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Sea power-session 10-empire

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The Seven Years War, full of lessons for military and naval officers, delivers the basis for the first British empire. It also sets in motion the age of the democratic revolutions which will be the focus for Sea Power 2

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Sea power-session 10-empire

  1. 1. Sea Power session x Empire
  2. 2. Not Guns, Germs, and Steel. Rather oceanic commerce and the ships which have guarded it. That’s the factor to explain the amazing rise of the English-speaking peoples. Their naval campaigns underlie this history. jbp
  3. 3. Padfield, p. 214. “The war was ended in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris. Britain’s chief negotiator, a leading member of the peace party, acted in the spirit of the objections to Pitt’s uncompromising policy: France’s main West Indian islands were returned to her, as well as Gorée on the slaving coast of Africa and Belle Isle; Havana and Manila were returned to Spain. Nevertheless, Britain retained the whole of Canada and acquired Florida from Spain. Since France transferred Louisiana to Spain, France was now excluded from North America. Her position in India was also so weakened as to leave the British East India Company dominant. “If Great Britain had given away many of the fruits of the most triumphant war she had ever fought •—as Pitt complained—she nevertheless emerged as undisputed mistress of North America and the widest trading empire. Moreover, the value of her exports and re- exports had risen by over 30% during the war, to almost £15 million; her imports had risen by 27%, to £11 million. Over 100 British slaving ships—65 from Liverpool, now undisputed slaving capital of the country—sailed each year for Africa, carrying on average over 20,000 Negroes to the Americas….” 11 Quiberon Bay, 1759
  4. 4. Ibid. “…the Americas. The metal and textile industries, agriculture and the entire internal market had been stimulated. Judged by these results and the temporary devastation of French trade and industry, the war had proved a highly successful commercial aggression. “It had also been hugely expensive. Subsidies to Frederick II and the other Continental allies had amounted to some £10 million. Average annual expenditures had been over £18 million, against tax revenue of £8.6 million. The resulting deficits had almost doubled the national debt, from £74 million up to £132 million, which now required over 50% of tax revenue to service. This was the investment in the bid for North America….The unprecedented scale of the effort was made possible only by the maturity of the fiscal and financial system; it was this which had enabled Britain to mobilize the savings of her people and foreigners alike—some £15 million, or 14% of the national debt was held abroad, chiefly by the United Provinces. “By contrast, the French financial system was once again in crisis….” 11 Quiberon Bay, 1759
  5. 5. Quebec, 1759 India The West Indies The (British) Lion’s Share
  6. 6. Quebec, 1759 The Death of General Wolfe Benjamin West, 1770; in the National Gallery of Canada
  7. 7. Ottawa R. St LAW RENCE R. CHAMPLAIN
  8. 8. FT Oswego FT W Henry Mont Real Quebec
  9. 9. The Missing People Indian C ountry
  10. 10. The Missing People Between the 80,000 French settlers of New France and the 1,500,000 mostly British settlers of the Thirteen Colonies were the American Indians, caught ‘between the blades of a scissors,’ as one Moravian missionary put it. With the notable exception of the Mohawks, the rest of the Iroquois, nearly all of the Micmacs, and Abenaki sided with the French. Hence we called this conflict the French and Indian War. And it had been going on with little remission since King William’s War. jbp
  11. 11. The Ohio Country The Upper St. Lawrence
  12. 12. 3: The Seven Years’ War “In America, meanwhile, Pitt had already put his plans in motion. In 1757 an unsuccessful expedition had been mounted from Halifax against Louisburg, the French bastion on Cape Breton Island,• which flanked the approaches to the Gulf of St. Lawrence.…” Sea Power, p. 55. The British Capture Louisburg
  13. 13. 3: The Seven Years’ War “… St. Lawrence. In 1758 a larger and better-commanded force, nominally under under the superannuated Major General James Abercrombie, but effectively under the field command of Lord Jeffrey Amherst,• set out to accomplish the same objective. This time Adm Boscawen held the naval command, and the redoubtable James Wolfe was one of the brigadiers of the assault force.…” op. cit., p. 55. The British Capture Louisburg
  14. 14. “In a well-planned amphib assault, the fleet’s boats took the troops in under fire to the rocky open coast W of the city.…” “… assault force.” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The British Capture Louisburg
  15. 15. “In a well-planned amphib assault, the fleet’s boats took the troops in under fire to the rocky open coast W of the city.• Many boats capsized in the heavy surf….” Ibid. The British Capture Louisburg 3: The Seven Years’ War
  16. 16. “In a well-planned amphib assault, the fleet’s boats took the troops in under fire to the rocky open coast W of the city.• Many boats capsized in the heavy surf, but a contingent of Wolfe’s redcoats on the left of the line made a precarious beachhead which their commander was quick to perceive and exploit….” Ibid. The British Capture Louisburg 3: The Seven Years’ War
  17. 17. “In a well-planned amphib assault, the fleet’s boats took the troops in under fire to the rocky open coast W of the city.• Many boats capsized in the heavy surf, but a contingent of Wolfe’s redcoats on the left of the line made a precarious beachhead which their commander was quick to perceive and exploit. As quickly as they landed, the superbly conditioned British troops wheeled into a bayonet-studded line, charged and cleared the coastal batteries. As reinforcements poured ashore, the English infantry rapidly forced the now-outnumbered French back into the fortifications of the city. Ibid. The British Capture Louisburg 3: The Seven Years’ War “Satisfied that superior British sea power would now cut off French reinforcements and supplies, Amherst refused the temptation to assault and settled down to siege…”
  18. 18. 3: The Seven Years’ War “… to siege. With Boscawen’s ships coasting back and forth hull-down on the horizon, there was no likelihood of relief for the besieged. On short rations and without hope, the French garrison finally surrendered in late July, after a six-weeks investment. Ibid. The British Capture Louisburg
  19. 19. “… six-weeks investment. The British Capture Louisburg Ibid. “If Louisburg was the ‘key to the St. Lawrence,’ then Quebec was the key to North America. Situated almost a thousand miles within the heartland of the continent, Quebec is located at the point where the St. Lawrence begins to broaden into a great tidal estuary. With the ordnance of the 18th century, the range of shore batteries was adequate to command the river above Quebec, but not below.• Protected by the turbulent Montmorency River to the E,… The Quebec Campaign
  20. 20. “… six-weeks investment. The British Capture Louisburg Ibid. The Quebec Campaign “If Louisburg was the ‘key to the St. Lawrence,’ then Quebec was the key to North America. Situated almost a thousand miles within the heartland of the continent, Quebec is located at the point where the St. Lawrence begins to broaden into a great tidal estuary. With the ordnance of the 18th century, the range of shore batteries was adequate to command the river above Quebec, but not below.• Protected by the turbulent Montmorency River to the E, and by the cliff-like shore line to the W, the rocky bastions of the ‘Upper City’ were deemed to be virtually impregnable to assault.• Yet to control Quebec was to control the upper St. Lawrence, the natural water-highway to the Great Lakes and the whole interior of the continent.•
  21. 21. “… six-weeks investment. The British Capture Louisburg Ibid. “If Louisburg was the ‘key to the St. Lawrence,’ then Quebec was the key to North America. Situated almost a thousand miles within the heartland of the continent, Quebec is located at the point where the St. Lawrence begins to broaden into a great tidal estuary. With the ordnance of the 18th century, the range of shore batteries was adequate to command the river above Quebec, but not below.• Protected by the turbulent Montmorency River to the E, and by the cliff-like shore line to the W, the rocky bastions of the ‘Upper City’ were deemed to be virtually impregnable to assault.• Yet to control Quebec was to control the upper St. Lawrence, the natural water-highway to the Great Lakes and the whole interior of the continent.• The Quebec Campaign To Pitt’s perceptive eye, here was a prize worth any cost.…”
  22. 22. “… six-weeks investment. The British Capture Louisburg Ibid. “If Louisburg was the ‘key to the St. Lawrence,’ then Quebec was the key to North America. Situated almost a thousand miles within the heartland of the continent, Quebec is located at the point where the St. Lawrence begins to broaden into a great tidal estuary. With the ordnance of the 18th century, the range of shore batteries was adequate to command the river above Quebec, but not below.• Protected by the turbulent Montmorency River to the E, and by the cliff-like shore line to the W, the rocky bastions of the ‘Upper City’ were deemed to be virtually impregnable to assault.• Yet to control Quebec was to control the upper St. Lawrence, the natural water-highway to the Great Lakes and the whole interior of the continent.• The Quebec Campaign To Pitt’s perceptive eye, here was a prize worth any cost. Thus the major British effort in 1759 was a three-pronged campaign against Quebec.…”
  23. 23. “…to control…the whole interior of the continent….
