BNamericas Project Risk Analytics - October 2015 State vs Private

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Project Risk Analytics: Tracking performance in Latin America’s top projects
US$
141bn 38% 47% 790Total increase in cost
estimates for top 200 current
projects in Latin America
of projects have
experienced increases to
original timing estimates
Number of projects in the
tendering stage in the
BNamericas project database
of projects have
experienced increases
in cost estimates
TRACKING PERFORMANCE IN
LATIN AMERICA´S TOP PROJECTS
State vs. Private – who will come out on top?
Project Risk Analytics - September 2015
PROJECT
RISKANALYTICS

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BNAMERICAS PROJECT RISK ANALYTICS
Tracking performance in Latin America’s top projects
BNamericas Project Risk Analytics tracks changes to estimates of completion dates and overall costs in Latin
American projects during their implementation phase.
The information herein is designed to be used by governments, insurers, reinsurers, project financiers, risk officers,
asset managers and advisers, to analyze upcoming risk to schedules and financing costs, and track the progress of
existing projects.
By providing a top-down analysis of the timeliness and costs of current Latin American projects, BNamericas
provides a new tool to the industry allowing it to learn from past events and improve planning for future projects.
SUBSCRIBE TODAY
PROJECT RISK ANALYTICS
Natan Levy
Author and Head of Project Risk Analytics
nlevy@BNamericas.com
+56 (2) 2941-0386
Arvinder Ludhiarich
Commercial Director
aludhiarich@BNamericas.com
+56 (2) 2941-0300

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CONTENT
FOREWORD.................................................................................4
SUMMARY...................................................................................5
RESULTS & DISCUSSION...............................................................6
project maturity as a determinant of cost overruns................................7
project duration as a determinant of cost overruns................................9
project size as a determinant of cost overruns.....................................10
State vs. Private projects....................................................................11
CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................14
APPENDIX I - ....................................................................................................................16
METHODOLOGY & PROCEDURES.........................................................................................18

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This second report by BNamericas follows on from the
inaugural report in June and updates the results for a
sample of 200 of the largest projects in Latin America
in the electric power, mining, oil & gas (excluding
upstream) and petrochemical sectors.
In tracking project data in Latin America - from the start
of construction to final completion - the report adds a
further 100 projects to the original sample and continues
to follow the progress and changes in timing and cost
estimates throughout the implementation phase of the
region’s largest projects.
Since the launch of BNamericas’ Project Risk Analytics
unit at the end of June, the work of the team has
focused on providing the data to users in a user friendly
way and the work continues to ensure this new product
by BNamericas becomes an essential tool for all actors
involved in the build-up of the region’s infrastructure.
FOREWORD
With the region’s economies continuing to depend on
the movements of foreign investment flows, and the
uncertainty surrounding policy moves by central banks
in the developing world, the focus around successful
project completion looks set to increase,especially so
as questions arise as to whether the ambitious plans for
infrastructure development – set at a time of economic
growth – can be met.
The report aims to set the scene for meaningful
comparisons between the performance of private and
state-owned projects while delving deeper into the
question of the influence of project size and other related
parameters.

