51.sulphur mtgrespmotavoidlien

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Farzad Tabatabai, Esq. (Bar No. 179912)
Richard Miyamoto, Esq. (Bar No. 217754)
TABATABAI & MIYAMOTO, APC
11755 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1250
Los Angeles, California 90025
Tel: (310) 525-3555
Attorneys for Judgment Creditor Sulphur Mountain
Land & Livestock Co. LLC
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(LOS ANGELES DIVISION)
CASE NO.: 2:21-bk-10360-NB
JUDGMENT CREDITOR SULPHUR
MOUNTAIN LAND AND
LIVESTOCK CO., LLC‘S
OPPOSITION TO DEBTOR
MAUREEN C. REDMOND‘S
MOTION TO AVOID JUDICIAL
LIEN.
Date: July 20, 2021
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Place: Courtroom 1545
Roybal Federal Building
United States Bankruptcy Court
255 East Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
In re:
MAUREEN C. REDMOND,
Debtor.
Case 2:21-bk-10360-NB Doc 51 Filed 07/06/21 Entered 07/06/21 22:23:51 Desc
Main Document Page 1 of 27

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................3
II. THE DEBTOR'S BAD FAITH BANKRUPTCY FILINGS. .............................................5
A. The history of Debtor’s Bad Faith Bankruptcy Tactics. .................................................5
B. SMLLC’s prior adversary proceeding against the Debtor resulted in the
bankruptcy court issuing terminating sanctions against the debtor and
entering judgment in favor of SMLLC.............................................................................7
III. SUMMRY OF RELEVANT FACTS .................................................................................11
A. Debtor’s representation regarding order of priorities is not accurate; it has
been adjudicated that that SMLLC’s judgment lien is in second position,
ahead of the liens of both attorney Avers and Lori Haynes..........................................11
B. SMLLC’s attachment liens were converted to judgment liens. ....................................12
C. The Redmonds’ 2006 bankruptcy....................................................................................12
D. The Trial Court and Appellate Court ruled that SMLLC’s judgment lien
relates back to October 2002, when its Writ of Attachment was recorded.................13
IV. DEBTOR MISREPRESENTS THE LIEN PRIORITIES, MULTIPLE
COURTS HAVE ADJUDICATED THAT SMLLC’S LIEN RELATES BACK
TO 2002 AND IS THEREFORE IN SECOND POSITION. ...........................................15
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine compels upholding the state trial court and
appellate court’s decisions confirming SMLLC’s lien position....................................15
B. Res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the Debtor’s re-litigation of
SMLLC’s lien priority, which has been adjudicated to be second...............................16
1. SMLLC‘s lien position is second, and any attempts by Debtor to characterize
SMLLC‘s lien position as anything but second must be disallowed due to claim
preclusion..................................................................................................................17
2. SMLLC‘s lien position is second, and any attempts by Debtor to characterize
SMLLC‘s lien position as anything but second must be disallowed due to issue
preclusion..................................................................................................................18
V. THE DEBTOR'S MOTOIN TO AVOID JUDGMENT LIEN
MISREPRESENTS THE AMOUNT OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
AVAILBLE TO HER..........................................................................................................20
VI. THE COURT SHOULD STAY ITS RULING BECAUSE THIS MOTION IS
PREMATURE. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD STAY ITS
RULING PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF THE
HOMESTEAD, WHICH IS CURRENTLY PENDING BEFORE THE NINTH
CIRCUIT IN AT LEAST TWO CASES ...........................................................................23
VII. MR. AVER’s ROLE AS BOTH A CREDITOR AND COUNSEL IS A CLEAR
CONFLICT OF INTEREST...............................................................................................24
VIII.CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................25

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to LBR 9013-1(f):
[A]ny reply to this Opposition must be filed with the court and served on the
responding party not later than 7 days prior to the hearing on the motion.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Debtor Maureen C. Redmond (hereinafter, ―Debtor‖ or ―Ms. Redmond‖) is
represented in this Bankruptcy proceeding, her fourth (4th
), by creditor and secured
lien-holder, attorney Raymond H. Avers (―Mr. Avers‖). Creditor Avers brings this
Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien (―Motion‖) of Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock
Co., LLC (hereinafter, ―SMLLC‖), in the name of Debtor Redmond, based on
significant misrepresentations regarding (1) SMLLC‘s lien priority and (2) the
amount of the homestead exemption available to the Debtor. Creditor Avers
appears to be acting on his own personal behalf, as well as for the benefit of creditor
Lori Haynes, an apparently related party (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶4).
As Mr. Avers well knows from his personal representation of the Debtor in
state court and multiple bankruptcy petitions for over a decade, that he and
Redmond have litigated and lost on the issue of priorities, with both the trial court
and the California Court of Appeal ruling that SMLLC‘s secured lien position is
second only to the original mortgage, and that SMLLC‘s lien relates back to 2002.
(Id. at 5, 6, and Exhs. A, B.) This puts SMLLC head of both the Aver‘s and Ms.
Haynes‘ liens, despite their representation to the contrary. (Id.)
The Court of Appeal Opinion expressly holds:
…plaintiff‘s lien became effective in October 2002, when
its writ of attachment was recorded.
(Id. at ¶5 and Exh. A thereto.) The Los Angeles Superior Court‘s ruling was in
accord, holding SMLLC‘s ―judgment lien in the property located at 12008 Greene

