Welfare conditionality - JSA and UC
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Presentation of dissertation findings given at the Ethics and Social Welfare Conference, September 2016
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Welfare conditionality - JSA and UC
- 1. How do staff and claimant attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy? Ethics and Social Welfare in Hard Times Holly Law, University of Bristol hy13311@my.bristol.ac.uk 1
- 2. Outline • Research aims and background • Methods • Findings – discretion and fairness • Conclusion – unanswered questions 2
- 3. Research Aim 1 To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy 3 Research aims
- 4. Research Aim 2 To examine if welfare conditionality policy is being implemented fairly To examine if welfare conditionality policy is being implemented fairly 4 Research aims
- 5. Background • Punitive welfare conditionality • 2010 White Paper Universal Credit:Welfare that Works “curse of intergenerational worklessness” (DWP, 2010) • Welfare dependency/intergenerational ’worklessness’ myth • Street-level bureaucracy 5
- 6. Why conduct this research? • Infuriation by the gap between policy rhetoric and academic research Video available at: https://vimeo.com/144546781 https ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RI5DK9VCKMY 6 Research significance
- 7. 7 • Observations • Semi-structured interviews • Citizens Advice / Foodbank Methods
- 8. Research Aim 1 To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy 8 Research aims
- 9. JSA - Protective work coaches “the difficulties I have is when you’ve got a really vulnerable person…and you start to think, you know, is this really serving a purpose? ‘Cause we should be here to help the hardest to help, and now we’ve taken that money away from them. So, that’s what I find very difficult to relate to sometimes” (Lauren, Jobseeker’s Allowance work coach) 9
- 10. JSA – utilisation of discretion “I think if you’ve got mental health issues and then you get a sanction, it’s not going to help is it? I mean, if I’ve got someone who has got mental health issues I think, oh I’ll just given them a couple of weeks – but I don’t think I really have that discretion!” (Rachel, Jobseeker’s Allowance work coach) 10
- 11. Universal Credit – stricter and harsher? “From our point of view as work coaches, if you agree to it and you haven't done it, it really is black and white.” (Kevin, Universal Credit Work Coach) 11
- 12. 12 “at the end of the day it is you as an individual who is making that decision” JSA Work Coach “it's out of our control so we just write the things down” Universal Credit Work Coach
- 13. Claimants - Accepting “I did go through the reconsideration process... they phoned me up to ask why I was appealing and I never heard anything again, and that was it. I didn't receive a letter to say whether I'd been successful but I mean obviously I hadn't." (JSA claimant, sanctioned) 13
- 14. Research Aim 1: To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy Research Aim 1: To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy • Utilisation of discretion 14 Summary
- 15. Research Aim 2: To examine if welfare conditionality policy is being implemented fairly Research Aim 2: To examine if welfare conditionality policy is being implemented fairly • Procedural consistency • Proportionality of outcome 15 Findings
- 16. Procedural consistency: Discretion “Somebody sat to my left may think that somebody applying for three jobs in two weeks is fine, I might not, so you know it comes down to the individual work coach” (Jobseeker’s Allowance work coach) 16
- 17. Procedural consistency: Claimant awareness “you have to appease your job coach, every week. You know, he's got to be happy that you're looking for a job… I’m guessing it is purely up to his discretion whether he feels you're not looking for work or not, and he can stop your money.” (Universal Credit claimant, not sanctioned) 17
- 18. Procedural Consistency: Relationships undermined by the UC service centre “I said it's personal, I don't want to tell you because I've already rang Universal Credit and told them. [she said] Well you've gotta tell me. [he said] No, I've been told by them it's fine, I don't have to tell you. She was like, you've gotta fill out this form, if you don't fill it out in the next week you'll get a sanction“ (Universal Credit claimant, sanctioned) 18
- 19. Proportionality of outcome: Powerlessness “They force you into that situation for applying for jobs that you know that you can't do, if you don't you'll get punished.” (JSA claimant sanctioned). 19
- 20. Proportionality of outcome: Not so powerless ”…lower your expectations. And I thought, no, I'm not. I'm not gonna do that, no way. If it means I'm going to be unemployed for a little bit longer then so be it…I'm fortunate that I've got the help from the family if I needed it, so any bills that come along that I wasn't expecting, I could have some help paying them " (JSA claimant, no sanction) 20
- 21. Proportionality of outcome: Missing Universal Credit claimants “a lot of [sanctioned] people under UC have just, as I've said we're only at week 5, but they've just disappeared” (Universal Credit Work Coach) 21
- 22. Research Aim 1: To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy Research Aim 1: To investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy • JSA Work Coach discretion allows protection • UC diminished discretion removes protection • Missing and powerless claimants – what can we do about this? 22 Conclusion Research Aim 2: To examine if welfare conditionality policy is being implemented fairly Research Aim 2: To examine if welfare conditionality policy is being implemented fairly
Editor's Notes
- Hello, my name is Holly Law. I graduated from the University of Bristol this summer, where I completed my undergraduate social policy degree.