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The overall results updated for the 200 largest projects in
Latin America show a significant change from June’s report
which focused on the largest 100 projects.
The addition of 100 smaller projects with a lower maturity
has brought down the incidence and severity of delays and
cost overruns.
The 200 projects covered represent an initial investment
estimate of US$367bn (compared to US$242bn in the
June report).
When updated for current estimates to the end of August
(chart 1), the expected investment for the 200 projects rises
to US$508bn, an increase of US$141bn, or 38% from
original estimates.
Further, the results, with the addition of 100 new projects,
continue to challenge the concept of the cone of uncertainty,
suggesting clearly that not only is variability in costs limited to
increases, but also that the uncertainty increases in a very
clear way for more mature projects.
SUMMARY
State versus private sector
The long standing debate as to the pros and cons of state
investment versus private sector investment has for some time
lacked real figures for comparison. In considering the track
record of investments across Latin America it is necessary to
provide information which allows for comparison of the extent
of cost overruns between the private and state sectors across
Latin America.
In that regard, there is some good news for the public sector
with the results illustrating that state-owned projects have
fared better than their private sector brethren in percentage
terms.
This however, has to be put into context and the reality has to
be acknowledged that the largest and most complex projects
continue to be undertaken by the public sector and in that
regard the current overspend in the region of US$141bn is
made up in large part by US$104bn in state-owned projects.
More importantly, by failing to budget correctly, it is also
questionable whether continued rounds of investment will
achieve their lofty goals or even if the financing will be there
for such investment to be considered.
Changes from original estimates
500
600
400
300
200
100
0
US$bn
70
80
60
50
20
40
10
30
0
Months
Total Costs US $bnTiming (average, months)
Latest estimates
of increase
16
Original project
duration
52
Latest estimates
of Increase
141
Original project
cost
367
Chart 1

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August Results – Top 200 projects
• On aggregate, current cost estimates for the top 200
projects in the region amounted to US$508bn as of August
2015, representing an increase of US$ 141bn to original
estimates.
• 47% of projects registered an increase from their original
estimate for completion, with 50% running on time and
2.5% of projects running ahead of schedule. (chart 2)
• 37.5% of projects showed an increase from their original
cost estimates, with 57% of projects running in line with
their original budget estimates and 5.5% running below
initial estimates in US dollars.
SEVERITY OF CHANGES TO TIMING ESTIMATES
• The average length of delay for the top 200 projects at
the end of August stood at 15.9 months or 35% greater
than initially estimated. The median length of delay in con-
trast has come down to zero with the addition of the new
projects. (chart 3)
• Of the 94 delayed projects, 40 are experiencing
major changes of over 60% from the original estimates.
• 33 of the 94 projects are showing medium increases of
20% to 60% from original estimates and 21 projects
are showing minor increases of between 5% and 20%
from original estimates.
• Of the remaining 106 projects, 101 are on time (-5% to
+5% from original estimates) and 5 are ahead of time.
RESULTS
Number of Projects delayed and over budget
120
100
80
60
20
40
0
Delayed On Time Ahead of
Schedule
Over budget To Budget Ahead of
Budget
94
5
101
75
114
11
Average delays and cost overruns for complete sample
50
30
40
20
45
25
35
Average delay Average cost overrun
35.1
37.6
Chart 2
Chart 3

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SEVERITY OF CHANGES TO COST ESTIMATES
• The average increase in cost estimates for the top 200 is
37.56% above initial estimates while the median increase in
cost estimates stands at 0%.
• Of the 75 projects with an increase in cost estimates, 45
projects are experiencing major changes of over 40% from
original estimates.
• 17 of the 75 projects are experiencing medium cost
increases of 20% to 40% and 13 projects are experiencing
minor increases of 5% to 20% from original estimates.
• Of the remaining 125 projects, 114 are running on
budget (-5% to +5% from original estimates) and 11 are
under budget.
CORRELATION
• When considering the relationship between changes
in costs and changes in timing estimates the correlation
coefficient stands at 0.52, with statistical significance to
p<0.001. This represents a drop from the correlation of
0.68 related to the first 100 projects.
OVER-BUDGET PROJECTS
• Given the low medians of the overall sample, following the
addition of new projects of a lower maturity, it is useful to
split the sample in order to look exclusively at those
projects which have experimend cost increases. (Chart 5)
• The average delay for a project which is running over its
initial cost estimate is close to 67% while the median stands
at close to 35%.
• The average cost overrun for those projects stands at
104% while the median stands close to 55%.
Changes from original estimates - Scatter
750%
350%
550%
150%
-50%
650%
250%
450%
50%
-50%
ChangestoCostSchedule
50% 150%
Changes to Timing Schedule
250% 350% 450%
Average delays and cost overruns for projects over budget
Average delay Average cost
overrun
Median delay Median cost
overrun
120
40
80
0
100
20
60
104
34.8
66.8
54.9
Chart 5
Chart 4