  24. 24. Quebec largest of the ten provinces and three territories of Canada, the world’s second largest country by area
  25. 25. Quebec City French explorer Jacques Cartier built a fort at the site in 1535, where he stayed for the winter before going back to France in spring 1536. He came back in 1541 with the goal of building a permanent settlement. “I shall put God’s gift to good use;” the Don de Dieu was Champlain’s (1608) ship.
  26. 26. The Île d’Orléans divides Lower and Upper St. Lawrence Lower St. Lawrence Upper St. Lawrence
  27. 27. At the Beginning of the French & Indian War
  28. 28. 1755
  29. 29. 1756
  30. 30. 1756 Montcalm captures Fort Oswego
  31. 31. 1757 Montcalm captures Fort William-Henry Pitt replaces Newcastle
  32. 32. 1758 Amherst takes Louisburg Montcalm defends Fort Carillon against General Abercrombie Forbes takes Fort Duquesne
  33. 33. 1759 Amherst takes Fort Crown Point Sir Wm Johnson takes Fort Niagara
  34. 34. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…against Quebec. op. cit., pp. 55-56. “Lord Jeffrey Amherst with 12,000 men would strike from the S, along the natural waterway provided by Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River…” The Quebec Campaign
  35. 35. 3: The Seven Years’ War op. cit., pp. 55-56. The Quebec Campaign “… Richelieu River later to figure importantly in both the American Revolution and the War of 1812). This would entail the capture of French outposts at Fort Ticonderoga • (Carillon) and Crown Point • (St. Frédéric)….”
  36. 36. “…Crown Point [St. Frédéric]. op. cit., p. 56. “A smaller British force [under Sir William Johnson and his Mohawks] would capture Fort Niagara and converge on Quebec from the W, following the valley of the [upper] St. Lawrence. “An amphib force would meanwhile ascend the St. Lawrence from the sea and operate against Quebec directly, isolating it from seaborne reinforcement and supply. This was a substantial command, consisting of 26 fighting vessels, besides auxiliaries and transports. It ferried 9,200 British regulars, at this epoch of history quite possibly the best soldiers in the world….” The Quebec Campaign 3: The Seven Years’ War
  37. 37. “…the superbly conditioned British troops…quite possibly the best soldiers in the world….” The Louisbourg Grenadiers was a temporary unit of grenadiers formed by General James Wolfe in 1759 to serve with British Army forces in the Quebec campaign of the Seven Years' War. Grenadiers from the 22nd, 40th, and 45th regiments were brought together by Wolfe at the Fortress of Louisbourg in Nova Scotia in preparation for action along the St. Lawrence River. The unit was involved in numerous battles during the months-long prelude to the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, including the ill-fated Battle of Beauport on July 31, 1759. After Quebec City's capture, the Grenadiers went on to be involved in the fall of Montreal the next year. After the end of the Seven Years' War, the unit was disbanded and its members returned to their original regiments.—Wikipedia op. cit., p. 56.
  38. 38. “…the world. But most important, the ships were commanded by Admiral Charles Saunders, and the troops by Major General James Wolfe. Together Wolfe and Saunders proved to be one of the great amphibious partnerships of history. “The campaign plan of the British was well conceived, and their forces, by the standards of colonial war at this time, were exceedingly formidable….” Ibid. The Quebec Campaign 3: The Seven Years’ War
  39. 39. “…exceedingly formidable. The French position, on the contrary,was weakened by a fatal feud • between the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the Governor of French North America, and the Marquis de Montcalm, the military commander. “But the French had the benefit of ‘holding the ground,’ and geographically Quebec is a very strong position.• They had, besides, the advantage of being in the midst of a French colony, with a friendly civilian population scattered up and down the river….” Ibid. The Quebec Campaign 3: The Seven Years’ War
  40. 40. “…the river. They had a potential garrison of 14,000 men and over 300 guns for the defense of their strong point.• Furthermore they had in Louis Joseph de Montcalm a talented and experienced commanding officer, altogether unlikely to be fooled by any elementary subterfuge….” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  41. 41. “…the river. They had a potential garrison of 14,000 men and over 300 guns for the defense of their strong point.• Furthermore they had in Louis Joseph de Montcalm a talented and experienced commanding officer, altogether unlikely to be fooled by any elementary subterfuge.• The French had also been successful in winning the allegiance of most of the Indians….” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  42. 42. “…the Indians. The natural difficulties imposed on a military advance through the trackless wilderness • would in any event have delayed the southern and western columns invading Canada,…” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  43. 43. “…invading Canada, but harassing guerrilla operations by small French forces powerfully reinforced by Indian war parties • helped to guarantee that neither of these British commands would reach its goal in time to assist Wolfe and Saunders….” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  44. 44. “…and Saunders. “Adm Saunders meanwhile was bringing Wolfe’s army to the threshold of Quebec City. By dint of boat surveys made by British squadrons earlier, and through the grudging aid of captured French-Canadian pilots, he took his whole armada of over a hundred sail up the difficult channel without loss. He anchored out of cannon shot of Quebec in the South Channel between the Isle of Orleans and Point Lévis.….” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  45. 45. “…Point Lévis. Disembarking the troops from the overcrowded transports,• Wolfe first occupied the undefended, low-lying Isle of Orleans and encamped at the extreme western end….” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  46. 46. “…western end. Subsequently he sent a column of troops to seize the lightly-defended heights of Point Lévis, • and emplaced heavy guns there to fire into the ‘Lower City’ across the river. The investing of Quebec had begun….” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War The Quebec Campaign
  47. 47. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…had begun. “On several occasions the French had attempted to drift down fireships and fire rafts on the ebb tide to destroy the anchored British men-of-war,• but the ever-watchful Saunders had ships’ boats patrolling nightly upriver, and these had little trouble boathooking the flaming hulks harmlessly ashore….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., pp. 56-57.
  48. 48. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…harmlessly ashore.• For the most part Montcalm was content to hold a tactical defensive, and depend on his entrenched troops to hold all of the N bank of the river.• “By raid and by personal reconnoitering, Wolfe endeavored to find a weak spot in Montcalm’s troop dispositions. But there appeared to be none. Leaving the strong-walled city lightly garrisoned, the French commander had arrayed the bulk of his force in earthworks along the high ground back of the beach all the way from the St. Charles to the Montmorency Rivers….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., pp. 56-57.
  49. 49. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…Montmorency Rivers. The lower reaches of the St. Charles River were covered by two armed hulks sunk athwart it.• Thus all the beaches that looked practicable for assault were covered. Westward of the city the river bank was virtually cliff….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., p. 57.Armed Hulks
  50. 50. Illustration of the cliffs and the battlefield, the Plains of Abraham
  51. 51. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…Montmorency Rivers. The lower reaches of the St. Charles River were covered by two armed hulks sunk athwart it.• Thus all the beaches that looked practicable for assault were covered. Westward of the city the river bank was virtually cliff.• At those few spots where landing even a single boat was possible, there was an outpost, able to give a prompt alarm. A mobile force under Montcalm’s able lieutenant, Louis Antoine de Bougainville,• operated upriver also, able to reinforce any threatened picket. “The narrow channel above Quebec made it infeasible for Saunders to take his big ships farther up the river, but flatboats, sloops of war, and even frigates passed under the guns of the city at night. From these, various probing raids were made against positions on the N bank, establishing beyond doubt that the French were alert….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., p. 57.