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Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90066 is effective as of October 15, 2002.”
(Id. at ¶6 and Exh. B thereto.) Thus, the moving party‘s representations regarding
priorities is simply not correct, and the motion fails to disclose this critical fact to
this Court.
While Creditor Avers and Debtor Redmond represent that SMLLC‘s
judgment lien is in fourth priority, before a purported ―Second priority deed of trust
in favor of Lori Haynes (―Haynes‖) in the amount of $353,607.75‖ and a ―Third
priority deed of trust in favor of Raymond H. Aver (―Aver‖) in the amount of
$141,251.07‖ (Motion at 5:5-12, emphasis in original), this is contrary to the facts
and the rulings of both the trial court and Court of Appeal.
Accordingly, Aver and Redmond are precluded by the Rooker-Felder
Doctrine and res judicata from asserting that SMLLC‘s lien is not ahead of both
Aver‘s and Haynes‘ liens.
Moreover, the motion misstates the amount of the homeowner‘s exemption
available to Redmond. Without citing any legal authority in support, Redmond
asserts that she is entitled to a $600,000 homestead. As will be discussed below,
she is not entitled to a homestead in that amount, but instead can only claim a
homestead in the amount of $75,000, which was the amount of the homestead
exemption in effect in 2002 when SMLLC recorded its writ of attachment. At a
minimum, this Court should stay a ruling on this issue, as the question of the
amount of the available homestead exemption is currently pending before the Ninth
Circuit in two matters.
Additionally, it appears attorney Raymond Avers has an actual conflict of
interest in his representation of the Debtor, where he is also a creditor that would be
wiped out by this very bankruptcy upon the already established priorities. Mr.
Avers attempt to avoid a senior lien to his own personal benefit, based on
significant misrepresentations, illustrates this serous conflict of interest.

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II. THE DEBTOR’S BAD FAITH BANKRUPTCY FILINGS.
Each time SMLLC has taken to enforce its 2002 perfected and secured
judgment lien, Redmond filed a bankruptcy petition to stay SMLLC‘s judgment
enforcement. Having made the same arguments and lost in the first three
bankruptcy cases, now in bad faith the debtor files a fourth case and again makes
the same augments to avoid SMLLC‘s 2002 lien that have been rejected by a host
of state and federal courts over and over again for a decade.
This fourth bankruptcy filing is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent
rulings by the federal and state courts that were adverse and/or unsatisfactory to the
debtor.
A. The history of Debtor’s Bad Faith Bankruptcy Tactics.
The Debtor has been misusing the bankruptcy laws to delay, hinder, and
defraud SMLLC for decades. In 2002, the Debtor, with her husband John Redmond
(who is now deceased) and their daughter Geraldine Redmond, formed a business
called Somerset Farms and became lessees of a large equestrian center of which
SMLLC was the lessor. The lease was obtained through fraud, the Debtors
thereafter fraudulently under reported their earnings to underpay their participating
lease obligations, defaulted on their lease payments, and vacated the premises
taking SMLLC‘s property with them. SMLLC filed suit against all four lessees in
state court and perfected a number of liens against the Debtor in 2002.
The state court suit was set for trial in 2003, but in order to delay and hinder
SMLLC by staying the trial, the Debtor‘s daughter filed her bankruptcy.
(Miyamoto Decl. at ¶7.) When the court set the case to go to trial against the non-
bankruptcy parties later in 2003, John and Maureen Redmond filed their first
Chapter 13 bankruptcy (Id. at ¶8). In addition, in 2003 the debtor filed a
bankruptcy for the company she had formed with her deceased husband. Each time
the bankruptcy was filed on the eve of trial for the sole purpose of hindering and

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delaying SMLLC by staying the trial date. (Id. at ¶9.) The Bankruptcy Court
dismissed the debtor‘s first Chapter 13 filing and the Debtors‘ case filed for the
business was also dismissed in 2004. The stay having been lifted, the state court
suit was again set for trial. Having exhausted (for the moment) their bad faith
bankruptcy strategy, judgment was entered against the Debtors. (Id. at ¶10.)
Faced with execution liens dating back to 2002, and after SMLLC began
collection efforts, the Debtors – again on the eve of their judgment debtor‘s exams –
used bankruptcy as a tactic to hinder and delay collection of this perfected and
secured judgment by filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 2:03-bk-42637-EC. SMLLC
filed an adversary proceeding in that case alleging the Debtors‘ fraud. (Id. at ¶11.)
During the proceeding, the Court determined that SMLLC was a secured creditor
and granted judgment against Debtors denying a discharge of the full secured debt
of SMLLC because of Debtors‘ repeated failure to comply with the Bankruptcy
Court‘s discovery orders and other orders, and that the debtors had again
prejudiced SMLLC‘s efforts. The debtors‘ sought a stay of enforcement of
SMLLC‘s secured claim, and Judge Carroll denied the motion. (Id. at ¶12.) The
Debtors‘ filed an appeal in the U.S. District Court, which appeal was heard and
denied by Hon. Cormac Carney. The Debtors appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court‘s decision. (Id. at ¶¶13, 14 and Exhs. C
and D thereto.)
When the stay had been denied by the Bankruptcy Court, SMLLC moved for
an order to sell the Debtors‘ principal real property. The debtors opposed the sale
and all of the priority and homestead issues now being raised in this Court were
fully litigated and fully determined in the trial court. The Redmonds unsuccessfully
appealed the sale order. (Id. at ¶15.)
On the evening before the date set for the court ordered sale of the property,
the Debtors again strategically filed another Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, Case No. 2:12-