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Effect of project maturity on changes to estimates
Overall
project
maturity
On time
Delayed
On
budget
Over
budget
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
103%
59%
154%
126%
74%
MATURITY PROFILE
When considering the maturity of the sample of 200 projects
it is possible to see the decrease resulting from the addition
of the 100 projects to the original sample. When measured
by the current average advance as a percentage of the
average initial expected duration, the overall maturity
decreased from 109% for the 100 projects in March 2015,
to 103% for the 200 projects.
• Further it is clear to see that the maturity of those projects
which have experienced increases to their timing estimates
stood at 154% compared to 58.51% for projects which
were estimated to finish on time. (chart 6)
• Projects which experienced cost overruns meanwhile
exhibited a maturity of over 152% compared to projects
which are still on budget that were far less mature at close
to 74%.
Further, when looking at chart 7 it is clear once again that
those projects which have so far experienced increases to
timing and cost estimates are further along in their maturity.
The correlation meanwhile, between maturity and cost over-
runs is 56% at a significance level of <.0001.
Chart 6
Chart 7
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300%
350%
150%
250%
50%
300%
100%
200%
0%
-50%
-100%
Costchanges
Maturity
Project Maturity to Cost changes - excluding
extreme outliers
y=0.407x - 0.1259

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PROJECT MATURITY AS A DETERMINANT OF COST OVERRUNS
As an extension of the analysis and in order to improve the
understanding of the sample, it can be split into quartiles by
the maturity of the projects. (Table 1)
The table makes it clear that the more mature projects
exhibit a greater average cost overrun and are by definition
delayed to a greater extent. In addition the table shows a
significant increase in the median delay and
median cost overrun in the fourth quartile.
The correlation of delays to cost overruns thus rises from
the first to the fourth quartile.
PROJECT DURATION AS A DETERMINANT OF COST OVERRUNS
Previous academic research has looked at testing the thesis
that projects with longer implementation phases tend to have
larger cost escalations, looking at the time period from when
the decision to build is taken until construction is completed.
Flyvbjerg et al (2004)1
, found a highly significant
dependence of cost escalation on the length of the
implementation phase for the 101 transportation projects
under their research.
Using the 200 projects, for which we have the original
estimates for the length of the implementation phase, we
have split the data into quartiles by the original estimate for
the length of implementation. (Table 2)
The resultant data does not paint a clear picture. While the
average cost overrun increases steadily from the second
quartile to the fourth, the average cost overrun for first
quarter is higher than both the second and third quartiles.
What is clear however, is the rising correlation between
delays and cost overruns as the original project
implementation period increases.
By % completion
(Maturity)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
No. of projects
Average maturity
Quartile info (Maturity)
Average delay (months)
Median (months)
Average delay %
Median delay %
50 51 50 49
25% 71% 109% 211%
44% 91% 134% 591%
0.40 4.75 12.46 46.67
0.00 0.00 3.00 20.00
0.61% 8.81% 25.09% 108.03%
0.00% 0.00% 10.88% 80.77%
Total cost overrun US$mn 311 9,291 71,658 59,956
Average cost overrun % 0.28% 13.59% 38.84% 99.23%
Median cost overrun % 0.00% 0.00% 3.87% 45.49%
Correlation Delay /Cost Ov -1.77% 29.91% 26.75% 44.05%
Table 1
1
Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm and Søren L. Buhl, “What Causes Cost Overrun in
Transport Infrastructure Projects?” Transport Reviews, vol. 24, no. 1, January 2004, pp. 3-18.)
By initial
implementation time
No. of projects 50 57 45 48
Average maturity 133% 116% 81% 79%
Quartile info (months) 35 48 63 144
Average delay (months) 10.70 19.39 13.16 19.58
Median (months) 2.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
Average delay % 40.25% 48.33% 23.12% 25.43%
Median delay % 25.18% 6.67% 0.00% 0.00%
Total cost overrun US$mn 16,941 23,272 15,541 85,462
Correlation Delay /Cost Ov 39.95% 45.64% 71.45% 78.37%
Table 2
Project Maturity as a determinant of cost overruns
Project duration as a determinant of cost overruns

