Those are the slides I have been using to introduce my research about a spatial approach for the analysis of terrorism vulnerability at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Japan Geoscience Union (JpGU) at Makuhari Messe on May 22nd, 2012, and the 5th Annual Meeting of the Japan Association on Geographical Space (JAGS) at the Tokyo Campus of Tsukuba University on June 30th, 2012.

1. Source: winwallpapers.net
Micro-Scale Terrorism
Vulnerability Mapping
A Case Study of Tokyo, Japan
30/06/2012 — Konstantin Greger, University of Tsukuba, Division for Spatial Information Science

2. Vulnerability ≠ Risk
risk
(loss / probability)
hazard
vulnerability

3. Vulnerability ≠ Risk
risk
(loss / probability)
hazard
vulnerability

4. Vulnerability ≠ Risk
risk
(loss / probability)
hazard
vulnerability

5. Vulnerability ≠ Risk
risk
(loss / probability)
hazard
vulnerability

6. Vulnerability Concept
susceptibility
factors and attributes that make an asset
more or less susceptible to a terrorist attack
vulnerability
disutility
value (worth) of the consequences
of a successful attack to the stakeholder

7. Vulnerability Concept
susceptibility
factors and attributes that make an asset
more or less susceptible to a terrorist attack
vulnerability
disutility
value (worth) of the consequences
of a successful attack to the stakeholder

8. Vulnerability Concept
susceptibility
factors and attributes that make an asset
more or less susceptible to a terrorist attack
vulnerability
disutility
value (worth) of the consequences
of a successful attack to the stakeholder

9. Vulnerability Concept
susceptibility
factors and attributes that make an asset
more or less susceptible to a terrorist attack
vulnerability
disutility
value (worth) of the consequences
of a successful attack to the stakeholder

10. Problem Statement / Hypotheses
(1) vulnerability is not distributed equally in space
✤ places with high vulnerability vs. places with low vulnerability
(2) factors exist that enhance or mitigate vulnerability
✤ attributes of objects at risk
➡ it is necessary to evaluate factors and visualize inequalities

11. Research Objective
✤ vulnerability-centric, scenario-based research
✤ no investigation what outcome an attack at a location can cause
✤ the unit of analysis is the geography, not the event
✤ terrorist attacks can happen everywhere, but make more sense in
some locations than in others
✤ "If I were a terrorist, I would ..." (Apostolakis and Lemon 2005:365)
➡ how prone a location is to an attack, as a result of the attributes
that define it

12. Study Area
✤ Central Tōkyō (around 東京駅),
千代田区、中央区、港区
✤ ~6 km2 area
✤ ~6,500 buildings
✤ diverse land uses, building
types and building density
✤ several landmarks, iconic
buildings and critical
infrastructures

13. Study Area
✤ Central Tōkyō (around 東京駅),
千代田区、中央区、港区
m
✤ ~6 km2 area
5k
~2.
~2.
5k
m
✤ ~6,500 buildings
✤ diverse land uses, building
types and building density
✤ several landmarks, iconic
buildings and critical
infrastructures

14. Study Area
✤ Central Tōkyō (around 東京駅),
千代田区、中央区、港区
m
✤ ~6 km2 area
5k
~2.
~2.
5k
m
✤ ~6,500 buildings
✤ diverse land uses, building
types and building density
✤ several landmarks, iconic
buildings and critical
infrastructures

15. Buildings
✤ buildings
✤ definition of “user groups” /
user categories
✤ generalization
✤ mixed usage types
✤ critical infrastructures
✤ open spaces

16. Buildings
✤ buildings
✤ definition of “user groups” /
user categories
✤ generalization
✤ mixed usage types
✤ critical infrastructures
✤ open spaces

17. Building Susceptibility Factors
✤ number of people in a building (daytime population)
✤ building use or function (mixed use)
✤ volume of public traffic (inside & outside)
✤ accessibility (security, parking garages)
✤ degree of fenestration
✤ symbolic value
✤ ...

18. Spatial Influence (SI)
✤ analysis focuses on the effect that the “crime generators” have on the
object's immediate surroundings
✤ 3-dimensional real-world objects vs. 1-dimensional point objects
“
The best way to map crime factors for the articulation of criminogenic
backcloths is to operationalize the spatial influence of each factor, acting as
crime generators, throughout a common landscape rather than atheoretically
mapping the factors as points, lines or polygons in a manner that keeps them
disconnected from their broader social and environmental contexts.
(Caplan and Kennedy 2010a:23)

19. Vulnerability
Factor Map
ted
r ic a
fab ta!
da
50m distance from buildings with low vulnerability
high fenestration rate (> 2 SD) high vulnerability

20. Vulnerability
Factor Map
ted
r ic a
fab ta!
da 50 m
50m distance from buildings with low vulnerability
high fenestration rate (> 2 SD) high vulnerability

21. Vulnerability
Factor Map
ted
r ic a
fab ta!
da
150m straight-line surroundings of low vulnerability
police boxes (koban) high vulnerability

22. Vulnerability
Factor Map
ted
r ic a
fab ta!
da
kernel density of buildings with high number of low vulnerability
employees (> 2 SD; search radius = 100m) high vulnerability

23. Vulnerability
Factor Map
ted
r ic a
fab ta!
da
> 2 SD
1-2 SD
0-1 SD
-1 SD
yees
number of emplo
kernel density of buildings with high number of low vulnerability
employees (> 2 SD; search radius = 100m) high vulnerability

24. Vulnerability
Map
ted
r ic a
fab ta!
da
low vulnerability
unweighted combination of three ⋮
previously shown factor maps layers high vulnerability

25. Multi-Threat Vulnerability Map
vulnerability
maps
disutility
scenario 1: small explosion
scenario 2: large explosion
susceptibility
scenario 3: small release
scenario 4: large release

26. Multi-Threat Vulnerability Map
vulnerability
maps
disutility
scenario 1: small explosion
scenario 2: large explosion
susceptibility
scenario 3: small release
scenario 4: large release

27. Summary
✤ analytic insight
✤ definition of attributes and factors affecting terrorism vulnerability
✤ new approach (terrorism + vulnerability + GIS)
✤ visualization
✤ creation of a micro-scale multi-threat vulnerability map of a study
area in a Japanese urban area
✤ spatial distribution of vulnerability factors

28. ご清聴ありがとうございました
Konstantin Greger
University of Tsukuba
Division for Spatial Information Science
greger@geoenv.tsukuba.ac.jp
http://www.konstantingreger.net

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