Ethiopia Impact Brief

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Ethiopia Impact Brief

  1. 1. DCA LOAN GUARANTEEETHIOPIAIMPACT BRIEF
  2. 2. On the Cover: Women sorting coffee beansat a coffee washing station. BACKGROUND EVALUATION OBJECTIVES Ethiopia is blessed with approximately 107,600 square USAID’s Office of Development Credit (EGAT/DC), kilometers of arable land (about 11 percent of its which administers the DCA guarantees, commissioned territory); yet, it has struggled for many years to feed its an evaluation of the BOA guarantees in 2009. This people. evaluation assesses the performance of the guarantee relative to its objectives as defined in the Action Package One problem Ethiopia’s farmers face is lack of access to developed by USAID/Ethiopia, i.e., increasing access to finance, which they need to modernize their practices credit for agricultural cooperative unions and producers and purchase machinery. ABOUT DCA in the coffee, food grains, horticulture, and livestock Ethiopian banks generally USAIDs Development Credit Authority sectors. The evaluation assesses the outputs, outcomes, require collateral valued (DCA) was created in 1999 to mobilize and impacts of the guarantee. local private capital through the at a minimum of 100 establishment of real risk sharing percent of the value of The evaluation covers BOA’s lending behavior and relationships with private financial institutions in USAID countries. The the loan plus interest, potential demonstration effects in the banking sector. It tool is available to all USAID overseas which is unreachable for does not examine EGAT/DC’s or USAID/Ethiopia’s missions and can be used as a vehicle for providing much needed credit to an most farmers. Since all administration of the guarantee, nor does it examine the array of enterprises and underserved Ethiopian land belongs guarantee’s contribution to USAID/Ethiopia’s strategic sectors. The evaluation in Ethiopia is to the government, objectives. part of a set of evaluations EGAT/DC is undertaking in different countries, to farmers cannot use the EVALUATION METHODOLOGY test a series of developmental farmland they lease as hypotheses related to the DCA This evaluation used a mixed methods approach, collateral and banks do guarantees. including statistical analysis of loan data, key informant not accept crops or and group interviews, and document review. It began other farm stock as with a review of background documents on BOA and its collateral. As of June 2000, agricultural lending made up MSED and DCA guarantees, and continued in Ethiopia only 8 percent of the total value of outstanding loans in from December 7 to 19 with semi-structured interviews Ethiopia. with BOA staff and clients, the USAID Mission, and other USAID responded to this lack of finance by providing a financial sector experts. The evaluator used comparative series of Micro- and Small Enterprise Development analysis, statistical analysis, and content pattern analysis (MSED) and Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan to draw findings from the collected data, from which portfolio guarantees (LPGs) to the Bank of Abyssinia conclusions were drawn. (BOA), a long-standing, private Ethiopian bank. USAID KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS designed the LPGs to support BOA lending, first to OUTPUTS agricultural cooperative unions, and then to the Conclusions Bank of Abyssinia wanted to lend to the agriculture sector in general. The LPGs with BOA span agriculture sector because it plays a major role in the 15 years, from the end of 1999 through 2014. country and economy and because export sub-sectors, such as coffee, generate desired foreign currency. BANK OF ABYSSINIA LOAN GUARANTEES Number of Median Starting Ending Ceiling Aggregate Utilization Average Loan Loans (as of Loan Size Year Year Amount ($) Amount ($) Rate Tenor (months) 1/2010) ($) 1999 2004 1.3 million 27 2,705,538 100 % 69,606 4.71 2003 2004 500,000 6 383,546 76.71 % 66,125 1.37 2004 2014 9 million 39 8,178,511 90.87 % 172,414 15.35
  3. 3. At the same time, the bank saw agricultural producers have changed somewhat, as some former USAID-and cooperatives as risky borrowers because they guaranteed borrowers received preferential loan terms.lacked collateral. Therefore, BOA used the LPGs to Findings to support these conclusions include:subsidize collateral requirements for guaranteed • According to BOA’s loan data, the bank has givenborrowers. nonguaranteed loans to eight of the borrowersBetween 2000 and 2008, the USAID guarantees were who first came to the bank under the USAIDresponsible for increasing BOA’s lending to the guarantee program. Six of the eight borrowersagriculture sector from 0 to an average of 2.3% of its were coffee processors and/or exporters and thetotal value of loans disbursed during the period. remaining two handled grain and livestock.The USAID guarantees enabled agriculture sector • BOA’s lending to agriculture grew 102 percentborrowers to obtain loans larger than they would between 2001 and 2009.otherwise have received, if they could have qualified for • The Vice President/Operations of BOA said thatany loan at all. the bank’s nonguaranteed lending to the agriculture sector has focused primarily on export crops,Findings in support of these conclusions include: especially coffee and sesame and recently, cattle. • BOA statistics show it had not lent to the