![4306097-106325-307340-1600202009 19348456238875 Michael Gallagher Advanced Intelligence AnalysisProfessor WozneakMay 14, 2009 17221202708910 Afghanistan:Land of Corruption Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies Table of Contents Page# Annex 1:Afghanistan: Land of Corruption 3-5Annex 2:Information Collection Plan Report 6-13Annex 3:Link Analysis Image 14Link Analysis 15-17Annex 4:IPB Analysis 18-19IPB Images 20-24Annex 5:Order of Battle 25-31Annex 6:Strategic Analysis of Competing Hypothesis(SACH) 32-24 a. ACH Chart 35-38 a. SACH Chart 39-44Annex 7:Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis 45-49Annex 8:Acknowledgments 50Annex 9:Contact Information 51 Annex 1: Afghanistan: Land of Corruption Executive summary: 44545252069465It is highly likely that Afghanistan will remain extremely unstable within the next 24 months. Afghanistan has a very weak central government that commands no authority outside of the capital city of Kabul. Afghanistan’s economy is dominated by opium and other black market products. Furthermore, there is a re-insurgency of Taliban militants from neighboring Pakistan. The Afghani government is greatly plagued by corruption and internal conflicts. Lastly, there is no sense of National pride due to constant ethnic and religious conflicts. Afghanistan is not a unified nation. The people of Afghanistan are losing trust in their government because of the escalation in violence and the lack of expectations being met by the government for the people. The conditions in Afghanistan have been deteriorating in all key areas, except for the economy and woman’s rights. Discussion: -9455153239135Afghanistan is extremely ethnically diverse. Afghanistan has over eight different ethnic groups, the largest group being Pashtun, who have the most control over the future of Afghanistan. There is a constant struggle between ethnic and religious groups, which lead to the creation of paramilitary groups who protect their group’s interests in Afghanistan. Since taking power in 2004, President Hamid Karzai has failed to unite the country or create a functional governing elite. Furthermore, Vice president Khalili is the leader of Hizb-i-Wahdat, a pro Shia militia group. Afghanistan’s political system is too closely centered around President Karzai, whose actions are becoming progressively more erratic as his first term of presidency approaches its end on 21 May, 2009. Karzai’s weak government has been plagued by corruption and patronage allegations, with personal, tribal/ethnic and family connections driving government appointments. Furthermore, President Karzai has publicly declared Militia groups to be illegal while promoting their leaders to powerful government positions. Also, those elected to the 249 seat legislature include many with dubious credentials, including tribal leaders with personal militias, known participants in the narcotics trade, religious zealots and former members of the Taliban. Most of the governing elites are former paramilitary leaders/warlords. Afghanistan’s parliamentary members are more interested in retaining personal power than they are in building a functioning Nation, which make it inevitable for personal grudges, religious argument and the settling of scores to dominate much of the parliament's activities. The unemployment rate in Afghanistan is 40%, which leads to widespread corruption. Afghanistan's economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Although the GDP growth exceeded 7%, Afghanistan still remains extremely poor, land locked, and tremendously dependent on foreign aid and trade with neighboring countries. Opium dominates every aspect of Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces approximately 92% of the world’s opium. Opium accounts for 1/3rd of Afghanistan’s GDP, not including an estimated 100 million US dollars toward defeating the Taliban and other antigovernment groups who participate in and profit from the opiate trade, which is a key source of revenue for the Taliban inside Afghanistan. Widespread corruption and instability impede counterdrug efforts. Unless a plan for alternatives to poppy cultivation is established, there will continue to be widespread economic hardship and more incentives to join militant groups. The government and the police are incapable of providing enforcement and their corruption is part of the problem. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is entirely dependent on the goodwill of major donor states for equipment. There are no defense production facilities operating in Afghanistan. Given the many economic and social problems that already strain the country, Afghanistan is unlikely to develop any native defense production capabilities in the near future. Afghanistan's Armed Forces lack most materiel requirements to provide a satisfactory operational capacity. Small arms, heavier weaponry, vehicles, uniforms and other requirements are provided ad hoc by various nations, usually from surplus stocks which would usually be disposed of by scrapping. The ANA currently has approximately 68,000 troops, of which only 38,000 are in combat units. The ANA is insignificant since most warlords have maintained their private armies; which are in