  52. 52. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…were alert. “After mature considerations of this choice of difficulties, Wolfe elected to prepare his major assault on the French left flank, where it rested on the Montmorency River.….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  53. 53. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…were alert. “After mature considerations of this choice of difficulties, Wolfe elected to prepare his major assault on the French left flank, where it rested on the Montmorency River.• Pursuant to this design, he landed two brigades on the E bank of the Montmorency, planning to protect their fording of the stream by a simultaneous frontal assault from boats….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  54. 54. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…were alert. “After mature considerations of this choice of difficulties, Wolfe elected to prepare his major assault on the French left flank, where it rested on the Montmorency River.• Pursuant to this design, he landed two brigades on the E bank of the Montmorency, planning to protect their fording of the stream by a simultaneous frontal assault from boats.• Meanwhile the admiral helped perfect the plan. The offshore shoals and ledges would generally prevent running frigates close enough inshore to give effective fire support, though possibly one well-handled vessel might work its way up the channel carved out by the rapid currents of the Montmorency….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  55. 55. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…were alert. “After mature considerations of this choice of difficulties, Wolfe elected to prepare his major assault on the French left flank, where it rested on the Montmorency River.• Pursuant to this design, he landed two brigades on the E bank of the Montmorency, planning to protect their fording of the stream by a simultaneous frontal assault from boats.• Meanwhile the admiral helped perfect the plan. The offshore shoals and ledges would generally prevent running frigates close enough inshore to give effective fire support, though possibly one well-handled vessel might work its way up the channel carved out by the rapid currents of the Montmorency.• To supply at least a minimum of artillery for the left and center boat squadrons, Saunders improvised gunboats (called ‘cats’) out of shallow-draft transports, which he intended to beach broadside as close to shore as possible….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  56. 56. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…as possible. “On July 31, Wolfe set the scheme in motion. It was a dangerous, almost desperate gamble. To achieve success, everything had to work perfectly, a very rare occurrence in amphib warfare. “In fact, the assault worked out very badly. The boats started out in brave alignment, but most of them beached on flats well offshore, or had to grope their way through irregular channels in the mudbanks. The grenadier companies, who were among the first troops ashore, broke discipline under the galling fire from the heights to charge the enemy line in driblets before they could be supported either from the boats or from the ford. By the time they could be recalled and re-formed, the day was already far advanced. A severe storm, threatening earlier, now burst, dampening both spirits and primers.… The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  57. 57. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…and primers. “Abruptly deciding to cut his losses before defeat became disaster, Wolfe evacuated his troops under cover of protective fire from Saunders’ ‘cats’ and the frigate Centurion. The whooping savage allies of the French came pouring down from the heights to butcher the wounded and scalp the dead. Wolfe had left 500 irreplaceable soldiers on the beach. “With the benefit of hindsight, military scholars condemn the Montmorency attack as badly conceived—a misuse of the mobility of sea power, since it involved a frontal assault on a carefully prepared, fixed position. Though the British hoped also to attack the French flank, it was not an exposed flank, for it was protected by the swift-flowing Montmorency River, fordable at only one place.…” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  58. 58. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…one place. The shoals that prevented the fleet from sending its big ships in close enough to lend effective fire support were a crucial factor. For only when seaborne artillery can lay down a crushing barrage just ahead of the infantry as it lands, will a frontal assault on a defended beach have much chance of success. Furthermore, Montcalm’s interior lines made reinforcement of any threatened point easy. Only panic among the French defenders or some grievous blunder by Montcalm could have enabled the British to gain their objectives. In weighing risks against the probability of success, the balance was clearly for not making the effort at this location. The Quebec Campaign op. cit., pp. 57-58. “Wolfe however at this time could see no alternative. Haunted by the memory of the Rochefort fiasco, He preferred a gallant failure to inaction. As he wrote to Pitt: “Soon afterward Wolfe himself became seriously ill of fever…” …the desire to act in conformity to the King’s intentions, induced me to make this trial, persuaded that a victorious army find no difficulties….7 ______ 7 Quoted in R. Beatson, Memoirs of Great Britain (London, 1804) II, 290.
  59. 59. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of fever. It appeared the campaigning season would end with Saunders having to take his ships out of the river before a decisive blow could be struck.• Now the qualities of Wolfe’s leadership were put to the test. He had tried a bold stroke and failed. Though perforce the attacker, he was greatly outnumbered. He had not received the reinforcements and relief he had been led to expect from Amherst. His ailing body refused the demands of his soaring spirit. He could, indeed, have sailed for Halifax secure in the reputation of an honorable effort. “But the record shows that neither Wolfe nor Saunders nor any of their principal subordinates had any idea of quitting while they had any resources remaining. Even as Wolfe tossed in delirium, his brigadiers pushed boat expeditions up the river, ever probing for a soft spot. Somewhat concerned by this possible threat to his right flank, Montcalm detached 3,000 men from his garrison and the Montmorency defenses to reinforce Bougainville’s guard force. Bougainville, whose role was to protect the whole N bank of the river above Quebec by moving troops to any threatened point, now mustered nearly 4,000 men. “Wolfe was now well enough to resume active command in early September, and eager to try a new line of attack….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., p. 58.
  60. 60. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of fever. It appeared the campaigning season would end with Saunders having to take his ships out of the river before a decisive blow could be struck.• Now the qualities of Wolfe’s leadership were put to the test. He had tried a bold stroke and failed. Though perforce the attacker, he was greatly outnumbered. He had not received the reinforcements and relief he had been led to expect from Amherst. His ailing body refused the demands of his soaring spirit. He could, indeed, have sailed for Halifax secure in the reputation of an honorable effort.• “But the record shows that neither Wolfe nor Saunders nor any of their principal subordinates had any idea of quitting while they had any resources remaining. Even as Wolfe tossed in delirium, his brigadiers pushed boat expeditions up the river, ever probing for a soft spot. Somewhat concerned by this possible threat to his right flank,• Montcalm detached 3,000 men from his garrison and the Montmorency defenses to reinforce Bougainville’s guard force. Bougainville, whose role was to protect the whole N bank of the river above Quebec by moving troops to any threatened point, now mustered nearly 4,000 men. “Wolfe was now well enough to resume active command in early September, and eager to try a new line of attack….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., p. 58.