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bk-42485-NB, in obvious bad faith to hinder and delay SMLLC, and utilized the
bankruptcy stay to prevent the sale. This bankruptcy was filed in bad faith and the
trustee recognized this when recommending non-approval of the Chapter 13 plan.
(Id. at ¶16.)
It is clear this current bankruptcy case was filed in bad faith. Bad faith means
―an abuse of the bankruptcy process [that] is offensive to the integrity of the
bankruptcy system.‖ (In re Yulon Enterprises Inc. (Bankr. CD Cal. 1984) 39 B.R.
919, 922.) Attempts to use the bankruptcy system to thwart creditors and/or to hide
assets would qualify as bad faith. Based on the history of bankruptcy proceedings
by the Debtor and the rulings made therein, the Debtor has demonstrated a long
standing pattern and practice of bad faith with respect to secured creditor SMLLC.
It is undisputed SMLLC has a judgment lien and, having filed a lis pendens
and obtained a writ of attachment in October 2002, is a secured creditor with an
interest in the debtor‘s real property. (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶5 and Exh. A thereto.) It
is also undisputed the Debtor has had multiple bankruptcy filings affecting her real
property. The record also clearly establishes the Debtor‘s filing of this new fourth
bankruptcy proceeding can be nothing other than another scheme to delay, hinder,
or defraud secured creditor SMLLC.
B. SMLLC’s prior adversary proceeding against the Debtor resulted
in the bankruptcy court issuing terminating sanctions against the
debtor and entering judgment in favor of SMLLC.
During the Debtor‘s 2006 bankruptcy case (2:06-bk-12188-RK), SMLLC
filed an adversary proceeding (2:08-ap-01309-RK) in which the court entered a
default judgment denying debtor‘s discharge from Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
(Miyamoto Decl. at ¶17.) In that adversary proceeding, SMLLC alleged six (6)
causes of action that included allegations that the Debtors transferred, destroyed or
concealed property and income prior to filing for bankruptcy and after filing for

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bankruptcy, that the Debtors had falsified or failed to maintain adequate records of
their property, that the Debtors had made false declarations under oath regarding
their property, and that the Debtors had failed to adequately explain their loss of
assets during their bankruptcy. (Id. at ¶18.)
During the course of these proceedings, the Debtors repeatedly refused to
comply with their discovery obligations, which forced SMLLC to file a motion to
compel the Debtors to provide their Rule 26(a) disclosures, to appear at their
noticed depositions, and to produce the documents requested in connection with the
previously noticed depositions without objections. (Id. at ¶19.) On September 29,
2009, the bankruptcy court found that because the debtors had repeatedly failed to
comply with their discovery obligations, by failing to produce their Rule 26(a)
disclosures until mid-August 2009 despite the court‘s order to provide those
disclosures eight months earlier in January 2009, failing to show up for their
noticed depositions, and objecting to the requests for production without filing a
privilege log, the court intended to issue terminating sanctions against the Debtors.
The court issued an order to show cause why terminating sanctions should not be
entered against them and set a hearing for October 19, 2009. (Id. at ¶20.)
At the hearing held on October 19, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court voiced its
displeasure at the Debtors‘ repeated failures to comply with their discovery
obligations, including failing to show up for depositions and making broad and
―nonsense‖ objections to the requests for production without submitting a privilege
log. (Id. at ¶21.) On October 27, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the debtors
to respond fully to SMLLC‘s requests for production of documents and set
deposition dates for the Debtors. The order stated that in the event the Debtors
failed to comply with the order, judgment would be entered in favor of SMLLC in
the adversary proceeding. (Id. at ¶22.)
Despite this order, the Debtors did not produce all documents by the Court-

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ordered deadline and refused to answer certain questions at their depositions. The
Debtors also produced an additional 2,132 documents after their depositions, and
after the court ordered deadline. (Id. at ¶23.)
On the basis of the Debtors‘ conduct, SMLLC brought a motion for judgment
against the Debtors for failure to comply with the Court‘s order. The Bankruptcy
Court found that the Debtors‘ non-compliance with two court orders had been
willful, that SMLLC had been prejudiced by the non-compliance, and that the
court‘s prior discovery sanction had not been effective in forcing the debtors to
comply with their discovery obligations. (Id. at ¶24.) The Court issued terminating
sanctions, striking the Debtors‘ answer, and entered default judgment in favor of
SMLLC. (Id.)
The Debtors appealed the Bankruptcy Court‘s decision. However, on May 2,
2011, the District Court affirmed the court‘s decision and noted that the record
clearly supported the Bankruptcy Court‘s findings that the Debtors had failed to
comply with the Court‘s order and that their failure to comply was ―willful.‖ (Id. at
¶25 and Exh. E thereto.)
The Debtors then appealed the District Court‘s order affirming the
Bankruptcy Court‘s decision. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling:
The bankruptcy court put the Redmonds on notice that
failure to comply with its October 27, 2009, order
granting Sulphur Mountain‘s motion to compel would
result in terminating sanctions. The Redmonds thereafter
failed to produce all responsive documents by the court-
ordered deadline, redacted others without court approval,
and refused to answer questions at their depositions
without having been so instructed by their counsel. The
court‘s decision to issue terminating sanctions based on
this conduct, combined with the Redmonds‘ long history
of discovery obstruction and repeated failures to comply
with prior court orders, was not an abuse of discretion.

