Rwanda Impact Brief


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Rwanda Impact Brief

  2. 2. On the Cover: Rwandan farmerholds coffee beans, a majorexport of the country.Photo credit USAID/Rwanda BACKGROUND enterprises. Qualified borrowers included investors in Rwanda is a very small and densely populated country coffee washing stations which are a key component of with a population that depends largely on subsistence the chosen strategy to improve coffee quality. agriculture for their livelihoods. This dependence, The DCA guarantee covered 40 percent of the loss of coupled with a limited land base, small landholdings, a principal on a maximum of $2 million in loans. In the high population growth rate, declining agricultural 32 months that the guarantee was in effect the Bank productivity, high rates of illiteracy, and limited of Kigali issued over $1.7 million in investment and opportunities outside of subsistence agriculture working capital loans to coffee washing station contribute to low incomes ABOUT DCA investors thus utilizing 86 percent of the guarantee. and high rates of poverty. USAIDs Development Credit Authority Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of the (DCA) was created in 1999 to mobilize The Government of guarantee. local private capital through the Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction establishment of real risk sharing EVALUATION OBJECTIVES Strategy Paper (PRSP) relationships with private financial The evaluation assesses the performance of the institutions in USAID countries. The identifies agriculture as the guarantee at three levels – output, outcome, and tool is available to all USAID overseas primary engine for growth. missions and can be used as a vehicle impact. At the output level, the evaluation asks It sets forth a strategy to for providing much needed credit to an whether the guarantee changed the Bank of Kigali’s build on the country’s core array of enterprises and underserved lending practices to the target sector (additionality, sectors. The evaluation in Rwanda is strengths in agriculture to i.e., did it issue loans that it would not have disbursed part of a set of evaluations EGAT/DC increase economic growth without the guarantee). At the outcome level, the and combat poverty in the is undertaking in different countries, to test a series of developmental evaluation assesses the extent to which the guarantee medium term. Rwanda’s hypotheses related to the DCA affected the Bank of Kigali lending to the target sector environment is ideal for guarantees. outside of the protection of the guarantee. At the producing distinctive coffees impact level, the evaluation asks whether the and enhancing the capacity guarantee had any demonstration effect that of Rwanda’s coffee sector to target high value prompted other banks to increase their lending to the specialty markets worldwide is one element of the target sectors. The evaluation focuses only on how strategy. the guarantee changed the behavior of the Bank of In 2001, USAID/Rwanda implemented several Kigali and other banks. It does not evaluate the technical assistance projects to support Rwanda’s performance of the Bank of Kigali in implementing the National Coffee Strategy. The projects sought to guarantee, USAID’s management of the guarantee, or enhance the capacity of farmers and processors to the impacts of guaranteed loans on borrowers. improve coffee quality and to develop links to high- EVALUATION METHODOLOGY value export markets. To support these projects, in The evaluation used structured interviews to collect 2004 USAID implemented a Development Credit information from the Bank of Kigali, USAID, other Authority (DCA) loan guarantee with the Bank of banks, borrowers, technical assistance providers to Kigali (BK) with the objective of increasing access to the coffee sector, relevant government ministries and credit for strategic export-oriented agricultural TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2004 BANK OF KIGALI DCA LOAN GUARANTEE Start Guarantee Number Aggregate Median Utilization End datea Type of loans TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2004 BANK OF loans date ceiling of KIGALI DCA LOAN GUARANTEE value value rate Working capital 7 $710,429 $82,647 9/2004 12/2007 $2 million 86% Capital investment 11 $1,019,019 $90,396 a. Suspended in February 2007 when the Rwandan Government assumed control of the bank, violating a condition of the guarantee agreement. Source: EGAT/DC Credit Monitoring System, accessed, October 21, 2009.
