Bla-blah-blah SAP. Bla-blah-blah big companies. Bla-blah-blah hack multi-million dollar systems. This is how typical SAP Talks are started. But not this time. We are really missing hardcore exploitation stuff and unusual vulnerabilities, no matter where they are. Now it's time for real HARDCORE! In our presentation, we will tell (and show) how by using a chain of minor vulnerabilities in different SAP services we can take complete control of an affected system. Have you ever heard that a denial of service vulnerability can be used for remote command execution? No, we are not talking about memory corruption. It's about how unexploitablea denial of service vulnerabilities can be exploited together with some minor issues to attack system in a way which you have never imagined. You'll see the way from Anonymous to SAP_ALL, enjoy!

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SAP, dos, dos, race conditions => rce
Dmitry Chastuhin, Dmitry Yudin

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About us
Business application
security expert
Yet another security
researcher
ERPScan
Wiem, jak korzystać z
tłumaczami

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About us
Security researcher
Reverse engineer
ERPScan

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About ERPScan
• The only 360-degree SAP security solution: ERPScan Security
Monitoring Suite for SAP
• Leader by the number of vulnerabilities in SAP and Oracle (500+)
• 100+ presentations key security conferences worldwide
• 30+ awards and nominations
• Research team: 20 experts with experience in different areas of
security
• Headquarters Amsterdam (EU), offices in USA, Australia,
Denmark
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About what?
• No blah-blah-blah about how important it is to spend time and
money on SAP security (critically important)
• No blah-blah-blah about best practices
• No Junk Hacking
Just a little story how we got yet another RCE in SAP
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SAP
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Target
• SAP and WEB?
– XSS, CSRF, double blind self clickjacking, whatever
• SAP and ABAP/JAVA?
– RFC, servlets, ABAP code, transactions
• SAP and additional services?
– Log Viewer, SDM, notepad, archives
Try to implement some reverse engineering to core binary file
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DISP+WORK.EXE
dw - disp+work - Dispatcher & Workprocess - "The complete
Kernel" - Here the complete ABAP is processed ...
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DISP+WORK.EXE
Binary has a considerable size: ≈ 51 M
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DISP+WORK.EXE
Binary has a considerable size: ≈ 51 M
Ida db size: ≈ 133 M
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DISP+WORK.EXE
Binary has a considerable size: ≈ 51 M
Ida db size: ≈ 133 M
Difficult debug network communication
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DISP+WORK.EXE
Difficulties with debug network communication
Even a child can process request: difficult guess the pid of process
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DISP+WORK.EXE

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Instance profile cfg
rdisp/TRACE = 2
rdisp/TRACE_RESOLUTION = 2
rdisp/TRACE_LOGGING = on
rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA = off
rdisp/TRACE_COMPS = 2
enque/TRACE = 2
alert/TRACE = 2
service/trace = 2
rdisp/configurable_wp_no = 0
rdisp/wp_max_no = 0
rdisp/wp_no_dia = 1
rdisp/wp_no_btc = 0
rdisp/wp_no_vb = 0
rdisp/wp_no_vb2 = 0
rdisp/wp_no_spo = 0
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Instance profile cfg
rdisp/TRACE = 2
rdisp/TRACE_RESOLUTION = 2
rdisp/TRACE_LOGGING = on
rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA = off
rdisp/TRACE_COMPS = 2
enque/TRACE = 2
alert/TRACE = 2
service/trace = 2
rdisp/configurable_wp_no = 0
rdisp/wp_max_no = 0
rdisp/wp_no_dia = 1
rdisp/wp_no_btc = 0
rdisp/wp_no_vb = 0
rdisp/wp_no_vb2 = 0
rdisp/wp_no_spo = 0
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Number of configurable work processes

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Actually it can be processed by one worker. ☺

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By only one worker ☺
But …

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DISP+WORK.EXE
Where is jstart???
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Before …

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After …
Yoo-hoo, JSTART?!?? …

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DISP+WORK.EXE
JSTART
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Reverse engineering of DISP+WORK.EXE
GOAL

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Reverse engineering of DISP+WORK.EXE
• But
– It’s too difficult
– It’s too big
– I’m too lazy
– RCE takes too much time

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Reverse engineering of DISP+WORK.EXE
• But
– It’s too difficult
– It’s too big
– I’m too lazy
– RCE takes too much time (maybe)

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SEEK AND DESTROY
How about some new
targets?