The focus on exportable goods results from the agriculture sector prior to 1999 and it only bank’s need for foreign currency. began to do so with its first MSED guarantee. • Of the eight borrowers who graduated from the • BOA’s Vice President said the bank was USAID guarantees, seven provided collateral interested in lending to the agriculture sector as valued at less than 100 percent of the loan amount a vital part of the country’s economy and plus interest they received. because agricultural exports have the potential • The Vice President/Operations of BOA said that to generate foreign currency. while the bank has been lending to the agriculture • All four of the private banks interviewed said sector without the guarantee, it has only been to they require at least 100 percent collateral from those enterprises with solid lending histories with their borrowers. other banks. The bank is not comfortable providing • BOA said it would not have lent to the loans to new customers with insufficient collateral. guaranteed borrowers without the guarantee. IMPACTS • BOA counted the USAID guarantees as Conclusions All Ethiopian banks have increased their fulfillment of 50 percent of the standard lending to the agriculture sector since 2000. collateral requirement, thereby enabling Government-owned banks’ behavior results from agricultural borrowers short of collateral to government policy focusing increasingly on supporting obtain credit. agriculture. The attractiveness of certain Ethiopian • The value of USAID-guaranteed loans disbursed agricultural exports has motivated private banks to during 2001 to 2007 represented between 0.3 engage increasingly with the sector, along with a and 6.7 percent of the total value of loans professed desire to support a sector that plays a large disbursed. role in the country’s economy. The USAID guaranteesOUTCOMES to BOA did not play any perceptible role in other banks’Conclusions The USAID guarantees encouraged BOA to decisions to lend to the agriculture sector.enter the agriculture finance sector and the bank will Loan access has improved somewhat over the last 10likely continue to lend to this sector, but only to years, mainly because of the efforts of the governmentexporters for the near future. BOA continued to lend to banks, which provide collateral-free loans to agricultural20% of the formerly USAID-guaranteed borrowers exporters.because they were profitable businesses. Loan terms
  4. 4. Private banks lower collateral requirements for BOA AGRICULTURE AND EXPORT LENDING AS % OFsome exporters to increase their foreign currency TOTAL LENDINGholdings. In addition, some agriculture sectorborrowers have increased their capital and aretherefore able to qualify for larger loans.The USAID guarantees clearly influenced BOA toincrease lending to the agriculture sector.However, the agriculture finance sector appearsto be still largely underserved.Findings to support these conclusions include: • Agriculture’s share of total Ethiopian bank lending has increased from 16 percent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2008. • The state-owned Development Bank of Ethiopia began lending to the agriculture sector when it was first established 100 years ago. Recently, the government has asked it to focus • Four coffee processors said that because the price on supporting agricultural exports.The state-owned of raw coffee has risen over the last four years, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia is following Ethiopian purchasing power of borrowed funds is lower. Government policy to increase the country’s self- • Four banks and three borrowers said that banks sufficiency by lending to agriculture. lack the capacity to assess the creditworthiness of • In interviews, private banks emphasized the desire agricultural borrowers and therefore still rely on to help support the agriculture sector, and collateral to guard against the perceived riskiness of highlighted the fact that they can obtain foreign the agriculture sector. currency by lending to agricultural export sectors. • Two cooperative union representatives, a • Five BOA borrowers interviewed have received government bank, and the FCC said that larger loans more recently than previously with cooperatives need training to help them produce little or no change in the collateral requirement, more profitably and manage loans they receive. which suggests that they built up enough collateral • Two cooperative representatives and two banks to qualify for more credit on their own. said that lack of rural infrastructure poses a serious • Six borrowers, four banks, and the Federal problem to both cooperatives’ capacity to produce Cooperative Commission (FCC) said that and transport their products, as well as to banks’ cooperatives, cooperative unions, and individual ability to reach agricultural producers farmers still lack sufficient collateral to qualify for the loans they need. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by SEGURA/IP3 Partners LLC under SEGIR Global Business, Trade and Investment II – IQC Indefinite Quantity Contract, Number EEM-I-00-07-00001-00 Task Order # 04, Development Credit Authority Evaluation. CONTACT INFORMATION U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Development Credit 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20523 http://www.USAID.gov Keyword: DCA

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