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(Id. at ¶14 and Exh. D thereto.)
Of particular note is the Debtors‘ refusal to answer questions at their
depositions about a particular loan they received from creditor Lori Haynes,
including their relationship to her, on the ground of confidentiality, even though
their counsel did not instruct them not to answer the questions. (Id. at ¶26.) Lori
Haynes, an apparently related party, is listed as the second-in-line creditor in
Debtor‘s motion, even though her lien is later in time that SMLLC‘s secured 2002
lien. (Motion at 5:5-8.)
This intimate relationship between Haynes and Redmond1
is reflected in the
apparent coordination setting up the present bankruptcy. None of the arms-length
creditors were seeking foreclosure. Only when California law changed to increase
the homestead exemption, did Haynes initiate foreclosure, leading to the filing of
this Bankruptcy Petition by Creditor Avers, and the present Motion seeking to avoid
SMLLC‘s senior lien in favor of Creditors Avers and Haynes liens, which should be
wiped out by SMLLC‘s senior position.
The Debtors‘ refusal to answer SMLLC‘s questions about Ms. Haynes and
her loan despite the court ordering them to do so, and going so far as to have
terminating sanctions issued against them in part because of their refusal to answer
these questions, is telling.
SMLLC has not yet had an opportunity to question Redmond at a meeting of
the creditors, but believes Haynes and Redmond are related parties, and suspects the
timing of Haynes foreclosure action after all these years, was a setup for Mr. Avers
to file this bankruptcy to attempt to obtain a $600,000 homestead exemption for
Redmond and to attempt to eliminate SMLLC‘s senior lien in favor of Avers‘ and
Haynes‘ junior liens. But as discussed herein, Creditor Avers and his client
1
A potential buyer of the property in the foreclosure proceedings even informed
SMLLC‘s counsel that according to Mr. Avers, Redmond and Haynes are related
parties. (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶4.)

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Redmond fail to disclose to this Court that SMLLC is senior to both Avers‘ and
Haynes‘ liens, and that the issue of the $600,000 homestead exemption is currently
pending before the Ninth Circuit.
Avers and Redmond‘s present conduct is consistent with the lengthy history
of misrepresentations and protracted obstructionist tactics dating decades, leading to
SMLLC‘s 2002 lawsuit, through multiple bankruptcy filings, and though multiple
state-court proceedings. The record clearly supports a conclusion that the Debtor‘s
latest Bankruptcy filing, her fourth, is in bad faith.
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Debtor’s representation regarding order of priorities is not
accurate; it has been adjudicated that that SMLLC’s judgment
lien is in second position, ahead of the liens of both attorney Avers
and Lori Haynes.
On or about October 4, 2002, SMLLC sued John A. Redmond, Maureen C.
Redmond (hereinafter collectively ―the Redmonds‖) and Somerset Farms LLC for
breach of a commercial lease in the Ventura Superior Court. The court issued a
writ of attachment against their property on October 11, 2002, which was recorded
against their Los Angeles County home (―the Property‖) on October 15, 2002 with
the Los Angeles County Recorder. (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶27 and Exh. F thereto.)
Notice of attachment lien was also filed with the Secretary of State on October 25,
2002. (Id. at ¶28 and Exh. G thereto.) In 2003, the Redmonds obtained an order
quashing the writ of attachment, but SMLLC posted an undertaking to keep the
attachment in place pending appeal or entry of judgment. On July 11, 2005, the
court entered a temporary protective order enjoining transfer, encumbering or
disposing of the Property until the judgment became final and the assets can be
levied upon (collectively the ―Attachment Liens‖). (Id. at ¶29 and Exh. H thereto.)
The legal effect of all of this was to place liens on the Property until judgment was
entered.

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B. SMLLC’s attachment liens were converted to judgment liens.
On July 28, 2005, judgment was entered for SMLLC in the amount of
$25,000. SMLLC‘s attachment lien was converted to a judgment lien by operation
of law, with a date of October 15, 2002, when the attachment lien was recorded.
On February 24, 2006, an amended judgment (the ―Judgment‖) was entered in favor
of SMLLC, and against John Redmond, Maureen Redmond, and Somerset Farms
LLC jointly and severally, effective as of July 28, 2005, for recovery of
$456,853.14 in Ventura Superior Court Case No. CIV214702. (Id. at ¶30 and Exh.
I thereto.) The Attachment Liens, by operation of law, were then converted to and
merged into the Judgment Lien and the Judgment Lien date takes on the date that
the Notice of Attachment was recorded, or October 15, 2002. (C.C.P. §697.020(a),
In re Ryan (2007) 369 BR 536, 546.) Thus, any liens recorded subsequent to
October 15, 2002 are subordinate to the Judgment Lien.
C. The Redmonds’ 2006 bankruptcy.
In May 2006, SMLLC executed on the Redmonds‘ bank account. The
Redmonds filed a bankruptcy petition later that month. (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶31.)
In March 2008, on the bankruptcy trustee‘s motion, the bankruptcy court ordered a
sale of the bankruptcy estate‘s interest in the equity of the Redmonds‘ home. The
Redmonds obtained a loan from Lori Haynes to buy $210,600 of the equity in their
home. (Id. at ¶32.) The Haynes loan was secured by a deed of trust recorded on the
Property on August 6, 2008, which is subordinate to SMLLC‘s judgment lien. The
loan proceeds were used to pay the Redmonds‘ creditors. SMLLC received
$181,478.15 from the loan proceeds in October 2009. However, this only partially
satisfied SMLLC‘s judgment lien. As the Court of Appeal noted:
We find the bankruptcy court ordered only a sale of equity
in the dwelling, and the equity was sold free of liens and
encumbrances so that the entire amount generated from
the sale could be turned over to the trustee to distribute

