This report addresses one of the most important issues facing Colombia today, the exodus of its educated citizens to other countries, otherwise known as the "brain drain." Colombia is currently experiencing a surge in emigration, with 525,000 Colombians leaving the country in the year 2000-a 65% increase from 1996-making Colombia the largest outflow of immigrants in South America.

1. t' ;/' J • -,
Turning the Colombian Brain Drain into a Brain Gain:
A study of attitudes among Colombians living in the United States
Applied Workshop Project
MPA Program
School ofInternational and Public Affairs
Columbia University
April 24, 2002
Manager: Jessie Walker
Deputy Manager: Carolina Soto
Ricardo Araiza
Divya Chaturvedi
Akiko Moriyama
Ardis Sanmoogan
Jennifer Simon
Carine Terpanjian
Cagri Koseyener
Diego von Stauffenberg
Eileen Peguero
Naohiro Takahashi
Faculty Advisor: Milena Gomez

2. Acknowledgments:
A special thank you to the enthusiastic supportfrom the Colombian Consul Mauricio Suarez Copete and
Vice-Consul Roberto Castro. We are grateful for the support ofour professional association partners
including Profesionales y Estudiantes Colombianos en El Exterior (PECX), the Colombian American
Association (CAA), and the Asociacion de Profesionales Colombianos (APC), as well as the Colombian
Civic Center in New York (CCC).
In addition, we would like to thank Angela Maria Jimenez, from the DNP, for her constant support in
gathering information and consulting with this team. We are also thankful to all those who supportedour
research, in particular Diego Aguilera and Orlando Aristizabalfrom PECX. Ana Maria Gonzalez from
CAA, Jose Miguel Torres from CCC, Arturo Sanchez, Sonia Ospina, our interviewees Ana Maria
Bejarano, German Cavelier, Claudia Gurisatti, Carlos Manzano, Elizabeth Moramass, Deborah Upegui
anda very special thank to all our survey respondents.
2

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report addresses one of the most important issues facing Colombia today, the exodus of its educated
citizens to other countries, otherwise known as the "brain drain." Colombia is currently experiencing a
surge in emigration, with 525,000 Colombians leaving the country in the year 2000-a 65% increase
from 1996-making Colombia the largest outflow ofimmigrants in South America. This surge is a direct
result of increased conflict in Colombia and the economic slowdown that has plagued the country. One of
the priorities of this study was to evaluate and research these attitudes and opinions of the Colombian
migrants to help inform policy recommendations for turning this brain drain into a gain.
From an analysis of past practices in Colombia to stem the brain drain and the research into other
countries best practices, two ways of implementing brain gain policies come forward. Brain gain policies
can be either implemented through incentives to encourage the return of the expatriates to the country of
origin- the return option, or through their remote motivation and association of its development-the
diaspora option. Policies implemented the Colombian Government in the past primarily fell under the
return option.
To arrive at a viable policy recommendation that would address the problem of the brain drain, the
research team decided to survey the attitudes and opinions of the very brains immigrated to the US. A
diversity of Colombians participated in the targeted sample survey with 92 percent falling into our "brain
drain" category of a Bachelor's degree or higher, with almost half actually holding a postgraduate
diploma, Masters degree, or Ph.D. Our survey analysis indicates that professional and educated
Colombians' willingness to return decreases with time spent in the US. Overall, when asked what would
need to change for their eventual return to Colombia, our respondents are more concerned with issues
such as improved security and macroeconomic stability than economic incentives such as tax breaks or
investment opportunities.
Given the reluctance of Colombians to return and reality of conflict in Colombia, our policy
recommendation depends heavily on the diaspora option and builds on the successful existing Colombian
intellectual/scientific diaspora network called Red Caldas. We make a note of caution regarding
recommendations to turn the brain drain into brain gain: the daily violence, economic woes, corruption,
and the lure of the north make any long-term solution problematic. For any lasting impact on reversing
the brain drain, peace and security in Colombia are paramount but we hope that, until then, the Colombian
diaspora can help influence a brain gain for Colombia.
3

4. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part 1: Background and Analysis
Introduction - 5
Background - 6
The Problem Today - 8
Analysis ofColombia's Past Policies - 11
Best Practices in Other Countries - 14
Part II: Analysis of Data
Methodology - 17
Description ofthe Data - 19
Analysis ofRespondent's Attitudes - 21
Part Ill: Policy Suggestions
Policy Options - 23
Primary Recommendations - 25
Key Steps - 26
Challenges - 27
Future research - 27
Conclusion - 28
Bibliography - 29
Appendices - 31
Project Scope
This research on the Colombian "brain drain" problem is a product of graduate public policy students at
Columbia University acting as outside consultants for the Colombian Departamento Nacional de
Planeaci6n (DNP). The study covers the reasons why Colombians left their country and focuses on
whether any changes or improvements in Colombian policies may turn the current "brain drain" into a
"brain gain".
4

5. PART 1: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
Like many developing countries such as India, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, Venezuela, and El
Salvador, Colombia is experiencing what is commonly termed a "brain drain" or an exodus of its
educated citizens to other countries. Today the brain drain is a result of several serious problems facing
Colombia. Left wing guerrillas, right wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers have forced many
Colombian migrants to flea their home country due to its prolonged civil war and resulting violence
imposed. Economically, the Colombian economy suffered its worst recession in 70 years in 1999 and
early 2000. GDP fell by 4.5 percent in 1999, unemployment rate reached 19.5 percent in early 2000, and
the fiscal deficit grew to about 5.5 percent ofGDP (Gamarra and Collier 2001).
The causes of the recession were many: a gradual worsening of its fiscal accounts, internal strife,
violence, and external shocks such as the fall in the world prices of oil and coffee. Further, since the late
1950s Colombian politics has been characterized by high electoral abstention, perceptions of corruption,
and generalized political apathy towards, and mistrust of, partisan politics. According to the latest
statistics from the Colombian government's Department of Administrative Security (DAS), 525,000
people left the country in the year 2000-a 65 percent increase from 1996-making Colombia the largest
outflow of immigrants in South America1
• The recent exodus is different from the earlier outflows in that
current migrants represent an increased number of intellectuals, highly educated middle class
professionals and members ofthe upper class.
All these factors have compounded the problem ofbrain drain. The term "brain drain" refers to the long-
term international migration of skilled people who have been the subject of considerable educational and
professional investment by their own society. Twice, in 1972 and 1982, the government tried to stem the
brain drain flow with policies that included tax and other incentives, with limited success.
However, no coherent strategy currently exists to address this problem along with closely related issues
around capital flight and economic dis-investment. To this end, Colombia's Departamento Nacional de
Planeaci6n (DNP), the government agency responsible for preparation, execution and assessment of
policies and programs in the public sector, has approached the group to study the economic, political and
1
The team received these up-to-date statistics directly from the Colombian Department of National Planning (DNP)
via email communication.
5