  61. 61. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of attack. While Saunders feinted a landing at the old beachhead, he would try a surprise attack at the Anse du Foulon, a little boat landing a bare mile and a half upriver from the city walls.• The movement was to begin the evening of September 12….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  62. 62. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of attack. While Saunders feinted a landing at the old beachhead, he would try a surprise attack at the Anse du Foulon, a little boat landing a bare mile and a half upriver from the city walls.• The movement was to begin the evening of September 12.• “Saunders played his role to perfection, bombarding the ruined lower town and the Beauport beach with every gun that could be brought to bear, ostentatiously loading the ships’ boats with marines and seamen as if a new landing was imminent….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  63. 63. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of attack. While Saunders feinted a landing at the old beachhead, he would try a surprise attack at the Anse du Foulon, a little boat landing a bare mile and a half upriver from the city walls.• The movement was to begin the evening of September 12.• “Saunders played his role to perfection, bombarding the ruined lower town and the Beauport beach with every gun that could be brought to bear, ostentatiously loading the ships’ boats with marines and seamen as if a new landing was imminent. Meanwhile a strong infantry force in flat- bottomed boats, supported by frigates and sloops-of-war, worked upriver with the tide as if to effect a lodgment far above the city. It was a fine moonlit night, and Bougainville marched the bulk of his force along the shore to parallel this cleverly visible movement….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  64. 64. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of attack. While Saunders feinted a landing at the old beachhead, he would try a surprise attack at the Anse du Foulon, a little boat landing a bare mile and a half upriver from the city walls.• The movement was to begin the evening of September 12.• “Saunders played his role to perfection, bombarding the ruined lower town and the Beauport beach with every gun that could be brought to bear, ostentatiously loading the ships’ boats with marines and seamen as if a new landing was imminent. Meanwhile a strong infantry force in flat- bottomed boats, supported by frigates and sloops-of-war, worked upriver with the tide as if to effect a lodgment far above the city. It was a fine moonlit night, and Bougainville marched the bulk of his force along the shore to parallel this cleverly visible movement. “But when the tide turned, the British boat force began rowing furiously down river. Aided by the tidal current it quickly outdistanced Bougainville’s exhausted foot soldiers. The lead boat scraped ashore shortly before dawn at the foot of the narrow rocky path up the bluff at Anse du Foulon.• The light infantry swarmed up the slope, and bayoneted the picket force before an alarm could be sounded. Working against time, the officers swiftly disembarked their troops, and sent the boats to help bring reinforcements across from Point Levis, the British post directly across the river. By clear daylight, Wolfe had spirited 4,500 men up to the Plains of Abraham and had them arrayed in battle order in sight of the walls of Quebec….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  65. 65. Buttes à Neveu
  66. 66. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…the river. By clear daylight, Wolfe had spirited 4,500 men up to the Plains of Abraham and had them arrayed in battle order in sight of the walls of Quebec.• “The shock of Wolfe’s sudden appearance virtually at the city’s gates and the chagrin of seeing his nearly perfect defenses so readily breached caused Montcalm for once to abandon his steady good judgement. After all, his immediate command could readily be drawn in behind solid walls built to withstand siege, and somewhere off to the W was Bougainville,• with nearly 4,000 stout troops. With a little patience a sortie coordinated with an assault by Bougainville on the British rear might be effected. In such a battle the odds would scarcely favor the outnumbered British, caught in a powerful pincers. “But Montcalm did not wait. He marched out his garrison pell-mell, forming a battle line as it advanced, its front covered by a swarm of skirmishers and marksmen. The British lines waited stolidly, while the French regulars marched steadily to a drumbeat. A six-pounder which some sailors had wormed up the cliff…” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  67. 67. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…the river. By clear daylight, Wolfe had spirited 4,500 men up to the Plains of Abraham and had them arrayed in battle order in sight of the walls of Quebec.• “The shock of Wolfe’s sudden appearance virtually at the city’s gates and the chagrin of seeing his nearly perfect defenses so readily breached caused Montcalm for once to abandon his steady good judgement. After all, his immediate command could readily be drawn in behind solid walls built to withstand siege, and somewhere off to the W was Bougainville,• with nearly 4,000 stout troops. With a little patience a sortie coordinated with an assault by Bougainville on the British rear might be effected. In such a battle the odds would scarcely favor the outnumbered British, caught in a powerful pincers. “But Montcalm did not wait. He marched out his garrison pell-mell, forming a battle line as it advanced, its front covered by a swarm of skirmishers and marksmen. The British lines waited stolidly, while the French regulars marched steadily to a drumbeat. A six-pounder which some sailors had wormed up the cliff • began rapid fire, and cut swaths in the white-clad French column. But the disciplined troops closed ranks and came on. As they approached small arms range, they began to fire, individually and by companies….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  68. 68. rugged terrain
  69. 69. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…by companies. The British accepted the fire without returning it. “When the French were within 30 yards, the swords of the British officers flashed up. Then down. ‘Fire!’….” The Quebec Campaign op. cit., pp. 58-59.
  70. 70. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…by companies. The British accepted the fire without returning it.• “When the French were within 30 yards, the swords of the British officers flashed up. Then down. ‘Fire!’ That great double-shotted volley may be said to have won Canada for Britain. It swept great windrows of French soldiery to the earth. Exercising superb fire-discipline, the British infantry rapidly reloaded, and delivered another volley before the French could recover from the shock of the first. After that it was a disorganized melee, rapidly turning into a rout. While the bagpipes of the highland regiment skirled madly, the demoralized French fled the field before the English bayonets and Scottish claymores. “Montcalm was mortally wounded; his second and third in command were killed outright. The British lost their quartermaster-general and one of their brigadiers. Wolfe, leading a charge of the Louisburg Grenadiers, was himself fatally injured, and was dead in the hour of victory….” The Quebec Campaign Ibid.
  71. 71. Benjamin West’s famous Death of General Wolfe painted in 1771
  72. 72. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…of victory. “The command devolved upon Brigadier George Townshend, who quickly reformed the troops….rapidly put out siege lines around the city and began the laborious work of building redoubts and siting batterie. Before this could be far advanced, the garrison recognized the hopelessness of its position and surrendered. “This durable triumph of British arms is a monument to excellent inter service cooperation, rather rare in military and naval annals until World War II. This unity of purpose and achievement is reflected in Townshend’s report to Pitt, in which he says:” The Quebec Campaign Ibid. I should not do justice to the Admirals, and the naval service, if I neglected this occasion of acknowledging how much we are indebted for our success to the constant assistance and support received from them, and the perfect harmony and correspondence which has prevailed throughout all our operations, in the uncommon difficulties which the nature of this country, in particular, presents to military operations of a great extent, and which no army can itself solely supply; the immense labour in artillery, stores and provisions; the long watchings and attendance in boats;the drawing up our artillery by the seamen, even in the heat of action. It is my duty, short as my command has been, to acknowledge, for that time, how great a share the navy has had in this successful campaign.8 ______ 8 Beatson , Memoirs of Great Britain, II, 306.
  73. 73. 1759—ANNVS MIRABILIS 1759—MIRACULOUS YEAR Commemorative medal. In the National Maritime Museum
  74. 74. India The British Raj in 1909
  75. 75. India—Jewel in the Crown Portugal, here, as in the case of Africa, was the earliest colonizer as well as the last to leave. The Dutch also claimed trading stations during their Golden Age. By the eighteenth century, the British and French East India Companies were the principal contenders. The Seven Years War would decide the issue… jbp From this standpoint our colonies still remain what James Mill cynically described them as being, "a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes.” J.A. Hobson, Imperialism. (1902), I, iv, 15
  76. 76. Provinces of India, earlier Presidencies of British India and still earlier, Presidency towns, were the administrative divisions of British governance in the subcontinent. In one form or other they existed between 1612 and 1947, conventionally divided into three historical periods. • During 1612–1757, the East India Company set up "factories" (trading posts) in several locations, mostly in coastal India, with the consent of the Mughal emperors or local rulers. Its rivals were the merchant trading companies of Holland and France. By the mid-18th century, three "Presidency towns": Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta had grown in size. • During the period of Company rule in India, 1757–1858, the Company gradually acquired sovereignty over large parts of India, now called "Presidencies." However, it also increasingly came under British government oversight, in effect sharing sovereignty with the Crown. At the same time it gradually lost its mercantile privileges. • Following the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the Company's remaining powers were transferred to the Crown. In the new British Raj (1858–1947), sovereignty extended to a few new regions, such as Upper Burma. Increasingly, however, unwieldy presidencies were broken up into “Provinces”. Wikipedia
  77. 77. Rigobert Bonne (1727–1795), Carte hydro-geo -graphique des Indes Orientales en deca et au de la du Gange avec leur archipel …, Paris, 1771 —Wiki Français
  78. 78. Mahé 1725 Pondicherry 1674 Chandernagore 1675 Calcutta 1690 Madras 1639 Bombay 1638
  79. 79. 3: The Seven Years’ War op. cit., p. 59. “The winning of India for the British raj is a saga in itself—the most decisive chapter of which was written during the Seven Years’ War. The prime contestants in this theater of war were the great trading companies—the French and British East India Companies, each almost a sovereign power with its own fleet and army. But the prizes of success were so obvious and considerable that each was able to secure the aid of royal forces. Ultimate British victory was due in part to a slight preponderance in Indian waters, in part to the genius of Robert Clive,• commander of the HEIC’s troops, in part to the professional skill of the RN’s admirals, Charles Watson • in the early part of the campaign and , after Watson’s death in 1757, Sir George Pocock.• “The French naval commander, the Comte d’Aché,• was a competent tactician, whom Pocock in several engagements failed to defeat decisively. But, after the fall of Chandernagor,…” Events in India
  80. 80. Chandannagar was established as a French colony in 1673, when the French obtained permission from Ibrahim Khan, the Nawab of Bengal, to establish a trading post on the right bank of the Hughli River. Bengal was then a province of the Mughal Empire. It became a permanent French settlement in 1688, and in 1730 Joseph François Dupleix was appointed governor of the city, during whose administration more than two thousand brick houses were erected in the town and a considerable maritime trade was carried on. For a time, Chandannagar was the main center for European commerce in Bengal. In 1756 war broke out between France and Great Britain, and Colonel Robert Clive of the British East India Company and Admiral Charles Watson of the British Navy bombarded and captured Chandannagar on 23 March 1757.• The town's fortifications and many houses were demolished thereafter, and Chandannagar's importance as a commercial center was eclipsed by that of Calcutta just downriver. Chandernagore was restored to the French in 1763, but retaken by the British in 1794 in the Napoleonic Wars.—Wiki
  81. 81. Attack and capture of the position of the French company of the Indies at Chandernagore in 1757 during the Seven Years War. 1771, by Dominic Serres—Wiki
  82. 82. View of Fort William [Calcutta] done after the painting in the Court Room in the [East India] Company’s House in Leaden Hall Street [London]. 1735, mezzotint by Elisha Kirkhall—Wiki
  83. 83. Ibid. “…Sir George Pocock.• “The French naval commander, the Comte d’Aché,• was a competent tactician, whom Pocock in several engagements failed to defeat decisively. But, after the fall of Chandernagor,• d’Aché was handicapped by having no base for refitting nearer than Mauritius, some 2,000 miles to the SW, across the Indian Ocean. Pocock could refit and wait out the monsoon season in Bombay. Furthermore, d’Aché failed to receive from France needed reinforcements and supplies. “The major naval phase of the Indian campaign occurred between April 1578 and October 1759, when d’Aché sailed his battered fleet away from India for the last time….” Events in India 3: The Seven Years’ War Location of Mauritius
  84. 84. Detail—The Coromandel Coast—Wiki Français “…last time. “The first major fleet engagement occurred on April 29, 1758, when Pocock sailed his squadron to the relief of Fort St. David, a British post on the Coromandel (SE) Coast of India…. 3: The Seven Years’ War Events in India Ibid.