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PROJECT COST AS A DETERMINANT OF COST OVERRUNS
In a similar way, when looking at whether the size of
original cost estimates for a project can determine the
extent of cost increases, we have tested to see whether
cost escalation varies significantly with the size of the
project, based on its original cost estimate at the time
when the project entered its implementation phase.
Flyvbjerg et al (2004) looked at 131 projects for their
sample and while they found no immediate dependence
between the two variables, they did conclude that for
bridges and tunnels, the available data support the
claim that bigger projects have bigger percentage cost
escalations.
Our data, for the 200 projects, similarly found no immediate
dependence and it remains to be seen if additional data will
result in a link being established. (Table 3)
By initial investment
estimate
No. of projects 50 50 50 50
Average maturity 115% 117% 89% 93%
Quartile info up to US$mn 432 865 1,810 40,000
Average delay (months) 10.60 20.12 14.18 18.54
Median (months) 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00
Average delay % 30.43% 41.81% 34.77% 33.56%
Median delay % 0.00% 14.66% 0.00% 4.05%
Total cost overrun US$mn 5,507 14,657 12,443 108,609
Correlation Delay /Cost Ov 34.53% 88.55% 9.87% 48.60%
Table 3
Project cost as a determinant of cost overruns

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Private State Overall
Amount over budget US$mn 36,740 104,476 141,216
Latest investment estimate US$mn 114,156 393,852 508,008
No. of projects 58 142 200
No. of projects ahead of schedule 3 2 5
No. of projects on time 27 74 101
No. of projects delayed 28 66 94
% ahead of schedule 5,17% 1.41% 2.50%
% on time 46,55% 52.11% 50.50%
% delayed 48,28% 46.48% 47.00%
No. of projects ahead of budget 1 10 11
No. of projects on budget 28 86 114
No. of projects over budget 29 46 75
% ahead of budget 1.72% 7.04% 5.50%
% on budget 48.28% 60.56% 57.00%
% over budget 50.00% 32.39% 37.50%
Portfolio % of completion (Materity) 108% 101% 103%
Average delay (Months) 11.07 17.82 15.86%
Median (months) 2.00 0.00 0.00
Average delay % 28.02% 38.05% 35.14%
Median delay % 242% 0.00% 0.00%
Average cost overrun % 43.08% 35.30% 37.56%
Median cost overrun % 2.42% 0.00% 0.00%
Correlation delays / cost overruns 41.10% 53.77% 51.86%
State vs Private - overall comparison
Table 4
a comparison of public vs private projects
The long standing debate as to where investment should
come from is beyond the scope of the report, but in
tracking the progress of projects in the region we have
classified projects by ownership, whether state-owned or
private.
This implies a consideration of the underlying ownership
of a project to be the key determinant, whereby a
concession contract implies ownership by the related
government agency and does not imply ownership by the
contracted firm. A project run by a state-owned company
is considered to be owned by the state.
• Of the 58 existing live projects under private ownership
in the region, half are running over their original budget
with changes to cost estimates averaging 43%. (Table 4)
• In comparison, of the 142 state-owned projects in the
sample, less than a third are running over budget, with
changes to cost estimates averaging 35%.
However, it is important to remember that the largest
most complex projects continue to be undertaken by the
public sector and in that regard the current overspend
in the region of US$141bn is made up in large part by
US$104bn in state-owned projects.

