Impressment of american seamen

Appeals to the Admiralty: Viewing Impressment
as a Microcosm of Anglo-American Relations
at the turn of the Nineteenth century

Dissertation
Submitted by Candidate 59237
11 September 2008
Department of International History

1

MA History of International Relations
London School of Economics and Political Science

American independence ushered in an era of haphazard interaction between Great

Britain and the United States as they navigated the uncharted waters of their post-colonial

relationship. The formal dissolution of the colonial bond left many issues unclear or

unaddressed. Riding the wave of its recent emancipation, the United States questioned Great

Britain over its maritime practices and pressed for recognition of American trade rights.

Great Britain had not only lost a colony rich in natural resources and commercial enterprise,

but also gained a serious challenger to its near-hegemony in overseas trade. At a time when

Britain faced both war and economic blockade with Napoleonic Europe, maintaining its

maritime supremacy—long the source of its wealth and defense—was essential for survival.

Great Britain’s global trade, colonial commitments and wartime engagements all

overstretched the Royal Navy at the start of the nineteenth century. Short on manpower, the

British employed a policy by which they targeted men with seafaring experience and forcibly

coerced them into joining the navy, a practice known as impressment. The Royal Navy

used impressment at least as early as Queen Anne’s reign beginning in the mid-seventeenth

century, but the practice intensified during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

because of the extreme need for seamen.1 Seafaring required highly specialized skills that

could only be acquired through time and experience, and even the offer of bounty upon

enlistment did not persuade enough volunteers to endure the Royal Navy’s notoriously harsh

1Perkins, Bradford. Prologue to War (Berkeley, 1968) p.87; Another lesser-known act also
passed under Queen Anne, stated that those born in the American colonies were exempt from
impressment. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812 (London,
1905) p.32

2

conditions.2 To make up for the deficit, press gangs roamed British port towns at home

and in the colonies with permission to seek and press into service any man with seafaring

experience. The British soon expanded the practice beyond domestic territory to the high

seas where the Royal Navy began stopping American merchant ships to retake British

deserters, invariably impressing American citizens as well.

The British populace largely accepted the practice of impressment as “both

imperatively required and easily justified” in defense of the country.3 Parliament reinforced

the practice through favorable legislation, and there is no record of the policy of impressment

being challenged in court. 4 However, the United States vehemently objected to the practice

and responded by creating an administrative system to provide documentation of citizenship

to American seamen and an appeals process for those impressed. This did little to end the

tension, and disagreements over impressment only fueled a broader commercial and maritime

impasse that ultimately led to the War of 1812.5

Contemporary observers and historians give very different estimates of the number

of seamen who were affected by impressment. Incomplete data, inaccuracies in recording

as well as the “tendency of both sides to doctor the figures for political purposes” make it

difficult to determine the amount of British deserters in the American merchant marine as

well as the number of impressed American seamen in the Royal Navy.6 From 1796 to 1812

there were at least 106,757 documented seamen in the United States.7 The British estimated

2 Perkins, Prologue, p.86
3 Perkins, Prologue, p. 87
4 Zimmerman, James Fulton. Impressment of American Seamen (New York, 1925) p.13
5 For treatment of the causes of the War of 1812 see, e.g., Horsman, Reginald. The Causes of

the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962); Brown, Roger Hamilton. The Republic in Peril (New
York, 1964)
6 For a discussion of the various estimates regarding desertion and impressment see

Zimmerman, p.259-275; Perkins, p.90-93
7 Zimmerman, p.272

3

that 20,000 of their native seamen were employed in American merchant ships, while the

United States estimated that 15,000 Americans were in the service of the Royal Navy. 8

Despite discrepancies in the data, it can be assumed that at least 3,800 and as many as 10,000

American seamen were impressed during this period, although most historians agree that the

total was most likely around 6,500.9

This paper explores the impressment of American seamen by the Royal Navy during the

French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (c. 1793) to the War of 1812. Existing

historiography addresses the diplomatic negotiations between British and American ministers

during this period.10 This paper instead examines a relatively unexplored aspect of the issue:

the appeals process by which impressed Americans petitioned the Admiralty for release.

Section One sets impressment within the wider Anglo-American military, economic and

socio-political milieu of this period. Section Two outlines the American response to

impressments, highlighting measures to protect seamen and provide recourse for those

impressed. Section Three depicts the Admiralty’s response to applications made by

Americans for discharge, including the evidence required and decisions reached. The

conclusion demonstrates how probing into the intricacies of impressment reveals a complex

web of factors that colored early Anglo-American relations.

Section One: Anglo-American Military, Economic and Socio-political Relations

I. Military Relations

8 Ibid., p.275, 142
9 Perkins, Prologue, p.91-92
10 For treatment of diplomatic negotiations see, e.g., Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic

History of the United States (New York, 1965); Stagg, J.C.A. Mr. Madison’s War: Politics,
Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton, 1983)

4

The primacy of Britain’s relationship with young America was quickly eclipsed by the

emergence of post-Revolutionary French aggression, particularly under Napoleon. Great

Britain went to war with France in 1793, dedicating a substantial amount of its time,

manpower, wealth and military to the conflict that raged across Europe and its colonies. 11

British naval victories at Cape St. Vincent in 1797 and the Nile in 1798 highlighted Britain’s

maritime supremacy in the face of French expansion and reinforced Britain’s commitment to

naval warfare. The defeat of the Spanish and French fleets at Trafalgar in 1805 conclusively

quashed the threat of invasion and French victory at sea. Nonetheless, as Napoleon’s control

of Europe became more complete, the British felt extraordinary pressure to maintain the fight

and saw “the Royal Navy [as] the sole remaining obstacle between the Emperor of France

and universal dominion.” 12

As mentioned, at a time of desperate need the Royal Navy suffered from a shortage of men. 13

Low pay, poor living conditions, corporal punishment and the threat of violent death in war

led to high levels of desertion. 14 Meanwhile, the rapid growth of the American merchant

marine created a demand for seamen in the United States, where pay and conditions were

substantially better. 15 Fearing that American merchant ships would be “a sanctuary for

fugitives” or an “asylum for…runaway seamen,” the British began vigorously pursuing

deserters by stopping American merchant ships to check the citizenship of those on board.16

11 For treatment of the Napoleonic Wars see, e.g., Chandler, David G. Campaigns of
Napoleon (London, 1966); Esdaile, Charles. Napoleon’s Wars: an International History,
1803-1815 (London, 2007)
12 Steel, Anthony, “Impressment in the Monroe-Pinkney Negotiation, 1806-1807” The

American Historical Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (January 1952) p.363
13 Horsman, p.26
14 Bad conditions in the Royal Navy spurred multiple mutinies in 1797. Kennedy, Paul M.

The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976) p. 128
15 American merchant ships paid seaman as much as one hundred percent more than the

Royal Navy. Zimmerman, p. 27

5

What the British viewed as an expedient measure for its defense, the United States

considered an affront to its national rights.

II. Economic Relations

Building on colonial commercial linkages Anglo-American trade significantly increased after

American independence. The United States provided foodstuffs and cotton to Great Britain

and Great Britain supplied manufactured goods to the United States. Indeed, a third of all

British exports went to the United States, while Britain purchased some 44 percent of

American exports.17 The United States benefited from Britain’s preoccupation with war with

France, and American trade expanded dramatically.18 The United States could build ships

faster and cheaper than the British and compensated for its lack of manpower by offering

higher wages to lure seamen from Britain.19 Commercial interdependence made trade

agreements necessary, but the budding maritime rivalry made them difficult to reach. 20

While the United States advocated free trade, Great Britain remained fiercely protective of its

monopoly on the carrying trade, that is, the maritime transport of goods to Britain and its

colonies. The United States challenged Britain’s mercantilist policies embodied in the

Navigation Acts, which had been specifically designed in the mid seventeenth century to

create an optimal environment for British trade.21 Negotiations on trade were further

complicated when the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a European trade war that restricted the

17 Ibid., p.24-26
18 For example, by 1805 the United States had become Europe’s primary supplier of sugar,
one of the world’s most lucrative goods. Smith, T.C. Wars Between England and America
(New York, 1914) p.191
19 Zimmerman, p. 27
20 The United States and Great Britain signed the Jay Treaty in 1794, which opened the

British East Indies and India to American trade. While it was an important first step in
normalizing Anglo-American trade relations, it did little to address the larger maritime issues
between them. Perkins, Bradford. The First Rapprochement (Philadelphia, 1955) p.5
21 Horsman, p.33

6

American merchant marine’s ability to carry certain cargo and dock at various ports

throughout Europe.