  85. 85. Detail—The Coromandel Coast—Wiki Français “…last time. “The first major fleet engagement occurred on April 29, 1758, when Pocock sailed his squadron to the relief of Fort St. David, a British post on the Coromandel (SE) Coast of India…. “With seven ships, Pocock gained the weather gage of d’Ache’s eight, and attempted a conventional attack in formal column. The three rear ships of Pocock’s column straggled behind the van. The lead ships suffered the concentrated fire of the French line when d’Ache’s force wore ship and defiled past the British flagship. The French withdrew as the British rear finally came to the support of its van ships. The British ships that had been engaged were far too crippled aloft for Pocock to attempt pursuit. Fort St. David was obliged to surrender to forces ashore. 3: The Seven Years’ War Events in India Ibid.
  86. 86. op. cit., pp. 59-60. “…forces ashore. “A second engagement took place in August under much the same conditions and with similar results. Pocock was bold enough in seeking out his adversary, but in attack he was firmly committed to the conterminous line. D’Aché was chary in accepting action, always aware that his adversary had better local logistical support and could more readily repair damages. But he handled his ships skillfully and parried Pocock’s attacks. “A final major action took place after the monsoon season in September 1759, when Pocock sought out the French off Pondicherry….” In the center is a large ship, flying the East India Company's flag. Fort St David is on the shore to the left, and on the extreme left a building with Dutch colors.— c. 1771, by Francis Swain—Wiki 3: The Seven Years’ War Events in India
  87. 87. Le Saint-Louis de l'escadre de d'Aché attaqué par le Pitt dans les eaux voisines de Pondichéry en 1758 ou 1759. Le combat est indécis. (Tableau de Lawson Dunn)—Wiki Français
  88. 88. Pondichéry au xviiie siècle. Vue des magasins de la Compagnie des Indes, de l'amirauté et de la maison du gouverneur (Lorient, Musée de la Compagnie des Indes). Cette vision, fantaisiste, est destinée à rassurer les investisseurs.—Wiki Français
  89. 89. Plan de la ville de Pondichéry dédié au gouverneur général Joseph François Dupleix (XVIIIe siècle).—Wiki Français
  90. 90. op. cit., p. 60. “…off Pondicherry. After considerable prior maneuvering, d’Aché, with eleven ships to Pocock’s nine, once more accepted the British attack. Though this too was a conventional line-against-line action, it was fought at close range and with uncommon fury by both sides. The British in this single engagement suffered 569 casualties, and the French losses were on the order of 1,500 killed and wounded. Here again the French withdrew, and the British were too severely damaged in rigging to give chase. “These battles were all tactical draws. In only one of them was even one ship lost, a French vessel that had to be beached after the action to save her personnel. These encounters were object lessons in the indecisiveness of formalist tactics. Yet they had great strategic importance. From the British point of view, since Clive was winning the war ashore, and since reinforcements and supplies could be sent freely from Britain and only with great difficulty from France, for Pocock merely to continue contesting the seas around the subcontinent was enough to insure ultimate British victory. “Presently d’Aché abandoned the whole area to the British….In the peninsula Clive profited from this sea supremacy and destroyed the remaining French forces. Though Pondicherry and some other minor enclaves were restored at the peace, India was to remain substantially British until after World War II…. 3: The Seven Years’ War Events in India
  91. 91. Rigobert Bonne (1727–1795), Carte hydro-geo -graphique des Indes Orientales en deca et au de la du Gange avec leur archipel …, Paris 1771—Wiki Français Sur l'immense théâtre d'opération de l'océan Indien, d'Aché réussit avec une petite escadre à ravitailler deux fois Pondichéry, mais sans pouvoir sauver la ville.—Wiki Français
  92. 92. The West Indies 1759—ANNVS MIRABILIS 1759—MIRACULOUS YEAR Commemorative medal. In the National Maritime Museum
  93. 93. op. cit., p. 60. “In the mid-18th century, the islands of the Caribbean enjoyed an economic importance hard to realize today. Enormous fortunes [and the political power they could buy in Parliament and royal courts] were made by the sugar planters. Indeed, except for the tea and spices of the Far East, the West Indies supplied nearly all the tropical products taken by the European market. As buyers these islands were also important in the cruel but profitable African slave trade. As will be apparent in subsequent [sessions], their trade relationships with the 13 English colonies on the North American seaboard were also significant, though largely illicit….” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  94. 94. op. cit., pp. 60-61. “…and Spain. “Since ’filching sugar islands’ had become established practice in maritime war, Pitt at the earliest convenient opportunity set about uprooting France from her valuable Caribbean possessions. Apart from his general empire-building objective, Pitt was motivated by the depredations of privateers based on Martinique and Guadeloupe. From the beginning of the war, these had raised havoc with English commercial shipping in the area, particularly where the trade routes converged on passes in the island barrier offered by the Lesser Antilles. “In early 1759 Commodore John Moore • with nine ships of the line and a frigate escorted a military force under Major General Peregrine Hopson,• a courageous but elderly and infirm veteran, to attack Martinique. Operations against Fort Royal, and later against St. Pierre, though bravely sustained by the rank and file, were unsuccessful—partly because of the strength of the defense, but also because of the vacillation, lack of thorough planning, and faulty cooperation between the military and the naval command. The expedition was then diverted to the less heavily defended Guadeloupe….” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  95. 95. op. cit., p.. 61. “…defended Guadeloupe. “Here in the face of discouraging advice from the chief engineer, Moore proceeded to bombard and silence the fortifications of Basse-Terre, the capital. The troops were able to occupy the town and forts without opposition. But the French troops made a campaign of it in the interior of the island, so that it was three months before the whole of Guadeloupe was secured. Major General John Barrington,• who succeeded to the military command on the death of Hopson in February, showed a vigor and imagination lacking in his former chief. Though outnumbered, he maintained a calculated program of small attacks, using boats and small craft to get behind enemy strong points by water. The French finally surrendered just a day too soon. One day after the capitulation, a relief force…appeared, now too late to undo Barrington’s skillful work. ‘In 1760 Commodore James Douglas and Lord Rollo stormed Dominica. In 1762 a very strong force under Admiral George Rodney • and General Moncton captured Martinique in a three weeks’ campaign. Grenada fell simultaneously. Captain Augustus John Hervey was at once dispatched to St. Lucia. Both it and S. Vincent’s were presently in British hands—a clean sweep of all the French possessions in the Lesser Antilles….” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  96. 96. op. cit., p.. 61. “…defended Guadeloupe. “Here in the face of discouraging advice from the chief engineer, Moore proceeded to bombard and silence the fortifications of Basse-Terre, the capital. The troops were able to occupy the town and forts without opposition. But the French troops made a campaign of it in the interior of the island, so that it was three months before the whole of Guadeloupe was secured. Major General John Barrington,• who succeeded to the military command on the death of Hopson in February, showed a vigor and imagination lacking in his former chief. Though outnumbered, he maintained a calculated program of small attacks, using boats and small craft to get behind enemy strong points by water. The French finally surrendered just a day too soon. One day after the capitulation, a relief force…appeared, now too late to undo Barrington’s skillful work. ‘In 1760 Commodore James Douglas and Lord Rollo stormed Dominica. In 1762 a very strong force under Admiral George Rodney • and General Moncton captured Martinique in a three weeks’ campaign. Grenada fell simultaneously. Captain Augustus John Hervey was at once dispatched to St. Lucia. Both it and S. Vincent’s were presently in British hands—a clean sweep of all the French possessions in the Lesser Antilles….” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  97. 97. Padfield, p. 213. “Ferdinand of Spain had died in 1759. His successor, Charles III, fearing that Great Britain, when she had seized all France’s colonies, would turn again on the Spanish empire, prepared to enter the war on Louis’ side. At the same time, in Britain the enormous cost of the war and Pitt’s • evident ambition to break France completely as a naval and colonial power had raised a powerful peace faction within the government. Its leaders considered Pitt’s system, ‘viz. that of a monopoly of all naval power…at least as dangerous to the liberties of Europe as that of Louis XIV.’ “Failing to persuade the Cabinet to accept a preemptive strike against the Spanish treasure fleet, Pitt resigned in October 1761.• His successors nonetheless continued preparations for seizing the last pockets of French power in the West Indies, and when Spain entered the war in early 1762—after the safe arrival of her treasure fleet—they mounted an even greater expedition to take the key base of Havana in the Spanish- American system….” 11 Quiberon Bay, 1759
  98. 98. “…Lesser Antilles. “Spain entered the war in January 1762. Earlier the combination of Spanish and French fleets could well have presented a mortal danger to England. But by now the French fleet had been broken, and Spain’s involvement at this time spelled to England merely opportunity. For Spain’s treasure-laden convoys were an open invitation to depredation by the cruisers of the British navy, and Spain had enormously rich dependencies in the West Indies (hereafter, WI) and the Far East. “Since England already had squadrons and soldiers in the WI, an operation against Havana was put in train almost at once. It was hoped that with reinforcements from England and America, it would be possible for the Earl of Albemarle • to take at least 15,000 effectives against Spain’s Caribbean bastion. Admiral Sir George Pocock • would have 50-odd fighting ships (including 22 rated at 60 guns or more). With transports and auxiliaries the invading armada would amount to about 200 sail….” Sea Power., p.. 61. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  99. 99. op. cit., p.. 62. “…200 sail. “With a small force Pocock and Albemarle sailed from England to Martinique, where it was planned at first to assemble the expedition. But the supporting vessels had not arrived, and the admiral was faced with a difficult command decision. Should he rendezvous with Douglas in Jamaica and proceed W of Cuba along the safe commercial route….” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  100. 100. op. cit., p.. 62. “…200 sail. “With a small force Pocock and Albemarle sailed from England to Martinique, where it was planned at first to assemble the expedition. But the supporting vessels had not arrived, and the admiral was faced with a difficult command decision. Should he rendezvous with Douglas in Jamaica and proceed W of Cuba along the safe commercial route,• or should he seek to gain surprise by concentrating his force on the Windward Passage (between Cuba and Santo Domingo), and proceed via the tortuous and badly charted Old Bahama Channel along the N coast of Cuba?…” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  101. 101. op. cit., p.. 62. “…coast of Cuba?• The risks of the latter course were considerable. A French squadron stronger than his own was thought to be at Cap Français,• on the N coast of Santo Domingo. In the 600-mile reef- studded Bahama Channel, a storm could mean disaster. But by successfully transiting the little-used passage, he would not only insure surprise; he would gain time. He would also be operating between the French at Cap Français and the Spanish fleet in Havana. A union of these forces would thereby be made less likely. Furthermore his route would favor a speedier meeting with the transport force expected from America….” Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  102. 102. “…from America. “Pocock considered that the advantages of assembling off Cape St. Nicholas • outweighed the dangers. Dispatches were sent to Hervey and to RAdm Sir James Douglas, commanding the Jamaica squadron. Pocock then moved his convoy N through the Mona Passage…,” Ibid. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  103. 103. “…Mona Passage and coasted westward along Santo Domingo. When he reached a point where a French sally from Cap Français might endanger his force, the admiral was reassured to find Hervey with seven of the line already blockading the roadstead….” Ibid. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  104. 104. “…the roadstead.• “Sending a frigate ahead to survey, Pocock awaited Douglas off Cape St. Nicholas for a week. When Douglas’ nine ships appeared, the British set out at once to thread their way through the Old Bahama Channel….” Ibid. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  105. 105. “Sending a frigate ahead to survey, Pocock awaited Douglas off Cape St. Nicholas for a week. When Douglas’ nine ships appeared, the British set out at once to thread their way through the Old Bahama Channel.• Local pilots were procured, but their value was slight. An old Spanish chart given to Pocock by Lord Anson and the survey work of Capt Elphinstone in the frigate Richmond were however sufficient ….” Ibid. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  106. 106. “…however sufficient. The most dangerous narrows was transited at night, with beacon fires on the beaches marking the way. In a week’s time the whole armada was clear of the passage and off Mantanzas, a day’s sail from Havana. Pocock’s gamble had succeeded. To the Spanish garrison the surprise was complete….” Ibid. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  107. 107. “…however sufficient. The most dangerous narrows was transited at night, with beacon fires on the beaches marking the way. In a week’s time the whole armada was clear of the passage and off Mantanzas, a day’s sail from Havana. Pocock’s gamble had succeeded. To the Spanish garrison the surprise was complete.• “The false sense of security enjoyed by His Excellency, Don Juan de Prado Porto Carrero, the Captain General, was understandable. In 150 years Havana had never been captured. With a landlocked harbor shielded by powerful fortifications, the city had come to be termed the ‘Gibraltar of the Caribbean.’ The city itself lies just to the W of Havana Bay, the entrance to which is flanked by the Castillo de la Punta on the city side,• and the Castillo del Morro to the E at the end of a promontory which makes the bay completely landlocked. Like the bony spine of a boar, a rocky ridge called la Cabaña runs E-W along this cape.….” Ibid. Operations in the West Indies 3: The Seven Years’ War
  108. 108. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…this cape. “On June 6, 1762, the British arrived off the Coximar River, 15 miles E of the city, where the sandy bay offered a suitable landing place. After battering down the blockhouses with cannon fire, Pocock sent the troops ashore at this point,…” Operations in the West Indies Ibid.
  109. 109. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…this cape. “On June 6, 1762, the British arrived off the Coximar River, 15 miles E of the city, where the sandy bay offered a suitable landing place. After battering down the blockhouses with cannon fire, Pocock sent the troops ashore at this point,• and then proceeded to threaten the city by a feinted landing to the W of it. “Had Albemarle fully exploited the advantage of tactical surprise, he might well have taken Havana by a coup de main without a costly siege of the Morro.• But Albemarle was a continental general, trained in the school of formalism. He was determined to invest the Morro and take it by storm if necessary….” Operations in the West Indies Ibid.