6. social consequence of migration and formulate policy initiatives that attempt to address the problem of
brain drain.
The team carrying out this study is made up of a group of graduate students of the Master in Public
Administration program at Columbia University in New York City. It was developed in a two months
time frame, as part ofthe Applied Workshop ofthe Public Administration Program. This short timeframe
was one of the most significant limitations of this project. In addition, the study is restricted to
Colombians living in the US, particularly focusing on the New York and New Jersey areas. lt is worth
noting that the sample surveyed is not representative of the entire population of Colombian migrants to
the US; rather it is a targeted survey whose findings give empirical support to the policy
recommendations. The distance between this research team and the Colombian Departamento Nacional
de Planeaci6n (DNP) made it impossible to have face-to-face interaction, limiting our ability to properly
survey the leadership and staff at the DNP. These factors make the study and its results an initial
approach to the brain drain problem in Colombia. Further research is suggested in order to achieve a
more comprehensive perspective.
This report outlines the research and findings conducted in order to better understand previous and
potential future policies to address the Colombian brain drain. To begin, we present the history and
causes of Colombian emigration to better explain the problem, as it exists today. Next we examine the
past policies implemented by the Colombian government and investigate other countries' solutions to the
problem.
A detailed discussion and rationalization of the project methodology is presented, followed by a
description of our analysis of the survey data. Next, given the context of the current conflict and
economic situation in Colombia, we present a series of policy recommendations. Finally, a discussion of
the challenges we encountered and future research suggestions will complete this report.
Background
Over the last fifty years Colombia has seen its citizens take flight to other countries around the world due
to both the push of internal security issues and the pull of economic and quality of life opportunities
abroad. While the majority of these emigrants have fled to the United States, many have settled in
Canada, Spain and nearby countries in Latin America such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Costa Rica. There
are estimates that nearly three million Colombians or seven percent ofthe Colombian population is living
6

7. abroad.2
The DAS claims there are currently around 2 million Colombians living in the US.3
However,
such data on the total numbers of Colombians living abroad are at best an approximation because of
divergent data collection systems in addition to migrants eluding official registration or falsely reporting
their status.
To date, there have been three waves of Colombian migration to the US. "La Violencia," the political
war between the Colombian Conservative and Liberal parties in the 1950s is associated with the first
wave, with emigrants representing people from all socio-economic classes seeking to escape the political
violence. However, the majority of Colombian emigrants were young adult males, who were
accompanied or later joined by their families, from the lower and lower-middle classes that were also
looking for better economic opportunities.
In addition, most migrants came from Colombia's largest interior cities as Bogota, Cali and Medellin
(Gamarra and Collier 2001). Although the civil war ended in the late 1950s, Colombian emigration
continued until the 1970s, but at a slower pace. Individuals representing mostly young adult males from
the lower and lower-middle class continued to seek out economic opportunities abroad (Chaney 1976).
The October 1965 amendments to the United States 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
constituted an attractive 'pull' factor since it repealed the national origins quota system- representing the
most far-reaching revision of immigration policy in the United States. In place of nationality and ethnic
considerations, the INA amendments (P.L. 89 236; 79 Stat. 911) substituted a system based primarily on
reunification of families attracting needed skills, and refugees. The 1965 amendments adopted an annual
ceiling of 20,000 for most countries, provisioned to change by 1968 to a ceiling of 120,000 for the entire
Western Hemisphere eliminating per-country limits and preference systems. As a result, since 1965, the
major source of immigration to the United States shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia,
reversing the trend since the founding ofthe nation.
The second wave of Colombian emigration surged again in the late 1970s and continued until the mid
1990s. In 1990 about 188,252 Colombians migrated to the US. Although Colombia was experiencing a
favorable economic climate during the 1980s and early 1990s, many Colombians were driven from their
home states due to security threats and drug-related violence-which occurred within the context of an
escalating US-led war on drugs (Gamarra and Collier 2001). To a lesser extent, the promise of jobs,
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
7

8. peace and stability were the other factors that contributed to emigration within this period, similar to the
forces that were responsible for the first wave. These migrants mostly came from the same interior cities
as the first group, with others coming from the coffee-growing region in the west-central part of the
country and the northern coastal city of Barranquilla (Gamarra and Collier 2001). The demographic
make-up of this group of Colombians was similar to the first group, but now the numbers of middle,
upper-middle and upper class migrants had increased.
Colombia is currently experiencing another surge in emigration, which began in the 1990s and continues
into the present. According to the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, in 1999, 446,328
Colombians migrated to the US. In fact, the Colombian consul Mauricio Suarez Copete in Manhattan
estimates that the Colombian population in New York City, New Jersey, and White Plains to be around
600,000 while only 15,398 Colombians have registered to vote in the region (Amado 2002). US census
shows that the New York State still has the second largest Colombians in the United States (next to
Florida) in 2000.
Although all socio-economic classes are still involved, this latest wave represent a dramatic increase in
the number of middle, upper-middle and upper-class professionals who are migrating primarily to escape
the increasing violence and personal security threats (extortion, kidnapping, murder, etc.) to themselves
and their families from the Colombian guerrillas, paramilitaries, common criminals, and government
security forces (Gamarra and Collier 2001). In addition, while Colombia's economy entered a deep
recession in the late 1990s the US economy was booming, a lure to many Colombians looking for better
economic opportunities abroad.
Further, by 1990 there was a dense immigration network of Colombians living in the US that facilitated
migration, creating a satellite community. In addition people started migrating for family reasons as close
relatives began arriving. The third wave of migrants is no longer just young adult males and their
families from the larger interior cities, but older Colombians from throughout the country, with an
increasing number from smaller cities in predominantly rural areas. The third wave of Colombian
migration has added yet more diversity to an already divergent Colombian community abroad. This
diversity is a result of the far-reaching effects of political and personal violence, which has pushed
Colombians ofall classes and regions out oftheir country.
8