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among the creditors. The bankruptcy court‘s later
judgment denying discharge permitted plaintiff to
continue to pursue defendants‘ nonexempt assets in full
satisfaction of plaintiff‘s judgment.
(Id. at ¶5 and Exh. A, p.9 thereto.)
SMLLC filed an adversary complaint objecting to the Redmonds‘ discharge
in the bankruptcy proceeding. In April 2010, the Bankruptcy Court found that the
July 28, 2005 judgment against the Redmonds was a secured debt and entered
judgment for SMLLC on the adversary complaint, denying discharge of the
judgment debt under the Bankruptcy Code. (Id. at ¶33 and Exh. J thereto.) The
Redmonds appealed, but the judgment was affirmed by the District Court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id. at ¶5, 14 and Exhs. A, D thereto.)
D. The Trial Court and Appellate Court ruled that SMLLC’s
judgment lien relates back to October 2002, when its Writ of
Attachment was recorded.
In September 2011, the Ventura judgment was amended to $543,804.35, to
add postjudgment costs and interest, and to account for credits received during the
bankruptcy, including the $181,478.15 that SMLLC received in October 2009. A
new abstract of judgment was recorded on October 3, 2011. (Id. at ¶34 and Exh. K
thereto.)
Therefore, as of October 2011, there were several liens on the Redmonds‘
home. These included a December 2001 purchase money first deed of trust by Citi
Mortgage, SMLLC‘s 2002 judgment lien, Lori Haynes‘s August 2008 deed of trust,
and a March 2010 deed of trust recorded by Raymond Aver.
On October 31, 2011, SMLLC sought an order to sell the Redmonds‘ home.
The Redmonds opposed, contending SMLLC‘s 2002 lien was extinguished by the
March 2008 bankruptcy court order that the sale of equity from the bankruptcy
estate to the Redmonds ―shall be free and clear of any and all liens and other

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interests of [SMLLC], and such liens and interests, if any, shall attach to the sale
proceeds with the same validity and priority as they may have had against the
Property.‖ (Id. at ¶35.)
The Redmonds argued that SMLLC‘s lien did not attach until 2011, after
their bankruptcy discharge was denied and a new abstract of judgment was
recorded, and was therefore junior in priority to all other liens on the property. (Id.)
However, this argument lacked merit and on January 18, 2012 the trial court
entered an Order for Sale of Ms. Redmond‘s property, ruling:
3. Judgment Creditor Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock
Co. LLC‘s judgment lien on the property located at 12808
Greene Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90066 is effective as of
October 15, 2002….
(Id. at ¶6 and Exh. B thereto.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed, likewise
rejecting Redmond‘s position, as advanced again by Avers. (Id. at ¶5 and Exh. A
thereto.) As to the issue of the priority of SM‘s lien, the appellate court held:
The order of the bankruptcy court denying defendants discharge
allowed plaintiff to pursue collection of its debt, because denial
of discharge preserves the debtor‘s liability to creditors, and
does not stop the administration of the case. (See 11 U.S.C. §
727.) Because defendants‘ debts were not discharged, and a
judgment lien relates back to (and merges with) the filing of a
writ of attachment, plaintiff‘s lien became effective in October
2002, when its writ of attachment was recorded. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 697.020; Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. v.
Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th
290, 302-303; see also Brun v. Evans (1925) 197
Cal. 439, 442-443.)
(Id. at ¶5 and Exh. A, p.10 thereto.)
Therefore, SMLLC‘s lien was effective as of October 15, 2002, and is only
junior to Citi Mortgage‘s lien. SMLLC renewed its judgment in July 2015 for

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$945,832.76, which is still outstanding and unpaid.
IV. DEBTOR MISREPRESENTS THE LIEN PRIORITIES, MULTIPLE
COURTS HAVE ADJUDICATED THAT SMLLC’S LIEN RELATES
BACK TO 2002 AND IS THEREFORE IN SECOND POSITION.
Ms. Redmond falsely claims that SMLLC‘s lien is fourth in priority, behind
Nationstar, Lori Haynes, and Raymond H. Aver. As discussed above, Ms.
Redmond has litigated and lost on this issue more than once, and those rulings are
now final and binding. Mr. Aver is personally well aware that SMLLC is in second
position, as he was the attorney of record for Ms. Redmond in her prior
bankruptcies and appeals, as well as on the appeal confirming SMLLC‘s lien relates
back to 2002, placing it in second position. Avers‘ and Redmonds‘ attempt to re-
write history as to the priorities is not only misleading, it is utterly without merit.
Therefore, the issue of SMLLC‘s lien position has already been litigated, and
multiple courts have concluded that SMLLC‘s judgment lien relates back to
October 15, 2002. Res judicata and collateral estoppel bar any attempt to re-litigate
this issue. Accordingly, SMLLC lien is in second priority, and the only lien that is
senior to SMLLC is Nationstar‘s.
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine compels upholding the state trial
court and appellate court’s decisions confirming SMLLC’s lien
position.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is concerned with finality and in ensuring that
once a claim has been adjudicated in the state system, a disappointed litigant shall
not also have access to the entire federal court system. See, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids a losing party in state
court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a
state court judgment and seeking federal court review and rejection of that
judgment. Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Here, the trial court issued its Order for Sale, clearly stating SMLLC‘s lien
relates back to October 15, 2002. This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal. Accordingly, this issue has already been litigated and the state court has
issued a final judgment. Thus, under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, this Court
should rejected Debtor‘s contention that SMLLC‘s lien is fourth in priority, and
uphold the determinations of the state trial court and the court of appeal, that
SMLLC‘s lien relates back to 2002, placing it in second position.
B. Res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the Debtor’s re-litigation
of SMLLC’s lien priority, which has been adjudicated to be
second.
Our United States Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires state court judgments to be given both issue and claim preclusive
effect in subsequent actions. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-
97 (1986).
To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment on a federal
proceeding, the court must follow California law governing the rules of preclusion.
Kremer v. Chemical. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982). ―Claim preclusion‖
provides that ―a final judgment forecloses ‗successive litigation of the very same
claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier
suit.‘‖ Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008), quoting New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001). ―Issue preclusion‖ bars successive litigation of an
issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination
essential to the prior judgment. Id. at 748-49.
A final judgment on the merits constitutes a complete bar of the same cause
of action or defense between or among the same parties, in effect, merging the
cause of action into the judgment and extinguishes the cause of action. Slater v.
Blackwood, 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 (1975); Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55, 58 (1954);