total, far stronger than the ANA. 3865880422275There is ongoing conflict on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The insurgency is strong in the Pashtun heartlands in between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This portion of the border is home to extremist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaida. Insurgency and other irregular forces are the major obstacles in the way of progress towards the establishment of the rule of law in Afghanistan. Attacks on infrastructure and international and Afghan military forces have increased dramatically since 2006. There is a re-insurgency of the Taliban into Afghanistan coming from neighboring Pakistan. Comments: The sources used for this annex are very reliable. Combinations of Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Global Security, and CIA world fact book were used in the writing of this estimate. There is a high sense of analytical confidence throughout this annex as well as the rest of my annexes. This annex sums up all the annexes in this study. Due to Afghanistan’s extreme instability this product may and will eventually become void. Source Reliability: 8 Source Confidence: 7 Annex 2: Information Collection Plan (ICP) Afghanistan ICP Report 2209165177165 Economics afghanistan_econ_1982.jpg http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_e 24 Educational Institution Open Source not often Useful 7 CIA - The World Factbook – Afghanistan https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 26 Government Website Open Source very often Highly Useful 10 Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Afghanistan http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent 27 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful 9 NationMaster - Afghan Economy statistics http://www.nationmaster.com/country/af-afghanistan/eco-economy 47 Research Center Open Source often Useful 8 Transformation: Afghanistan http://www.bertelsmann-transformation- 44 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful 9 Geography Afghanistan Geography http://www.photius.com/wfb2000/countries/afghanistan/afghanistan_geography.html1 Research CenterOpen Sourceoften Useful 5 Afghanistan Geography - Library of Congress http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/31.htm2 Government WebsiteOpen Sourcenot often Useful 8 Afghanistan; The Natural Environment http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0030) 20 Corporate Website Open Source not often Useful 9 Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Afghanistan http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent 27 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful 9 CIA - The World Factbook -- Afghanistan https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 22 Government Website Open Source very often Highly Useful 10 NationMaster - Statistics on Afghanistan http://www.nationmaster.com/country/af-afghanistan 45 Research Center Open Source often Highly Useful 9 Military 070329_breakingpoint.pdf http://www.socom.mil/iw/groups/SSTR/070329_breakingpoint.pdf 32 Research Center Open Source very useful Highly Useful 9 Afghanistan and the troubled future http://books.google.com/books?id=w7fmg1cCjskC&q=afghanistan&dq= 28 Book Open Source not often Not Useful 5 Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Afghanistan http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent 27 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful Afghanistan- Imagery http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/imint/afghanistan.htm 42 Research Center IMINT often Useful 10 Afghanistan Military Guide http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/index.html 34 Research Center Open Source often Highly Useful 8 ISAF - International Security Assistance Force http://www.nato.int/ISAF/ 38 Government Website Open Source very often Highly Useful 10 United States Central Command - Afghanistan http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/aor/afghanistan/ 36 Government Website Open Source very often Highly Useful 1 Political Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Afghanistan http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent 27 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful 9 Afghan-map_warlords_2004.gif http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/images/afghan-map_warlords_2004.gif 15 Institutional Website Open Source often Highly Useful 7 Government and Politics http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0080) 14 Government Website Open Source not often Useful 9 Taliban publicly execute woman http://www.rawa.org/murder-w.htm 19 Institutional Website Open Source often Highly Useful 7 070329_breakingpoint.pdf http://www.socom.mil/iw/groups/SSTR/070329_breakingpoint.pdf 32 Research Center Open Source very useful Highly Useful 9 Social Afghanistan - People http://exxun.com/Afghanistan/c_pp.html 30 Research Center Open Source often Highly Useful 9 Afghanistan ethnic groups http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0037) 4 Government Website Open Source not often Useful 9 Afghanistan gender roles http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0057) 5 Government Website Open