9. The Problem Today
Unlike the civil wars ofCentral America that eventually came to an end through peace treaties, the war in
Colombia continues unabated. In February 2002, during the research period for this paper, Colombian
President Andres Pastrana broke off the three-and-a-half year peace negotiations with the armed
opposition group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) after the kidnapping of
Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay. Since peace talks with the government fell apart, the FARC's
bad faith at the negotiation table has evolved into redoubled attacks on pipelines, power stations, and now
civilians----even in Bogota. As a result, there is a renewed threat to civilian lives, which may lead to more
migration from the country, increasing the brain drain.
The brain drain involves transfer of skills and knowledge from the country of origin and education ofthe
migrants, to the country where they now work. It is normally thought of as a phenomenon primarily
affecting developing countries whose stock of human capabilities may be seriously eroded by migration
of highly educated and trained personnel to post-industrialized countries-wasting the government's
already scarce resources invested in higher education.
Table 1 shows the emigration of Colombians to the United States in 1990s. One third of the 525,000
people who left Colombia in 2000, according to the DAS estimates, have ended up in the US adding to
the estimated 2 million Colombians (around 5 percent of the national population) already living there.
Throughout the period, the emigration has increased remarkably, mostly because of the rise in non-
immigrants-defined as aliens who seek temporary entry to the US for a specific purpose (See Appendix
1 for Figure 1). However, we suspect that the number ofrefugees and asylees in Figure 1 might be far less
than the real number since they are often counted incorrectly.
Table 1: Colombia Population and Emigration to the United States
1990 1995 1999
Population 34,970,000 38,542,000 41,566,000
Total emigrants to the US 188,252 249,131 446,328
Percentage(Total Emigrants/Po~ 0.54% 0.65% 1.07%
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, World Development Indicators
According to the US census, the number of Colombians in New York City decreased from 1990 to 1999
but a look at the broader New York and Jew Jersey areas shows an overall increase in the area (Tables 3
and 4).
9

10. Table 3: Colombians living close to New York
1990 2000
Nassau County (NY) 6,115 7,230
Rockland County (NY) 445 562
Westchester County (NY) 6,948 7,032
Bergen County (NJ) 7,990 11,161
Hudson County (NJ) 12,488 12,843
Union County (NJ) 9,476 11,423
Total 43,462 50,251
Source: US Census
Table 4: Colombians in New York and New Jersey ~
1990 2000
New York State 107,377 104,179
New Jersey State 52,210 65,075
U.S Total 378,726 470,684
Source: US Census
According to the US census, the number of
Colombians in New York City decreased from
1990 to 1999 but a look at the broader New
York and Jew Jersey areas shows an overall
increase in the area (Tables 3 and 4).
This could be explained by increased
incorporation among Colombians into US
society, causing families to move further away
from close-nit communities, such as Jackson
Heights in Queens, into the surrounding
suburbs.
One of the priorities of this study is to evaluate whether recent migrants include a proportionally larger
percentage of professionals from all sectors ofColombians society. Tables 5 and 6 show US Immigration
and Naturalization Service data on the immigrants and non-immigrants classified by occupations. This
data must be examined carefully since 80 percent of immigrants admitted to enter the United States report
no occupation. In addition, more than 90 percent of non-immigrants are coming to the United States as
temporary visitors for business or pleasure.4
Table S. Selected Class of Admission) I Table 6. Selected Class of Admission ) I(Immigrants from Colombia to the US in 19~ (Non-immigrants from Colombia to the US in 19
Occupation 2008 20.1%
Protess1ona1, :spec1a11ty &
Technical 455 4.6%
r.xecut1ve, AC1mtn. &
Managerial 118 1.2%
Sales 240 2.4%
Officials 1,750 4.0%
1emporary workers tor
Business 71,166 15.8%
1emporary Workers tor
Pleasure 338,790 75.3%
Admin. Support 89 0.9%
Transit Aliens 11,048 2.5%
Craft & Repair 46 0.5%
Treaty Traders & Investors 973 0.2%
laborer 962 9.7%
Farming, Forestry, Fishing 14 0.1%
Service 84 0.8%
No Occupation 7,958 79.9%
Total 9,966 100%
Students 10,277 2.3%
1emporary Workers &
Trainees 6,625 1.5%
lntracompany Transfers 3,999 0.9%
Fiances (ees) of US Citizens 447 0.1%
Source: Immigration and Natu1·a/ization Servic
Source: Immigration andNaturalization Service
4
Immigrant: a person who comes to a country to take up permanent residence. Non-immigrant: the absence of
former.
10

11. An exacerbation of the Colombian brain drain problem could have a lasting negative impact on the
country. Investment in education may not lead to the desired economic growth if a large number of its
highly educated people leave the country. In other words, the brain drain makes it more difficult for
Colombia to retain the very people critical for its economic and social development. Although Colombia
falls into the third ranking (out of four) of Latin American countries expenditures spent on students- in
1990 Colombia spent around $1,000 per year per student-this is a significant investment for a
developing country.5
A discussion of brain drain and policies addressing this problem cannot be complete without considering
the phenomenon of transnationalization. In an increasingly globalized world there are integrative forces
of capital flows, information flows, and movements of people. As large-scale migration is an
instrumental aspect of the globalization, it is represented in current elite discourse, as a process of global
multiculturalization, and the real processes of movement across borders, integration/disintegration, and,
transnationalization (Smith 2002a).
The concept of transnationalization addresses how countries with increasing migrant populations can
strategically incorporate their diasporic populations into their newly defined political community, or
"global nations" (Smith 2002b). In other words, transnationalism basically refers to the maintenance of
economic, cultural, social and political connections between sending and receiving counties. In the past,
immigrants broke off from their native countries and assimilated to their new societies. Today, we are
seeing (as argued by the authors) that the governments of Mexico, the Dominican Republic or Colombia
have successfully forged these transnational connections for the benefit of their countries. They have
recognized that, in varying degrees, (trans)migration has emerged as a structural element in their
respective economies, for example, the growing importance of remittances. The government of Colombia
has also recognized the importance oftheir diaspora by allowing for dual citizenship, the de-territorialized
political representation and legislation that facilitates economic linkages.
5
Comparing expenditures on students, it is seen that in 1990, Brazil spent about nine thousand dollars per year per
student in federal institutions, compared with about 1,500 for Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, around one thousand for
Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay, and around 500 or less for Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. (Latin America: National Responses to World Challenges in Higher Education by
Simon Schwartzman. Prepared for the Symposium on the new world challenges for higher education, organized by
the Council for International Exchange ofScholars, Washington, December, 1998.
http://www.airbrasil.org.br/simon/challenges.htm)
11