  3. 3. departments (i.e., the Ministry of Agriculture, Rwanda borrowers could have obtained loans fromCoffee Board – also known as OSIR-Café, and others) other banks but these loans were guaranteedknowledgeable of Rwanda’s coffee and financial sectors by a government-backed guarantee facility andand of the guarantee. application and disbursement practices were more cumbersome than those at BK.None of the people directly involved in designing andimplementing the DCA guarantee remained at either OUTCOMEUSAID or the bank at the time of the evaluation. The Conclusions The guarantee had a limited impact on thelack of institutional memory limited the evaluator’s Bank of Kigali’s lending to the coffee sector outside ofaccess to key qualitative and quantitative data for the the protection of the guarantee. In spite of the bank’sevaluation and thus restricted the depth of analysis. demonstrated interest in continued lending to the sector and ample opportunity to lend, the bank hasKEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS issued no investment loans to the sector since USAIDOUTPUTConclusions Even though the bank did not have a suspended the guarantee. The bank has provideddocumented strategy to increase lending to agriculture, working capital loans outside of the guarantee to athe guarantee provided the bank an opportunity to handful of borrowers with which it gained experienceincrease its agricultural portfolio and increase deposits during the guarantee but has not changed its usualat reduced risk. The guarantee was entirely responsible lending practices when making the loans – that is, itfor the bank’s substantial increase in capital investment requires 100 percent collateral. Some DCA borrowersand working capital financing to coffee washing station were able to accumulate assets for use as collateralinvestors. during the time that they made use of DCA loans which then gave them greater access to credit outsideThe close coordination between the guarantee and of the guarantee.USAID-supported technical assistance projectstargeted to the coffee sector contributed to the bank’s Findings in support of these conclusions include:extraordinarily rapid and appropriate utilization of the • Bank personnel reported that the bank hadguarantee. The technical assistance projects steered made no investment loans to the coffee sectorqualified and creditworthy borrowers to the bank and since USAID suspended the DCA guarantee.substantially reduced the bank’s costs in implementing • The bank’s interest in a second DCAthe guarantee. guarantee in 2006 demonstrates its interest in continued lending to the sector. Two of the sixFindings in support of these conclusions include: borrowers that the evaluator interviewed • The bank’s annual reports and interviews with reported seeking additional investment loans bank personnel revealed no specific strategy to from BK to expand their operations thus use the guarantee. However, the bank did not providing the bank an opportunity to lend to have to market the guarantee because all 11 the sector. borrowers had received USAID-supported • The bank has provided working capital loans to technical assistance and approached the bank at least two DCA borrowers outside of the seeking guaranteed loans. guarantee. The experience the bank gained • The Bank of Kigali had disbursed only one with these borrowers during the guarantee investment and one working capital loan to probably played a role in the decision to coffee washing station investors prior to the continue lending. The guarantee also seems to guarantee. This fact, along with statements have helped some borrowers increase their from the bank and from borrowers, suggests collateral positions thus making them eligible that the bank would not have made the 18 for larger non-guaranteed loans than they guaranteed loans without the guarantee. Some would otherwise have been able to receive.
  4. 4. IMPACT GUARANTEED LENDING TO THE COFFEE SECTOR, 2004-2009Conclusions Rwanda’s banking sector hassubstantially increased its short- andmedium-term lending to small-scale coffeeinvestors since 2004. However, banksplaced most, if not all, of the loans underone of three available guarantee facilitiesor used donor-supported credit lines.There is no evidence that banks areproviding any substantial number of non-guaranteed investment or working capitalloans to the coffee washing stationsegment of the coffee sector. Banks stillseem unwilling to lend to this segment ofthe coffee sector outside of theprotection of a guarantee or credit line.Findings in support of these conclusionsinclude: • Bank lending to the coffee sector increased • Loan guarantees seem largely responsible for substantially between 2004 and 2008. According supporting the growth in lending to coffee to data provided by the National Bank of washing station investors. However, the DCA Rwanda, total lending to the coffee sector guarantee represented a relatively small 7.5 increased from $10.7 million in 2004 to $24.0 percent of the guaranteed financing to the sector million in 2008. However, most of the lending while the Government of Rwanda’s Agricultural was non-guaranteed lending to larger traders and Guarantee Facility (AGF) accounted for 88 exporters. percent. • Guaranteed lending to the sector increased from • None of five commercial banks that the evaluator less than 4 percent of coffee sector lending in interviewed said that they were willing to lend to 2004 to a maximum (over the 2004-2008 period) coffee sector investors with less than 100 percent of 31 percent in 2007. Guaranteed lending likely collateral. Furthermore, none said that they were served primarily small-scale investors such as willing to relax their strong preference for urban washing station investors. rather than rural property as collateral. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by SEGURA/IP3 Partners LLC under SEGIR Global Business, Trade and Investment II – IQC Indefinite Quantity Contract, Number EEM-I-00-07-00001-00 Task Order # 04, Development Credit Authority Evaluation CONTACT INFORMATION U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Development Credit 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20523 Keyword: DCA