After Trafalgar, it became clear that France could neither invade Britain nor defeat

it at sea, so Napoleon sought to cripple it economically. Napoleon’s Berlin Decree in 1806

and Milan Decree in 1807 deprived Great Britain of European trade by prohibiting British

ships from docking at French or French-controlled ports. The British retaliated with the

Orders of Council in 1807, which prevented French and allied European ships from docking

at British or British-controlled ports, as well as blockaded French and allied European ports

from neutral shipping. This economic warfare severely curtailed American neutral trade

because American ships that docked in British ports would be banned—if they made it

past the British blockade—from French or French-controlled ports and vice versa. These

constraints also applied to goods with regard to their country of origin and destination. In

response to the trade wars, the United States enacted the Embargo of 1807 and the milder

Non-intercourse Act in 1809, which closed American ports to both French and British ships.

Poorly conceived, the American legislation decimated American commerce but did nothing

to lift British or French restrictions on American vessels.22 As Britain remained its primary

trading partner and retained dominance in maritime affairs, the United States directed its

protestations toward London.23 Invariably American complaints over the Orders in Council

included objections to Britain’s impressment of American seamen.

22 Ibid., p.142
23 The United States also objected to the British “Rule of 1756”, where Britain would not
trade with a neutral country who was also trading with its enemy. British infringements on
neutral shipping had been challenged before with limited success in 1780 (and revived in
1800) by a group of European nations, led by Russia in the League of Armed Neutrality.
Kennedy, p.112

7

The British were unresponsive to American complaints over trade because of “the

fundamental conviction…that the welfare of the navy, the one defense of the empire,

depended upon maintaining the carrying trade, with the right of impressment from it.”24

Indeed, the British may have viewed impressment as both a military necessity and an

economic advantage: in 1793, Phineas Bond, a British consul to the United States, advised

Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, that impressment would prevent the United

States from taking over the carrying trade while Britain was occupied with war with France. 25

Bond prophesied that “ ‘tho only an infant now” the United States would outpace Britain in

trade and manufacturing particularly if it retained access to Britain’s seamen. 26 It is difficult

to overstate the toll this would have taken on the British given the interconnectedness of its

trade wealth and military ability: the war with Napoleon, including funds given to allies,

ultimately drained a total of 1.657 billion pounds.27

III. Socio-Political Relations

The socio-political situation between the United States and Britain also had a

significant influence on the debate over impressment. Because of the intimacy of their

colonial relationship, the United States and Great Britain shared many socio-political

foundations. However the two countries had very different roles on the world stage. The

United States was a young nation, lacking international experience and political clout. The

central government was formed in 1789 from a blend of ideological convictions; however, its

actions and authority were undermined by infighting between the political factions of the

24 Mahan, p.101
25 Neel, Joanne Loewe. Phineas Bond: a Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1786-1812
(Philadelphia, 1968) p.95
26 Ibid., p.151
27 Kennedy, p.139

8

Federalists and Republicans, especially with regard to foreign policy.28 The Federalists had

long supported closer ties with Great Britain, and, under the presidency of John Adams (1797-

1801), they built up the army and navy and engaged in naval skirmishes with the French over

trade in the West Indies.29 In contrast, the Republicans favored neutral ties with both Great

Britain and France in an effort to protect and promote American commerce.30 Upon coming

to power in 1801, the Republicans cut funding and downsized what little military and naval

reserves the Federalists had created during Adams’ administration. Indeed, President

Thomas Jefferson saw no need for the navy at all since he believed that European nations

would enter into treaties with the United States based on the universal desirability of global

trade.31 While the Federalists were more willing to acknowledge Britain’s need and right to

pursue naval deserters, both the Federalists and Republicans agreed that the impressment of

American seamen was harmful to American commerce and a clear indication that Great

Britain did not fully recognize its sovereignty.32

Great Britain, on the other hand, had both stability at home and a strong record of

international leadership and maritime preeminence. British administrations such as the

Tory government under William Pitt (Prime Minister from 1783-1801; 1804-1806) were

generally friendly toward American commerce. However, they were heavily influenced by

the powerful and vocal shipping industry who viewed the United States as a threat to British

trade.33 The British had not encountered a maritime rival since the Dutch in the seventeenth

28 For early political history of the United States see e.g., Adams, Henry. History of the
United States (New York, 1891-1898)
29 Perkins, Rapprochement, p.92
30 For treatment of Republicanism see e.g., Perkins, Prologue, p.32-66
31 Smith, p.184
33 Mahan, p.100-101

9

century and remained unwavering in their adherence to protective policies.34 When the

United States made claims to rights for neutral shipping, the British felt no need to acquiesce

to a former colony that was not only politically insecure, but also lacked the military ability

to back up its demands.35

Washington and London collided over the policy of belligerents toward neutrals

on the high seas. An international norm allowed belligerents to search neutral ships in

their domestic ports and waters for deserters and enemy goods.36 Problems arose when

Britain extended this policy to cover ships on the high seas, where the Royal Navy stopped

merchant ships, confiscated cargo and impressed seamen. 37 While the seizure of goods

took an economic toll on the United States, the impressment of Americans struck at deeper

issues. Impressment revealed a fundamental disagreement over citizenship. Britain and the

rest of Europe believed in indefeasible national allegiance and as such did not recognize the

American policy of naturalization.38 In 1790, American law required as few as two years

residency for naturalization, but in 1802 it increased to five years.39 The official American

position maintained that naturalization “conferred full rights of citizenship, absolving new

citizens from former obligations.” By contrast, the British adhered to a rigid definition of

citizenship asserting, “once a British subject, always a British subject.” 40 This difficulty over

a question so fundamental to the notion of new statehood brought additional weight to the

34 Four Anglo-Dutch wars were fought over maritime issues from the mid-seventeenth to the
late-eighteenth century. Kennedy, p.47-67; 73-74
35 Mahan, p.46; Perkins, Prologue, p.95
36 Bemis, Samuel Flagg. “The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney, 1792-1796” The

American Historical Review Vol. 28, No. 2 (January, 1923) p.240
37 Zimmerman, p.19-20; Hitsman, J. Mackay. The Incredible War of 1812: A Military

History (Toronto, 1966) p.10
38 Zimmerman, p.21
39 Ibid., p.23; Perkins, Prologue, p.89
40 Steel, Anthony. “Anthony Merry and the Anglo-American Dispute about Impressment,

1803-6” Cambridge Historical Journal Vol. 9, No. 3 (1949) p.331

10

issue of impressment and hindered wider discussions on maritime issues.

In 1806, the special mission of American diplomats, James Monroe and Thomas

Pinkney, failed when the United States and Britain were unable to agree on a treaty that

addressed both neutral trade and impressment. Indeed President Jefferson refused to send

the draft treaty to the Senate because it did not include a provision on impressment. 41 In

1807, relations reached a new low when the British man-of-war, HMS Leopard fired on an

American frigate, the USS Chesapeake, off the coast of Virginia, killing three, wounding

eighteen and impressing four suspected deserters. This high-profile clash could have been

swiftly addressed, but it remained unresolved for years because the United States refused to

separate the incident from the wider practice of impressment.42 In 1807, James Madison,

then Secretary of State, neatly summarized the American position on impressment: “That an

officer from a foreign ship should pronounce any person he pleased, on board an American

ship on the high seas, not to be an American citizen, but a British subject, & carry his

interested decision on the most important of all questions to a freeman, into execution the

spot, is anomalous in principle…grievous in practice and…abominable in abuse.”43 The

vicissitudes of Anglo-American relations were not only visible in impressment, but also

dictated its course.

Section Two: American Responses to Impressment

41 Steel, “Monroe-Pinkney” p.353
42 Ibid., p.366

11

In 1792, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson wrote to Thomas Pinckney, minister to

Great Britain, and predicted that if France and Great Britain fought, there would be negative

repercussions against the United States from Britain’s “peculiar custom of impressing

seamen.”44 Given the similarities in appearance, names, language and cultural practices

of both nationalities, there were bound to be mistakes made when trying to distinguish

American seamen from British deserters.45 The United States tried to target these issues

proactively, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent potential misunderstandings.

The Act for Relief and Protection of American Seamen

With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1793, the impressment of American citizens

increased dramatically. In response, but only after fierce partisan debate, Congress passed

the “Act for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen” (the “Act”) on May 28, 1796. 46

The Act sought to obtain more accurate information regarding impressment and assist the

effort in securing the release of those impressed. It had three main elements. First, the

Act required all American shipmasters to make official statements of incidents involving

impressment. Second, in an effort to prevent future impressments, the Act called for the

federal government to issue seamen a standard document verifying citizenship. Third, the

Act called for the appointment of representatives, including one primary Agent, who would

act on behalf of American seamen suffering from impressment. While the Act outlined a

premise that could have been the basis for a working relationship between the United States

and Great Britain, it was not strong enough to be a viable solution on its own. Its early

successes were followed by abuses, revealing its limited utility.