Source not often Not Useful 9 Afghanistan: State Department http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm 6 Government Website Open Source often Useful 10 Afghanistan; Social Structure http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0036) 3 Government Website Open Source not often Useful 9 Afghanistan_ethno72.jpg http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_et 8 Institutional Website Open Source very often Highly Useful 8 Afghanistan_ethnoling_97.jpg http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_et 7 Educational Institution Open Source often Useful 8 Afghanistan_pop_1982.jpg http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_p 9 Educational Institution Open Source often Useful 8 LC Zoom Viewer - Ethnolinguistic groups in Afghanistan. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl 50 Government Website Open Source not often Highly Useful 9 World Fact Book – Afghanistan https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 2 Government Website Open Source very often Highly Useful 10 Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Afghanistan http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent 27 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful 9 Technology Afghanistan – Infrastructure http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/cs-infras.htm 51 Research Center Open Source often Useful 8 Afghanistan Country Study http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/Infrastructure.html 52 Educational Institution Open Source not often Useful 7 Afghanistan: Restoring Infrastructure http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/State/60029.pdf 3 Government WebsiteOpen Sourcenot often Useful 9 CNN.com - Afghan entrepreneurs find profit in technology - Mar 28, 2005 http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/03/23/afghan.tech/index.html 55 Online News Source Open Source not often Highly Useful 7 Infrastructure « Development News from Afghanistan http://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/category/infrastructure/ 59 Blog Open Source very often Useful 7 NationMaster - Afghan Energy statistics http://www.nationmaster.com/country/af-afghanistan/ene-energy 48 Research Center Open Source often Useful 8 NationMaster - Statistics on Afghanistan http://www.nationmaster.com/country/af-afghanistan 46 Research Center Open Source often Highly Useful 8 Technology News: Technology: Afghanistan's Tech Boom http://www.technewsworld.com/rsstory/66381.html 58 Online News Source Open Source not often Useful 8 USAID - Asia and the Near East - Countries - Afghanistan - Infrastructure http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/afghanistan 53 Government Website Open Source not often Not Useful 5 Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Afghanistan http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent 27 Research Center Open Source very often Highly Useful 9 -1652270608330I2 Link chart scan Annex 3: Link Analysis 2546985328930Executive summary: Source: Link chartA Link Analysis of Afghanistan shows that the Terrorism node is the key factor to the instability of Afghanistan in the next 12-24 months. Terrorist control the production of opium, and opium affects the political, economic and social conditions in Afghanistan. Many of the Political elites, including President Karzai, were former leaders in Para-military organizations. President Karzai has publicly declared militia groups to be illegal, despite promoting their leaders to powerful government positions. The Technology node is diminutive due to Afghanistan lacking infrastructure and any form of health care. The social node is the next significant area of the link analysis. Vast ethnic and religious groups, followed by a plethora of languages, greatly divide the country of Afghanistan. There is no sense of national pride. Discussion: Afghanistan is a breeding ground for terrorist. There are 13 known terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. The Taliban, whose organization is based in Pakistan, prospered in Afghanistan until they were ejected from Afghanistan when US forces invaded. Karzai’s vice president, Vice President Khalili, is the leader of Hizi-i-Wahdat, a pro Shia militia group. Khalili is also a former war lord. As previously stated, those elected to the legislature include many with questionable credentials, including tribal leaders with personal militias, known participants in the narcotics trade, religious zealots and former members of the Taliban regime. President Karzai is the most important figure in the Political system of Afghanistan. The parliamentary system is constantly undermined by President Karzai. Although Karzai is the most powerful political figurehead, he can only exercise his power within the capital of Kabul. President Karzai cannot travel safely outside of Kabul since his government is quickly becoming irrelevant to large sections of the population. When the Taliban was driven out of Afghanistan the production of opium increased dramatically. The opium text circle is in line with the terrorism node and overlaps the social and economic nodes to show how opium binds these two entities together. Opium also greatly affects