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Table 5
State vs Private - Sector breakdown
State vs Private - Detailed breakdown
Number of
Projects
Cost
Increase
US$mn
Latest
estimate
for total
Investment
US$mn
Average
change
in timing
estimates
Average
change
in cost
estimates
Average
Maturity
Water & Waste 18 3,689 20,014 34.97% 25.74% 107.22%
Electric Power 55 26,372 97,366 33.54% 31.34% 101.84%
Infrastructure 67 10,729 147,786 30.84% 22.83% 89.18%
Mining 28 30,531 85,133 29.22% 65.78% 111.84%
Oil & Gas and Petchem 32 69,895 157,709 52.18% 61.02% 126.29%
Grand Total 200 141,216 508,008 35.14% 37.56% 103.40%
Number of
Projects
Cost
Increase
US$mn
Latest
estimate
for total
Investment
US$mn
Average
change
in timing
estimates
Average
change
in cost
estimates
Average
Maturity
Privado
Water & Waste 1 - 3,430 0.00% 0.00% 49.01%
Electric Power 25 3,164 19,125 20.73% 20.11% 84.09%
Infrastructure 4 1,909 6,620 84.21% 51.89% 188.47%
Mining 25 26,576 75,230 28.86% 64.76% 116.86%
Público
Water & Waste 17 3,689 16,584 37.02% 27.25% 110.65%
Electric Power 30 23,208 78,241 44.21% 40.70% 116.63%
Infrastructure 63 8,820 141,166 27.45% 20.99% 82.88%
Mining 3 3,955 9,903 32.26% 74.28% 70.00%
Grand Total 200 141,216 508,008 35.14% 37.56% 103.40%
Table 6
BY SECTOR
For a more detailed comparison between the private and
public sector projects it is useful to break the data down
by sector. (Table 5)
When broken down, the data illustrates how the greatest
cost overruns are concentrated in the mining and oil & gas
sectors.
Private project sectors are concentrated on the whole in
the mining and energy sectors while in the public sector,
projects are spread more equally, with the exception of
the mining sector.
As a result, the most useful direct comparison is available
in the electric power sector where the sample includes 25
private sector projects and 30 in the public sector. (Table 6)
Here it is found that the average change in timing and cost
estimates for electric power projects in the private sector,
both at 20.1% are much lower than for electric power
projects in the public sector where the change in timing
estimates averages 44.2% and changes in cost estimates
average 40.7%.
A closer look reveals some justification for the results in
the concentration of hydroelectric projects and nuclear
energy projects in the public sector - which carry a much
higher investment value and are by their nature more
complex than other forms of electric power stations,
including wind and solar parks which tend to be built by
the private sector in the region.

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QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
The qualitative analysis follows the methodology
introduced by a paper in the Research Journal of Applied
Sciences, Engineering and Technology in 2013.
An analysis of the main factors cited by company
contacts, public bodies and press reports for increases
in timing and cost estimates on the affected projects
uncovered the main factors to be as follows:
• Of the 200 projects in the sample, the analysis
established sufficient information for 55 of the 75 projects
that have exceeded their costs estimates, where one
or more factors were cited for their contributions to cost
increases. (Table 7)
• Financial management was the most-often-cited factor
for cost increases in 27 of the projects and included
cases where cost inflation and failures in budgeting were
cited as the causes as well as those which experienced
difficulties in receiving timely funding.
• Design factors were cited on 22 occasions as having
led to an increase in costs and involved cases of changes
in scope and redesign throughout the implementation
phase.
• Labor factors were the third most common reason cited
for cost increases on 15 occasions and included labor
disputes resulting in strikes as well as difficulties in finding
skilled staff.
• External factors, including changes in commodity prices,
in ownership and political decisions which impacted
costs, were cited in 13 cases as having contributed to
cost increases.
1
Ade Asmi Abdul Azis,AftabHameedMemon, Ismail Abdul Rahman and Ahmad TarmiziAbd.Karim. (2013) Controlling Cost Overrun Factors in
Construction Projects in Malaysia.Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology 5(8): 2621-2629.
Table 7
Factors responsible for cost overruns
Financial Management 27
Design 22
Labor 15
External 13
Project Management 11
Environmental 10
Social & Community 4
• Project management failures were cited in 11 cases
while environmental and community factors were the least
cited reasons for cost increases in the sample during the
implementation phase of a project.
• Labor factors were the third most common reason cited
for cost increases on 15 occasions and included labor
disputes resulting in strikes as well as difficulties in finding
skilled staff.
• External factors, including changes in commodity prices,
in ownership and political decisions which impacted
costs, were cited in 13 cases as having contributed to
cost increases.
• Project management failures were cited in 11 cases
while environmental and community factors were the least
cited reasons for cost increases in the sample during the
implementation phase of a project.