44 Zimmerman, p.43
45 Ibid., p.44-45
46 Statute 1:477-78; Perkins, Rapprochement, p.62

12

I. Protests

The Act required the captains of ships whose men had been impressed to make

a “protest” immediately at the next port, whether foreign or domestic. The protest was a

sworn statement in which shipmasters’ recounted how their ships were stopped and boarded

by the British, who then seized men, often violently and arbitrarily, regardless of whether

they had proof of citizenship.47 Aside from concerns about the welfare of individuals

impressed, the shipmasters were inconvenienced by the loss of men; in some instances entire

crews were impressed rendering the vessel unable to sail.48 The Act dictated that Congress

receive a copy of every protest, and protests often appeared in American newspapers.

Publication influenced public opinion on impressment,49 but the protests do not seem to have

been used by the American government as evidence of Britain’s wrongdoing in diplomatic

negotiations or in the applications for release of seamen.50 Thus, protests were all but

meaningless in American efforts to end impressment.

II. Customs House Protections

Discussions on identification papers had begun as early as 1790 when Gouverneur

Morris, an American minister in London, suggested “the idea of certificates of citizenship

to be given by . . . courts of America to our seamen.”51 In 1793 Phineas Bond, a British

47 NARA: RG 59, M1839; See Appendix C for a sample protest.
48 Zimmerman, p.31
49 Ibid., p.39-42
50 Deeben, John P. “Taken on the High Seas: American Seamen Impressment R

National Archives, 1789-1815” New England Ancestors, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 2006) p. 19-20
51 Deeben, John P. “Maritime Proofs of Citizenship: The Essential Evidence behind

Seamen’s Protection Certificates, 1792-1875” National Genealogical Society Quarterly, Vol.
96, No. 2 (June 2008) p.140; Bemis p. 233; Mahan p.119

13

minister, suggested that American seamen receive certificates from British Consuls in the

United States upon showing evidence of their citizenship either from church records or

witnesses.52 While both offered similar proposals, they could not agree on who would issue

the certificates of citizenship.

The Act formalized what had already been a haphazard practice by some seamen of

procuring evidence of their citizenship to show if threatened with impressment. Before 1796,

seamen could get public officials to notarize a copy of their evidence but, after the

introduction of the Act, seamen were required to register with Customs Houses in American

ports and pay twenty-five cents to obtain a protection certificate before embarking on either a

foreign or domestic journey.53 Customs Houses collected duties on cargo, and, as the main

point of departure and arrival for merchant vessels, they made a natural choice for the

dispersal of protections. To apply for a protection a seaman needed to produce

documentation of his birthplace, usually in the form of copies of birth or baptismal registers

supplied by churches.54 While these records provided the most reliable proof of a seaman’s

birthplace, the Customs Houses also accepted verbal affirmations of citizenship. Seamen

often brought family members or friends as witnesses to provide affidavits swearing to the

validity of the seamen’s claims of citizenship. Customs Houses were required by the Act to

keep records of the protections they granted, especially the date issued and information

included. These records proved invaluable when copies were required to obtain discharge

from the Royal Navy.

Customs House Protections (“CHPs”) were certificates notarized by a Customs

House agent that contained the date and place of birth and a physical description of the

52 Neel p.96
53 Deeben, “Maritime Proofs” p.140
54 See Appendix D for a sample baptismal record.

14

seaman. 55 Most agents tried to note unique markings such as birthmarks or scars to help

with recognition. The more detailed the protection, the more likely the seaman would be

identified correctly and the less likely the CHP could be used fraudulently. One particularly

colorful protection describes William Forrest as having multiple crucifixes, Adam and Eve,

the tree of knowledge, a mermaid and an anchor drawn with “India ink” on various parts

of his body.56 CHPs were a genuine attempt by the United States to help differentiate their

seamen and thus make the British officer’s task of pursuing British deserters less open to

mistakes and fraud. However, the CHP system proved to be inadequate and subject to

numerous abuses. While no formal agreement was ever reached with the British about their

use, from 1796 CHPs became the most widely used proof of citizenship, and by 1799 they

were the most effective piece of evidence in applying for release from the Royal Navy. To

facilitate the system of protests and protections, the United States created new ministerial

positions in Great Britain whose responsibilities were to provide relief and protection for

American seamen.

III. Agents for American Seamen

The final part of the Act called for the presidential appointment of American consuls

to various port towns throughout Great Britain with the sole purpose of tending to the needs

of American seamen. Until the posting of these consuls, the American Plenipotentiary to the

Court at St. James doubled as the Agent for American seamen.57 As Plenipotentiary, Thomas

Pinckney (1794-1795) and Rufus King (1796-1803) not only conducted all negotiations with

the Foreign Secretary (including impressment), but also oversaw the initial 401 applications

55 See Appendix E for a sample Customs House Protection.
56 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 928
57 Zimmerman, p.79

15

for release made to the governing board of the Royal Navy, the Admiralty.58 When the

numbers of impressed seamen rose, the duties were passed to the newly created role of Agent

for American seamen (“the Agent”).59 Port town representatives served as the first point

of contact for those who were making protests or seamen who had been impressed. While

consuls throughout Europe received complaints of impressment, only the Agent in London

could appeal to the British government.60 The creation of the Agent’s role and the permission

for him to reside in London showed commitment from both sides to alleviating the problem.

Four men served as Agent from 1797 until the start of the War of 1812, and, while

they were all charged with the same task of securing the release of American seamen, their

experiences and success rates differed according to the changing international climate.

Detailed registers kept by Agents David Lenox and William Lyman are available for

review61, while only some application totals are known for Agents George W. Erving and

Reuben G. Beasley.62 As war pressures intensified, the number of impressments rose and

the requirements for discharge became stricter. The Agents’ letters to the Secretary of State

provide the best descriptions of the appeals process and the most insight into the political

climate at any given time.

In the early reports from David Lenox (Agent from 1797 to 1802), he appears

to be convinced that the Admiralty was willing to accept applications if the “proofs are

clear” and the “proper documents” are included.63 By 1799, however he had become more

58 Ibid., p.75; 79
59 Ibid., p.71n
60 Ibid., p.71
61 See Appendix A and B for Abstracts of applications made by David Lenox and William

Lyman.
62 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 936; RG 59, MLR A1 932; Zimmerman, p.106; 164
63 NARA: RG 84, T168, 7: Letter from Lenox to Pickering, 1.3.98; Letter from Lenox to

Pickering, 5.12.98; Zimmerman, p.72

16

frustrated with the Admiralty, which had begun to only accept CHPs instead of less formal

documents. Whereas Lenox used to chastise American seamen for not carrying evidence of

their citizenship, he then became much more critical of impressment, calling it “an evil not

lessening in magnitude…which demands the most prompt and decisive interference of our

government.”64 Despite his growing pessimism, Lenox was quite successful as Agent and

secured the discharge of 47 percent of the 2248 applications he submitted.65 In 1801, Lenox

wrote to the Admiralty that since the war had ended with the Peace of Amiens, he expected

all Americans to be discharged regardless of their proof.66 The Admiralty replied that it

could not, because to do so “would be productive of the most dangerous consequences to His

Majesty’s Navy.”67

George W. Erving (Agent from 1803 to mid-1805) had a much more difficult

time in office and his reports revealed his frustration with the Admiralty, who he accused

of “playing games” to avoid the release of Americans.68 During his appointment, at a time

when Britain feared invasion, the number of impressments increased and the rate at which the

Admiralty granted discharges slowed. Under Erving 273 seamen were reportedly released,

which was only about a fifth of the applications he made.69 William Lyman (Agent from mid-

1805 to1810) was much more vocal in his disapproval of impressment which can be

attributed to the fervor surrounding the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair. He insisted, “The time

has come to claim and insist on their redress and prevention of this badge of inferiority and

submission too degrading longer to be bourne [sic].”70 In 1807 Lyman reported that 3,791

64 NARA: RG 84, T168, 8: Letter from Lenox to Pickering, 7.4.00; Zimmerman, p.73-74
65 Perkins, Rapprochement, p.66; Zimmerman, p. 75
66 NA: ADM 1/3852: Lenox to Nepean 23.10.01
67 NA: ADM 1/3852: Nepean to Lenox 26.10.01
68 Zimmerman, p.108
69 Ibid., p.106
70 Ibid., p.141

17

American seamen were impressed during his term and at least 1,016 were discharged or

ordered to be discharged.71 By the time Reuben G. Beasley (Agent from 1810 - until war in

1812) arrived, the Admiralty was extremely strict as it claimed that too many CHPs were

obtained fraudulently. He accused the Admiralty of becoming more arbitrary and irregular in

its decisions—accepting a set of documents in one case but rejecting similar ones in

another.72 The results of the 802 applications Beasley made in 1811 are not known.73 The

Agents spearheaded the American government’s efforts to secure the release of its impressed

citizens and attended to applications with dutiful attention and perseverance. Nevertheless,

they remained at the mercy of the vacillations of the Admiralty.

