The Devolution of Voting Technology: Recent Developments

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Slides for a panel talk at the 2008 ABA Annual Meeting intending to 1) familiarize attorneys with the types of voting technology in the field; 2) recent scientific developments with these technologies; and, 3) implications for the 2008 election.

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The Devolution of Voting Technology: Recent Developments

  1. 1. The Devolution of Voting Technology: Recent Developments Joseph Lorenzo Hall UC Berkeley, School of Information NSF ACCURATE Center This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable and Transparent Elections (ACCURATE), Grant Number CNS-0524745. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
  2. 2. A Brief History of Voting Tech. <ul><li>Early Voting by voice </li></ul><ul><li>Then by ballot (1629) </li></ul><ul><li>Then by secret ballot (1888-1909, …) </li></ul><ul><li>Lever machines (1892; Lockport, NY) </li></ul><ul><li>Punchcard (1960’s) </li></ul><ul><li>Optical scanners (1970’s) </li></ul><ul><li>Direct Recording Electronic (1980’s) </li></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  3. 3. Punchcard Systems <ul><li>Two styles: Votomatic and DataVote </li></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  4. 4. Lever Systems 8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  5. 5. Optical Scan 8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information Precinct-based (PCOS) Centrally Counted (CCOS)
  6. 6. InkaVote Plus <ul><li>Used in Los Angeles for most precinct voting </li></ul><ul><li>Uses an inked stylus </li></ul><ul><li>Can be precint or central </li></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  7. 7. DRE Voting Systems <ul><li>“ full-face” vs “scrolling” machines </li></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information ES&S Unilect Sequoia 1242 Diebold Sequoia Hart MicroVote
  8. 8. Ballot Marking Devices 8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information AutoMARK Populex
  9. 9. Others 8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information <ul><li>Vote-PAD: essentially a laminated template </li></ul><ul><li>Has “nubs” next to holes </li></ul><ul><li>Large page turning assists </li></ul><ul><li>Can be used with existing optical scan </li></ul><ul><li>IVS Inpsire: </li></ul><ul><li>Can be used on phone </li></ul><ul><li>In precinct audio </li></ul><ul><li>Verification of paper </li></ul><ul><li>via bar code scanner </li></ul>
  10. 10. Registration/Activation Systems <ul><li>DESI’s e-pollbook </li></ul><ul><li>Card Activators </li></ul><ul><li>ES&S PEB </li></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  11. 11. Recent History <ul><li>2000 Presidential Election </li></ul><ul><li>HAVA passed in 2002 ($3.86B) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Required accessibility in each polling place </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Encouraged ditching lever, punchcards </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Established the US EAC </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Computerized Tech. widely deployed </li></ul><ul><ul><li>$1 Billion /yr ($200M in tech.) [2001] </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  12. 12. Current State <ul><li>Complicated and expensive federal qualification/certification process </li></ul><ul><li>Most States have their own cert. </li></ul><ul><li>Some States have gone even further: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>CA Top-To-Bottom Review (TTBR) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>OH EVEREST Review </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  13. 13. CA Top-To-Bottom Review <ul><li>http://sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr .htm </li></ul><ul><li>CA SoS’ review of 3 voting systems </li></ul><ul><li>4 types of review exercises: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>source code review </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>red team review </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>accessibility review </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>document review </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  14. 14. CA TTBR Results <ul><li>Cryptography was flawed or missing </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Sequoia: “secret” -> “secretXYZ” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Sequoia team: “We could not find a single instance of of correctly used cryptography that successfully accomplished the security purposes for which it was intended.” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Diebold: default password = “diebold” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hart had systemic lack of authentication </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  15. 15. CA TTBR Results <ul><li>Ballot secrecy remains a challenge </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Diebold: stores votes in order cast </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hart: stores votes in a predictable order </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Systems failed basic eng. principles </li></ul><ul><li>All three systems open to viruses </li></ul><ul><li>Red team results so bad, results private </li></ul><ul><li>Accessibility: none HAVA compliant </li></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  16. 16. CA TTBR Results <ul><li>Document review: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>previous qualification regime inadequate </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>could not determine what tests performed </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>difficult to run elections independently </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>evidence delivered to states was not adequate to substantiate certification </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>some systems far from usable by typical jurisdictions </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  17. 17. OH EVEREST Review <ul><li>http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/voterInformation/equipment/VotingSystemReviewFindings.aspx </li></ul><ul><li>OH SoS’ review of 3 voting systems </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Including ES&S’ systems </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Types of review: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Academic vulnerability testing </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Industry vulnerability testing </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Industry reliability testing </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Industry configuration management testing </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  18. 18. Results <ul><li>Academic testing expanded CA results </li></ul><ul><li>Confirmed and extended many vulns. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Insufficient security </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Virus susceptibility </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Voter-side tampering </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>No trustworthy auditing capability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Flaws place incredible pressure on physical security and human procedures </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  19. 19. 8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  20. 20. Effects on 2008 Elections <ul><li>Increased procedural security measures </li></ul><ul><li>Increased physical security measures </li></ul><ul><li>Increased post-election audits </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Litigation in CA (SD Co. v. Bowen) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Some jurisdictions (OH, CO) completely scrapping certain systems </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Litigation in OH (ACLU v. Brunner) </li></ul></ul>8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information
  21. 21. 8 Aug 2008 (cc) 2008, Joseph Lorenzo Hall; UC Berkeley, School of Information

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