- I am going to share some of my dissertation findings with your today. After briefly discussing the policy context and literature, I will outline the methods used in my qualitative enquiry. The bulk of this talk will concentrate on my findings that problematise discretionary decision making, and suggest an emergent shift under UC towards a harsher implementation of welfare conditionality. I will also question the fairness of policy in relation to both procedural consistency and proportionality of outcome. Finally, I will conclude by calling for the need for a better understanding of how claimants can be empowered to to negotiate contemporary policy so they can receive the support they need, Rather than their treatment being dependent on the work coach they are assigned to Or the type of unemployment benefit they receive.
- My research aims included an investigation of how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence the implementation of, and engagement with, policy;
- and an examination of how fairly welfare conditionality policy is being implemented.
- Welfare conditionality has been a feature of unemployment benefits since the inception of the post-war welfare state This research is concerned with contemporary welfare conditionality in the form of benefit sanctions. First introduced by New Labour and intensified under the Coalition government, in the 2010 White Paper, this proposed the policy solution to the “curse of intergenerational worklessness” (DWP, 2010) is to change the behaviour of claimants by removing benefits for up to three years if they do not fulfill the requirements set out in their Claimant Commitment. This policy embodies the rhetoric of the welfare dependent underclass thesis by suggesting that negative attitudes towards paid work resulting in ‘worklessness’ are being transmitted through generations and communities EVEN THOUGH EMPIRICAL SEARCHING HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUTED THIS CLAIM. conditionality (and also workfare) has been criticized as inventing a 'solution' to welfare dependency by focusing on the need to increase ‘employability’ and ignoring the structural economic reasons for the lack of labour demand and hence transferring risk from the state to the individual (Peck and Theodore, 2001). while actively ignoring the structural economic reasons for the lack of labour demand (Slater, 2014) This has been coupled with a continued attack on the welfare state as encouraging the option to make a ‘lifestyle choice’ to become part of the welfare dependent (Mead, 1997) underclass (Murray, 1990). Previous SLB research looking at benefit sanctions has found that differences in implementation and exist, my research contributes to the literature by attempting to understand if and how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence this differential implementation and engagement
- I want to briefly share with you the exact moment I realised I was going to undertake this kind of research. VIDEO I watched IDS introduce the welfare reform bill that included the increased severity of benefit sanctions, which have since harmed so many people in this country, and could not believe my ears as he attempted to justify policy by using claims that academic research has consistently refuted. It made my blood boil.
- But, undergraduate dissertations don’t often change the world - so I had to use the inspiration kindly supplied by IDS to create a manageable research project which led to the research aims outlined earlier. And I'll remind you of in a moment To fulfill these aims I conducted observations in two job centres to allow me to understand the processes in place when claiming and implementing Jobseekers Allowance and Universal Credit Interviews with ten work coaches, 4 administering UC, 5 administering JSA and a manager. My expectation from previous research was that accessing DWP staff would difficult, but I was pleasantly surprised, or perhaps lucky! that it was really quite simple. Worked with my local Citizens Advice and Foodbank to recruit claimants Wanted to interview 8 but recruitment of claimants was more difficult than expected and I was only able to interview two Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants (one sanctioned, one not) and two Universal Credit claimants (one sanctioned and one not).