12. Analysis ofColombia's Past Policies
Historical policy responses to the problem ofbrain drain have typically addressed countermeasures, either
to prevent/regulate flows or to cancel their negative effects through taxation. However, the concept of
transnationalism has entered the consciousness of policy makers. Recently, according to Jean-Baptiste
Meyer et al, conceptions about migration have evolved, putting stronger emphasis on brain gain, which is
based on idea that the expatriate skilled population may be considered as a potential asset instead of a
definite loss ( 1997).
Di·as·po·ra (n.)
• A dispersion ofa peoplefrom their original
homeland.
• A dispersion ofan originally homogeneous
entity, such as a language or culture:
There are two ways to implement the brain
gain: either through the return of the
expatriates to the country of origin-the
return option, or through their remote
motivation and association of its
development- the diaspora option. (Meyer
et al. 1997)
Policies implemented in the past by the Colombian Government primarily fell under the return option.
Decree No. 1397 of August 16, 1972 offered a tax incentive plan to professionals and technicians living
abroad, seeking to import items from abroad to firmly resume permanent residency in Colombia. The
decree outlined the responsibility of the Colombian government, lnstituto Colombiano de
Especialiazacion Tecnica en el exterior (ICETEX), a government organization that provides scholarships
for educational advancement, Fondo Colombiano de lnvestigaciones Cientificas y Proyectos Especiales
(COLCIENCIAS - the government's research organization) and the Colombian professional or
technician.
The policy obligated ICETEX and COLCIENCIAS to hire only professionals of Colombian descent
based on the need and demand for the specialization of this individual. Once all requirements had been
met professionals and technicians would be tax exempt from items imported and specified in contract.
The policy was to take effect immediately after approval of the decree and applied to individuals aspiring
to return as of August 1970. However, the policy was scheduled to expire July 13, 1973. The success of
the policy was hindered for several reasons, the expiration date of the policy, the corruption of some
officials, and the lack ofopportunities for some expatriates to utilize the skills obtained abroad.
The return option has been successfully realized in various new industrialized countries such as Singapore
and the Republic of Korea or large developing countries such as India and China, but has met limited
success in Colombia. The diaspora option, on the other hand, proceeds from a different strategy based on
12

13. the recognition that many of the expatriates are not likely to return. The objective, then, is to create the
links through which they could effectively and productively be connected to its development (Meyer &
Brown 1999).
Since 1991 there has been increased attempts on behalf of the Colombian government to initiate policies
directed at the diaspora. A major example of this was the social reforms to the 1991 Colombian
Constitution that resulted in a multitude of political, social and economic rights for expatriates. This
reform was initiated by began with a grass-roots movement of Colombians based in Miami, Florida, that
lobbied the National Constituent Assembly to include dual citizenship reform in the new Constitution.
Article 96 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution allowed native Colombians and those born to Colombians
the right to be acknowledged as citizens of both Colombia and their host country. This in turn afforded
the dual-citizens the same rights as native-born Colombians.
The Constituent Assembly, also approved and included in the 1991 constitution, improved the political
representation of Colombians abroad in the national Congress by creating a global extraterritorial
electoral district that includes all countries outside the national territory. Unfortunately this representation
is limited to one individual who has to work on behalf of the interests of all Colombians abroad, which
clearly are not uniform. In addition to these reforms, in 1997 the Colombian Congress passed a law
granting expatriates the right to vote for congressional candidates representing electoral districts in
Colombia, providing migrants the power to elect from abroad the legislative representatives of their own
regions oforigin.
To further enhance the rights of Colombians abroad the Ministry of Foreign Relations created the
Programa para la Promocion de las Comunidades Colombianas en el Exterior (Program for the
Promotion of Colombian Communities Abroad or PPCCE) as part of the Colombia Para Todos
(Colombia for Everyone) program. This program included outreach to Colombian nationals living abroad,
legal assistance for those incarcerated in foreign jails, professionalization of consular officials, and efforts
at surveying the needs and characteristics of the Colombian diaspora (Guarnizo 1999). Just recently in
March 2002, the Colombian Social Security in the Exterior program was created by the Social Security
Institute (ISS) to offer all Colombians living abroad a pension plan and/or an opportunity to pay for the
pension plans and/or health coverage of family or friends living in Colombia. This in tum serves as an
avenue for Colombians living abroad to lend a hand to family and friends living in Colombia.
13

14. In addition to policies that help Colombians abroad, COLCIENCAS initiated a network of expatriate
Colombian researchers, academics and engineers called the Colombian Network of Researchers and
Engineers Abroad or "Red Caldas." Established in 1991, Red Caldas encourages Colombian experts
around the world to contribute to scientific and technological progress by publicizing the results of their
research. Its aim is to contribute, from abroad, to the scientific, technical, socioeconomic and cultural
development of Colombia (Meyer et al. 1997).
Today Red Caldas brings together nearly 1,000 out of the roughly 2,000 people of the Colombian
scientific diaspora, living in 30 countries. A quarter of them live in other Latin American countries, 24
percent are in the USA, 12 percent in Great Britain, 9 percent in France, 9 percent in Germany and the
rest in other areas ofthe world. The social and human sciences are the most significant fields (31 percent),
followed by technology and engineering (23 percent). Then come the natural sciences (16 percent), the
hard sciences (14 percent), medicine and health (12 percent) and finally earth and environment (4 percent)
(Meyer et al. 1997).
The professionals focus on three major aspects in the network. The first is a system of permanent
communication through an electronic database. The second is the organization of local associations, or
"nodes". These are groups of scientists, engineers, and professionals officially working for the
development of Colombia under NGO status in the resident country. Worldwide, there are 21 nodes, the
largest located in the United States, France, Spain and Canada.
Relevant to this study, listed members of Red Caldas located in New York went on to form PECX, the
Association of Colombian Students and Professionals Abroad-also a partner organization assisting the
research conducted for this study (Meyer et al. 1997). Finally, the third category of activity for Red
Caldas is the collaboration on joint projects between diaspora and home community members. These
projects began in 1994 and include the Bio-2000 project, which focused on biomedical applications of
physics and another project, centered on robotics and automation with the aim of designing a
multipurpose industrial robot (Meyer & Brown 1999).
Best Practices in other Countries
Many other developing countries such as the Republic ofKorea, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Mexico are
grappling with the brain drain phenomenon and have designed and implemented both return and diaspora
option type policies to reverse the flow. Perhaps other countries' "best practices" would not work in
14