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Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1517 (2008).
Res judicata limits litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair
adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing the issue into controversy and
subjecting the other party to further expense. In re Crow, 4 Cal.3d 613, 622-23
(1971). Here, there can be no legitimate dispute that Redmond and Avers have had
multiple full and fair opportunities to litigate the issue of SMLLC‘s lien priority,
and have lost. The Court of Appeal‘s ruling confirming SMLLC‘s lien relates back
to 2002 is binding and final, and neither Redmond, Avers, nor Haynes may re-
litigate the issue again here.
―Claim preclusion treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of
relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same claim or cause of
action.‖ Id. (citing Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc., 575
F.2d 530, 535 (5th
Cir. 1978) and McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th
Cir.1986)) (quotations omitted.) In other words, a final judgment on the merits of an
action precludes the parties or their privies from re-litigating issues that were or
could have been raised in a prior action.‖ In re Imperial Corp. of America, 92 F.3d
1503, 1506 (9th
Cir. 1996).
1. SMLLC’s lien position is second, and any attempts by
Debtor to characterize SMLLC’s lien position as anything
but second must be disallowed due to claim preclusion.
There are three elements a party must establish to invoke claim preclusion: (i)
an identity of claims; (ii) a final judgment on the merits; and (iii) party privity.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d
1064, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2003). Here, all three requirements are met, and the Court of
Appeal‘s opinion acts as claim preclusion establishing SMLLC‘s second lien
position.
First, the ―identity of claims‖ requirement is satisfied. The litigation

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concerning the lien position, and the trial court‘s Order for Sale and the Court of
Appeal‘s decision affirming the trial court, arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts, involve the same rights, and depend on substantially the same
evidence, and the rights established by virtue of the trial court and appellate court‘s
orders would be destroyed or impaired if the debtor is allowed to be in second lien
position. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th
Cir.
2005) (addressing factors considered in analyzing presence of ―identity of claims‖).
Second, the trial court‘s order is a final judgment of the merits. The debtor
appealed and lost, as the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‘s order. Redmond
did not pursue the issue further, thus rendering the ruling final.
Third, there was clearly party privity. Here, debtor Redmond seeks to avoid
the judgment of SMLLC, the very same judgment Redmond challenged both in the
trial court and the appeallate ruling finding SMLLC‘s lien relates back to 2002.
Therefore, parties to this Motion and the proceedings before the trial court and
appellate court are identical and are ―therefore quite obviously in privity.‖ Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, 322 F.3d at 1081 (concluding that party privity requirement
for claim preclusion was obviously satisfied when both actions involved the same
parties).
Accordingly, under principles of claim preclusion, it is established that
SMLLC‘s lien relates back to 2002, placing it in second lien position. Any attempts
by creditor Avers or Debtor Redmond to characterize SMLLC‘s lien position as
anything but second must be rejected.
2. SMLLC’s lien position is second, and any attempts by
Debtor to characterize SMLLC’s lien position as anything
but second must be disallowed due to issue preclusion.
Issue preclusion also bars the debtor‘s ability to claim that SMLLC‘s lien is
not in second position. Issue preclusion has the ―dual purpose of protecting

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litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his
privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.‖
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326 (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-329 (1971)). In the Ninth
Circuit, issue preclusion applies where (1) there was a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the identical issue in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in
the prior action; (3) the issue was decided in a final judgment; and (4) the party
against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to
the prior action. Syverson v. International Business Machines Corp., 472 F.3d
1072, 1078 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Here, all the elements issue
preclusion have been met, and SMLLC‘s position as second in line has already been
established.
First, the Debtor had a full and fair opportunity in the trial court and appellate
court to litigate SMLLC‘s lien priority, and did in fact litigate that issue. SMLLC‘s
lien priority was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the trial court. The
Debtor appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeal affirmed. The Court of
Appeal noted Debtor‘s argument by stating in its opinion, ―Defendants argued that
plaintiff‘s lien did not attach until 2011, after their bankruptcy discharge was denied
and a new abstract of judgment was recorded, and was therefore junior in priority to
all other liens on the property.‖ (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶5 and Exh. A, p.4 thereto.)
Unfortunately for the Debtor, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal agreed
with her argument. In its opinion, the Court of Appeal clearly and unequivocally
held, ―Because defendants‘ debts were not discharged, and a judgment lien relates
back to (and merges with) the filing of a writ of attachment, plaintiff‘s lien became
effective in October 2002, when its writ of attachment was recorded.‖ (Id. at Exh.
A, p.10.)
Therefore, the facts and procedural history here foreclose any argument by

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the debtor she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
SMLLC‘s lien position. Moreover, the issue was actually litigated in the trial court
and Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the record establishes that the Debtor had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate SMLLC‘s lien position and that issue was actually
litigated. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal concluded that SMLLC‘s lien
relates back to October 2002, making its lien second in position.
Next, the issue of SMLLC‘s lien position was decided in the Order for Sale,
which constitutes a final judgment. The Order for Sale ordered, ―Judgment
Creditor Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co. LLC‘s judgment lien…is
effective as of October 15, 2002…‖ (Id. at ¶6 and Exh. B thereto.) The Court of
Appeal affirmed the Order for Sale in regards to SMLLC‘s lien priority.
Accordingly, the Order for Sale is a final judgment for issue preclusion purposes.
See Luben Indus., Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th
Cir. 1983) (―A
‗final judgment‘ for purposes of collateral estoppel can be any prior adjudication of
an issue in another action that is determined to be ‗sufficiently firm‘ to be accorded
conclusive effect.‖).
Finally, the debtor was a party in the trial court and appellate court. There
can be no dispute that the ―same party‖ or privity exists for purposes of issue
preclusion. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 322 F.3d at 1081.
For these reasons, the debtor is barred by issue preclusion from claiming that
SMLLC‘s lien does not relate back to October 2002 and therefore is in second
position.
V. THE DEBTOR’S MOTION TO AVOID JUDGMENT LIEN
MISREPRESENTS THE AMOUNT OF THE HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION AVAILABLE TO HER.
Ms. Redmond asserts that she is entitled to a homestead exemption in the
amount of $600,000. (Motion at 4:20-21.) However, she is only entitled to
$75,000, as that was the amount of the homestead exemption in 2002, when