- Moving on to some of the findings of the research, I’m going to first focus on findings relating to attitudes and how these may influence differential implementation, before briefly discussing how attitudes may influence engagement. I will present evidence that suggests under Universal Credit there is a shift, in comparison to Jobseeker’s Allowance, in the capacity for work coaches to utilise their discretion. However, there is the need for a caveat to the findings regarding Universal Credit work coaches that that this is policy in flux. UC is a new and evolving benefit. And this is a small qualitative enquiry.
- I found a group of staff that I categorised as JSA protective work coaches. Two of these were JSA wc and two were UC staff. The reason I included the two UC staff in the JSA protective work coaches category is because they had experienced only 5 weeks administering UC. This stood in contrast to their many years administering JSA. It became apparent during the interviews that the examples of practice used by these UC staff, in fact related mostly to their JSA experience. The ‘protective work coaches’ saw the importance of building a relationship with the customer as the preferred tool, as opposed to benefit sanctions, to encourage claimants to actively seek work:
- The ‘protective work coaches’ talked about feeling uncomfortable when referring claimants for a sanction, especially if the claimant was viewed as vulnerable. Examples of this vulnerability included being a lone parent, or having a mental health condition. These protective work coaches questioned whether sanctions achieve what they are supposed to. They also expressed the most ownership over their decisions. What I found particularly interesting was that these protective WC utilised their discretion to protect claimants they felt needed, or perhaps deserved, it. They talked about giving certain claimants a second, and often more, chance if they hadn’t fulfilled the obligations set out in their claimant commitment.
- This stands in contrast to the views shared by most UC WC.
- While the JSA protective work coaches felt it was very much their own decision as individuals as to whether to refer a claimant for a sanction to a DWP decision maker, UC staff made it clear that the decisions are out of their hands. The shift away from staff taking responsibility for the sanction referrals may be affected by the role of the Universal Credit service centre. To clarify, If a Jobseeker’s Allowance claimant cannot attend an appointment, or is struggling to fulfill a Claimant Commitment requirement they have a direct line to the work coach, or can visit the job centre to speak to them / leave a message. However, any such changes for Universal Credit claimants have to be notified over the, premium rate, phone line to the service centre. The service centre appears to remove the ability for work coaches to utilise their discretion, as the decision whether to refer a claimant for a sanction in these circumstances is taken by staff at the service centre rather than the work coach. This diminished discretion is concerning, as it appears that it is the utilisation of discretion that permitted the JSA staff to protect certain claimants.
- My attempt to investigate how attitudes towards welfare conditionality influence engagement was constrained by the small sample size of claimants I was able to recruit. What was clear however, was that both the UC and JSA claimant who had their benefit sanctioned that I spoke to were largely accepting of their sanctions. This acceptance is surprising considering one claimant made it clear he did not understand the reason for the sanction, and another made it clear he felt the sanction was wrongly applied and unfair. Despite this, both claimants saw the sanction as something they must just put up with.
- To summarise The findings discussed so far regarding the discretion utilised by work coaches starts to uncover the relationship between attitudes and implementation. The ‘protective work coaches’ are aware that they use, and to an extent subvert, the processes in place to treat claimants more leniently than some of their colleagues. This suggests the attitudes of the ‘protective work coaches’ influences how they implement of policy. It is the ability (and choice) of the ‘protective work coaches’ to utilise their discretion that allows their attitude towards welfare conditionality to influence how they implement policy.
- I will now move on to discuss the findings relating to the second reseach aim regarding the the fairness of implementation I'll do this under two themes - precedural consistency and proportionality of outcome.