the political node of the link analysis. President Karzai’s brother is involved in the opium market, along with other powerful government figures. The Taliban had purposely decreased the opium supply in order to raise the price of their opium (supply-demand). When the Taliban was not present, farmers began growing opium without the Taliban’s permission, thus creating a flood of cheap heroin into the market. Afghanistan’s infrastructure is incredibly rudimentary. Afghanistan requires at least 30,000 km of paved roads to create a reasonable commercial and social transport network. The ISAF has helped Karzai’s government in starting projects to rebuild Afghanistan’s road ways, including a 1,200 km highway project that will link Kabul with Herat and Kandahar. Insurgents and U.S military operations have disrupted progress in Afghanistan’s rebuilding of its infrastructure. 18459451056640The social aspect of Afghanistan accounts for many problems. A vastly diverse ethnic and religious population, along with a variety of languages form many conflicts between each group. Ethnic and religious diversity is the reason for the many Para-military organizations in Afghanistan. Each group wants their interests protected the way gangsters protect their neighborhoods interest and security. Source: Link chartThe terrorism node overlaps the military node to explain how the warlord’s private militias are far stronger than the Afghan National Army (ANA). The warlords private militias are well supplied due to the vast amount of wealth accumulated through the opium market. Comments: The link Analysis is the foundation of my research and analysis, the link analysis was the first product created that hinted towards Afghanistan being unstable. I used highly reliable sources such as Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Global Security, CIA world fact book, and the library of Congress. I found very little information pertaining to Afghanistan’s technology. The fact that Afghanistan never had any modern technology to begin with and the destruction of most of its infrastructure during the Russian invasion lends itself to having no foundation of any technology or the development and research of technology. Source Reliability: 8 Source Confidence: 8 Annex 4: Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield (IPB) Analysis Executive Summary: The Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield (IPB) shows ANA bases as well as both 2841613985879ANA and ISAF air fields. Afghanistan is a land locked country whose terrain is extremely mountainous. The most effective approach into Afghanistan is through Pakistan and Iran. Travel through the country is incredibly challenging with mostly unpaved roads and an inadequate railroads system. Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain and vast networks of caves provide a great deal cover and concealment. The ANA is in its developmental stage and cannot protect itself against an attack. However, Afghanistan is occupied by the ISAF, whose mission consists of 42 nations. Discussion: See full picture on page 23-5880102754630Over two decades of war and neglect have destroyed most of the already insufficient networks in Afghanistan. Observing the topographical map shown on the right, we can see that Afghanistan’s topography is mostly rugged mountains. However, there are plains in the north and southwest. There are small areas of fertile land that lay in between the many valleys throughout the country, and some larger cultivated areas along the line from Kabul to Kandahar and some other regions. Afghanistan is a totally land locked country whose area is slightly smaller than the state of Texas. Afghanistan forms part of a key watershed, whose four main rivers flow out of the country. To the north lies the Amu Darya (formerly the Oxus and at its source the Pamir) which flows along the northern borders then north to Turkmenistan. The Hari Rud, in the center, ends in the Kara Kum desert, also in Turkmenistan. The Kabul River flows into Pakistan, and the Helmand, the country's longest river, and the most used for irrigation flows near Kabul and into Iran. The highest point in Afghanistan is Nowshak Mountain, which is 7,485 meters above sea level. The lowest point being Amu Darya river, at 258 above sea level. As shown in Annex 5 (order of battle) the ISAF has 42 nations spread throughout the country acting as an international security force, with the United Stated, Great Britain, and Germany having the greatest number of troops stationed in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the ANA separated its forces into five different corps, each having control over a certain area of the country (see page 29). Planning is ongoing for 13 ANA bases to be built across the country in an attempt to extend the authority of the central government beyond Kabul. The main headquarters for the ANA is in the capital, Kabul, with four regional commands in Gardez, Kandahar, Herat and the Mazar e Sharif. There are a total of 14 air field in Afghanistan. The most significant air field is Bagram Airbase, a U.S airbase in which most ISAF forces are processed. Bagram Airbase is located in the Parvan Province approximately 11 kilometers southeast of the city of Charikar and 47 Kilometers north of Kabul. It is served by a 10,000 foot runway built in 1976 and capable of landing large cargo and bomber aircraft. Bagram Air Base is also the main detention facility for personnel detained by U.S forces within Afghanistan. Afghanistan IPB Image produced using Goggle Earth.