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Smart Card Security
Xufen Gao
CS 265
Spring, 2004
San Jose State University
Overview
 Introduction
 Security Technologies
• Physical structure and life cycle
• Communication with the outside world
• Operating system
 Attacks on Smart Card
 Conclusion
Introduction
 Smart card is a credit card sized plastic card
embeds an integrated circuit chip.
 Smart card provides memory capacity and
computational capabilities.
 It is used in the applications that require
high security protection and authentication.
Introduction (Cont.)
 Main applications of smart card
 Credit/debit card
 Medical card
 Identification card
 Entertainment card
 Voting card
Security Technologies
 Three Points of Views
 Physical Structure and Life Cycle
 Communication with Outside World
 Operating System
Physical Structure
Three basic elements
A plastic card
A printed circuit
 An integrated circuit chip
Life Cycle of the Smart Card
 Five phases in smart card’s life cycle
• Fabrication phase
• Pre-personalization phase
• Personalization phase
• Utilization phase
• End-of-lift phase
 Every phase has its own limitations on
transferring and accessing data
Fabrication Phase
 The chip manufacturer makes and tests the
integrated circuit chip
A unique fabrication key (FK) is added to
prevent chip from modifying
• FK stays in the chip until it is assembled into the plastic card
• FK is derived from a master manufacture key
Pre-personalization Phase
 Controlled by the card suppliers
 Circuit chip is mounted on the plastic card
 A personalization key (PK) replaces the
fabrication key
 A personalization lock VPER is set to prevent further
modification
 The card only can accessed by the logical memory
addressing
Personalization Phase
 Card issuer writes the data files and application
data to the card
 Stores identity of card holder, PIN, and
unblocking PIN
 Set a utilization lock VUTIL to indicate the card is in
the utilization phase
Utilization Phase
 For normal use of the card by the card
holder
 Application system and logical file access
controls are available
 There are application security policies to
rule the access of the information
End-of-Life Phase
 Also called invalidation phase
 There are two ways to move the card into this
phase
• Set an invalidation lock to an individual or master file.

Operating system disables all operations except read for analysis
• Block all the PINs to disable all operations

Operating system disables all operations including read
Communication with Outside World
 Smart card usually needs external
peripherals to cooperate
• e.g. needs to connect to card acceptor device to
obtain power and input/output information
 The untrusted external peripherals
reduce the security
Communication with Outside World
(Cont.)
 To prevent massive data attack
• Data exchange limits to 9600 bits/second
•
Use half duplex mode
 Mutual authentication protocol is used
between smart card and CAD
 Use message authentication code (MAC) to
protect integrity
Authentication between Smart Card
and CAD
Smart Card
1. rs
2. rs encrypted with Ksc
3. Smart card encrypts rs with
Ksc and compares it with the
data received from CAD
4. rc
5. rc encrypted with Ksc
6. CAD encrypts rc with
Ksc and compares it with
the data received from
smart card
Card Acceptor Device
(CAD)
Operating System
 Logical File Structure
 Access Controls
Logical File Structure
 Files are in a hierarchal tree
form
• Master file (MF)
• Dedicated file (DF)
• Elementary file (EF)
 Every file has header and body
• Header consists security attributes
to indicate user’s rights
• Body stores all the headers of its
immediate children or data
 Application can access files
only it has the appropriate right
Access Controls
 Depends on the correct presentation of PIN and their
management
 5 Levels of access conditions
• Always (ALW)
• Card holder verification 1 (CHV1)
• Card holder verification 1 (CHV1)
• Administrative (ADM)
• Never (NEV)
 PIN presentation and management
• Counter
• Maximum number
• Unblocking PIN
Attacks on Smart Card
 Logical attacks
 Control the voltage or temperate on EEPROM
 Physical attacks
 Wash away the surface of circuit chip and Examine it
 Use UV light
Logical and physical attacks are expensive. They
are only available in well-funded laboratories.
Logical and physical attacks are expensive. They
are only available in well-funded laboratories.
Attacks on Smart Cart (Cont.)
 Functional attacks
• Smart card consists five parties

Cardholder, terminal, data owner, card issuer, card manufacturer,
and software manufacturer
• There are potential attacks between any two parties
• Solutions

Use strong cryptographic protocols to increase tamper resistance

Reduce the party number

Make the system more transparent

Consider the security issue at the beginning of the system design
Conclusion
 Smart card uses integrated circuit chip rather than
magnetic strip to store data
 Smart card can be programmed to compute the
cryptographic keys
 Smart card is a good device to store important information
• Private key
• Account numbers
• Biometrics information
 Smart card has weakness, but it is secure enough for
present requirements
Q & A
???