15. Colombia because of the country's unique situation. However, the evaluation of these other attempts to
reverse the brain drain can help better inform potential new policies for Colombia.
One interesting example is the Republic of South Korea, which implemented both return and diaspora
type policies that successfully encouraged expatriates home. The government established research
institutions, such as the Korea Institute for Science and Technology (KIST) in 1966, as a way to attract
returnees (Human Development Report 200 I). Returnees who join KIST were given a great deal of
research and managerial autonomy, and are offered salaries competitive with overseas incomes, better
working conditions and help with housing and children's schooling. The state-led repatriation was quite
successful, though there were other reasons, such as Korea's improved economic prospects. Today,
rather than focusing on the physical return of their pools of technological talent living abroad, Korea is
working to construct cross-national networks among them. Jt is organizing networks of professionals
overseas and linking them back with Korea. One example is Korea's visiting professor programs that tap
into the expertise ofthose uncertain about returning home for good (Human Development Report 2001).
In El Salvador the migration trend is somewhat different. The majority of the emigrants have only a
secondary education when they leave El Salvador, completing their post secondary studies in the United
States-causing the average educational level of emigrants to be higher than the local level (Andrade
1999). This trend is common to Central American countries in large part, due to a scarcity of institutions
of higher learning. El Salvadoran remittances make up 10 percent of the country's GDP, motivating the
government to institute a number of policies and programs to protect the well being ofSalvadorans Iiving
in the US, which make up roughly 20 percent of their population (Le6n 2000). One example of this
commitment is the consulate's office of community affairs that offers free legal advice, facilitates
immigration status, and promotes human rights for immigrants in general.
However there is criticism that the current emphasis on remittances misses the potential value of the
knowledge, contacts, and talents acquired by Salvadorans abroad. In response, the government has also
attempted to foster relationships between the diaspora and their counterparts in El Salvador. One example
is the Competitiveness Project that brings together a specific set of economic actors in El Salvador to
conduct outreach to their emigrant counterparts for the purpose of economic development. Specifically,
the Emigrants Cluster, as it is known, attempts to connect small and medium-sized enterprise in El
Salvador with emigrant businesspeople interested in investing in El Salvador (Leon 2000). Another
example is the Unidad Salvadorena network (UNISAL), which was set up via the web to conduct
campaigns to support development efforts in El Salvador (Andrade 1999).
15

16. Another best practice using the diaspora option is program TALVENffALAND set up by the Permanent
Delegation of Venezuela at UNESCO at the end of 1994, with the support of this Organization. It is a
project whose principal objective is to recreate bonds with the diaspora intellectual and scientific
Venezuelan in the world, and "to recover the intelligence expatriate" by helping it to promote
communication networks with the country (Meyer et al. 1997). The principle is to finance short duration
work meetings with the members of the scientific and intellectual community in Venezuela. Significant
seminars and meetings were organized, as well in the fields of biology, medicine, and physics, as in that
of the artificial intelligence or philosophy, or the economy. Today the Data Bank created by the
Delegation of Venezuela counts more than 1.000 indexed experts and 175 visits ofwork carried out with
the country (Meyer et al. 1997).
In the past ten years Mexico has increased its ties with Mexicans living abroad for more than three
decades. The government created the Programfor Mexican Communities Living Abroad (PCME), whose
main responsibility is to promote cooperation with Mexican expatriates. This program was created
because the Mexican government perceived remittances sent by Mexicans to their country not only as a
source of economic resources, but also as a brick in its wall of solidarity. In addition, the program
involves an important social component directed primarily to those less favored in the US. It is important
to highlight that part of the creation of the PCME was influenced by the large immigrant flow of
Mexicans, as it increased the government's need to protect its nationals in the exterior and confront
bilateral problems (Mohar 2000). In addition, by strengthening these ties the government encourages the
sustaining dispatch of economic resources to Mexico. As stated by Mohar (2000) the challenge is to
identify those areas ofcommon interests for Mexicans on both sides of the border and to learn to respect
the understandable differences between both groups.
An additional resource is the UNDP sponsored diaspora program called the Transfer of Knowledge
Through Expatriate Networks (TOKTEN), which began in 1977 and in the twenty years since has
facilitated over 5,000 volunteers engaging in assignments in 49 developing countries in a wide spectrum
of fields. Nearly all areas are covered, from public administration to management of enterprises, from
agricultural research to computer technology. Since 1994, the program has come under the umbrella of
the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) program. The TOKTEN concept is a "global UNDP mechanism
for tapping on expatriate nationals, who had migrated to other countries and achieved professional
success abroad, and mobilizing them to undertake short-term consultancies in their countries of origin,
under UN aegis" (UNDP).
16

17. The TOKTEN approach is regarded as an added dimension oftechnical cooperation, which contributes to
reducing the adverse effects of the "brain-drain", with several advantages as such as the shared language
and traditions, relatively low cost and speed of implementation. The TOKTEN program is based on a
spirit of volunteerism, which means that TOKTEN volunteers are not paid direct salaries but are entitled
to roundtrip air ticket and a daily subsistence allowance (DSA). TOKTEN has programs in China,
Turkey, Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam, Philippines and Lebanon, among others.
All these countries have divergent forces that cause the migration of educated and professional people,
which also differ considerably from Colombia. In Colombia, the lack ofopportunities is compounded by
the daily violence, which creates a strong "push" factor, but nonetheless there is the potential for creative
policies that can help the situation. The goal of this research is precisely to formulate a set ofproposals to
recommend policies to turn the Colombian brain drain into a gain. The next section ofthis paper lays out
the research methodology and results informing the final section on policy recommendation and
suggestion for future research.
PART U: ANALYSIS OF DATA
Methodology
Due to the unique factors leading to the Colombian brain drain problem, this study sets out to better
understand educated and professional Colombians' motivations for leaving their country and attitudes
towards returning. The research team decided the most effective means to establish effective policy
recommendations was to survey the attitudes and opinions of Colombian ''brains" who have immigrated
to the US. To explore these attitudes and perceptions, the group designed a questionnaire (see Appendix
2) to survey such professionals, drawing on both a New York University and south Florida study
(Hoffinan & Zuleyman 1997 and Kesselman 2001).
No claim is made that the survey sample is representatives of the general population of Colombian
migrants to the US. The findings based on this sample might not be generalized to all Colombian
migrants in the US, or to the relevant associations; rather they serve as empirical evidence to understand
relevant theoretical hypotheses to establishing policy recommendations. For this purpose, a random
sample is not necessary; rather a targeted survey approach is more effective in understanding reasons for
migration and what incentives may be necessary to facilitate return.
17

