consciousness containing experienced smells, tastes,
colors, images, the inner movie, and other qualia? Chalmers
calls this question the “hard problem of consciousness.”
Neuroscientists have no scientifically confirmed answer.
Mind-body dualism, of course, supplies an answer. The neural
functioning of a living human brain is accompanied by
conscious states because a human being is an immaterial mind,
or soul, interacting with the physical brain, and the soul brings
the conscious, subjective side of life to the equation. Zombies
would lack conscious mental states because they would lack a
soul. Materialists have no answer to date.
Chalmers’s question can be generalized. The Japanese are
leaders in creating robots that behave in very humanlike ways.
Why is the functioning of one of these life-like robots not
accompanied by consciousness, while the functioning of a
human being is accompanied by consciousness? Mind-body

dualists have a ready answer. The functioning of a human being
is accompanied by conscious experiences because a human
being has an immaterial mind or soul that is the seat of
consciousness, while no conscious mind or soul is present in the
metal robot.
Considerations based on Ockham’s razor raise another problem
for functionalism. The behavior of a computer or metal robot,
no matter how humanlike it is—can be fully explained in terms
of matter in motion, that is, in terms of physical objects such as
electrical signals, circuits firing according to a program, and
logic gates opening and closing. In other words, the functioning
can be explained purely in material terms without any reference
to consciousness. If so, then why does the functionalist attribute
consciousness to the machine or robot? Doesn’t the addition of
consciousness make the explanation more complex than it needs
to be (and thus less likely according to Ockham’s razor)?
Wouldn’t the functionalist explanation be simpler if we dropped
consciousness from the account altogether? Isn’t the
consciousness part of functionalism a spinning wheel doing no
explanatory work? Ockham’s razor, it seems, requires that we
shave the functionalist explanation of the robot and the
computer down to purely physical processing and thus drop all
reference to consciousness. Does functionalism violate
Ockham’s razor? Does Ockham’s razor rule out attributing
consciousness to computers? Does functionalism rule out
attributing consciousness to human beings?
BOX: The Hard Problem of Consciousness
David Chalmers puts the hard problem this way in his TED
Talk:
Right now you have a movie playing inside your head. It’s an
amazing multitrack movie. It has 3-D vision and surround sound
for what you are seeing and hearing right now. But that’s just
the start of it. Your movie has smell, and taste, and touch. It has

a sense of your body, pain, hunger. . . . it has emotions, anger,
happiness. . . . And it has this constant voice-over narrative, in
your stream of conscious thinking. At the heart of this movie is
you experiencing all of this directly. This movie is your stream
of consciousness. Consciousness is one of the fundamental facts
of human existence. Each of us is conscious. We all have our
own inner movie. . . . There is nothing we know about more
directly. At least, I know about my consciousness directly. I
can’t be certain you guys are conscious. . . . But at the same
time it’s the most mysterious phenomenon in the universe. Why
are we conscious? Why do we have these inner movies? Why
aren’t we just robots who process all this input, produce all that
output, without experiencing the inner movie at all. Right now,
nobody knows the answer.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhRhtFFhNzQ
The Inverted-Spectrum Argument
Suppose two individuals, Ann and Bob, have qualitatively
different internal color experiences, or color sensations, when
viewing the same object. When Ann looks at a ripe Red
Delicious apple, she has the same kind of color experience or
quale that Bob has when he looks at a ripe Golden Delicious
apple. When she looks at a ripe Golden Delicious apple, she has
the same kind of color experience Bob has when he looks at a
ripe Red Delicious apple. In short, red things look to Ann the
way yellow things look to Bob, and vice versa. If we place a red
apple in front of both Ann and Bob, Ann experiences what is
really a sensation of yellow, while Bob experiences what is
really a sensation of red.
However, in learning to speak the English language, both Ann
and Bob have been taught since they were young to use the
word red for this color experience. So, Ann calls the color she
experiences when she looks at a red delicious apple “red,” and
Bob also calls the color he experiences looking at the same

