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# 10-24

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### 10-24

1. 1. 10-24
2. 2. objects persisting in time <ul><li>three dimensionalism coincidence </li></ul><ul><li>four dimensionalism coincidence </li></ul><ul><li>essentialist non-coincidence </li></ul><ul><li>non-essential non-coincidence </li></ul><ul><li>(mereological) nihilism </li></ul>
3. 3. leibniz’s law <ul><li>if (x)(y) [(x=y), then (P) (Px, iff Py) </li></ul><ul><li>for any two objects, x and y, if x is equal to y, then, for any property P, P is a property of x if and only if P is a property of y </li></ul>
4. 4. 3Dism <ul><li>3D states that (1) an ordinary object occupies multiple spacetime regions; (2) these spacetime regions are temporally unextended, or instantaneous, and non-simultaneous </li></ul><ul><li>claims that objects endure in time </li></ul><ul><ul><li>an ordinary object x exists at time t iff it is wholly present at t </li></ul></ul>
5. 5. 4Dism <ul><li>(1) an ordinary object occupies a unique spacetime region; (2) this spacetime region is temporally extended </li></ul><ul><li>claims that objects perdure </li></ul><ul><ul><li>an object exists at time t iff it has a temporal part at t </li></ul></ul>
6. 6. coincidence <ul><li>lump of clay/statue puzzle </li></ul><ul><ul><li>there exists at t 1 a lump of clay </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>the lump of clay is molded into a statue, such that the statue exists at t 2 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>the lump of clay is, according to leibniz’s law, distinct from the statue as it has a property that the statue does not have, namely it existed at t 1 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>it looks like there are two objects coinciding in the same spacetime region, and this looks like a puzzle because it is generally understood that objects cannot do any such thing </li></ul></ul>
7. 7. solution to coincidence <ul><li>3Dism says that there is a total overlap, and objects completely overlap </li></ul><ul><li>4Dism says that the objects’ temporal parts overlap, that the statue is merely a subsegment of the “temporal worm”; this is no more surprising than two roads overlapping </li></ul><ul><li>the essentialist move is to say that there is only one thing, and we make a mistake to suggest that there is any overlap at all. once we have a statue, the lump no longer exists </li></ul><ul><li>the non-essentialist says the object in question has no essential properties, and we merely used different sortals to talk about the same thing </li></ul><ul><li>the nihilist claims there is no object; there is only simples and relations between simples </li></ul>
8. 8. personal identity <ul><li>biological view </li></ul><ul><li>psychological view </li></ul><ul><li>memory </li></ul><ul><li>nihilist (eliminativist) </li></ul>
9. 9. biological view <ul><li>identity is related to the organism; we just are our body </li></ul><ul><li>brain is not necessarily any more important than any other body part </li></ul><ul><li>as long as organism is biologically alive, identity survives </li></ul><ul><li>allows us to say things like “i was once a fetus.” </li></ul>
10. 10. psychological continuity <ul><li>personal identity is in the psychology of the person </li></ul><ul><li>allows us to make sense of “brownson” case </li></ul><ul><li>this seems to be what most people rely on when pressed </li></ul>
11. 11. memory <ul><li>a particular version of the psychological view </li></ul><ul><li>a person’s memory is responsible for continued identity as the same person </li></ul><ul><li>this is the view espoused by locke </li></ul>
12. 12. nihilism <ul><li>there is no such thing as personal identity; it is merely a fiction </li></ul><ul><li>we never experience the “i” </li></ul><ul><li>we only have the experiences of particular impressions, and we have no reason to suppose there is some ultimate subject to whom those impressions all belong </li></ul>
13. 13. alternate ideas <ul><li>notion of identity is vague </li></ul><ul><ul><li>we simply never decided what was meant in these particular instances </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>there are multiple candidates for identity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>this is a linguistic move </li></ul></ul><ul><li>mistaken use of word </li></ul><ul><ul><li>problems arise because we do not recognize that when we begin to talk about person having psychological identity we are applying a different concept than we normally use </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>person normally simply refers to object </li></ul></ul>
14. 14. various problems <ul><li>can i say that i was ever a fetus? </li></ul><ul><li>do i have some responsibility to “brownson”? </li></ul><ul><li>how does brain fission change things? </li></ul><ul><li>can psychology be instantiated by a computer program? </li></ul><ul><li>am i the same person if i am made up of different material put together in exactly the same way? </li></ul>