Applications for Release

I. Application Process

The application process was usually started by the impressed seamen himself who

would send a letter explaining his plight from on board a British man-of-war. Seamen

often had no idea who to turn to first; in some instances a seaman wrote home to family

members—often for the first time in years—imploring them to take action on his behalf.

The seamen did so without knowing whether the letters would be received as they could

be intercepted, lost en route or sent to someone who had moved or died. Others addressed

their letters to the President, Secretary of State or Agent in London. In one such letter,

seaman Henry Conway addressed President Jefferson and Congress with “Now Gentlemen I

humbly submit to your consideration if I am still to be inslaved [sic] or thus deprived of that

71 Ibid., p.164
72 Zimmerman, p.167
73 Ibid., p.164

18

purchased by the blood of my forefathers and relations and that which I hourly pant after.”74

Assuming the letter reached the government official and a reply also made its way back (a

tenuous proposition given the state of international mail and the difficulties in reaching a ship

at sea), the seaman was then informed that he must furnish proof of his citizenship before an

application could be made to the Admiralty.

For each seaman there could be an exchange of numerous letters in an attempt

to procure appropriate evidence from the right sources. When the documents were forwarded

to London, the Agent then submitted a request for the seaman’s release to the Admiralty,

often “transmit[ting] herewith copies of sundry documents relating to impressed seamen.” 75

When an application contained sufficient documentation, the Admiralty ordinarily arrived at

their decision and informed the Agent promptly; according to Lenox’s registers, the

Admiralty usually responded within a week of receiving an application. For example, in the

case of one James Driskell, his letter informing Lenox of his impressment was dated 31

January 1799, his application was made on 7 February and the Admiralty replied with his

discharge on 26 February.76 Other applications took much longer when the Admiralty had to

investigate the case and contact ships to enquire after seamen. The Agents kept meticulous

records noting the date the application was made and to whom, the name of the seaman, the

American ship and captain from whence he was impressed, the British ship and captain

where he was currently held, the date and place of the impressment, the evidence submitted

to the Admiralty and the result of his application.77 Starting in 1799, the Agents were

required to submit abstracts of impressed seamen compiled from these registers to Congress

74 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 928: Letter from Conway to Jefferson and Congress, 10.10.08
75 NARA: RG 59, M78: Letter from Lenox to Nepean, 21.3.01
76 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 936
77 Most entries only included a few of these records; See Appendix F for a sample page of a

register.

19

through the Secretary of State.78 From the abstracts, the American government was able to

grasp the scope of the impressment problem and assess the level of success met by the

Agents in applying for the release of impressed Americans.

As a foreign minister, Lenox was initially required to correspond with the British Foreign

Office but he secured the right to contact the Admiralty directly from Foreign Secretary Lord

Grenville in 1797.79 This was seen as a huge gain by the Americans and also showed an

effort by the British to expedite the process. Agents would exchange letters with the

Secretary of the Admiralty, who acted as a middleman between the Agent and the Lords of

the Admiralty who actually made the decisions. Lenox and the Secretary of the Admiralty,

Evan Nepean (Secretary from 1795-1804), worked together for five years during which they

built a polite rapport, suggesting cordiality that extended beyond the requirements of their

respective positions. 80 Little was known then or now about the actual assessment of the

evidence by the Lords of the Admiralty. The records that exist merely report the decision of

the Admiralty to the Agent without offering insight into the actual decision-making process. 81

Erving reportedly received no reply when he requested “definite information as to the

grounds on which seamen were impressed,” nor did the Admiralty set specific guidelines as

to what it considered acceptable evidence.82 This ambiguity afforded the Admiralty a

significant amount of flexibility in decision-making since it was not bound to any specific

policy, but it was extremely frustrating for the Americans Agents who could not predict with

any regularity whether the evidence provided would be accepted.

78 Deeben, “High Seas” p.20
79 NARA: RG 84, T168, 7: Letter from Lenox to Pickering, 12.6.97; Perkins,
Rapprochement, p.65
81 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 934
82 Zimmerman, p.107

20

II. Evidence

A seaman applying for release had the burden of proof to produce sufficient evidence to

convince the Admiralty that he was indeed American. Although the American government

did not raise the issue, it could be argued that the burden should have been on the side of the

British who instigated the act of impressing the seaman. Procuring evidence of citizenship

was often difficult, especially when an impressed seaman attempted to make his case while

on board a British man-of-war. Some British officers prevented the seamen from sending

letters and others physically blocked them from seeking the help of consuls when docked in

British or foreign ports.83 Those who were able appeared in person at the various consulates

where they could swear an oath that they were American and receive a written protection

from the American representative. Until 1799, this increased the chance that the seaman

would be released. However after 1799, when protections from consuls such as James Maury

in Liverpool were presented to the Admiralty as evidence, they were deemed insufficient and

almost never accepted. This was a particular blow to the authority of the American consuls.

The British believed that consuls were too lenient when determining whether a seaman

qualified for protection, thus allowing some British deserters to obtain protection. As early

as 1796, Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville asked Rufus King, the American minister,

to “notify to the Consuls that they are in the future to abstain from a proceeding which far

exceeds the limits of their office…[and is] an act…injurious to the authority of the King’s

government.”84

83 Ibid., p.112

21

When impressed seamen could not appear in person, they were responsible for

ensuring that any documentation that could verify their citizenship was sent to the Agent in

London so that an official application could be made on their behalf. Before the CHP system

became standardized, seamen who needed to produce evidence of their citizenship were

encouraged by the Agents to look to their hometowns for help.85 While clear requirements

were never outlined by the Admiralty, it was much more lenient in the types of evidence

it accepted before 1799. Copies of parish records of births and baptisms usually sufficed,

but seamen achieved better results when their family and friends provided affidavits. 86

In these testimonies, made before a notary, the deposed was duly sworn in and then

provided information about their relationship to the seaman, particularly the length of their

relationship, a physical description of the seaman and by what authority they could attest to

his citizenship.

The Secretary of State was an active participant in the appeals process and often

helped seamen and their families locate evidence. Receipt records show that the Secretary

of State’s office purchased advertising space in newspapers calling upon the families of

impressed seamen to obtain and send to his office any available evidence.87 When passing

the documents onto the Agent in London, the Secretary of State often included his own

statement and signature confirming the validity of the claims made in the body of evidence.

In the case of one Allen Baker, a copy of his CHP, a letter from the Customs House agent

in Boston and three affidavits from his family were forwarded to London along with a letter

from the Secretary of State and Agent Lyman and were deemed sufficient by the Admiralty. 88

85 NARA: RG 84, T168, 7: Letter Lenox to Pickering, 1.3.98
86 See Appendix G for a sample affidavit.
87 NARA: RG 59, M1839: New York Customs House receipt, 16.4.07
88 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 928

22

If additional evidence became available, a seaman could make multiple

applications. However, there is nothing to suggest that multiple applications increased the

chances for release; rather each was assessed individually and the decision was based on

whether or not the new evidence met the Admiralty’s current standards. For example, in the

case of one John Richards, Agent Lenox applied on 1 October 1798 with Richards’ letter of

27 September and on 5 November the Admiralty wrote he was not on board the ship stated.

Lenox’s second application of 14 November 1798 included Richards’ letter of 9 November

and a certificate of citizenship and on 19 November the Admiralty replied again that he was

not on the ship specified. The third application was made on 24 November with Richards’

own letter from the 21 November and after he appeared in person (to whom is unclear), the

Admiralty then ordered his discharge on 26 November.89 The number of duplicate or

renewed applications varied greatly; for instance, they made up around 20 percent of total

applications for each quarter in 1801 and only five percent in 1806. Duplicate applications

were itemized in the abstracts, but since they were included in the total applications for each

quarter they have caused discrepancies in estimates of the total number of impressed

Americans.90

III. Weaknesses of the Administrative System

Those who were critical of the Act for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen in 1796

correctly identified that its protection system was weak and left too many areas open to fraud.

89NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 936
90NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 936; RG 59, MLR A1 932; Perkins disagrees with Zimmerman’s
assessment that duplicate applications were unimportant. Perkins, Prologue, p.91n

23

The abuses of the system emerged in 1798, worsened in 1803-1805 and had almost

completely crippled the appeals process by the outbreak of war in 1812. Each country

accused the other of wrongdoing and each was guilty: American agents and British seamen

fraudulently provided and obtained CHPs; some British officers ignored protections; and the

Admiralty treated CHPs with increasing suspicion and arbitrariness to serve their interests.

Abuses occurred at every stage until they had completely undermined the system.

When seamen applied for protections, there were cases when affidavits were

provided by less than trustworthy sources: seamen for fellow seamen or seamen’s “wives”

who were more likely to be the seaman’s local girlfriend in the port.91 In one case, the

Customs House in New Orleans issued a protection to one William Lionnet on 23 April 1804

based on the testimony of Gaspard Debuys, a Frenchman who would give his oath of

allegiance to the United States a month later. The following day, William Lionnet gave the

exact same testimony in support of another seaman, Jean Gaugac.92 While all three seamen

may have previously known each other, occasions such as these were a bit too convenient to

be believable and supported the British claim that CHPs were given too freely. The lax

regulations in the evidence required by some Customs Houses and consuls aroused the

Admiralty’s suspicion of all CHPs. As early as 1797, Robert Liston, the British minister in

the United States, conveyed the Admiralty’s complaint to Secretary of State Pickering that

the American consul in Portugal in particular was issuing protections to anyone willing to

pay.93 It is unclear why some consuls were willing to give CHPs so freely, but it can

probably be attributed to bribery, incompetence and residual anti-British sentiment.

91 Deeben, “Maritime Proofs” p.145
92 Deeben, “Maritime Proofs” p.143-144
93 NARA: RG 84, T168, 7: Letter from Liston to Pickering, 16.12.97

24

Seamen often lost their protections due to conditions at sea or simple carelessness. William

Lindsay claimed his CHP “fell out of his pocket ‘enclosed in a tin box, which sank’ into the

sea”.94 In the event of a lost CHP, the issuing Customs House could be contacted for a

duplicate. Customs House agents were instructed to keep detailed ledgers of the protections

they issued for precisely this reason. Many were legitimately lost, but there is also evidence

that protections were frequently bought and sold on the black market.95 The Admiralty

complained that CHPs issued in duplicate and triplicate increased the chance of abuse.

Consequently, they tightened their standards so that if there was any discrepancy in the

protection (particularly if the seaman holding the protection did not answer to the description

on the protection) it was refused.

The United States also accused the British of wrongdoing. Some seamen complained

that upon presenting British officers with their protections, the documents were taken or

destroyed. Henry Conway, an American seaman, reported that he gave his protection to

Captain Coglin of HMS Bernard who examined it. According to Conway, Coglin said, “it

was a very good one, he then tore it and hove it overboard.”96 Lyman noted that some British

officers would record false names for the impressed Americans in the ship’s register so that

they could not be correctly identified when applications for release were made. 97 Erving

blamed the Admiralty for having invented “games” to discredit protections and accused them

of bribing seamen to testify that they had received their protections fraudulently.98 In one

such case, the Admiralty claimed to have the voluntary testimony of one James Daniels who

swore he was a British native who served on an American merchant ship, and that before

94 Deeben “Maritime Proofs” p.143
95 Zimmerman, p.165
96 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 928: Letter from Conway to Jefferson and Congress, 10.10.08
97 Zimmerman, p.142
98 Ibid., p.108

25

leaving Wilmington, South Carolina for Montego Bay, Jamaica, the shipmaster went ashore

and returned with four CHPs and assured the British seamen that they would be protected as

American citizens.99

The use of CHPs by American seamen and the acceptance of them by the Admiralty as

sufficient proof of citizenship and grounds for release marked the closest the two countries

ever reached to an understanding or compromise. The abuse of the protections system by

both Americans and the British undermined CHPs as a proof of citizenship and caused the

Admiralty to question their authenticity. The Act of 1796 was an important first step in

providing some sort of protection for American seamen, but it was not strong enough to

withstand the pressures it would experience. The United States failed to support it with

stronger measures but neither did Great Britain suggest any amendments that would allay

their doubts. In addition to other factors, the flawed protection system played a key role in

influencing the Admiralty’s responses to applications for release.

Section Three: The Admiralty’s Responses to Applications

Throughout the entire era the Admiralty maintained that they sought only to

retrieve native British deserters and viewed the impressment of Americans as a regrettable

but negligible side effect.100 In February 1803, Admiral Nelson reported that as many as

42,000 British seamen had deserted, representing a significant loss to the Royal Navy.101

According to records, however, only 400 applications for discharge were refused because the

seamen were found to be British natives, which spoke to the wider futility of impressment as

99 NARA: RG 59, M50: Affidavit of James Daniels, 9.6.96
101 Ibid., p.61

26

a means of recovering deserters.102 In an attempt to curb mistakes and abuses, Robert Liston,

British minister to the United States, wrote to British captains and, “suggested the

propriety…of forbearance and moderation, and…exhorted our officers to adopt the maxim

that it is better that the guilty should escape than that the innocent should suffer.” 103 British

officers, however, had little incentive to avoid impressing Americans since many of their

ships had a legitimate need for men and the Admiralty rarely took any action against officers

accused of wrongful impressment. Wartime demands put immense pressure on the

Admiralty causing Lord Holland, a British diplomat, to comment in 1806 that, “the

atmosphere of the Admiralty made those who breathed it shudder at anything like

concessions to the Americans.”104 The Admiralty’s overwhelming need to keep the Royal

Navy adequately manned coupled with the increasing unreliability of the protections system

dictated the actions it took when assessing applications. By not identifying clear standards

for the applications, the Admiralty afforded itself considerable latitude, which sometimes

resulted in more expedient decisions. The Admiralty entertained very few proofs of

citizenship and “investigations…were only perfunctory and discontinued on the least

excuse.”105 The Admiralty viewed applications with increasing suspicion and after a period

of relative success during Lenox’s appointment, the American Agents grew more and more

frustrated with the Admiralty’s seemingly arbitrary decision-making.

I. Successful Applications

102 Zimmerman, p.274-275
104 Horsman p.87
105 Bemis, p.238

27

The Lords of the Admiralty were charged with the management of the Royal Navy,

which include the assessment of applications for release.106 The Secretary to the Admiralty

conveyed the Admiralty’s decisions to the Agents through a standardized letter.107 A

successful application for release resulted in the notification of the seaman’s discharge or

order to be discharged. Many men remained in the service of the navy for up to a year after

the order was given for their release, but before they were actually discharged. 108 Some

received their wages upon discharge and in some instances even prize money.109 Others sank

into destitution as they loitered around the port town consulates waiting to hear from the

Admiralty or after having been discharged but without sufficient funds for passage home.110

The American government provided some financial relief for these seamen through the

Agents, but the American government never went so far as to demand indemnity from the

Admiralty for the suffering of the American seamen.111

II. Unsuccessful Applications

Applications to the Admiralty were supposed to contain documented proof of

a seaman’s citizenship. Therefore, a basic and uncontested reason for rejection was that a

seaman had no documents. While it can be assumed that the seaman, the Secretary of State

and Agent exhausted all possible sources for evidence, most agreed that the refusal to release

because of lack of proof was fair. A more contentious reason for rejection was when

documents were submitted with the approval of the Secretary of State and the Admiralty

106 The Admiralty oversaw the expansion of the Royal Navy from 36,000 men in 1792 to
120,000 in 1805. Perkins, Prologue, p.85
107 See Appendix H for a sample Admiralty response letter.
108 Horsman, p.21
110 NARA: RG 84, T168, 8: Letter from Erving to Nepean, 12.10.02

28

deemed them insufficient. It was viewed as a political affront when the Secretary of State

substantiated the claims made in a set of documents and they were then refused. However,

after CHPs became standard issue, documents sent by the State Department (usually

affidavits of family members and church records) were no longer regularly accepted, so such

rejections usually did not surprise the Agents. Similarly, after first having been accepted,

protections issued by American consuls were refused revealing the Admiralty’s suspicions

that both British seamen and American agents were abusing the service with “spurious

protections.”112

The rejection of other applications had more to do with the qualities of the seamen

themselves rather than the documents they provided. Some applications were refused even

when a seaman produced a CHP because the seaman “did not answer to the description”

given on the CHP. In such cases the Admiralty presumably suspected that the CHP belonged

to another seaman and had been obtained fraudulently. However, there were legitimate

explanations, such as aging, as to why a seaman did not resemble the description in his CHP.

