52.decl miyamotooppmotavoidlien

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5147-002 -1-
Declaration of Richard Miyamoto
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
Farzad Tabatabai, Esq. (Bar No. 179912)
Richard Miyamoto, Esq. (Bar No. 217754)
TABATABAI & MIYAMOTO, APC
11755 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1250
Los Angeles, California 90025
Tel: (310) 525-3555
Attorneys for Judgment Creditor Sulphur Mountain
Land & Livestock Co. LLC
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(LOS ANGELES DIVISION)
CASE NO.: 2:21-bk-10360-NB
DECLARATION OF RICHARD
MIYAMOTO, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF
JUDGMENT CREDITOR SULPHUR
MOUNTAIN LAND AND
LIVESTOCK CO., LLC’S
OPPOSITION TO DEBTOR
MAUREEN C. REDMOND’S
MOTION TO AVOID JUDICIAL
LIEN.
Date: July 20, 2021
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Place: Courtroom 1545
Roybal Federal Building
United States Bankruptcy Court
255 East Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
In re:
MAUREEN C. REDMOND,
Debtor.
Case 2:21-bk-10360-NB Doc 52 Filed 07/06/21 Entered 07/06/21 22:28:00 Desc
Main Document Page 1 of 98

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5147-002 -2-
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
DECLARATION OF RICHARD MIYAMOTO
I, Richard Miyamoto, declare as follows:
1. I am an attorney at Tabatabai & Miyamoto, APC, attorneys for
Judgment Creditor Sulphur Mountain Land & Livestock Co., LLC (“SMLLC”), in
the above captioned action.
2. I provide this declaration in support of SMLLC’S Opposition to Debtor
Maureen C. Redmond’s Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien.
3. Based upon my review of records and files in this case since being
retained and conversations with SMLLC’s prior counsel, I am informed and believe
and on that basis assert the following:
4. Farzad Tabatabai, an attorney and shareholder of Tabatabai &
Miyamoto, APC, received a phone call from a potential buyer in the foreclosure
proceeding initiated by Lori Haynes. I was on the phone call with Mr. Tabatabai
and the potential buyer. The potential buyer contacted Mr. Tabatabai because he
was interested in purchasing the Property and to do so, he needed to resolve
SMLLC’s judgment lien. During those discussions, the potential buyer told Mr.
Tabatabai that Mr. Avers revealed to him that Ms. Haynes had a personal
relationship with the Redmonds (“the Debtors”). Mr. Tabatabai and I understood
from that discussion that Ms. Haynes and the Debtors were related parties.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of the Court
of Appeal’s opinion filed on January 2, 2014.
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit “B” is a true and correct copy of the trial
court’s Order for Sale, filed on January 18, 2012.
7. The trial for SMLLC’s lawsuit in the trial court was set for trial in
2003, but the Debtor’s daughter filed for bankruptcy, which stayed the trial.
8. When the court set the case to go to trial against the non-bankruptcy
parties later in 2003, John and Maureen Redmond filed their first Chapter 13
bankruptcy.