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SMLLC recorded it writ of attachment.
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that California exemption law must be
applied in California bankruptcies. This is because ―California has chosen to ‗opt
out‘ of the federal exemption scheme, so California residents filing for bankruptcy
are limited to the exemptions afforded under state law.‖ In re Rolland, 317 B.R.
402, 412 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004) (citation omitted.) ―Therefore, exemption
questions in California bankruptcies require the application of California law.‖
In re Nolan, 618 B.R. 860, 863 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2020)(citing In re Tallerico, 532
B.R. 774, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (emphasis added)). Additionally,
―[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law.‖ Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). ―Property interests‖ include interests in real property,
including liens. Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993).
Further, ―it is the entire state [exemption] law applicable on the filing date that is
determinative of whether an exemption applies.‖ In re Jacobson, 676 F.3d 1193
(9th
Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Under California‘s exemption law—currently in effect and in effect on the
date Ms. Redmond filed this bankruptcy case—―[t]he determination whether
property is exempt or the amount of an exemption shall be made by application of
the exemption states in effect (1) at the time the judgment creditor’s lien on the
property was created…‖ Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §703.050(a) (emphasis added).
―This section applies to all judgments…‖ Id. § 703.050(b) (emphasis added).
SMLLC recorded its writ of attachment against the Property on October 15,
2002. At that time, the homestead exemption available to Debtor was $75,000.
Accordingly, if Ms. Redmond was entitled to claim a homestead exemption in the
Proeprty, the exemption would be capped at $75,000. See, e.g., In re Yau, 115 B.R.
245, 251 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (―[u]nder California law the validity and amount
of the homestead exemption is also determined under the exemption statutes in

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effect when the attachment lien was created…‖; Bernhanu v. Metzger, 12
Cal.App.4th
445, 447 (1992) (homestead exemption amount determined under
exemption statutes in effect at time judgment creditor‘s lien created); In re Morgan,
157 B.R. 467, 469-71 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (―A plain reading of the California
exemption scheme provides that, pursuant to C.C.P. §703.050(a), the determination
of the amount of an exemption shall be made by application of the exemption
statutes in effect at the time the judgment creditor‘s lien was created.‖)
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that all of California exemption law
must be applied in California bankruptcies. In Jacobson, the Ninth Circuit wrote
that ―[b]y giving states the opportunity to define exemptions for the purposes of
federal bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Code demands respect for the ways in
which states balance the rights of debtors and creditors.‖ 676 F.3d at 1200
(emphasis added) (citing Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991)). And where
California law provides the answer to a question about the application of California
law, as it does with California exemption law, the Ninth Circuit defers to California.
See, e.g., In re Watts, 298 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th
Cir. 2002) (court applied likely
ruling that California Supreme Court would issue on exemption question); Stephan
v. Dowdle, 733 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding prior decision of Circuit no longer
binding where it appeared to conflict with state law); see also TwoRivers v. Lewis,
174 F.3d 987, 996 (9th
Cir. 199) (observing that if court applies state law it is bound
by a state appellate court opinion that conflicted with an earlier panel); Bernhanu,
12 Cal.App.4th
at 477 (time of creation of judgment creditor‘s lien determines
amount of exemption available).
The Debtor‘s motion itself does not cite to any legal authority in support of
her argument that a higher exemption amount would apply. Accordingly, she has
misrepresented the amount of the exemption available to her.

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VI. THE COURT SHOULD STAY ITS RULING BECAUSE THIS
MOTION IS PREMATURE. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT
SHOULD STAY ITS RULING PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE
ISSUE OF THE HOMESTEAD, WHICH IS CURRENTLY PENDING
BEFORE THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN AT LEAST TWO CASES
This Motion is also premature. Debtor seeks to avoid SMLLC‘s lien, when
SMLLC‘s time to object to Debtor‘s claim itself has not yet run. An issue on the
objection will be the amount of the homestead exemption, and that issue is currently
pending before the Ninth Circuit in two separate matters.
The reason Lori Haynes is initiating foreclosure now after all these years is
transparent, as this appears to be a ruse to give Mr. Avers an opportunity to file
bankruptcy for Ms. Redmond, and to file this Motion to jump ahead of SMLLC‘s
lien and for Redmond to take the advantage of the change in California law that
allows for a $600,000 homestead exemption. In other words, Haynes is being used
as a vehicle to avoid SMLLC‘s lien. However, as discussed above, SMLLC‘s lien
position is second, and Ms. Redmond is not entitled to the $600,000 exemption.
The issue of the amount of an exemption that would apply in a case such as
the present is currently pending before the 9th
Circuit in at least two matters:
 Dean Harris v. Crystal Holmes, No. 21-1128
 In Re: Kevan Gilman, et al v. Tammy R. Phillips, No. 20-56279.
In the Harris case, the trial court found that $600,000 homestead exemption
did not apply. The trial court found that ―the maximum exemption in the Property
available to the [Harris and/or the Debtor], if they were able to satisfy the burden of
proof that the property is a homestead, would be $100,000 pursuant to CCP
§§703.050 and 704.730.‖ (Miyamoto Decl. at ¶37 and Exh. L thereto.) An appeal
was taken of this ruling to the Ninth Circuit, and is pending. (Id.) As explained by
the Bankruptcy Judge in that case, according to the Appellant in that case, ―the
purpose of the appeal is to obtain a determination that the Debtor is entitled to a
homestead of $600,000 in the Property.‖ (Id.) That is precisely the issue here. The