Another reason that the Admiralty would not approve the discharge of an American seaman

was if he married or resided in Great Britain—a policy that contradicted the British claim

that national allegiance was non-transferable. Similarly, the Admiralty did not accept any

applications made by those who claimed to have been naturalized in the United States due

again to the principle of indefeasible allegiance and also because of the ease with which

naturalization papers could be obtained in the United States.113

Yet another reason for immediate refusal of an application was if the seaman had

accepted the King’s bounty, a bonus offered upon enlistment. The British considered

112 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 936
113 Zimmerman, p.22-23

29

accepting the bounty as a willingness to trade service for reward. Some seamen protested

that they never took the bounty or received it only after being beaten or pressed into service

for a prolonged period of time. Still others claimed it was forced upon them so as to ensure

that they would not be discharged. Nevertheless, dispersals of bounty were usually logged

in the ship’s records and could therefore by pointed to by the ship’s officers as tangible

evidence against return. Similarly, applications were rejected if the Admiralty could show

that the American seamen entered into the service of the Royal Navy by a means other than

impressment. Americans found on board French privateer ships were held as prisoners of

war and did not qualify for release. Others were handed over by their American shipmasters

to avoid paying their wages or for mutinous or unruly behavior; such was the case of one

John Williamson, who said his captain handed him to HMS Leviathan after he “drank too

much of the liquor which made me and the mate quarrel”.114 While the Agents were eager

to secure the release of all impressed American seamen, the aforementioned reasons for

unsuccessful applications were considered fair, if not favorable.

III. Grey Areas

The rationales behind unsuccessful applications were more varied, and in most

cases the Admiralty offered no explanation or evidence of how or why it reached a certain

conclusion. Indeed, some applications received no answers whatsoever. The Admiralty

operated in a grey area between rigid adherence to standards and blatant disregard of proof,

which operated afforded it some discretion, resulting in some dubious decisions. Some

responses to applications merely stated that the Lords of the Admiralty “do not think it fit

to allow these men discharge,” although most failed applications were rejected based on the

114 Ibid., p.107; NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 928: Letter from Williamson to Gilson, 22.5.09

30

documents submitted or other discrepancies in the application. 115 The documents accepted

by the Admiralty varied throughout the period, and, although there was some regularity in

the standards, there were numerous examples of arbitrary rejections of evidence that had

otherwise been accepted.116 In some applications, the Admiralty responded that the “Lords

have reason to believe he is a subject of His Britannical Majesty” and therefore ineligible for

discharge, but offered no explanation as to how it reached such a conclusion that the seaman

was British.117 Other applications were rejected regardless of the evidence supplied because

the Admiralty found the seamen to be “ignorant of the place supposedly from” in America. 118

How the Admiralty reached such results cannot be discerned, but it must be assumed that

there was some sort of interview or questionnaire to assess the seaman’s knowledge of

America.

Even when sufficient evidence was produced to bring about an order for

discharge, there often would be problems in locating the seaman and the men-of-war on

which they served. In some cases, the Admiralty reported that the impressed seaman did not

appear to be on board the ships as claimed. This could have been for any number of

legitimate reasons such as desertion, escape or transfer to another ship. However, Agent

Erving credited some of these missed connections to the British practice of recording false

names for the impressed men in the ship’s records.119 In some instances, the man-of-war in

question would be in a foreign station, such as when one Spencer Hopkins wrote from Lima

in 1805, and the Admiralty responded with “further steps cannot be taken” at this time.120

115 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 932
116 Zimmerman, p.167
117 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 934: Letter from Nepean to Lenox, 25.4.96
118 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 936
119 Zimmerman, p.108
120 NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 928: Letter from Hopkins to his mother, 11.6.05

31

This proved to be a point of contention between the consuls and the Admiralty; the Agents

believed that with some effort, the Admiralty could reach the ship, but instead was trying to

find every reason to reject an application to retain a seaman in their service. There is no

record as to whether or not the Admiralty attempted to make contact with the men whose

ships were in foreign stations upon their return, or if the Agents followed up on the matters at

later dates. The Admiralty appears to have interpreted ambiguities in the chaotic

administrative system in its favor, often to the disadvantage of impressed seaman.

Conclusion

Impressment is best viewed as a microcosm of Anglo-American relations at the turn

of the nineteenth century. Despite being a relatively esoteric topic and fleeting issue between

the United States and Great Britain, impressment is quite important—less for what it was

and more for what it represented. In the short term, impressment did little to harm American

commerce and only succeeded in reclaiming a fraction of the men the Royal Navy lost to

desertion. In the long term, however, impressment embodied the intricacies of post-colonial

relationship between Great Britain and the United States.

Most historians have dwelt upon negotiations between the diplomatic elites of

Great Britain and the United States when examining impressment. However, the course of

impressment cannot be viewed though any single lens. Rather was intrinsically linked to the

wider military, economic and socio-political environment. It was this multidimensionality of

impressment that hindered progress toward its resolution. Instead of focusing on preexisting

approaches to impressment, this paper delves further into individual cases, narrowing the

scope to focus on vignettes that illustrate the complexity of the issue and the myriad of

32

factors at play.

At its heart impressment embodied the complicated post-colonial relationship

between the mother country, Great Britain, and its young offspring, the United States.

Britain was a leader in the international arena and consequently followed a conservative

path to protect its preeminence in maritime power. However, the upstart United States

empowered by its growing importance to international trade challenged Britain’s established

predominance, largely through the use of principles and ideals. Uncertain of how to respond,

Britain and the United States stumbled through the post-colonial haze with ad hoc processes

for dealing with novel issues such as citizenship and naturalization.

The United States also raised issues that had historically questioned British

naval practices, chiefly with regard to the rights of neutral trade. Due to commercial

interdependence and colonial bonds, Britain somewhat indulged the United States on trade

matters, much more so than any other nation. The United States’ neutral trade, however,

was a double-edged sword that alternately sustained Great Britain and chipped away at its

monopoly on the carrying trade. Britain was both dependent on trade with the United States

as source of funding that financed the war with Napoleon but also vulnerable to its loss of

seamen to the American merchant marine.

While the United States was at a disadvantage in that it was largely naïve about

the machinations of the balance of power, Britain was unable to respond because of its

preoccupation with the conflict with France. Napoleon did not beat Britain but he left

it battered. French aggression interrupted America’s coming of age and Great Britain’s

adjustment to it. At least from Britain’s point of view, the upheaval in France was influenced

by, if not directly related to, American independence. As such, the British held the

33

Americans somewhat responsible for this disruption of the European status quo.121

Adolescent America was new to the international arena and not yet accepted as an equal

member. Drawing from its experience with independence, it was confident in asserting

universal principles but reluctant with fielding military power. Content with its isolation the

United States did not enter into an alliance with either Britain or France during the

Napoleonic Wars; rather it remained wedded to neutrality and the commercial profit and

peace that accompanied it. This stance was soon betrayed as naïve and the United States

subsequently blundered its way through an ill-conceived response to the European economic

warfare. Domestic partisan infighting revealed American uncertainty about the direction of

its future development. Desiring to stay neutral yet simultaneously determined to take a

stand in defense of its citizens and sovereignty, the United States fumbled its way through

weak legislation that ended up causing more confusion than clarity. Perhaps as expected,

Britain responded to such haphazard American efforts at reaching a compromise over trade

and impressment issues with its own set of seemingly arbitrary responses.

The course of Anglo-American interaction over impressment can roughly be divided

into different periods. In the decade following American independence impressment was a

non-issue. Revolutionary France soon came to threaten the predictability of the European

ancien regime and British comfort was rattled from across the Atlantic and the Channel.

Faced with a real need for manpower, Britain vigorously pursued the policy of impressment

with the outbreak of war in 1793. Cases of impressment spiked in 1796 and 1803 when

Britain felt most vulnerable to invasion and needed to boost its defenses. The Peace of

Amiens brought little solace, and Trafalgar did not bring peace; thus impressment continued.

In response, the United States instituted a far-reaching administrative program of protections

121 Bemis, “London Mission” p.233

34

and appeals to mitigate, if not counteract, British impressment of American seamen. This

administrative process soon proved subject to fraud and wide-ranging abuse giving the

British valid, if not sufficient reasons for discounting it. After a few short years of success,

zealous officers, conniving seamen and a suspicious Admiralty rendered the American

administrative response impotent.