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5147-002 -3-
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
9. In addition, in 2003 the Debtors filed a bankruptcy for the company she
had formed with her deceased husband. Each time the bankruptcy was filed on the
eve of trial for the sole purpose of hindering and delaying SMLLC by staying the
trial date.
10. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Debtors’ first Chapter 13 filing
and the Debtors’ case filed for the business was also dismissed in 2004. The stay
having been lifted, the state court suit was again set for trial and judgment was
entered against the Debtors.
11. Faced with execution liens dating back to 2002, and after SMLLC
began collection efforts, the Debtors, on the eve of their judgment debtor’s exams,
used bankruptcy as a tactic to hinder and delay collection of this perfected and
secured judgment by filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in Case No. 2:03-bk-42637-
EC. SMLLC filed an adversary proceeding in that case alleging the Debtors’ fraud.
12. During the proceeding, the Court determined that SMLLC was a
secured creditor and granted judgment against Debtors denying a discharge of the
full secured debt of SMLLC because of Debtors’ repeated failure to comply with the
Bankruptcy Court’s discovery orders and other orders, and that the debtors had
again prejudiced SMLLC’s efforts. The debtors’ sought a stay of enforcement of
SMLLC’s secured claim, and Judge Carroll denied the motion.
13. The Debtors’ filed an appeal in the U.S. District Court, which appeal
was heard and denied by Hon. Cormac Carney. Attached hereto as Exhibit “C” is a
true and correct copy of the Order Granting Motion for Judgment for Failure to
Comply With Orders of the Court.
14. The debtors appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court’s decision. Attached hereto as Exhibit “D” is a true and correct
copy of the Ninth Circuit’s Memorandum affirming the District Court’s decision.
15. When the stay had been denied by the Bankruptcy Court, SMLLC
moved for an order to sell the Debtors’ principal real property. The debtors opposed

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5147-002 -4-
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
the sale and all of the priority and homestead issues now being raised in this Court
were fully litigated and fully determined in the trial court. The Redmonds
unsuccessfully appealed the sale order.
16. On the evening before the date set for the court ordered sale of the
property, the Debtors again strategically filed another Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, Case
No. 2:12-bk-42485-NB, in obvious bad faith to hinder and delay SMLLC, and
utilized the bankruptcy stay to prevent the sale. This bankruptcy was filed in bad
faith and the trustee recognized this when recommending non-approval of the
Chapter 13 plan.
17. During the Debtor’s 2006 bankruptcy case (2:06-bk-12188-RK),
SMLLC filed an adversary proceeding (2:08-ap-01309-RK) in which the court
entered a default judgment denying debtor’s discharge from Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
18. In that adversary proceeding, SMLLC alleged six (6) causes of action
that included allegations that the Debtors transferred, destroyed or concealed
property and income prior to filing for bankruptcy and after filing for bankruptcy,
that the Debtors had falsified or failed to maintain adequate records of their
property, that the Debtors had made false declarations under oath regarding their
property, and that the Debtors had failed to adequately explain their loss of assets
during their bankruptcy.
19. During the course of those proceedings, the Debtors repeatedly refused
to comply with their discovery obligations, which forced SMLLC to file a motion to
compel the Debtors to provide their Rule 26(a) disclosures, to appear at their noticed
depositions, and to produce the documents requested in connection with the
previously noticed depositions without objections.
20. On September 29, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court found that because the
debtors had repeatedly failed to comply with their discovery obligations, by failing
to produce their Rule 26(a) disclosures until mid-August 2009 despite the court’s
order to provide those disclosures eight months earlier in January 2009, failing to

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5147-002 -5-
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
show up for their noticed depositions, and objecting to the requests for production
without filing a privilege log, the court intended to issue terminating sanctions
against the Debtors. The court issued an order to show cause why terminating
sanctions should not be entered against them and set a hearing for October 19, 2009.
21. At the hearing held on October 19, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court voiced
its displeasure at the Debtors’ repeated failures to comply with their discovery
obligations, including failing to show up for depositions and making broad and
“nonsense” objections to the requests for production without submitting a privilege
log.
22. On October 27, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the debtors to
respond fully to SMLLC’s requests for production of documents and set deposition
dates for the Debtors. The order stated that in the event the Debtors failed to
comply with the order, judgment would be entered in favor of SMLLC in the
adversary proceeding.
23. Despite this order, the Debtors did not produce all documents by the
court ordered deadline and refused to answer certain questions at their depositions.
The Debtors also produced an additional 2,132 documents after their depositions,
and after the court ordered deadline.
24. On the basis of the Debtors’ conduct, SMLLC brought a motion for
judgment against the Debtors for failure to comply with the court’s order. The
Bankruptcy Court found that the Debtors’ non-compliance with two court orders
had been willful, that SMLLC had been prejudiced by the non-compliance, and that
the court’s prior discovery sanction had not been effective in forcing the debtors to
comply with their discovery obligations. The court issued terminating sanctions,
striking the Debtors’ answer, and entered default judgment in favor of SMLLC.
25. The Debtors appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. However, on
May 2, 2011, the District Court affirmed the court’s decision and noted that the
record clearly supported the Bankruptcy Court’s findings that the Debtors had failed