18. Through the partnership of the Colombian Consulate and a number of Colombian associations based in
New York City-including the Professionales y Estudiantes Colombianos En El Exterior (PECX), the
Colombian American Association, and the Asociacion de Professionales Colombianos (APC)-the group
was successful in reaching a wide diversity of Colombians. Ninety-two percent fell into our "brain drain"
category of a Bachelor's degree or higher, with almost half holding a post-graduate diploma, Masters
degree, or Ph.D. (see Figure 2). In addition, over halfcompleted their last year ofeducation in Colombia,
representing substantial Colombian educational investment (Figure 3).
Figure 2: Educational Level
Other High school
PhD 2'J> 9'J>
Mastera
32%
Poet graduate
diploma
11%
Bachelors
36%
Figure 3: Country Completed Last
Year of Education
Other
5%
Cotorrbla
51%
The total number of surveys obtained was 481, with 195 administered in person at the Colombian
Consulate in Manhattan, the Colombian Civic Center in Queens, and the March l 0th Colombian
congressional voting booths in Queens and New Jersey. In addition to the paper survey, the group also
received 286 electronic responses from a web-based interactive survey form that allowed us to email the
link directly to our partner organizations' members. When a form was submitted, the response data came
to us electronically and anonymously. The original email list totaling about 1,500 quickly expanded as
respondents forwarded the link to friends and colleagues-reaching as far as London, Spain, and Canada6
•
While some may argue that a web-based survey creates a bias towards respondents who are comfortable
with and have access to computer technology, this was an appropriate and effective tool for the purposes
of our survey, since e-mail is a central, common mode of communication among professionals, whom we
were targeting.
Limitations of this study were primarily due to a severe time constraint of ten weeks to complete the
project from beginning to end. In addition, the physical distance of our client, Colombia's Departamento
Nacional de Planeaci6n, eliminated the possibility of face-to-face meetings and interviews, which would
have allowed more depth to this study. Most importantly, the group recognizes that a solution to
6
Respondents living outside the US were removed from the sample for analysis.
18

19. Colombia's internal conflict is the purview of our study. However, if the violence and fear many
Colombians feel and/or have experienced is not seriously addressed in tandem with any policy
recommendations we make, then we fear that the success of these polices will be limited. Recognizing
these limitations and constraints we moved forward with our objective of recommending workable
solutions to reverse the brain drain in Colombia.
Description oftheData
The survey instrument (see Appendix 2 and 3) had a total of 39 questions that measured demographics,
level of assimilation in the US, reasons for leaving Colombia, potential plans to return, and possible
policy recommendations. Through the use of demographic statistics we created several sub-groups to
compare attitudes among individuals with diverse levels of education, income, occupation, and years
living in the US.
Figure 4: State of Residence
5''11.
~II ~ ~jl'""
I .. ....
-I
-NY NJ FL TX CA PA
Figure 5: Residents of the New York and
New Jersey Areas
Otha r cltl• 1 Bronx
ln:nvd~~;•• I'll. Br";~tyn
33% lhnhattan
28%
St1ten
lnal1nd
1.,. Qu11na
30%
Rost of
us·
The majority ofthe 481 respondents (73 percent)
were from the New York and New Jersey area,
providing a strong case study, as New York is the
second largest destination for Colombian migrants
in the US after Florida (Figure 4). As stated
earlier, the US Census determined there are
approximately 77,150 Colombians currently
residing in New York city and 35,400 Colombians
reside in New Jersey. Among those in our sample
residing in the New York/New Jersey area, 30
percent live in Queens, 28 percent in Manhattan, 7
percent in Brooklyn and 1 percent in the Bronx
and Staten Island. The remaining 33 percent
reside in other parts ofNew York and New Jersey
The majority of the respondents are recent immigrants to the US, with 69 percent having resided in the
country under five years-representing the new wave of migrants (Figure 6). In addition, the majority
has visa or permanent residency status (44 percent and 22 percent respectively), with only 17 percent
having US citizenship and 9 percent reporting being undocumented in the US.
19

20. Figure 6 : Number of Years Living In US
21+years
5%
0-5yaars
89"/o
Men makeup 56 percent of the respondents in the following age ranges: 39 percent 18-29, 34 percent 30-
39, 16 percent 40-49 and 11 percent 50 years or older (See Appendix 1 for following graphs). Overall, 39
percent ofrespondents had one or more children, with marital status breaking down as follows: 47 percent
married, 39 percent single, 5 percent living with a partner, 5 percent divorced, and the rest separated or
widowed. Of those with partners, 58 percent have partners of Colombian nationality, 19 percent US
citizen status, 9 percent dual citizenship, and 14 percent are other nationalities.
Among the sample surveyed, 20 percent studied
Business and engineering, 12 percent economics,
8 percent architecture, and less than 6 percent
for medicine, biology and law. Twenty-five
percent made up other professional and educational (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Fields of EWcation Concentration
•Oller•Business
oEIVneerirg
0 E.cmorrics
•MhtedJe
QMedic:ine
• Biology/Chenistry
Ol..a.v
Same
11%
"Colombia is losing smart and innovative
people, innovative people, willing to
construct..."
Colombian News Broadcaster in New
York
Figure 8: Comparison of Occupation
The respondents' employment status in Colombia was high, with 246 working in either a professional
specialty or holding an executive position. However, the results of our survey indicate an overall decline
in professional status upon moving to the US, with an 11 percent decrease in professional specialty and
20

21. 41 percent decrease in executive positions. Surprisingly, this did not impact respondents' personal
comparison of their job status: an overwhelming 72 percent consider their current position in the US
much better or somewhat better than their status in Colombia (Figure 8). One possible explanation is that
56 percent of respondents have a household income of over $40,000-<iramatically higher than
professional salaries in Colombia (See Appendix 1). This factor may contribute to the difficulty of
attracting Colombian migrants to return.
Analysis ofRespondents Attitudes
In order to detennine the most significant factors that affect the respondents' current plans to return to
Colombia today, we surveyed attitudes towards conditions in Colombia ("push" factors) and the lure of
US opportunities ("pull" factors) that may have influenced their decision to migrate to the US. We also
examined the conditions that may be significant factors in the respondents' willingness to return.
The survey results indicate that professional and educated Colombians' willingness to return decreases
with time spent in the US.
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Figure 9: Change in Attitude to
WHEN ARRIVED NOW
We found that respondents are more willing to
return when they first arrive, and with time
they become more resistant to the prospect.
For example, in our sample 11 percent
indicated that in contrast to their attitude when
arriving in the US, they no longer plan to
return (Figure 9).
To further understand this change in mindset, it is important to determine why these migrants left
Colombia in the first place. When asked what the main reasons were for leaving, work/economic and
educational (or pull) opportunities in the US ranked in the top two, with 26 and 25 percent respectively
(Figure 10)7
• Leaving for reasons of violence was ranked third, making up 19 percent of the responses.
Lack ofopportunity, better quality oflife and corruption where also high on the list. In contrast, when
7
These percentages do not refer to the number ofrespondents, but to the number oftimes the option was marked
across all the surveys.
21