Thus, in spite of winning minor adjustments to the British policy of impressment,

America never became satisfied that Britain fully respected its sovereignty as an independent

nation. Though a historically brief problem, impressment was representative of a myriad of

grievances between the two states. A fluid situation that changed constantly, impressment

was an omnipresent lightning rod for Anglo-American tensions. Ironically, the conclusion of

the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 eliminated the British need to pursue deserters in the American

merchant marine, but not before the United States felt compelled to declare war against Great

Britain over a host of unresolved issues in 1812. In short, while impressment affected only

a small number of people for a relatively brief amount of time, it was nonetheless a very rich

human and historical drama played out on the international stage.

Word Count: 9,948

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY MATERIAL

35

Unpublished

United States National Archives and Records Administration

Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1756-1999

M50 Letters from the British Legation in the United States
M78 Consular Instructions from the Department of State, 1801-1834
M1839: Miscellaneous Lists and Papers Regarding Impressed Seamen, 1796-1814

MLR A1 928: Letters Received Regarding Impressed Seamen,
Compiled 1794 – 1815
MLR A1 929: Correspondence with Collectors of Customs Regarding Impressed Seamen,
Compiled 1796 – 1814
MLR A1 931: Quarterly Abstracts of Applications for the Release of Impressed Seamen,
Compiled 1797 - 1801
MLR A1 932: Quarterly Returns of Impressed Seamen, Compiled 10/1806 - 12/1809
MLR A1 933: Abstracts of Quarterly Returns of Impressed Seamen, Compiled 1805 - 1809
MLR A1 934: Letters Received from the British Admiralty Office, Compiled 1794 – 1796
MLR A1 935: Index to Register of Applications for the Release of Impressed Seamen,
Compiled 1794 - 1797
MLR A1 936: Registers of Applications for the Release of Impressed Seamen,
Compiled 19 July 1793 - 1 May 1802

Record Group 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
Compiled 1788-1964
T168: Despatches from US Consuls in London, Compiled 1790-1906

National Archives of the United Kingdom

ADM 1: Admiralty, and Ministry of Defense, Navy Department: Correspondence and Papers,
Compiled 1660-1976

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Adams, Henry The History of the United States Vol.1-9
(New York, 1891-1898)

Bemis, Samuel Flagg Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1965)

Brown, Roger Hamilton The Republic in Peril (New York, 1964)

Chandler, David G. Campaigns of Napoleon (London, 1966)

36

Esdaile, Charles Napoleon’s Wars: an International
History, 1803-1815 (London, 2007)

Hitsman, J. Mackay The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History
(Toronto, 1966)

Horsman, Reginald The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962)

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976)

Mahan, Alfred Thayer Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, Volume One
(London, 1905)

Neel, Joanne Loewe Phineas Bond: A Study in Anglo-
American Relations, 1786-1812 (Philadelphia, 1968)

Perkins, Bradford The First Rapprochement (Philadelphia, 1955)
Prologue to War (Berkeley, 1968)

Smith. T.C. Wars Between England and America (New York, 1914)

Stagg, J.C.A. Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy and
Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830
(Princeton, 1983)

Zimmerman, James Fulton Impressment of American Seamen (New York, 1925)

Articles

Bemis, Samuel Flagg “The London Mission of Thomas
Pinckney, 1792-1796” The American Historical Review Vol.
28, No. 2 (January 1923)

Deeben, John P. “Taken on the High Seas: American
Seamen Impressment Records at the National Archives, 1789-
1815”
New England Ancestors, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 2006)
“Maritime Proofs of Citizenship: The Essential Evidence
behind Seamen’s Protection Certificates, 1792-1875” National
Genealogical Society Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 2 (June 2008)

Steel, Anthony“Anthony Merry and the Anglo-American
Dispute about Impressment, 1803-6” Cambridge Historical
Journal Vol. 9, No. 3 (1949)
“Impressment in the Monroe-Pinkney Negotiation, 1806-1807”
The American Historical Review Vol. 57, No. 2 (January 1952)

37

APPENDIX

A. Abstracts of Applications made by David Lenox, 13 December 1797-1 May 1802

B. Abstracts of Applications made by William Lyman, 30 September 1805-30 September
1810

C. Protest made by William Vicary, Master of the Juliana—New York, NY, 13 January 1798

D. Baptismal Record of Martin Powers, seaman—Middleton, CT, undated

E. Customs House Protection for Benjamin Lincoln, seaman— Boston, MA, 25 July 1804

F. Page of Register kept by David Lenox, Agent for American Seamen—10-27 August 1800

G. Affidavit of Ann Richards, mother of seaman, John Richards—Philadelphia, PA, 29 April
1802

H. Letter from Evan Nepean, Secretary to the Admiralty to David Lenox, Agent for
American Seamen—9 February 1796

38

Abstracts of Applications made by David Lenox, 13 December 1797-1 May 1802
Compiled from NARA: RG 59, MLR A1 931 and table from Zimmerman p.262

D 1 1 1 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 M J 0 D J M J A N J A J O J A J O M
D a u J e a a u u o a p u c a p u c a
e r n u c n r n g v n r l t n r l t y
c c e l 1 1 c e 1 1 1 i y 1 1 i y 1 1
1 h 1 y 7 7 h 1 7 7 8 l 1 8 8 l 1 8 8
7 1 7 1 9 9 1 7 9 9 0 1 8 0 0 1 8 0 0
9 7 9 7 8 9 7 9 9 9 0 8 0 0 1 8 0 1 2
7 9 8 9 9 9 0 0 0 1
8 8 9 0 1

Or … … … … … 65 11 78 79 19 10 10 12 13 14 83 13 17 13
igi 1 1 2 6 9 5 3 2 0 6 3
nal
app
lica
tio
ns

Re … … … … … … … … … 21 27 3 9 9 21 28 6 41 24
ne
w
ed
app
lica
tio
ns

Un 53 31 28 47 41 31 33 45 38 85 61 42 45 32 12 12 33 42 7‡
ans * †
we
red

Dis 77 10 11 12 15 17 9 9 8 35 37 22 39 32 33 11 21 40 31
cha 1 9 3 7 3
rge
d

Or 30 42 52 64 10 99 5 11 39 48 31 33 31 46 36 24 39 74 54
de 1
red
for
dis
cha
rge

De 58 73 10 10 14 17 28 22 23 37 41 29 42 34 78 33 43 55 69
tai 3 3 5 2
ned
for
wa
nt
of
doc
um
ent
s

Re 39 55 66 67 76 93 18 9 4 22 8 12 6 8 6 3 4 7 10
cei
ved

39

bo
unt
y

Bri 11 15 18 20 28 29 5 10 … 4 19 6 5 4 6 2 6 11 5
tish
sub
ject
s

N 5 14 16 20 21 22 4 1 7 8 8 2 4 6 15 6 7 9 13
ot
on
shi
ps
rep
res
ent
ed

Ma 2 5 10 11 16 17 3 2 4 6 9 6 3 2 4 2 2 3 7
de
th
eir
esc
ape

N 1 … … … … 2 … … … 2 … 1 … … … 5 3 1 1
ot
an
sw
eri
ng
des
cri
pti
on

De … … 4 6 9 8 … 2 … 2 2 19 … 2 … 1 2 … …
tai
ned
as
pri
so
ner
s of
wa
r

Sh … … … … … 3 5 … … … … … … … 3 1 … 6 7
ips
on
fo
rei
gn
stat
ion
s

Se … … 1 1 1 1 … 1 … … … … … … … … …
nt
on
bo
ard
by
the

40

ci
vil
aut
hor
ity

Ta 9 15 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ken
by
Fre
nch

(no
t in
tot
al)

Ta … 4 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ken
by
Du
tch

(no
t in
tot
al)

Pic … … … … 8 … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ked
up
at
sea
esc
api
ng
Fre
nch

Se … … … … 3 … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
nt
for
mu
tin
ous
con
duc
t

De … … … … … 1 1 … … 1 … … … … 1 1 … 2 1
ad

Kil … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … …
led
in
acti
on

De … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … …
tai
ned
on
sh
ip
on

41

sus
pic
ion
of
M
uti
ny
of
He
rmi
one

No … … … … … … … … … … 1 1 … 1 … … … … …
or
der
to
lea
ve
the
se
rvi
ce
aft
er
req
ue
sti
ng
my
int
erf
ere
nce

On … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … …
bo
ard
the
La
Be
rtin
on
da
te
wh
en
she
fou
nde
red

Tot 27 33 41 46 60 65 11 78 79 19 10 10 12 13 14 83 13 17 13
al 6 6 7 2 6 1 1 2 6 9 5 3 2 0 6 3

*These 31 cases were on the 16th of January.
Are in the return March 1st and the subsequent abstract.
† One invalid.
‡ One invalid and two on board the foundered La Bertin.