-3384551263650A large portion of the country is classified as “Slow-Go” (shaded in green). Slow-go means the terrain would prove very challenging for normal infantry forces to traverse. A very large area of north eastern Afghanistan is classified as “No-Go” (shaded in red), meaning that the terrain is nearly impossible to traverse. Southern Afghanistan is very flat and has a marked absence of any AFA or ISAF military bases. -9086851033145 Topographical map of Afghanistan showing significant cities, the capital, and avenues of approach through southern Afghanistan, the Topographical map shows how mountainous the Afghan terrain is. -706755748030 The population density map above shows that most of the population lies in the major cities in Afghanistan. -647700525145 The map above shows the extreme ethnic diversity in Afghanistan. The map above shows the different provinces in Afghanistan affected by Opium. The map also shows the risk of security in each province. Southern Afghanistan grows the most opium and is poses the highest risk to security. -60032780957 Comments: all of my information regarding to base and air field locations come from Janes Sentinel Country study and from Global Security. The imagery with all the base and airfield information was produced using Google® Earth 5.0 (beta), a virtual globe and geographic information program. A plethora of topographical maps were found on Afghanistan. Population density, topographical, drug production and ethnic maps were placed in the ICP to better understand the demography, geography, and security of Afghanistan. Source Reliability: 9 Source Confidence: 8 Annex 5: Order of battle 397510147320 741680227330 -802005-154940 Equipment in service TypeManufacturerRoleOriginal TotalIn ServiceFirst DeliveryT-62Nizhnyi TagilMain Battle Tankn/an/an/aT-55Former Soviet state factoriesMain Battle Tankn/an/an/aBRDM-1/2Arzamas Machinery Plant Reconnaissance Vehiclen/a50n/aBMP-2n/aInfantry Fighting Vehiclen/an/an/aBTR-60/70/80Arzamas Machinery PlantArmoured Personnel Carriern/an/an/aBTR-152Former Soviet state factoriesArmoured Personnel Carriern/an/an/aM113A2BAE SystemsArmoured Personnel Carriern/a1732005M577 BAE SystemsCommand Post Vehicle16162005 Artillery TypeManufacturerRoleOriginal TotalIn ServiceFirst Delivery155 mmn/aHowitzer24n/a1n/aD-30Joint Stock Company Spetstehnika Howitzern/a502n/a152 mm M1943 (D-1) Joint Stock Company Spetstehnika Howitzern/an/an/a130 mm M-46Motovilikha Plants Corporation Field Gunn/an/an/a122 mm BM-21 Splav Scientific Production ConcernMultiple Rocket Launcher n/an/an/a82 mm M37Former Soviet state factoriesMortarn/an/an/a107 mm M38Former Soviet state factoriesMortarn/an/an/a120 mm M1943Former Soviet state factoriesMortarn/an/an/a160 mm M1943Former Soviet state factoriesMortarn/an/an/aNotes: HYPERLINK
http://www6.janes.com:80/pmp/indirect.pmp?match=Turkey&doc=http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp%3FSent_Country%3DAfghanistan%26Prod_Name%3DSASS%26K2DocKey%3D/content1/janesdata/sent/sassu/afghs110.htm%40current
Turkey provided 24 surplus 155 mm howitzers, but arrangements for maintenance and spare parts supply are not clear.24 D-30s were transferred from Slovakia in 2006. In general, the ANA howitzers are of doubtful reliability. Anti-Tank Weapons TypeManufacturerRoleOriginal TotalIn ServiceFirst Delivery73 mm SPG-9 'Kopye'KBP Instrument Design Bureau Anti-Tank Gunn/an/an/a82 mm RCL B-10Former Soviet state factoriesRecoilless Riflen/an/an/a9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 'Sagger' )Konstruktorskoye Byuro MashynostroyeniyaAnti-Tank Guided Weaponn/an/an/aRPG-7 V n/aRocket Launchern/an/an/a Air Defence Weapons TypeManufacturerRoleOriginal TotalIn ServiceFirst Delivery9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 'Gopher')Saratovskiy Zenit Machine Plant Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missilen/a16n/aFIM-92A StingerRaytheon Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missilen/an/a1n/aHN-5ANORINCOMan-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile400n/an/a23 mm ZSU-23-4 Former Soviet state factoriesSelf-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gunn/a100n/a12.7 mm M53 (Quad) 2Former Czech state factoriesMounted Anti-Aircraft Gunn/an/an/a14.5 mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4variousTowed Anti-Aircraft Gunn/an/an/a57 mm S-60GPO Aleksinskiy KhimkombinatTowed Anti-Aircraft Gunn/an/an/a100 mm KS-19Former Soviet state factoriesTowed Anti-Aircraft Gunn/an/an/a85 mm M1939 (KS-12)Former Soviet state factoriesTowed Anti-Aircraft Gunn/an/an/aNotes:Stingers are in the hands of various armed factions as well as the ANA.Mounted in the rear of BTR-152 (6 × 6) APCs. Infantry Weapons TypeRole9 mm MakarovPistol7.62 mm TT-33Pistols7.65 mm CZ vz-61Sub-Machine Gun5.45 mm AK-74Rifle5.45 mm AKS 74URifle7.62 mm AMDRifle7.62 mm Vz 58Rifle7.62 mm Simonov SKSRifle7.62 mm AK47Assault Rifle17.62 mm