apple “red.” They have also been taught since birth to call fire
trucks, Valentine hearts, and Santa Claus’s coat “red.”
Thus, although Ann and Bob have differing internal, color
qualia, both behave or function the same way with respect to
colored objects. Viewed from the outside—from the third
person perspective—both exhibit the same behavior or
functioning with respect to color. Yet from the inside, each has
qualitatively different internal experiences, or qualia. This is
called an “inverted-spectrum case.”
If an inverted-spectrum case is logically possible—describable
without self-contradiction—then functionalism is false, for
according to functionalism, inverted-spectrum cases are
logically impossible. An inverted spectrum case is logically
impossible if functionalism is true since the two people in the
case would be e "Functionally isomorphic"functionally
isomorphic (their behavior patterns with respect to color would
be functionally indistinguishable) yet they would be undergoing
qualitatively differing internal mental states. Functionalism
claims this is impossible. Thus
1. If functionalism is true, spectrum inversion is logically
impossible.
2. But a spectrum-inversion case is conceivable without
contradiction.
3. Therefore, spectrum inversion is logically possible.
Does Functionalism Explain Consciousness?
The arguments we’ve just examined indicate that there is much
more to consciousness than merely functioning, or behaving, the
way a conscious being behaves. Critics of functionalism, such

as Nagel, Searle, Block, Chalmers, argue that functionalists, by
focusing solely on outward behavior, miss something important
about consciousness. They miss what goes on inside our stream
of consciousness, namely, the private, subjective process
experienced only from the inside: Functionalism ignores (and
can’t explain) the subjective nature of thought—the part we
experience privately.
Nagel puts the idea this way: a conscious being has an inner
mental life. If a being has an inner mental life, there’s
something it is like to be that individual—something that is not
simply an outward pattern of behavior.
However, since this inner life is nonpublic and subjective, it
cannot be “functionalized” (explained solely in external, public,
functional terms). This, the critics argue, is why functionalism
fails to explain consciousness. But if consciousness is
subjective and private in this way, while functioning is entirely
a public phenomenon, then the mind is not simply a function
that can be run on a platform, material or otherwise.
Each of us knows by personal experience that qualia are real.
We know by experience that the mind has the private,
subjective, and nonfunctional aspects described by the critics of
functionalism. We verify these facts every time we directly
experience our own consciousness. Functionalism stands in
conflict with our common human experience.
11. Summing Up
During the twentieth century, many philosophers and
psychologists rejected dualism, assumed without proof that
materialism is true, and attempted to explain the mind in terms
consistent with materialism. First they tried to explain
consciousness by hypothesizing that mental states are nothing
but behavior. When behaviorism fizzled out, they proposed that
the mind is identical to the physical brain. After the identity
theory failed, they resurrected behaviorism in the form of
functionalism, and tried to explain consciousness as if it is an
abstract function that can be run on any suitable platform—
including the operating system of a digital computer. However,

none of the major materialist attempts to explain the mind in
material terms alone—behaviorism, the identity theory, and
functionalism—succeeded. In particular, no materialist theory
of the mind successfully explained
· the directly experienced, subjective, internal mental states
called “qualia;”
· the aboutness of many of our conscious mental states;
· the subjectivity of the mental;
· the privacy of the mental;
· why the person in the Chinese room does not understand
Chinese;
· why the group of one billion people realizing the belief in
Santa program does not constitute a giant mind that believes in
Santa.
· Why humans experience consciousness while zombies would
not.
After twenty-five hundred years of the rational investigation of
the system of nature and the nature of matter, and nearly five
hundred years of modern science, scientists still have no answer
at all, not even the beginnings of a good answer, to the
following questions:
1. How can any purely material object possess intrinsic
intentionality?
2. How can a purely material object have as part of its essence
an essential relation to an intentional object?
3. How can any purely material object possess subjectivity?
4. How can any purely material object have a point of view?