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The results for 200 of the largest projects in Latin
America, representing over half a trillion dollars of on-going
investment in the region attest once more to the conclusion
that delays and cost overruns are a significant issue.
Not only are delays and cost overruns extensive, they are
closely linked as the evidence shows, with more mature
projects exhibiting the greatest delays and cost overruns.
That said, the addition of 100 projects to the original
sample from the June report -which are progressively
smaller than the original 100 projects - has reduced the
overall incidence of projects running over schedule and
over original budget estimates as well as the extent of the
changes, lending weight to previous academic work which
linked project size and complexity to greater delays and
cost overruns.
This can be put down to the reduced size, maturity and
complexity of the new projects as we continue to ramp up
the sample size.
When analyzing by project size, the results proved
inconclusive, suggesting that project size was not a reliable
determinant of cost overruns.
Additional analysis by expected initial duration also proved
inconclusive, suggesting that while those projects which
are forecast to take the longest to complete experience the
greatest cost overruns, they do not experience the more
severe delays.
State vs Private
A comparative analysis of state-owned and privately-owned
projects suggests that state-owned projects are performing
better overall. Here time is required to see if the scales are
evened as more projects are added to the sample and as
they move towards completion but as shown for projects in
CONCLUSIONS
the electric power sector, the results are also influenced by
sector specific factors which make generalizations less valid.
When considering the maturity profile of on-going
projects it is important to revisit the results at completion.
If one assumes that the public sector is not under the
same scrutiny as the private sector - where accounting
recognition of fair value and changes to costs is called
for on a regular basis - it can be argued that a substantial
chunk of cost overruns in public sector projects remains to
be recognized.
If timely recognition of changes in cost estimates are indeed
the issue, with time the figures will become clearer, allowing
a more accurate comparison between private and state-
owned projects.
However, the overall scale of cost increases experienced to
date, raises important questions about the reliability of cost
estimates and as to whether both the public and the private
sectors are crowding out investment in more worthwhile
projects.
Further, As Flyvbjerg et al (2004) noted over 10 years ago,
“the main problem in relation to cost escalation may not be
public versus private ownership but a certain kind of publico
wnership, namely state-owned enterprises, which lack
both the transparency and public control that placement in
the public sector proper would entail and the competitive
pressure that placement in the private sector would bring
about,” adding that “It is an issue of principal significance for
deciding on the institutional set-up and regulatory regime for
infrastructure provision.”
Finally, an analysis of the major factors responsible for cost
overruns continues to point the finger squarely at financial
mismanagement and changes in original designs as being
the most significant reasons for increases in cost estimates.

15
The inescapable conclusion being, that better designed
projects with more accurate estimates are a must if the
region is to achieve the aims of the myriad investment
programs, launched by governments and supported by
the numerous actors which finance, insure and construct
projects in Latin America.
UPCOMING RESEARCH AND ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS
In continuing to improve and expand our database we have
concentrated on improvements to our systems new levels
of information, from costs in local currencies to tracking top
project metrics such as kilometers for roads and power
capacity for power stations.
In so doing we are working towards linking unitary costs at
the start of a project to its end, thereby solidifying further,
the information and understanding of the evolution of
project costs throughout their life cycle.
Following the launch of our tracking service at the end of
June, our information was made available to subscribers
for individual projects, allowing users to filter the sample for
their own use.
Our work in the coming months will concentrate on
aggregating the information and creating a series of
dashboards to allow users to see the relevant information
by sector, by country as well as by relevant themes,
with the ability to look at the individual track records of
contractors in in our sample.