22. asked primary reasons for wanting to return to Colombia, respondents ranked family links (23 percent)
and to work for their country (19 percent) as the top two reasons (Figure 11).
Figure 10: Main Reasonsfor Leaving Colombia
BWxWecmopps.
.Educ. ~.
O Violmoe in Colanbia
DLack d <WO·
•Betterquaily ofIWe
• Famiyl8880l1I
OMemalMI ifestytes
.CAiler
Figure 11: Reasons Why Respondents Would
Retum to Colombia
• Famly links
•Wort for mycountry
QCllmate & nature
C Economic achlewment
•Better tMng conditions
0 ECOnli>fOf. opps.
• Lack otlegal us does.
ORestfrom US
•Educ. fot cMdren
llfWli19
O Escape discrimlnatJon
The second portion ofour evaluation consists on regression analysis used to explain respondents' plan to
return to Colombia at some point in the future. Appendix 4 presents the variables and provides a brief
description of each. Appendix 5 shows the regression results.
The dependent variable for our regression questioned respondents' willingness today to someday return
Colombia (PLANNOW). Our regression model is represented by the following equation:
PLANNOW = 1.8* - .003(age) + .464**(geoder) - .358(maritalxl) - .14**(educlvl) + .681*(jobsttsx) +
.686*(familycolx) + .375**(ussttsx)- .469**(actvtylx) + .771*(actvty2x)
Because this is a non-linear, logit regression, it requires a slightly more complex interpretation that varies
in percentage increases of PLANNOW-likelihood that a respondent will answer yes to returning some
day to Colombia- with each unit increase within each variable (see Appendix 5 for logit calculations).
This model correctly predicted 70 percent of the time and explained l0.87 percent of the variation in our
PLANNOW variable. Although 10.87 percent is a low Pseudo R2
, low explanatory values are common in
studies measuring social factors such as people attitudes.
From the equation, while also controlling for age and marital status, we can gather that:
• Women are 10.15 percent less likely to return to Colombia;
Higher level of education causes a decrease in the likelihood of the respondent planning to return to
Colombia;
Higher employment status- business owners and full-time workers- makes respondents less likely
to have plans to return to Colombia compared to the unemployed, retired, part-time employee and
student respondents;
22

23. No close family members still living in Colombia makes respondents 15.5 percent less likely to
return;
As we would expect, those respondents with visa or undocumented status are more likely to plan to
return than respondents with US citizenship or permanent residency status; and
• More involvement in Colombian social or political activities increases the likelihood of planning to
return to Colombia by 18 percent.
Because the target population for reversing the brain drain possesses all these features, it can be
concluded that it would be difficult to provide viable, effective incentives that would convince them to
return.
Figure 12: Condition That Needto Change
· ~soanty
•Enddwt!t
0 lnll'tMld eccn. """"'
oEndd~ng
• nlJl<)Wd nJ&d law
alnY8strrert opp:>Mntes
1 Bet1ert>g1Ered.Cl'.JPS.
OTax inavtives
, .,_....., nmili1y
DClner
Supporting this conclusion, when asked what
would need to change for their eventual
return to Colombia, respondents are more
concerned with issues such as improved
security and macroeconomic stability than
economic incentives such as tax breaks or
investment opportunities (Figure 12).
Furthermore, an overwhelming number of Colombians are aware of the brain drain problem and consider
it to be detrimental to Colombia's economic and social prosperity. When asked how serious they
perceive the brain drain problem to be, 78 percent responded that it was very serious and 16 percent that it
is somewhat serious (see Appendix 1 for figure). Only l percent of respondents did not think the brain
drain was a priority concern for Colombia.
Given the current escalating civil conflict and violence in Colombia, it is clear that the security and
economic stability problems cannot be solved immediately or even in the short run. Furthermore, due to
Colombia's budget constraints, it is also difficult for the government to undertake the type of economic
incentives needed to lure high skilled Colombian immigrants back to the country. Therefore, the return
option mentioned before, though extremely desirable, may not answer the problem of the country's brain
drain.
23

24. PART Ill: POLICY SUGGESTIONS
Policy Options
The reality of brain drain in Colombia cannot be denied. As discussed earlier, there are two ways of
addressing this problem. One is to encourage the expatriates to return to their country by providing
incentives and tax breaks--the return option. The other is to recognize that the migrants will not return
and to consequently make efforts to use their knowledge or skills from abroad to benefit the country-the
diaspora option. While the most effective approach would be to employ both options for effective results,
it is true that some countries focus solely on the return option-missing out on the rich rewards that the
expatriates can provide the country from abroad.
In our survey, when openly asked for policy suggestions, Colombian expatriates indicated investment in
certain sectors and incentives as critical policies for them to reconsider returning to their country. Some
of the suggestions include creating job opportunities, competitive salaries (consistent with education and
capabilities), higher educational opportunities, and promoting professional sectors such as health,
construction, tourism, art, culture, science and technology. All these changes require heavy investment
by the country in infrastructure, education and research and development. Based on the respondents'
policy suggestions, the following list ofrecommendations would facilitate return ofexpatriates.
1. Promoting investment through tax breaks and tax holidays
2. Research and Development with government funded opportunities coupled with incentives that
are targeted towards high level income as well as education for children
3. Incentives for entrepreneurs with credit opportunities to start own business and tax incentives for
enterprise creation
4. Facilitation of job opportunities through targeted job fairs and Internet based offers. Also
encouragement ofvisa modifications that would facilitate mobility
However, Colombia's lack adequate resources could make it difficult to provide such benefits to the
expatriates and consequently Jose out on the human capital. In fact, it is this very lack of resources in a
country that leads to the flight ofprofessionals in search ofbetter opportunities.
ln addition, in the case of Colombia, given the reality of the civil conflict and violence, investment in
extensive infrastructure or the development of science and technology might prove to be challenging if
24

25. not impossible. Nonetheless, the country can effectively leverage the diaspora option, which does not
rely on prior infrastructural investment, but capitalizes on already existing resources.
Further, one of the key advantages of the Diaspora option is that not only is the country successful in
taking advantage of the knowledge and skills of expatriates, but through them is able to gain valuable
access to professional networks and associations to which the expatriates belong. However, it needs to be
said that the diaspora option is less viable for Colombians escaping violence, war, and personal security
threats, who express a greater reluctance to do something for Colombia.
Primary Recommendations: The Diaspora Option - A casefor Colombia
For Colombia, the Diaspora option is likely to be most appropriate since it involves the reality of conflict
in Colombia and the current fiscal deficit. ln addition, this option does not rely on new investments,
rather it capitalizes on existing resources. This option could also tap into the willingness ofexpatriates, as
reflected in our research, to use their knowledge and skills for the benefit of the country through networks
or temporary visits. Lastly, this option lends itself to a permanent policy objective rather than a short-
term measure to counter or mitigate the effects ofbrain drain in Colombia.
"...it is a good idea, as those who are
already establishedabroadwill not
return. It is important to strengthen
the Colombian community abroad. "
With this in mind, our policy recommendation
focuses on the Diaspora option and builds on the
successful existing intellectual/scientific
diaspora network Red Caldas, discussed earlier.
The goals of the diaspora option are to firstly, establish a network between existing Colombian
associations in Colombia and abroad. Secondly, to create opportunities for permanent communication to
facilitate skills and knowledge transfer in all professional fields through existing associations. Thirdly,
the network would promote joint research and development projects to improve socio-economic
conditions in Colombia. And lastly, it would encourage cooperation with international financial
institutions to attract Colombian savings and investment from abroad. For example, under the proposed
diaspora network, a Colombian agriculture engineer developing alternative crops in California could log
onto a website to join with Colombian researchers who are assisting a rural Colombian farming
community.
We recommend that the DNP, tapping into its leadership role in public policy decisions, propose the
expansion of this model to include business, engineering, architects, academics, education and the arts,
25