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Bankruptcy Court in that case (Judge Robles), certified a direct appeal on its own
motion, so the issue could be resolved. Therefore, it would be prudent for this
Court to wait for clarification from the 9th
Circuit on this issue.
Moreover, the Motion is premature as SMLLC‘s time to object to the
Debtor‘s claim of exemption has not run since the meeting of the creditors has not
concluded. Therefore, there has not yet been a determination on whether Debtor is
entitled to the $600,000 homestead exemption, which is a predicate fact the Motion
assumes and upon which the Motion is based.
Especially given the Debtor‘s long history of bad faith bankruptcy tactics,
and SMLLC‘s belief expressed herein that this latest bankruptcy appears to also be
a sham or bad faith filing, SMLLC respectfully requests that if the Court is inclined
to do anything other than outright reject the Motion, that it delay ruling on this
Motion until after SMLLC has had an opportunity to question Redmond at the
meeting of the creditors, SMLLC has had an opportunity to object to Redmond‘s
exemption, and this Court has had an opportunity to determine the validity and
extent of Redmond‘s homestead exemption. The Court is likewise requested to
wait until determination of this issue by the Ninth Circuit.
VII. MR. AVER’S ROLE AS BOTH A CREDITOR AND COUNSEL IS A
CLEAR CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Mr. Avers, as an attorney, has a duty to exercise independent judgment for
his client, who in this case is also his debtor. This duty is codified in California
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1, which states that ―a lawyer shall exercise
independent profession judgment and render candid advice.‖
It appears Mr. Avers has an actual conflict of interest in his representation of
the Debtor herein, where he is also a creditor that should be wiped out by this very
bankruptcy. Thus, it appears that in order to preserve his own lien, Mr. Avers has

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resorted to filing this Motion seeking to avoid a senior lien in favor of his own. The
duty to exercise independent judgment for Ms. Redmond cannot be achieved in this
instance because his interest as a creditor conflicts with his duty to exercise
independent judgment for Ms. Redmond.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Motion.
Dated: July 6, 2021 TABATABAI & MIYAMOTO, APC
By:
Richard Miyamoto, Esq.
Attorney for Judgment Creditor Sulphur
Mountain Land & Livestock, Co. LLC

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PROOF OF SERVICE OF DOCUMENT
I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding. My business
address is: 11755 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1250, Los Angeles, CA 90025
A true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled (specify): “JUDGMENT CREDITOR SULPHUR
MOUNTAIN LAND AND LIVESTOCK CO., LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEBTOR MAUREEN C.
REDMOND’S MOTION TO AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN; DECLARATION OF RICHARD MIYAMOTO, ESQ.
IN SUPPORT” will be served or was served (a) on the judge in chambers in the form and manner required
by LBR 5005-2(d); and (b) in the manner stated below:
1. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF): Pursuant to
controlling General Orders and LBR, the foregoing document will be served by the court via NEF and
hyperlink to the document. On (date) July 6, 2021, I checked the CM/ECF docket for this bankruptcy case
or adversary proceeding and determined that the following persons are on the Electronic Mail Notice List to
receive NEF transmission at the email addresses stated below:
X Service information continued on attached page
2. SERVED BY UNITED STATES MAIL:
On (date) July 6, 2021, I served the following persons and/or entities at the last known addresses in this
bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope
in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows. Listing the judge here
constitutes a declaration that mailing to the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the
document is filed.
X Service information continued on attached page
3. SERVED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, OVERNIGHT MAIL, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL
(state method for each person or entity served): Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 5 and/or controlling LBR, on (date)
_______________, I served the following persons and/or entities by personal delivery, overnight mail
service, or (for those who consented in writing to such service method), by facsimile transmission and/or
email as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that personal delivery on, or overnight
mail to, the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is filed.
Service information continued on attached page
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.
Richard Miyamoto
Date Printed Name Signature

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SERVICE LIST
VIA NEF
Raymond H. Aver ray@averlaw.com, averlawfirm@gmail.com, ani@averlaw.com,
katya@averlaw.com
Carolyn Dye (TR) trustee@cadye.com, cdye@ecf.axosfs.com, atty@cadye.com
Erin M. McCartney bankruptcy@zbslaw.com, emccartney@ecf.courtdrive.com
Cassandra J. Richey cgcaecf@bdfgroup.com
Edward A. Treder cdcaecf@bdfgroup.com
United States Trustee ustpregion16.la.ecf@usdoj.com
(LA)
VIA U.S. MAIL
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC dba Mr. Cooper
c/o Barrett Daffin Frapper Treder & Weiss, LLP
3990 E. Concourse St., Ste. 350
Ontario, CA 91764
P.O. Box 818060
5801 Postal Road
Cleveland, OH 4181
Attn: Christopher Marshall
P.O. Box 619089
Dallas, TX 619089
Attn: Christopher Marshall
Lori Haynes
P.O. Box 5442
Santa Monica, CA 90409
Lori Haynes
c/o ZBS Law
30 Corporate Park, Suite 450
Irvine, CA 92606

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