16
APPENDIX I - BNAMERICAS’ PROJECT PIPELINE
BNamericas’ entire database of over 2800 projects includes
projects from their initial early works through to construction
and completion.
By comparing the number of projects in construction and in
the tendering stage across sectors, a more accurate picture
can be obtained of the project pipeline for the region.
• Of the 2857 projects, 510 are currently in construction,
while 434 are in the process of being tendered or awaiting
an investment decision to be taken. 320 projects are in the
process of undergoing and environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA). (Table 8)
• The pipeline which includes those projects under tender,
awaiting investment decision and undergoing an EIA, is
seen to be concentrated in the energy and infrastructure
sectors.
• A breakdown by sector and country is included in Chart 9
and Table 9.
Number of projects by stage
Construction 510
Tender/Awaiting investment decision 434
EIA 320
Total 1,246
EIA
320
Tender/
inv.decision
434
510
PipelineConstruction
800
900
400
600
200
700
300
500
100
0
Number of projects by stage
Energy MiningInfra O&GWater
300
250
0
50
400
350
100
500
450
200
150
63
168
185
39 55
117
319
197
75 46
Construction Pipeline
Table 8
Chart 8 Chart 9

17
Sector Country Construction Pipeline
Water Argentina 6 11
Brazil 7 27
Chile 6 13
Colombia 5 11
México 12 14
Peru 6 20
Water total - All countries 63 117
Energy Argentina 5 12
Brazil 23 18
Chile 49 177
Colombia 9 11
México 20 25
Peru 9 28
Energy Total - All countries 168 319
Infra Argentina 11 11
Brazil 49 46
Chile 16 30
Colombia 19 25
México 26 12
Peru 15 16
Infra Total - All countries 185 197
Mining Argentina 3 4
Brazil 9 2
Chile 8 41
Colombia 2 2
México 9 6
Peru 4 14
Mining Total - All countries 39 75
Oil & Gas and Petchem Argentina 4 2
Brazil 6 4
Chile 1 4
Colombia 4 4
México 16 7
Peru 3 15
Oil & Gas and Petchem Total - All
Countries
55 46
510 754
Table 9

18
Definitions
Projects covered include state-owned and private projects in the Infrastructure, Electric Power, Oil & Gas (excluding upstream), Water and Waste,
and Mining sectors.
Where applicable, a project is considered as such until the end of construction and ramp-up to full capacity (with the exception of mining projects,
where the date of commissioning signifies the end of the project). Projects must have a:
• Start date
• Estimate for completion
• Initial investment estimate
Data
For state-owned projects, initial information about the start date and estimates for completion and investment are taken from original signed con-
tracts, along with addendums and annexes.
If original contracts cannot be obtained, information is taken from public documents, presentations, news articles from BNamericas archives, and
external sources.
In cases where contracts are subject to approval by legislators, the start date is the date of the law or legislative approval.
In the case of private projects, information is taken from public sources, such as stock exchange filings, annual reports, company presentations,
third party research and press releases.
In judging the timing of investment decisions for private projects, great care was taken to differentiate between large projects receiving environmental
approval and proceeding directly to construction, and smaller projects where the investment decision hinges on securing financing.
Recorded data is correct at the time of entry and all efforts were made to ensure that each entry is backed with a relevant source.
The greatest care possible was taken to ensure consistency of information in order make a like-for-like comparison in project costs. Insofar as the
figures rely on disclosure by the organization or company responsible, the figures can be considered to be conservative in nature.
No attempt was made to adjust figures for inflation during the course of research or for consideration of the time value of money.
Validation
In the case of state-owned projects, validation is carried out where possible with either a member of the consortium, EPC contractor, a relevant
state agency or advisors to either party.
METHODOLOGY & PROCEDURES