Abstracts of Applications made by William Lyman, 30 September 1805 – 30 September 1810

42

Compiled from NARA: RG 59 MLR A1 933 and table from Zimmerman p. 264-265

3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 O J J O J A O J A J O J A J O J A J
S c a u c a p c a p u c a p u c a p u
e t n l t n r t n r l t n r l t n r l
p - - y - - - - - - y - - - y - - - y
t 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 -
1 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 J 3 1 1 0 3
8 D M 0 D M J D M J 0 D M u 0 D M J 0
0 e a S e a u e a u S e a n S e a u S
D
5 c r e c r n c r n e c r e e c r n e
ate
1 1 p 1 1 1 1 1 1 p 1 1 1 p 1 1 1 p
of
Ab 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 1
stra 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 8
ct 5 6 0 6 7 7 7 8 8 0 8 9 9 0 9 0 0 1
6 8 9 0

Nu 25 26 27 31 32 33 34 … … … … … … … … … … … …
m 26 20 98 07 65 36 48
ber
of
Ap
pli
cati
ons

Or 23 25 26 29 31 32 33 … … … … … … … … … … … …
igi 21 26 19 25 07 65 36
nal
Ap
pli
cati
ons

Of 10 4 3 10 12 5 1 5 5 4 12 X 4 2 … … … … …
wh
ich
are
du
pli
cat
es

Di 54 29 49 72 59 28 37 39 31 47 88 53 29 51 71 60 55 94 70
sch
arg
ed
and
or
de
red
to
be
dis
cha
rge
d

RE
FU
SE
D

No 4 … 1 15 4 … 8 1 … 1 5 X 2 6 43 5 9 12 32
doc

43

um
ent
s

Sa 22 4 5 4 6 1 12 16 16 22 6 X 2 20 31 34 86 30 28
id
to
be
Bri
tish

Ta 7 3 13 5 9 … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ken
the
Bo
unt
y

Pri 1 … … … … … … … … … 1 1 … … … … … … …
so
ner
s of
Wa
r

Ta 1 … … … … 1 … 1 4 … … … … 4 11 … 9 13 6
ken
out
of
Pri
vat
eer

M … … 1 2 … 1 … 1 1 1 2 2 … … 2 4 2 11 3
arr
ied
to
En
gli
sh /
Iris
h

Ac … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
cu
sed
of

Ste
ali
ng

Nat … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … …
ive
of
Ca
nad
a

Nat … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ive
of
De
nm

44

ark

Nat … … … 1 … … … 1 … 2 … … … … 1 5 5 2 1
ive
of
W
est
Ind
ies

Nat … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1 1 … 1
ive
of
Afr
ica

Nat … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … 1 … … …
ive
of
Sw
ede
n

Nat … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1
ive
of
Pru
ssi
a

Nat … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … …
ive
of
Ha
no
ver

Nat … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … …
ive
of
Ital
y

N … … … … … … … … … … 1 … X 6 1 … … … 2
ot
A
me
ric
an

Vo … … … … … 4 4 13 … 5 3 X 4 10 9 8 4 4 14
lun
tee
r

Im … … 2 … … … 1 4 1 1 … 5 … … … 1 2 … 2
pos
ters

Ig … … … … … … … 2 2 1 1 1 … … 1 … … … 4
no
ran
t of

45

par
t of
US
sa
id
to
be
fro
m

Mu … … … … … … 3 2 … … … … … … … … … … …
tin
ous
Co
nd
uct

Iris … … … … … … … 1 … … 1 … … … … … … … …
hm
an
se
nt
for
mi
sde
me
ano
r

De … … … … … 1 … 1 1 … … … … … … … … … …
fra
ud
ing
the
Re
ven
ue

3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p - - y - - - - - - y - - - y - - - y
t 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 -
1 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 J 3 1 1 0 3
8 D M 0 D M J D M J 0 D M u 0 D M J 0
D
ate
1 1 p 1 1 1 1 1 1 p 1 1 1 p 1 1 1 p
of
Ab 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 1
stra 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 8
ct 5 6 0 6 7 7 7 8 8 0 8 9 9 0 9 0 0 1
6 8 9 0

IN
SU
FF
ICI
EN
T

EV
ID
EN
CE

46

Pro 10 5 1 7 11 9 11 14 9 7 8 15 11 15 16 9 13 11 14
tect
ion
fro
m
con
sul
s

Aff 6 4 5 1 3 … 3 3 5 4 6 6 5 6 11 3 7 9 9
ida
vit
fro
m
US

Aff 5 … … … 1 1 … … … … … … … … 2 1 … 1 3
ida
vit
fro
m
En
gla
nd

Co 9 2 1 … 1 1 9 1 3 1 1 3 … 2 … … 2 5 2
lle
cto
rs’
Pro
tect
ion

Do 6 5 5 … … 3 1 7 1 3 1 1 2 1 4 6 2 6 10
cu
me
nt
fro
m
De
pt.
of
Sta
te

Ad … 1 … 1 1 … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … 1
mi
ral
ty
Pro
tect
ion

Ind … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … 1 2 1
ent
ure
s

N … 3 … … 3 … … 12 2 6 10 7 6 14 12 17 10 9 13
ot
an
sw
eri
ng
the
des

47

cri
pti
on

Ke … … … … 4 … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
pt
by
of
fic
ers
w
ho
im
pr
ess
ed
the
m

Ce … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … …
rti
fic
ate
of
Bir
th

Pro … … … … … … … … 4 … … … … … … … … … …
tec
tio
ns
tak
en
fro
m
the
m

Dis … … … … … … … … 3 … … 1 … 1 … … 3 1 …
cha
rge
fro
m
Ro
yal
Na
vy
as
A
me
ric
an
Cit
ize
ns

N 11 4 9 9 7 2 5 9 2 3 7 1 1 3 7 12 12 15 9
ot
on
sh
ip
stat
ed

N … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 4 12 13
ot
kn

48

ow
n
wh
ere
or
on
w
hat
shi
p

De 1 … 6 4 3 … 1 4 4 12 6 7 6 3 11 9 3 6 7
sert
ed

Be … … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 4 1 2 1 1
ing
de
se
rter
s or
sa
id
to
be
des
ert
ers

Att … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1 … …
em
pt
ed
to
des
ert

Sh 19 13 36 18 9 2 6 11 8 10 4 12 3 18 14 20 4 30 59
ip
on
fo
rei
gn
stat
ion

N 1 … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ot
im
pre
sse
d

Ap 5 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
pli
cati
ons
req
uir
ed
do
cu
me
nts
ret
urn
ed

49

De 1 1 1 … 1 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … …
tai
ned
not
kn
ow
n

Un 31 15 6 21 31 9 10 31 13 36 17 6 … … … 3 … 2 1
ans
we
red

Inv … 1 1 1 … 1 … 7/1 … 1 4 5 4 6 11 4 10 3 8
ali
d

De … … 1 1 … … … 1 … … … … … 1 … … … 1 5
ad/
dro
wn
ed

Sh … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … …
ip
lost

Sh … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1 … 2 1 …
ip
out
of
co
m
mis
sio
n

For … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … 1 …
me
rly
bel
on
ged
to
the
Ro
yal
Na
vy

3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p - - y - - - - - - y - - - y - - - y
t 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 -
1 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 J 3 1 1 0 3
8 D M 0 D M J D M J 0 D M u 0 D M J 0
D
ate
1 1 p 1 1 1 1 1 1 p 1 1 1 p 1 1 1 p
of
Ab 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 1
stra 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 8
5 6 0 6 7 7 7 8 8 0 8 9 9 0 9 0 0 1

50

ct 6 8 9 0

Be … … … 3 … … … … … … … … … … 2 2 … 2 …
ing
exc
han
ged
as
Bri
tish
su
bje
cts
fro
m
ene
my
pri
son
s

Fr … … … … … … … … … … 2 … … 2 8 7 4 6 3
au
dul
ent
pro
tect
ion
s

Pro … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … …
tec
tio
ns
irre
gul
ar

No … … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 5 9 1 … 2
rea
son
ass
ign
ed

Re … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … …
fer
red
to
tra
nsp
ort
boa
rd

Be … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 3 … … …
ing
rel
eas
ed
fro
m
pr
iso
n at
Go

51

tte
nb
urg
by
Bri
tish
con
sul

Etc 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
.

52

Impressment of american seamen

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Similar to Impressment of american seamen

Similar to Impressment of american seamen (10)

Impressment of american seamen