5. How can any purely material object possess consciousness?
6. How can any purely material object intentionally follow the
objective laws of logic?
7. How can any purely material object have qualitative content?
And two questions that will arise in the next chapter:
8. How can a purely material object whose operations are
governed by the laws of physics and chemistry bear moral
responsibility?
9. How can a purely material object whose operations are
governed by the laws of physics and chemistry have free will?
If materialism and the three major theories of mind compatible
with it cannot account for consciousness, subjectivity, the
privacy of the mental, and rationality, perhaps mind-body
dualism—the common view held by most human beings and
most religions of the world throughout history—deserves a
second look. Perhaps the only barrier to taking dualism
seriously is a materialist bias that blocks some people from
thinking outside the scientific box. If dualism is true, there is
more to consciousness than meets the scientific eye.
1. In your own words, explain functionalism’s basic claim.
2. Give an argument for functionalism.
3. Does Searle’s Chinese room actually understand Chinese?
Does anything within the room understand Chinese? What
follows if it does not?
4. Critically evaluate Ned Block’s thought experiment. Does a
giant mind come into existence? Does his argument raise
troubles for functionalism?

5. Would the existence of qualia contradict functionalism?
Discuss.
6. In your own words, explain one of the arguments presented
against functionalism.
7. Is functionalism an adequate theory of consciousness?
Discuss.
8. Are you a materialist or a dualist with respect to the mind?
What is the basis for your answer?
Appendix
From Dualism to Theism
Anyone who accepts mind-body dualism faces the following
question: How do immaterial minds, or souls, become joined to
physical bodies when a new human being first comes into
existence? What process or agent brings the two together? If
dualism is true and if our modern understanding of science is
correct, the process cannot be a purely material one, for several
reasons. First, purely material processes are mindless. They are
also completely governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, and
biology. But no law of physics, chemistry, or biology refers to,
or ever will refer to, immaterial entities such as souls, for
standard science restricts itself to the material realm. It follows
that no law of physics, chemistry, or biology relates mind and
body. It also follows that the process that joins mind and body
is not a material process governed by the laws of physics,
chemistry, or biology. The union of mind and body therefore
cannot in principle be explained by science.
How, then, does the soul get joined to the body, given that
dualism is true? Theism offers one plausible explanation. If God
exists, and if God creates each individual soul and joins it to a
physical body each time a new human being comes into
existence, then we have an explanation, albeit a philosophical
one, for the union of body and soul. Is any other explanation

available? This is one of many areas where theism helps us
make sense of a phenomenon that would otherwise be
unexplained. Many dualists are theists as the result of a best
explanation argument that runs something like this.
A Dualistic Argument for God’s Existence
1. Mind-body dualism is true.
2. Some agent or process unites the physical body and the
immaterial soul each time a new human being comes into
existence. (This is the data to be explained.)
3. This agent or process cannot possibly be a purely material
agent or process.
4. Therefore, an immaterial agent or process existing above or
outside the system of matter unites body and soul when a new
human being comes into existence.
5. The most plausible candidate is God or a supreme being: God
creates each individual mind, or soul, and unites it with a
physical body when a new human being comes into existence.
6. Therefore, theism is the best explanation of the data.
7. It is therefore reasonable to believe that God or a supreme
being exists.
Argument for 3:
If dualism is true, and if our modern understanding of science is
correct, the agent or process that unites body and soul cannot be
a purely material being or process, for material processes are (a)
mindless; (b) they are completely governed by the laws of
physics and chemistry, and (c) no law of physics or chemistry
relates mind and body, for no law of science refers to, or ever
will refer to, immaterial entities such as souls.

Theism and dualism are related in many complex ways. The
following is a deductive argument from mind- body dualism to
theism. The first premise reflects the fact that theism and
materialism are the two great worldviews competing for
allegiance today.
1. Either (a) materialism is true and the first cause of all things
is pure mindless matter, or (b) theism is true and God is the first
cause of all things.
2. Mind-body dualism is true.
3. If mind-body dualism is true, a mind cannot be produced by a
purely material agent or process.
4. Therefore, a mind cannot be produced by a purely material
agent or process.
5. Minds exist.
6. If materialism is true and the first cause of all things is pure,
mindless matter, then minds do not exist.
7. Therefore, materialism is false.
8. Therefore, theism is true and God is the first cause of all
things.
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)
observed that each philosophical position is logically linked to
other philosophical positions so that the view we adopt on one
issue influences the views we hold on other issues. All
philosophical topics, he suggested, are logically interrelated.
Does mind-body dualism make the most sense within a theistic
framework? Does mind-body dualism logically point to theism?
If you believe that dualism is true, should you also believe that
God exists? In short, is mind-body dualism evidence for God’s