  110. 110. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…this cape. “On June 6, 1762, the British arrived off the Coximar River, 15 miles E of the city, where the sandy bay offered a suitable landing place. After battering down the blockhouses with cannon fire, Pocock sent the troops ashore at this point,• and then proceeded to threaten the city by a feinted landing to the W of it. “Had Albemarle fully exploited the advantage of tactical surprise, he might well have taken Havana by a coup de main without a costly siege of the Morro.• But Albemarle was a continental general, trained in the school of formalism. He was determined to invest the Morro and take it by storm if necessary.• “So for nearly two months the rank-and-file suffered agonies in the tropical summer [the WI was widely regarded as a death sentence for soldiers because of yellow fever]. Guns from the fleet were laboriously winched into position. Above-ground works had to be built on the rocky ledges since there was too little earth for entrenchments….” Operations in the West Indies Ibid.
  111. 111. 3: The Seven Years’ War “…this cape. “On June 6, 1762, the British arrived off the Coximar River, 15 miles E of the city, where the sandy bay offered a suitable landing place. After battering down the blockhouses with cannon fire, Pocock sent the troops ashore at this point,• and then proceeded to threaten the city by a feinted landing to the W of it. “Had Albemarle fully exploited the advantage of tactical surprise, he might well have taken Havana by a coup de main without a costly siege of the Morro.• But Albemarle was a continental general, trained in the school of formalism. He was determined to invest the Morro and take it by storm if necessary.• “So for nearly two months the rank-and-file suffered agonies in the tropical summer [the WI was widely regarded as a death sentence for soldiers because of yellow fever]. Guns from the fleet were laboriously winched into position. Above-ground works had to be built on the rocky ledges since there was too little earth for entrenchments.• The fascines took fire from enemy shot. There was no water on the whole peninsula; it had to be brought from the fleet, and there was never enough. Spanish resistance was stubborn and unremitting….” Operations in the West Indies Ibid.
  112. 112. Bombardment of the Morro Castle, Havana 1 July 1762 by Richard Patton. Left to Right: HMS Marlborough, HMS Dragon, HMS Cambridge—Wikipedia
  113. 113. “…and unremitting. “Pocock’s task of blockade was rendered almost needless by the Spaniards themselves. In spite of the very strong fortifications on each side of the half-mile-wide entrance to the harbor, they deliberately sank three of their ships of the line as blockships in the channel, thereby locking in their remaining nine, and incidentally freeing Pocock from the responsibility of guarding against a sortie. “As in all WI ops, the most severe toll of casualties was from disease, especially yellow fever, which struck down many times the number lost in battle. The reinforcements from Lord Amherst were slow in arriving, and for a time in July it began to look as though the expedition would fail.• “But though a mediocre tactician, Albemarle had perseverance. Sappers finally completed a tunnel under the shoreward walls of the Morro, where a mine was exploded, and the redcoats swarmed through the narrow gap it blew out. They hunted down the defenders in the stone corridors of the fortress in a matter of minutes. With the Morro in British hands, the city also was obliged to surrender….” op. cit., pp. 62-63. 3: The Seven Years’ War Operations in the West Indies
  114. 114. The red-coated troops, from the main siege camp to the left (east) of the castle are here shown are clearly seen marching in line across the narrow parapet of the transverse wall dividing the castle's deep dry-ditch defence from the sea and storming up crumbling rampart into the castle. Over them, explosive mortar shells arc into the castle precinct, all set against a dramatically stormy, lowering sky.
  115. 115. The terms of surrender for Havana were concluded on 13 August and in the painting a flotilla of boats of the fleet are shown ferrying in the occupation forces on the following day. At the same time as this was taking place, sailors dismantled the boom defence, visible in the middle distance. The Union flag flies from the fort and the men-of-war are firmly established in the harbor.
  116. 116. The English fleet moved into Havana harbor once the obstructions had been cleared on 21 August. On the left of the picture, Commodore Augustus Keppel in the 'Valiant', is leading in his squadron first, an honour accorded him by Admiral Sir George Pocock. On the right Pocock's 'Namur', flying his flag as Admiral of the Blue, together with the Union flag and blue ensign, is shown following with the bulk of the fleet.
  117. 117. The scene refers to the conclusion of the naval operation. The painting is a complex panorama depicted from the southern end of the harbor, showing the captured Spanish warships at anchor, ships on the stocks being burnt at left and the sunlit fortress of El Morro seen down an open sightline at the centre right. The tropical cloud formation in the background is an important element of the composition and execution.
  118. 118. “…to surrender. “Few conquests of any war have had the immediate cash value of the capture of Havana. Spain lost a fifth of their fleet—in nearly undamaged condition. Over a hundred major pieces of ordnance and great quantities of there war materials and commercial valuables (including chests of specie) fell into British hands.• Both the commanding general and the admiral received £122,000 in prize money.9 “In the Havana op the role of the fleet was indispensable—both in fighting and in logistic support. Like Saunders in Quebec, Pocock at Havana set an example of selfless cooperation for subsequent naval commanders. Albemarle himself wrote: op. cit., p. 63. ______ 9 There is an instructive sidelight on the social hierarchy of the 18th century in the fact that a private’s share was £4 1s. 8 ½ d; an able seaman’s £3 14s. 9 3/4d. …Sir George Pocock, and Commodore Keppel have exerted themselves in a most particular manner; and I may venture to say, that there never was a joint undertaking carried on with more harmony and zeal on both sides…10 10 Letter to Lord Egremont, quoted in Beatson, op. cit., II, 566. 3: The Seven Years’ War Operations in the West Indies
  119. 119. “Because control of the seas gave the British a virtually free choice of where and when to strike, Britain was not merely able to conduct those major ops which would contribute materially to the outcome of the war. She was also from time to time capable of investing a fraction of her power in ‘sideshow ops,’ which had but commercial importance, or which might slightly improve her bargaining position at the peace table. Her seizure in 1758 of the French slave-trading stations of Goree and Senegal in the Guinea Gulf is an example. And in 1760 Pitt renewed ‘conjunct ops’ against the French coast, sending a considerable force to seize Belle Île. “In 1762 a group of private English adventurers equipped a shoestring expedition to Buenos Aires. With two frigates purchased from the British government and two small Portuguese men-of- war, and 500 Portuguese troops, they set out from Rio de Janeiro to try to do in Spain’s vast mainland colony what Clive and his little handful had done at Plassey and Windewash. Through poor piloting in the Plata estuary and through the mischances of war this effort came to disaster. “The capstone of the British war effort overseas was the Manila expedition, undertaken by HEIC troops under Brigadier William Draper and an eight-ship squadron commanded by VAdm Samuel Cornish. After bombardment and siege, Manila fell in less than two weeks. The Governor surrendered the entire Philippines and ransomed Manila for $4,000,000 (Spanish). Since the squadron also captured the Acapulco galleon with $3,000,000 in specie and bullion, the prize money rivaled that in the capture of Havana.” Other Operations Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War
  120. 120. The (British)Lion’s Share
  121. 121. “The complicated pattern of European power politics shifted with bewildering rapidity in the last stages of the Seven Years’ War. With victorious peace almost in sight, Pitt resigned when the Cabinet refused his demand for an immediate declaration of war against Spain.11 Spain attempted invasion of Portugal, England’s ancient ally, only to be frustrated by a British fleet and expeditionary force. Pitt’s bumbling successor, Lord Bute, alienated Frederick the Great and destroyed the Prussian alliance. The Russian Czarina died, and was succeeded by the nearly idiotic Prussophile Peter III, who signed an immediate peace with Frederick. Peter III was presently assassinated, but Catherine II, who succeeded him, would not renew the war. Sweden withdrew from the Grand Coalition. Their allies gone, nearly exhausted, and without further expedient, France and Austria both sued for peace. “The Peace of Paris (1763) represented the high-water mark of Britain’s ‘Old Empire.’ Everywhere victorious, the British might well have demanded more than they took. And they took the lion’s share….” The End of the War op. cit., pp. 63-64. ______ 11 Pitt’s resignation is ironic in that events made the declaration inevitable soon thereafter in any case. 3: The Seven Years’ War
  122. 122. “The Peace of Paris (1763) represented the high-water mark of Britain’s ‘Old Empire.’”—Ibid.