RPDMachine GunRPKMachine Gun7.62 mm PK/PKM Machine Gun12.7 mm DShKMachine Gun14.5 mm KPVMachine GunNote:It has been stated by US manufacturers that there is intention to standardise the infantry on the M-16 rather than the AK-47. It is probable that selected units, for example the new commando battalion, will be equipped with US weapons. Some 40,000 AK-47s are being provided by, among other countries, Egypt, Estonia and Hungary. At least 1,000 assault rifles were provided by Romania. Army Aviation TypeManufacturerRoleOriginal TotalIn ServiceFirst DeliveryMi-24 'Hind'MilHelicopter - Attackn/a61n/aMi-17 'Hip'MilHelicopter - Assault / Transportn/a2122007An-32 'Cline'AntonovTransportn/a42008An-26 'Curl'AntonovTransportn/a2n/aL-39C AlbatrosAeroTrainern/a22005Notes:Total includes six former Czech Mi-24V 'Hind-E' versions being delivered during 2008-2009.Total includes six former Czech and three former Slovakian Mi-17s, as well as another seven Mi-17s funded by the United Arab Emirates, all of which entered service in 2008. Three additional Mi-17s are currently being refurbished in the UAE and will enter service in Q2 2009. Source: ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Afghanistan&Prod_Name=SASS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/sassu/afghs110.htm@current Annex 6: Analysis of Competing Hypothesis Executive summary: 3359198243540 An initial analysis of the competing Hypothesis (ACH) using Palo Alto research Center software indicates that Afghanistan will be decidedly unstable within the next 24 months. A second ACH taking in to account all aspects of the country shown in the link analysis indicates Afghanistan will be unstable for social and political reasons. Discussion: The results for the ACH were collected by using indicators that were given symbols. Inconsistent (I), Consistent (C), and neutral (N) were the main indicators to create the ACH, followed by the double consistent (CC) and double inconsistent (II) which strongly indicate consistency or inconsistency. A single inconsistent (I) rejects the hypothesis when given to a piece of evidence, while a single consistent (C) signifies support when given to a piece of evidence. The vast gap between stability and instability is significant, revealing the extreme instability within Afghanistan. The weighted inconsistencies score, a -118 for stability and a -7 for instability, indicates that Afghanistan is very likely to be unstable based on the tested indicators. -623570109220The second ACH tested the different aspects of Afghanistan in order to narrow the sources of instability within the country. These same sections are shown within the link chart. The different aspects tested were social, political, military, economic, technology, and geography. The ACH testing narrowed the main cause of instability in Afghanistan to social reasons, closely followed by political reasons. The Geographic and Technologic reasons affect Afghanistan’s instability the least. The analysis generated scores of social -16, political -20, military -42, economic -52, technology -76, and geography -99. There is multiple reasons for Afghanistan being socially unstable. The social reason for Afghanistan being unstable rests in the fact that the Afghan people have no national pride or identity. There is far too much ethnic, language, and religious diversity. This diversity has led to the creation of multiple para-military groups in Afghanistan whose purpose is to protect their group’s interests within Afghanistan. Furthermore, the unemployment rate in Afghanistan is 40%. Such a high poverty rate lends itself to corruption. Afghanistan is the fifth most corrupt nation in the world. Politics is a key factor in Afghanistan’s instability. President Hamid Karzai’s government is corrupt and is becoming irrelevant to large sections of the population. Furthermore, Karzai’s government appointments are driven by tribal/ethnic and family connections. The central government’s authority does not extend beyond the capital, Kabul, due to lack of a functional military and a police force to enforce its laws. 775970149860 Comments: The sources used in the production of the ACH are very reliable. The information used is derived from my link chart and Janes Sentinel country Risk assessment. The most frequently used type of evidences is political, followed by an equal amount of economic and military, social, and finally, Geography. The social element of Afghanistan cannot handle Afghanistan’s new political face. People have the chance to vote and there is a constitution, but the population has always the rule of government to local warlords and tribal leaders. A combination the political and social aspect, along with paramilitary groups, account for Afghanistan’s immense instability. Source Reliability: 9 Source Confidence: 8 ACH Matrix #1: Afghanistan will not be stable in the next 24 months -8731254612640-873125159385 -8134353835400-813435-71755 -6946903858895-6991350 -6921503954145-694690-635 -7645401200150ACH Matrix #2: Afghanistan will not be stable in the next 24 months due to social and Political reasons -764540896620-7645403648710 -764540534670-7645403545205 -8166103124835-81661027940 -730250689610-7283453242945 -730250678180 -7302503302000 