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SEEK AND DESTROY
• Disp+work – here the complete ABAP is processed
• Gwrd – SAP gateway
• Icman (icm) – SAP Web Application Server
• Jstart – SAP AS Java Instance
• Sapstart – SAP starter
• Igswd_mt – SAP IGS (Internet Graphics Service )
• Igsmux_mt – SAP IGS
• Igspw_mt – SAP IGS

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SAPSTARTSRV
• HOW ABOUT SAPSTARTSRV

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SAPSTARTSRV
• SAP Management Console

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SAPSTARTSRV
• ≈ 15M
• LISTEN tcp 0 0.0.0.0:5NN13
• SOAP
– SAPControl:OSExecute ☺
• But ☹
– We need authentication

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Reverse engineering of SAPSTARTSRV
• IsTrustedInternalConnect()
– JsfOpenShm()
– JsfCheckShmKeyString()
– JsfCloseShm()

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Reverse engineering of SAPSTARTSRV
IsTrustedInternalConnect()
– Hardcoded user names
• “{2D4A6FB8-37F1-43d7-88BE-AD279C89DCD7}”
User name for requests with a temporary local logon tickets.
• “{221BA44F-F88E-4166-BB2B-E2541910B86A}”
UNDOCUMENTED HARDCODED USER NAME

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Reverse engineering of SAPSTARTSRV
IsTrustedInternalConnect()
How about a hardcoded password?

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Reverse engineering of SAPSTARTSRV
IsTrustedInternalConnect()
How about a hardcoded password?

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SHM
• IsTrustedInternalConnect()
– JsfOpenShm()
– JsfCheckShmKeyString()
– JsfCloseShm()

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SHM
• IsTrustedInternalConnect()
– JsfOpenShm()
– JsfCheckShmKeyString()
– JsfCloseShm()

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SHM
What is SHM?

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Shared memory
SHM - Shared Memory is an efficient
means of passing data between
programs. One program will create a
memory portion which other
processes (if permitted) can access.

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Shared memory
•IsTrustedInternalConnect()
–JsfOpenShm()
–JsfCheckShmKeyString()
–JsfCloseShm()

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Shared memory
•IsTrustedInternalConnect()
–JsfOpenShm() - ok
–JsfCheckShmKeyString()
–JsfCloseShm()

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Shared memory
•IsTrustedInternalConnect()
–JsfOpenShm() - ok
–JsfCheckShmKeyString()
–JsfCloseShm() - ok

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Shared memory
•IsTrustedInternalConnect()
–JsfOpenShm() - ok
–JsfCheckShmKeyString() - ???
–JsfCloseShm() - ok

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Shared memory
•JsfCheckShmKeyString()
•What is this key?
•Is this key static?
•Can we guess this key (if not
static)?
•Can we brut this key?

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Shared memory
• JsfCheckShmKeyString()
What is this key?
• password for authentication on SAPSTARTSRV
• Is this key static?
• Can we guess key (if not static)?
• Can we brut this key?

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Shared memory
• JsfCheckShmKeyString()
• Is this key static?
• No
– Rng_PseudoRandomInit
– Rng_PseudoRandom
– Rng_CompleteUpdate
– Key len 36 bytes
• Can we guess this key (if not static)?
• Can we brut this key?

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Shared memory
• JsfCheckShmKeyString()
• Is this key static?
• No
– Rng_PseudoRandomInit
– Rng_PseudoRandom
– Rng_CompleteUpdate
– Key len 36 bytes
• Can we guess this key (if not static)? - No
• Can we brut this key?

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Shared memory
• JsfCheckShmKeyString()
• Is this key static?
• No
– Rng_PseudoRandomInit
– Rng_PseudoRandom
– Rng_CompleteUpdate
– Key len 36 bytes
• Can we guess this key (if not static)? - No
• Can we brut this key? - No

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Shared memory
• JsfCheckShmKeyString()

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ShmKey …
BUT

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ShmKey …

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ShmKey …
… if we try to debug a
little

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authBypassOSExec_poc.py

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DEMO 1

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ShmKey …
• “Random” ShmKeyStrting is
– “xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx”

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ShmKey …
• “Random” ShmKeyStrting is
– “xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx”

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ShmKey …
• “Random” ShmKeyStrting is
– “xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx”

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Random ShmKey …
AWESOME

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ShmKey …
Why?
“xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx”

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• JsfCheckShmKeyString()
– Read raw (binary) key from shm memory
– Convert key to readable format
– Add ‘x’ to end and ‘x’ to begin of key ☺ (why?)
– Check key with user input
– Return result

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SHM

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In our case
xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx
is a printable presentation of raw key
Hex dump:
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000020 00

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In our case
xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx
is a printable presentation of raw key
Hex dump:
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000020 00
Some shared memory problems?

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Random ShmKey …
Do you remember …

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Random ShmKey …
Do you remember …
profile cfg …

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Random ShmKey …
Do you remember …
profile cfg …
jstart – what never started …