  123. 123. “…lion’s share. Britain received Canada and a cession of French claims to all territory E of the Mississippi. She thereby unwittingly defined the boundaries of the then-undreamed-of United States of America, to be established 13 years later. From France Britain also received Senegal. From Spain she received Florida in exchange for Cuba. She had Minorca returned to her. To France were restored Belle Île, Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Lucia, Goree, the French trading stations in India (which France promised not to fortify), and the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. To Spain were restored Cuba and the Philippines. France helped to make the treaty more acceptable to Spain by ceding to her New Orleans and the Louisiana Territory, a primeval empire of unsurveyed dimensions to the W of the Mississippi.” “The Seven Years’ War was the first of the world wars. It is the archetype of wars between a strong land power and a strong sea power. In it Britain followed the pattern she had employed earlier against Spain, Holland, and France of allying with other continental powers against a major continental power….” The End of the War op. cit., p. 64. Summary 3: The Seven Years’ War
  124. 124. “…lion’s share. Britain received Canada and a cession of French claims to all territory E of the Mississippi. She thereby unwittingly defined the boundaries of the then-undreamed-of United States of America, to be established 13 years later. From France Britain also received Senegal. From Spain she received Florida in exchange for Cuba. She had Minorca returned to her. To France were restored Belle Île, Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Lucia, Goree, the French trading stations in India (which France promised not to fortify), and the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. To Spain were restored Cuba and the Philippines. France helped to make the treaty more acceptable to Spain by ceding to her New Orleans and the Louisiana Territory, a primeval empire of unsurveyed dimensions to the W of the Mississippi.” “The Seven Years’ War was the first of the world wars. It is the archetype of wars between a strong land power and a strong sea power. In it Britain followed the pattern she had employed earlier against Spain, Holland, and France of allying with other continental powers against a major continental power….” The End of the War op. cit., p. 64. Summary 3: The Seven Years’ War
  125. 125. “…continental power. The distinctive strategic feature of the Seven Years’ War, from the British point of view, was Pitt’s Plan,• a strategy toward which Britain had been groping since the Anglo- Dutch Wars. “On the worldwide scale, Pitt’s strategy, like all strategies that achieve true concentration, had both a hitting and a holding aspect. The main British offensive, the hitting aspect, was carried out beyond the seas—using England’s naval preponderance to support attacks on the colonies of France and Spain. Capture of these colonies expanded the British Empire, promoted trade, and thereby produced wealth. A part of this increased wealth went to subsidize Britain’s allies on the continent of Europe. The holding aspect consisted of 1) the efforts of the RN in first blockading and then destroying the French fleet and 2) the efforts of Britain’s allies, chiefly Frederick the Great of Prussia,• in absorbing French wealth and containing French manpower that might otherwise have been used to build up the French navy, break the British blockade, and succor France’s overseas possessions. “Within the European theater also, Pitt’s Plan had a hitting and a holding aspect. Here Frederick’s army was the principal hitting element, while British ‘conjunct expeditions’ along the coast of France…” Summary Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War
  126. 126. “…of France were intended in part to make the French sufficiently fearful of an invasion to hold back troops that might otherwise have been sent against Frederick. “France’s counter-strategy against Britain consisted of 1) raids on British maritime commerce, 2) attempts to defend French colonies, and 3) attempts to invade England. Britain’s naval preponderance rendered all such efforts futile. Belleisle’s scheme for invading the British Isles by eluding the Channel fleet died in the planning stage, but his Med diversion resulted in the repulse of Byng’s • fleet and the capture of Minorca (1756). Later French invasion plans, requiring the combining of the Toulon and Brest fleets in the English Channel, were nullified when the former was destroyed by Boscawen • in the Battle of Lagos Bay (1759) and the latter by Hawke in the Battle of Quiberon Bay (1759). “While France was expending her strength and treasure in the fruitless war in Europe, relatively minor British forces were capturing French possessions all around the world. In 1758 Amherst • and Boscawen opened the St. Lawrence River by capturing Louisburg. In 1759 • Wolfe and Saunders assured the British conquest of Canada by capturing Quebec. At the same time • Clive, with the naval cooperation of Watson and Pocock was winning control over India…” Ibid. 3: The Seven Years’ War Summary
  127. 127. “…over India, and such army-navy teams as Barrington and Moore, Rollo and Douglas, and Moncton and Rodney were seizing French possessions in the WI. When Spain allied herself with France in 1762, she was promptly dispossessed of Havana by Albemarle and Pocock,• and of Manila by Draper and Cornish. Such conquests were rendered possible by French preoccupation with the European war and by the sea control of the RN that isolated the colonies, denying them assistance from the homeland. “All wars have their object lessons for the thoughtful student. The Seven Years’ War, more than most, is replete with lessons and examples. The following are among those most evident. The strict adherence to line tactics as enjoined by the Permanent Fighting Instructions [today’s ROE], prevented decisive victory, since it rendered tactical concentration nearly impossible. The Minorca action and the several engagements of Pocock and d’Aché in Indian waters exemplify this. On the other hand melee tactics, initiated by General Chase, won smashing victories at Lagos and Quiberon Bay. “In amphib war, careful planning, unstinted inter service cooperation, boldness of leadership, and perseverance are essential. These were lacking in the Rochefort op and in the first Martinique invasion, both of which failed….” op. cit., pp. 64-65. 3: The Seven Years’ War Summary
  128. 128. “…which failed. Wolfe and Saunders at Quebec, Moore and Barrington at Guadeloupe, and • Albemarle and Pocock at Havana showed the qualities necessary to accomplish this most difficult of military tasks—assault on land positions from the sea.• “Pitt is the model of the CinC, characterized by unity of purpose, consistency, and decisiveness. In the chess game of war, he saw the board as a whole. He disposed his pieces so that each aided all the others. The ineptness of the British conduct of the war before Pitt came to power, and its lessened efficiency after he left the government, evidenced his indispensability. Because Pitt thought naturally in grand strategic terms, he could insure not merely victory, but a chance for England to secure all her war aims. “Above everything else the great lesson of the Seven Years’ War is the pervasive and inexorable power of naval preponderance in a world war. The British navy at once kept the tight little island secure from invasion and made possible winning half the world for empire. Pitt’s vision, in which the continental war became secondary, was based on his perception of the potential of sea power. It is natural that the great American naval historian,• Alfred Thayer Mahan, should have turned to the history of England between 1660 and 1783 to mine object lessons to support his sea power thesis. In his chapter on the Seven Years’ War he concludes,….” op. cit., p. 65. Summary 3: The Seven Years’ War
  129. 129. Mahan Hall Ernest Flagg, architect—1908 Home of the English, History and Government Department, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD
  130. 130. [Sea power]…made [England] rich, and in turn protected the trade by which she had her wealth. With her money she upheld her few auxiliaries, mainly Prussia and Hanover, in their desperate strife. Her power was everywhere her ships could reach, and there was none to dispute the sea to her.Where she would, she went, and with her went her guns and her troops. By this mobility her forces were multiplied, those of her enemies distracted. Ruler of the seas, she everywhere obstructed its highways. The enemies’ fleets could not join; no great fleets could get out, or if it did, it was only to meet at once, with uninsured officers and crews, those who were veterans in gales and warfare. Save in the case of Minorca, she carefully held her own sea-bases and eagerly seized those of the enemy. What a lion in the path was Gibraltar to the French squadrons of Toulon and Brest! What hope for French succor to Canada, when the English fleet had Louisburg under its lee? “The one nation that gained in this war was that which used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe.12 Ibid. Summary ______ 12 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 328-9. 3: The Seven Years’ War Naval School Founded October 10th. 1845. JAMES K. POLK President of the U.States. GEO. BANCROFT Secretary of the Navy
  131. 131. The ‘first world war’ set the stage for the Age of the Democratic Revolutions. The immense war debts of both Britain and France will set in train urgent and counterproductive efforts to regain financial soundness. And, when the British North American colonies rebel, France will sense an opportunity for renewing ‘The Great War for Empire.’ Which will only hasten her own encounter with democratic revolution. And once again maritime supremacy will be decisive. But that’s another story… jbp
  132. 132. Fin

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