Annex 7: MCDM Afghanistan Likely to See an Increase in Taliban Activity 4545330194945 Executive Summary: Taliban flag Due to the continued state of corruption and lack of central government, Afghanistan is vulnerable to a Taliban re-insurgency. The Pakistani government has been combating Taliban forces in their country. The effect has been that Taliban forces have been fleeing into the newly emerging Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s army cannot fight of the Taliban. The only force powerful enough within Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban is the ISAF (International Security assistance force), a NATO led security and developmental mission in Afghanistan. Requirement: What will likely happen to Taliban activity flowing from Pakistan into Afghanistan over the next 12-24 months? Possible Courses of Action: COA A: Taliban militants will flow in from Pakistan freely COA B: The ISAF will stop/prevent the Taliban coming in from Pakistan by working closely with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments COA C: Pakistani government will take action against the Taliban and chase them out of the country, forcing them into Afghanistan COA D: Taliban cells will rise in the unstable southern Afghanistan COA E: The ISAF will destroy and/or eject the Taliban out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan COA F: Pakistan will complete the fence that it has built at the Afghan border, slowing the flow of Taliban militants. COA G: The ISAF will completely destroy Afghanistan’s production of Opium, which in turn will cut the Taliban’s funding, leaving them crippled. COS H: The ISAF and Afghan government will reach out to elements of the Taliban who are engaged in the battle for financial gain, rather than ideological gain and exploit those who are in the Taliban for financial reasons. COA I: The ISAF, in conjunction with the Afghan government, will try to negotiate with the Taliban. Screening Criteria: COA must depend on the actions of the ISAF. Remaining COAs (After Screening Applied): COA 1: The ISAF will completely destroy Afghanistan’s production of Opium, which in turn will cut the Taliban’s funding, leaving them crippled. COA 2: The ISAF will stop/prevent the Taliban coming in from Pakistan by working closely with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments COA 3: The ISAF will destroy/eject the Taliban out of Afghanistan COA 4: The ISAF, in conjunction with the Afghan government, will try to negotiate with the Taliban. COA 5: The ISAF and Afghan government will reach out to elements of the Taliban who are engaged in the battle for financial gain, rather than ideological gain and exploit those who are in the Taliban for financial reasons. Evaluation Criteria: Eval A: Pakistani Goverment (Intuitive/Weight of the Information, 1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high) Eval B: President Karzai’s goverment (Intuitive/Weight of the Information, 1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high) Eval C: ISAF/International support (Intuitive/Weight of the Information, 1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high) Eval D: popular support (Intuitive/Weight of the Information, 1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high) Matrix: Will Afghanistan see an increase in Taliban forces over the next 24 months?Eval A: Pakistani Goverment Eval B: President Karzai’s GovermentEval C: ISAF/International support X2Eval D: Popular supportTotalCOA 1: The ISAF will completely destroy Afghanistan’s production of Opium, which in turn will cut the Taliban’s funding, leaving them crippled.12418COA 2:The ISAF will stop/prevent the Taliban coming in from Pakistan by working closely with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments 336214COA 3: The ISAF will destroy/eject the Taliban out of Afghanistan 226212 COA 4: The ISAF, in conjunction with the Afghan government, will try to negotiate with the Taliban. 23229COA 5: The ISAF and Afghan government will reach out to elements of the Taliban who are engaged in the battle for financial gain, rather than ideological gain and exploit those who are in the Taliban for financial reasons. 126110 Sources: COA 1, Eval A-D: ,[object Object]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/m-gallagherafghanistanfinal-091128222015-phpapp01/85/M-Gallagher-Afghanistan-Final-1-320.jpg)
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M.Gallagher Afghanistan Final
- 17. http://www.smh.com.au/world/pakistan-persists-with-nuclear-as-extremists-circle-20090504-asm6.html
- 26. http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21292Annex 8: Acknowledgments I would like to thank Professor Wozneak for the invaluable help and guidance throught the course of this project. I also need to thank Stanislav Kostic, my rowing coaches, the ROTC cadre, my parents, and my girlfriend, Jackie, for the invaluable support they have given me through the course of this term in balancing this project, my classes, rowing, and ROTC… Thank you. Annex 9: Contact Information -896620403225Mike GallagherMercyhurst College501 E 38th StreetErie, PA 16546West Duval #33Advanced Intelligence Analysis Cell: 301-537-5198Email: mgalla22@mercyhurst.edu