19
tIMING Budget
Language definitions
Where guidance is non-specific as to dates for completion, the following is used.
Project to be completed by 2018 = December 31, 2017
Project to be completed in 2018 = December 31, 2018
Currency
Project costs are measured in US dollars.
Where project costs are measured in a local currency, amounts are converted to US dollars at the date of the relevant announcement, signature or
report.
Severity of deviation from original estimates
The severity of deviation from original estimates is defined according to set criteria.
Changes in Scope
Changes in scope beyond the start date are not accounted for.
Status StatusCondition Condition
Ahead of time
On time
Minor changes
Medium changes
Major changes
Ahead of budget
On budget
Minor changes
Medium changes
Major changes
95% of original estimate or below
(measured in months)
95% of original budget estimate
or below
95% to 105% of original estimate 95% to 105% of original estimate
105% to 120% of original estimate
105% to 120% of original budget
estimate
20% to 160% of original estimate
120% to 140% of original budget
estimate
Over 160% of original estimate
Over 140% of original budget
estimate
Disclaimers
• Figures and dates correspond to the latest publicly available information, as well as information gathered by BNamericas reporters and analysts,
and are subject to change.
• Changes to original budget estimates are shown as the total figure available and may include interest, working capital, inflation adjustments and
other contingencies in addition to capital expenditure.
• Amounts and overall results are shown in US dollars unless otherwise stated.
• BNamericas does not guarantee the sequence, accuracy, adequacy, completeness or availability of any information and is not responsible for
any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from the use of such information. There are no express or implied warranties. In no event shall
BNamericas, its agents, directors, officers, employees, representatives, successors, and assigns be liable for any damages of any nature in
connection with the BNamericas content.

20
About BNamericas Project Risk Analytics
BNamericas’ Project Risk Analytics tracks changes to estimates
of project completions dates and overall costs, in Latin
American infrastructure, energy and mining projects.
Governments, insurers, reinsurers, project financiers, risk
officers, asset managers and advisers can use this information
to analyze upcoming risk to schedules and financing costs,
and track the progress of existing projects for risk management
purposes.
By providing a top-down analysis of the timeliness and costs
of current Latin American projects, BNamericas provides a new
tool to the industry, allowing it to learn from past events and
improve planning for future projects.
In collaborating with the Major Projects research group at the
University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School, BNamericas
utilized the expertise of leading practitioners. The research
group is world-leading in its field with the most cited articles
in the field of major projects, programs and megaprojects in a
wide area of industries, such as transport infrastructure, energy,
civil engineering, IT and mega events.
Researchers advised and reviewed the methodology used by
the team and offered advice on structuring the data analysis to
make sense of the results. This collaboration ensured that the
data and the results are highly robust following international best
practice in terms of data collection and analysis.
About BNamericas
BNamericas delivers on-the-ground insight and trusted
business intelligence to companies and investors in Latin
America. BNamericas analyzes macro movements that
affect everyday business and future developments, including
social, political, economic, regulatory, technological, financial
and labor-related coverage. Connecting our clients with
trustworthy and timely insights, focused on 12 industry sectors,
BNamericas has been shaping the development of Latin
America for 19 years.
PROJECT
RISKANALYTICS
Improve
your planning
Increase
the chances of
successful delivery
Analyze
current projects
Subscribe and get access
to future reports and
individual project matrices

21
www.BNamericas.com
CONTACT US TODAY! Natan Levy
Author and Head of Project Risk Analytics
nlevy@BNamericas.com
+56 (2) 2941-0386
Arvinder Ludhiarich
Commercial Director
aludhiarich@BNamericas.com
+56 (2) 2941-0300Los Militares #6191,Las Condes Santiago, Chile
Business Insight in Latin America
business insight
in latin americaBNamericas delivers on-the-ground insight and trusted business
intelligence to companies and investors active in and entering Latin
America for over 19 years, identifying opportunities early on and
connecting clients with business contacts and decision-makers.
Our subscription gives you access to:
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