1. CRUELTY AS A GROUND
FOR DIVORCE
UNDER HINDU LAW
KASHYAP THAKKAR
FAMILY LAW - I
SEM - V
2. GROUNDS OF DIVORCE
• Some of the grounds available under the Hindu Marriage
Act can be said to be:
I. Adultery
II. Cruelty
III. Desertion
IV. Conversion
V. Insanity
VI. Renunciation
3. CRUELTY
• The concept of cruelty is a changing concept. The modern
concept of cruelty includes both mental and physical
cruelty.
• Acts of cruelty are behavioural manifestations stimulated
by different factors in the life of spouses.
• While physical cruelty is easy to determine, it is difficult to
say what mental cruelty consists of.
• In Pravin Mehta v. Inderjeet Mehta, the court has defined
mental cruelty as ‘the state of mind.’
4. CRUELTY
• Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelty was not a
ground for divorce but only for judicial separation.
This was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of
Narayan Ganesh Dastane v Sucheta Narayan
Dastane in 1975.
• However the amendment of the act in 1976,
incorporated cruelty as a ground for divorce.
5. CRUELTY
• false accusations of
adultery
• demand of dowry
• refusal to have marital
intercourse/children
• impotency
• birth of child
• drunkenness
• threat to commit
suicide
• wife’s writing false
complaints to employer
of the husband
Some Instances of Cruelty are as follows:
6. CRUELTY
• ordinary wear & tear of married life
• wife’s refusal to resign her job
• desertion per se.
The following do not amount to cruelty:
9. FACTS
• The appellant is Narayan Ganesh Dastane, a well-educated
and qualified man
• The Respondent is Sucheta who is a well-educated woman
whose father works in the Ministry of the Government of
India.
• The Respondent’s father sent letters to the Appellant before
finalising the marriage informing him regarding an incident
where the Respondent suffered from a bad attack of
sunstroke which affected her mental condition for some time
which she recovered from and cited cerebral malaria as
another reason for the brief decline of her mental health.
10. FACTS
• He did not make any further inquiries at the Yeravada Mental
Hospital.
• The had two daughters until 1959.
• They lived together until February 1961, but the Respondent was
three month’s pregnant when her relationship with her husband
was strained.
• The Respondent addressed a letter to the Appellant complaining
against his conduct and asking for maintenance for herself and
her daughters. The Respondent wrote a letter to the Secretary,
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, stating that the Appellant had
deserted her, treated her with extreme cruelty, and asked the
Government to separately provide for her maintenance.
11. FACTS
• The Appellant expressed regret for not being extended a
proper invitation for the naming ceremony of his own
child.
• On December 15, 1961, the Appellant informed the
Respondent’s father that he has moved the Court for
seeking separation from the Respondent.
• On February 19, 1962, proceedings were instituted in the
Trial Court where the Appellant asked for the annulment
of his marriage under S.12 (1)(c), Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 (HMA) on the ground that his consent was obtained
by fraud.
12. FACTS
• Alternatively, the Appellant asked for judicial
separation under S.10(1)(b) on the ground that the
Respondent had treated him with a cruelty which
created a reasonable apprehension in his mind that
his life is under threat if he lives with her.
13. TRIAL COURT
• The Trial Court held the wife guilty of cruelty but
rejected the contentions regarding fraud and
unsoundness of mind, and subsequently passed a
decree for judicial separation.
14. TESTS LAID DOWN BY SC
I. The alleged acts constituting cruelty should be proved
according to the law of evidence;
II. There should be an apprehension in the Petitioner’s mind
of real injury or harm from such conduct;
III. The apprehension should be reasonable having regard to
the condition of the parties;
IV. The Petitioner should not have taken advantage of his
position;
V. The Petitioner should not have condoned the acts of
cruelty.
15. VERDICT
• The contention regarding the Respondent inflicting cruelty
on the Appellant has been proven to exist.
• But the Appellant’s act of engaging in sexual intercourse
with the Respondent amounts to condonation of cruelty in
the eyes of law.
• The Respondent was willing to make amends and return to
the household shared by both parties and she realised her
mistakes.
• The Appellant condoned the Respondent after which she did
not act in the manner she did before the condonation. The
Respondent will not be held liable for cruelty.