26. and create a new umbrella network to connect people working in all professions abroad with those in the
same fields in Colombia. This umbrella network would facilitate the linkages between respective
government agencies, professional associations, dominant universities between Colombia and all the
countries where Colombian brains have migrated.
This model will require initial resources to launch the effort and coordinate the communication, but the
long-term goal is for it to be self-sustaining through membership dues and volunteer participation.
Key Elements of Diaspora
•!• Permanent Communication System
•!• Joint Projects
There are three key elements to the Diaspora
option. First, it involves nodes or chapters that
tap into existing professional associations and
networks. Second, it requires a web-based
communication system; a database to map out
skills of member associations, universities, and
individuals; and regular updates through list
serves or newsletter. And last, the diaspora option facilitates joint projects that focus on skills training,
knowledge exchange, or policy analysis and development.
ln the long-run, with such a network building among Colombians and migrants abroad, the chances of
these professionals returning in the future would most likely increase due to increased involvement in
their community in Colombia-as our regression model shows. Such a long-run approach could also
increase the potential of economic investment- whether through philanthropy or direct foreign
investment-in Colombia even ifmembers choose never to return.
Furthermore, from the results of our survey, respondents seem willing and interested in getting involved
in activities or making investments in Colombia: 26 percent expressed interest in networks of support, 23
percent were willing to make temporary visits to Colombia, 17 percent were willing to invest or join a
volunteer cooperative and 13 percent were interested in philanthropic contributions (Figure 13).
26

27. Key Steps
Figure 13: What Respondents Would do for Colombia From Afar
The Diaspora Option
Philanthropy··········Invest
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
In order to initiate the diaspora network, we recommend the DNP propose its creation at the National
Migration Commission, made up of the DNP, Colciencias and the Foreign Ministry, among others. The
network would require the following steps. First, helped by Colciencias, set up a consultative meeting
with the Red Caldas to learn best practices and bring them into the fold of this umbrella network. Second,
establish a mission statement for the network. Third, create a strategic plan. Fourth, approach UNDP's
TOTKEN group, to make Colombia and its diaspora part of its program. Lastly, tap into the knowledge
of the Foreign Ministry to facilitate the network's expansion and make it consistent with current
migration policies. The DNP should also conduct a survey of existing associations, institutions and
government agencies (domestic and abroad) and determine the most effective way to bring them into the
network.
Challenges
The diaspora option faces the challenge of reaching out to an overall distrustful migrant community. The
violence and drug war has left many expatriates wary oftheir fellow Colombians, with some even fearing
to disclose their whereabouts for fear ofretribution. ln this scenario, many Colombians could be reluctant
to participate in associations and to return to Colombia for training or teaching activities. However, the
professionals Colombians involved in professional associations based on fields of expertise, of which
there are significant and tightly connected communities, are more open to the diaspora option, as we have
found out from our survey and interviews.
27

28. Future Research
The problem of brain drain in Colombia is complex and requires significant future research to turn the
brain drain into a brain gain. Although this study provides one step forward in addressing this critical and
difficult issue, there is other research that could be done to help inform future policies. The areas of
future study can be as simple as compiling a database of Colombian emigrants, or as complicated as
determining the socio-psychological responses to the violence in the country and their effects on
migration. However, one important policy needing future research is the impact of remittances.
According to El Tiempo (2002), Colombia receives US$670 million in remittances per year, 80 percent of
which comes from the US This amount - which is currently equivalent to half the value of Colombian
coffee exports - is expected to increase to US$ l billion within two years.8
El Tiempo cites as well, that together with Cubans, Colombians are the Latin immigrants who face the
highest transaction costs to send money back home.9
One possible explanation is that Colombians are
perceived as "risky agents" due to the drug-trafficking problem. Interestingly, the results of a survey
done by the Multilateral Investments Fund organism shows that among Latin immigrants, those earning
less than $20,000 are more likely to send money back home than those with income over $40,000.
In order to assess the impact of remittances in relation with the brain drain problem, and make policy
recommendations, further examination is required. In the meantime, the government's efforts should
focus on obtaining more favorable conditions from the US government, for Colombians to send money
back home.
Conclusion
With globalization increasingly diluting countries' borders, the outbreak of war and violence in various
parts of the world and increased economic opportunities in the developed world, have all created a brain
drain pandemic. Colombia is not alone in facing this problem, as we have discussed at great length in our
study. But the way it can deal with it makes it stand apart. The daily violence, economic woes,
corruption, and the lure of the west make any long-term solution an illusion. However, there is a ray of
hope and it is embedded in the scientists, doctors and professionals whose talents and skills can be used to
provide some brain gain to the country. The Colombian diaspora has the power and potential to alleviate
the brain drain through coordination and collaboration.
8
As stated by Donald Terry, chiefofthe Multilateral Investments Fund (IADB).
9
US$25 per each $200 remitted.
28

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30

31. APPENDIX 1: FIGURES NOT IN THE DOCUMENT
Flgure 1: Emigration from Colombia to the
Unlted States
500000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
400000 -+-------------
300000
200000
100000
0 Nonimmigrants
• Refugees and Asylees
• Immigrants
0 +-___...,...,..__.,...___...,...,..____,~_...,...,..__---1
1990
40 .49
16%
30. 39
34%
Partnered
5%
1995 1999
Year
Age Distribution
0 . 17
Marital Status
Sepel'lllAtd
3%
18. 29
/ 39%
Single
39%
31

32. Dual Citizen
9%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
19%
Origin of Partner
Other
Household Income
Colombian
58%
less than 10,000- 20,000- 40,000- 60,000- more
than
80,000
10,000 19,000 39,999 59,999 79,999
Income Ranges
How Serious is the Brain Drain Problem?
• Very serious
•Somewhat serious
D Not very serious
D Not serious
•Not sure
32

33. 100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Educational Attainment by Gender
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Educational Attainment byyears in US
Change In Addltudes to Return According to
Years Living In US
IIfemale
•male
•21 +years
0 16-20 years
011-15 years
•6-10 years
11 1-5 years
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 21 +years
I1:1Before •After I
33