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Instance profile cfg
rdisp/TRACE = 1337
rdisp/TRACE_RESOLUTION = 1337
rdisp/TRACE_LOGGING = on
rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA = off
rdisp/TRACE_COMPS = 7
enque/TRACE = 7
alert/TRACE = 7
service/trace = 7
rdisp/configurable_wp_no = 0
rdisp/wp_max_no = 0
rdisp/wp_no_dia = 1
rdisp/wp_no_btc = 0
rdisp/wp_no_vb = 0
rdisp/wp_no_vb2 = 0
rdisp/wp_no_spo = 0
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Instance profile cfg
#rdisp/TRACE = 1337
#rdisp/TRACE_RESOLUTION = 1337
#rdisp/TRACE_LOGGING = on
#rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA = off
#rdisp/TRACE_COMPS = 7
#enque/TRACE = 7
#alert/TRACE = 7
#service/trace = 7
#rdisp/configurable_wp_no = 0
#rdisp/wp_max_no = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_dia = 1
#rdisp/wp_no_btc = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_vb = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_vb2 = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_spo = 0
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Instance profile cfg
#rdisp/TRACE = 1337
#rdisp/TRACE_RESOLUTION = 1337
#rdisp/TRACE_LOGGING = on
#rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA = off
#rdisp/TRACE_COMPS = 7
#enque/TRACE = 7
#alert/TRACE = 7
#service/trace = 7 + RESTART WHOLE SYSTEM (OS)
#rdisp/configurable_wp_no = 0
#rdisp/wp_max_no = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_dia = 1
#rdisp/wp_no_btc = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_vb = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_vb2 = 0
#rdisp/wp_no_spo = 0
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Random ShmKey …
• After restart

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Random ShmKey …
• After restart
– Jstart started

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Random ShmKey …
• After restart
– Jstart started
– “Random” ShmKeyStrting indeed random

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Random ShmKey …
• After restart
– Jstart started
– “Random” ShmKeyStrting indeed random
– This key is NOT working
“xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx”

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Random ShmKey …

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HOW CONVERT THIS BUG TO REMOTE RCE WITHOUT LOCAL PF
MODIFICATION?

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HOW ABOUT JSTART …

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HOW ABOUT JSTART …
Plan A:
Run
authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with “magic key”)

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HOW ABOUT JSTART …
Plan A:
Run
authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with “magic key”)
try to kill jstart

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HOW ABOUT JSTART …
Plan A:
Run
authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with “magic key”)
try to kill jstart (now only local)

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HOW ABOUT JSTART …
Plan A:
Run
authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with “magic key”)
try to kill jstart (now only local)
$ killall –r jstart -9

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• AND

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PLAN B
• Ok, time for plan B

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PLAN B
• Plan B

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PLAN B
• ICMAN …

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PLAN B

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PLAN B
Q:
How do you think it killed both jstart and icman at the same
time?

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PLAN B
A:

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PLAN B

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PLAN B
• ICMAN
$ authBypassOSExec_poc.py
$ killall -r icman -r jstart -9

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DEMO 2

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REMOTE RCE
• PLAN
– Run authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with a magic key)

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REMOTE RCE
• PLAN
– Run authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with magic key)
– Find remote DoS for jstart

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REMOTE RCE
• PLAN
– Run authBypassOSExec_poc.py (with magic key)
– Find remote DoS for jstart
– Find remote DoS for icman

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JSTART
JSTART – Application server for Java

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JSTART
• DoS after ≈ 3 days

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JSTART DoS
• DoS after ≈ 3 days
• Possible race condition

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JSTART DoS
• DoS after ≈ 3 days
• Possible race condition
• Jstart restart after a crash

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JSTART DoS
• DoS after ≈ 3 days
• Possible race condition
• Jstart restart after a crash
• EASY TARGET ^_^

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JSTART DoS
Multiply request:
"x00x00x00x1cNI_RTERRx00yx04x00x00ASDx00x00x00x04DAAAAAAA“

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ICM
• ICM …

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ICM
•ICM …

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ICM
•ICM…

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ICM
• ICM in the SAP NetWeaver Application Server.
The ICM is a component of the SAP NetWeaver
Application Server. It is implemented as a
separate process, which is started and monitored
by the ABAP dispatcher.
• One of core component of SAP

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ICM
– Binary name icman.exe
– Size 5.7M
– IDA db ~ 100M
– One of core components of SAP => thoroughly
audited

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ICM
• ICM (icman) … cve details

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ICM
• ICM (icman) … cve details
Last DoS found in 2014 …

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ICM
• ICM (icman) … cve details
Last DoS found in 2014 …
via unknown vectors

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ICM DoS
• DoS after …
Not so easy ...

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ICM DoS
After

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ICM DoS
≈ 35 days

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ICM DoS
≈ 35 days + some weekends

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ICM DoS
• Multiple requests :
'get / HTTP/1.0rnhost:rncookie: ;x0c%srnrn' % ("x0c" * 0x1b58)
• icman restart after a crash

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PROBLEMS …
• Race conditions …
• If We kill jstart before icman => NO RCE
• Small gap for a magic key between jstart and
icman start

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Video 3 - RCE

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Solutions…
• ICM DoS:
– SAP note 2256185 (Dmitry Yudin)
• Jstart DoS:
– SAP note 2259547 (Dmitry Yudin)
• MC auth bypass:
– SAP note 2259547 (Dmitry Chastuhin, Dmitry Yudin)

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Conclusion
• Don’t give up. If you can't exploit vulnerability
using one issue try to find another way to trigger
it
• Holistic approach + correlation (code, SOD,
vulnerabilities)
• Probably a lot of vulnerabilities still do exist on a
binary level of different SAP services
• Have fun!

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