- Staff made it clear that discretion was used when deciding which job search requirements would be built into individuals Claimant Commitments, As well as when deciding if a claimant had done enough to fulfill the commitment, and whether or not an individual should be referred to a decision maker for a benefit sanction, While this discretion allows ‘protective work coaches’ to protect claimants they deem vulnerable, it has an obvious implication regarding the fairness of policy the treatment claimants receive and the likelihood of receiving a benefit sanction should not be dependent on the varying attitudes of individual staff members.
- Claimants are acutely aware of this discretion, and the impact it could have on their subsistence income. They reported the fear they feel because they need to ensure that at every appointment their work coach is convinced they have done enough to fulfill their claimant commitment.
- I have already mentioned that the UC process stipulates claimants should report any changes in circumstances, or reasons for being unable to fulfill their CC to the UC service centre. However, I was told how a WC will expect the same information to be repeated to them in the Jobcentre when a claimant signs on. The frustration at this repetition shared by a claimant suggests the existence of the service centre can make it more difficult for work coaches and claimants to build an effective relationship, leaving the work coach little option but to threaten a sanction referral to try and obtain the information they require if a claimant is unwilling to repeat themselves.
- The finding I found most difficult to hear from claimants related to their sense of powerlessness. Two claimants told me how they felt coerced to apply for inappropriate jobs even when they know they don’t have the skills or experience that certain job adverts are asking for. Even though they felt sympathy for what they described as wasting the time of employers, they felt they had no option because they were too scared they’d get sanctioned if they didn’t do as they were told.
- The unfairness of welfare conditionality policy is highlighted by the fact that the powerlessness just described, does not apply to all claimants. Another claimant who was not dependent on his benefit income due to extended family help and wealth suggests that the option to be ‘choosy’ about the job a claimant is willing to do or apply for (Dunn, 2013;14) is more readily available to certain claimants. This also suggests the ability for policy to change the job search behaviour of claimants, as welfare conditionality intends to do, varies dependent on the differing amount of assistance from family and friends each claimant has access to.
- Concerns regarding fairness are also raised by the change to Hardship Payments under Universal Credit. While sanctioned Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants can apply for a reduced rate of benefit payment until their sanction ends, Universal Credit hardship payments are repayable loans. There are unanswered questions about the impact on the lives of these individuals who may be less inclined to apply for hardship payments. This is all the more concerning when it is understood that the Jobcentre’s ability to support or signpost these people in times of hardship are diminished by their lack of recording - I asked how it is recorded, and what happens, if a claim closes as a result of a sanction - and was told it is not recorded.
- To summarise, The relationship between the attitudes and implementation of the staff classified as ‘protective work coaches’ suggests the key mechanism that allowed them to protect claimants was the ability to utilise their discretion. In contrast, Universal Credit work coaches have a diminished capacity to utilise their discretion, largely due to the the decision of whether to refer a claimant for a sanction being taken by staff at the service centre rather than by the work coach. There are also serious concerns about the damage the service centre can do to the claimant – work-coach relationship. This forces a somewhat contradictory conclusion; Pause the ‘protective work coaches’ show that implementation of policy is most affected by attitudes when discretion can be utilised, which is unfair as staff hold a variety of attitudes towards welfare conditionality and treatment should not depend on the individual you happen to be assigned to. However, Universal Credit diminishes the capacity for discretion to be utilised, which is unfair as it removes the opportunity for work coaches to protect claimants from policy they know can be damaging. In addition to questioning the fairness of welfare conditionality this research has raised the need for further investigation to understand why are claimants who don’t agree with being sanctioned not fully appealing the decision? And why are sanctioned claimants who disappear not, at the very least, being recorded by the DWP? Whilst a contradictory conclusion may seem less than ideal, perhaps this outcome points to a succinct policy implication: welfare conditionality in its contemporary form is an inherently unfair policy based on refuted welfare dependency assumptions, hence, it should be abandoned. Thank you very much for listening.