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Gao

  • 1. Smart Card Security Xufen Gao CS 265 Spring, 2004 San Jose State University
  • 2. Overview  Introduction  Security Technologies • Physical structure and life cycle • Communication with the outside world • Operating system  Attacks on Smart Card  Conclusion
  • 3. Introduction  Smart card is a credit card sized plastic card embeds an integrated circuit chip.  Smart card provides memory capacity and computational capabilities.  It is used in the applications that require high security protection and authentication.
  • 4. Introduction (Cont.)  Main applications of smart card  Credit/debit card  Medical card  Identification card  Entertainment card  Voting card
  • 5. Security Technologies  Three Points of Views  Physical Structure and Life Cycle  Communication with Outside World  Operating System
  • 6. Physical Structure Three basic elements A plastic card A printed circuit  An integrated circuit chip
  • 7. Life Cycle of the Smart Card  Five phases in smart card’s life cycle • Fabrication phase • Pre-personalization phase • Personalization phase • Utilization phase • End-of-lift phase  Every phase has its own limitations on transferring and accessing data
  • 8. Fabrication Phase  The chip manufacturer makes and tests the integrated circuit chip A unique fabrication key (FK) is added to prevent chip from modifying • FK stays in the chip until it is assembled into the plastic card • FK is derived from a master manufacture key
  • 9. Pre-personalization Phase  Controlled by the card suppliers  Circuit chip is mounted on the plastic card  A personalization key (PK) replaces the fabrication key  A personalization lock VPER is set to prevent further modification  The card only can accessed by the logical memory addressing
  • 10. Personalization Phase  Card issuer writes the data files and application data to the card  Stores identity of card holder, PIN, and unblocking PIN  Set a utilization lock VUTIL to indicate the card is in the utilization phase
  • 11. Utilization Phase  For normal use of the card by the card holder  Application system and logical file access controls are available  There are application security policies to rule the access of the information
  • 12. End-of-Life Phase  Also called invalidation phase  There are two ways to move the card into this phase • Set an invalidation lock to an individual or master file.  Operating system disables all operations except read for analysis • Block all the PINs to disable all operations  Operating system disables all operations including read
  • 13. Communication with Outside World  Smart card usually needs external peripherals to cooperate • e.g. needs to connect to card acceptor device to obtain power and input/output information  The untrusted external peripherals reduce the security
  • 14. Communication with Outside World (Cont.)  To prevent massive data attack • Data exchange limits to 9600 bits/second • Use half duplex mode  Mutual authentication protocol is used between smart card and CAD  Use message authentication code (MAC) to protect integrity
  • 15. Authentication between Smart Card and CAD Smart Card 1. rs 2. rs encrypted with Ksc 3. Smart card encrypts rs with Ksc and compares it with the data received from CAD 4. rc 5. rc encrypted with Ksc 6. CAD encrypts rc with Ksc and compares it with the data received from smart card Card Acceptor Device (CAD)
  • 16. Operating System  Logical File Structure  Access Controls
  • 17. Logical File Structure  Files are in a hierarchal tree form • Master file (MF) • Dedicated file (DF) • Elementary file (EF)  Every file has header and body • Header consists security attributes to indicate user’s rights • Body stores all the headers of its immediate children or data  Application can access files only it has the appropriate right
  • 18. Access Controls  Depends on the correct presentation of PIN and their management  5 Levels of access conditions • Always (ALW) • Card holder verification 1 (CHV1) • Card holder verification 1 (CHV1) • Administrative (ADM) • Never (NEV)  PIN presentation and management • Counter • Maximum number • Unblocking PIN
  • 19. Attacks on Smart Card  Logical attacks  Control the voltage or temperate on EEPROM  Physical attacks  Wash away the surface of circuit chip and Examine it  Use UV light Logical and physical attacks are expensive. They are only available in well-funded laboratories. Logical and physical attacks are expensive. They are only available in well-funded laboratories.
  • 20. Attacks on Smart Cart (Cont.)  Functional attacks • Smart card consists five parties  Cardholder, terminal, data owner, card issuer, card manufacturer, and software manufacturer • There are potential attacks between any two parties • Solutions  Use strong cryptographic protocols to increase tamper resistance  Reduce the party number  Make the system more transparent  Consider the security issue at the beginning of the system design
  • 21. Conclusion  Smart card uses integrated circuit chip rather than magnetic strip to store data  Smart card can be programmed to compute the cryptographic keys  Smart card is a good device to store important information • Private key • Account numbers • Biometrics information  Smart card has weakness, but it is secure enough for present requirements

Editor's Notes

  1. 1. Plastic card has a dimension of 85.60mm x 53.98mm x 0.80mm. It must be able to bent in a certain degree without any damages 2. Printed circuit is gold plate that provides the communication between the external power or data and the internal chip. Moreover, it prevents the circuit chip from mechanical stress and static electricity. 3. Integrated circuit chip is The most important component in smart card. It contains microprocessor, read only memory (ROM), non-static random access memory (RAM), and electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM). The size of the integrated circuit chip is a few millimeters because it is made of silicon, which is easy to break