existence? You decide.
Notes
� Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Laurence J.
Lafleur (trans)(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Educational
Publishings), 81.
� For the purposes of this introductory level argument, I am
assuming that a “part” of the body contains at least two atomic
particles.
� For logic purists, technically, premise 2 is the contrapositive
of Leibniz’s law. (The contrapositive of “If P, then Q” is “If not
Q, then not P.”) Every conditional, or “if, then,” proposition is
logically equivalent to its contrapositive and therefore implies
(and is implied by) its contrapositive.
� Thomas Nagel, What Does It All Mean? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987 ), 33.
� Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, eds. The Waning of
Materialism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.
� Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, eds. The Waning of
Materialism, 18.
� Jerry Fodor, “The Mind-Body Problem,” in Richard Warner
and Tadeusz Szubka, eds, The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to
the Current Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 25.

� Edward Feser, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginners Guide
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005).
� John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary
Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004).
� For more on this, see Paul Churchland, Matter and
Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), chap. 2, and
Fodor, “The Mind-Body Problem,” in Warner and Szubka,
Mind-Body Problem.
� For further exploration of the identity theory, see Cynthia
Macdonald, Mind-Body Identity Theories (London: Routledge,
1989). See also Warner and Szubka, eds., Mind-Body Problem,
part 1; Keith Campbell, Body and Mind (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1970); and Churchland, Matter and Consciousness,
26–36. Two important early defenses of the identity theory are
U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?,” reprinted in
V. C. Chappell, ed., Philosophy of Mind; and J. J. C. Smart,
“Sensations and Brain Processes,” reprinted in the same volume.
See also David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).
� The case of Phineas Gage is often mentioned. In the 1840s,
Gage was working on a railroad construction crew, setting
dynamite charges, when a horrible accident occurred. A stick of
dynamite exploded prematurely, sending a three-foot-long iron
tamping rod through his left cheek and out the top of his skull.
Amazingly, Gage survived, but the rod destroyed part of the
front of his brain (his prefrontal cortex). After he recovered, his
friends and associates noticed a drastic change in his

personality. The philosophy professor Steve Duncan in
correspondence suggested one way to interpret this case:
perhaps Gage's personality change was his real self coming out
after damage to his frontal cortex made it impossible for him to
disguise his true nature.
� From “Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise,” in Andrea
Lavazza and Howard Robinson, eds., Contemporary Dualism: A
Defense (New York, Routledge, 2014), 87.
� See J. J. C. Smart. “Sensations and Brain Processes” in David
Rosenthal, ed., Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 54.
� In framing my explanation, I am indebted to Anthony
Appiah’s account in Necessary Questions (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 22.
� For further development of this line of reasoning, see John
Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1984).
� Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Ned Block,
ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 276.
� Chalmers, Character of Consciousness.
� David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford

University Press, 2010).
� For further exploration of this interesting point, see Thomas
Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in Thomas Nagel, Mortal
Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
� The neuroscientist John C. Eccles, who was awarded the
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, defends a dualist
account of the mind-brain relationship in Karl Popper and John
C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for
Interactionism (New York: Routledge, 1984). Dualism is also
defended in John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the
Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (New York:
Routledge, 1991). See John C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its
Brain (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994). Eccles develops a
dualistic account of the brain that incorporates the latest
scientific understanding of the brain’s structure while offering
an account of how a nonmaterial mind might act on the physical
brain to bring about voluntary action.
� I am using the word material to refer to the entities and
forces studied by science, namely, subatomic particles, atoms,
molecules, quanta of energy, the forces of nature, and so forth.
� Of course, all theists are mind-body dualists in the minimal
sense that they believe that at least one immaterial mind exists,
namely, God’s mind.
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Chapter 7. The Mind-Body ProblemChapter 7. The Mind-Body Pro.docx

Chapter 7. The Mind-Body ProblemChapter 7. The Mind-Body Pro.docx

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