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5147-002 -6-
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
to comply with the court’s order and that their failure to comply was “willful.”
Attached hereto as Exhibit “E” is a true and correct copy of the District Court’s
Order Affirming Bankruptcy Court’s Order Entering Terminating Sanctions Against
Defendants.
26. The District Court noted the Debtors’ refusal to answer questions at
their depositions about a particular loan they received from creditor, including their
relationship to the creditor, on the ground of confidentiality, even though their
counsel did not instruct them not to answer the questions. Based on my
conversations with SMLLC’s prior counsel, the creditor that is referenced in the
District Court’s order is Lori Haynes.
27. Attached hereto as Exhibit “F” is a true and correct copy of the Writ of
Attachment recorded on October 15, 2002.
28. Attached hereto as Exhibit “G” is a true and correct copy of the Notice
of attachment lien filed with the Secretary of State on October 25, 2002.
29. Attached hereto as Exhibit “H” is a true and correct copy of the
temporary protective order enjoining transfer, encumbering or disposing of the
Property, filed on July 11, 2005.
30. Attached hereto as Exhibit “I” is a true and correct copy of the
Amended Judgment signed on February 24, 2006.
31. In May 2006, SMLLC executed on the Redmonds’ bank account. The
Redmonds filed a bankruptcy petition later that month.
32. In March 2008, on the bankruptcy trustee’s motion, the bankruptcy
court ordered a sale of the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the equity of the
Redmonds’ home. The Redmonds obtained a loan from Lori Haynes to buy
$210,600 of the equity in their home.
33. Attached hereto as Exhibit “J” is a true and correct copy of the
Bankruptcy Court’s judgment in the adversary proceeding, awarding judgment to
SMLLC and denying discharge against the Debtors.

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5147-002 -7-
TABATABAI &
MIYAMOTO,
APC
34. Attached hereto as Exhibit “K” is a true and correct copy of the
Abstract of Judgment recorded on October 3, 2011.
35. On October 31, 2011, SM sought an order to sell the Redmonds’ home.
The Redmonds opposed, contending SMLLC’s 2002 lien was extinguished by the
March 2008 bankruptcy court order that the sale of equity from the bankruptcy
estate to the Redmonds “shall be free and clear of any and all liens and other
interests of [SMLLC], and such liens and interests, if any, shall attach to the sale
proceeds with the same validity and priority as they may have had against the
Property.” The Redmonds argued that SMLLC’s lien did not attach until 2011, after
their bankruptcy discharge was denied and a new abstract of judgment was
recorded, and was therefore junior in priority to all other liens on the property.
36. However, this argument failed and the trial court concluded that SM’s
lien was effective as of October 15, 2002, and accordingly, was only junior to Citi
Mortgage’s lien.
37. Attached hereto as Exhibit “L” is a true and correct copy of the
Memorandum Regarding Certification For Direct Appeal To Ninth Circuit Court Of
Appeals Of Order Disallowing Homestead Exemption Claim.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on July 6, 2021, at Los Angeles, California.
Richard Miyamoto, Esq.

EXHIBIT “A”

Filed 1/2/14
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
SULPHUR MOUNTAIN LAND &
LIVESTOCK CO. LLC,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOHN A. REDMOND et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
B238767
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BS134625)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Matthew
St. George, Temporary Judge. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Reversed and remanded.
Law Offices of Raymond H. Aver and Raymond H. Aver for Defendants and
Appellants.
Westlake Law Group and David Blake Chatfield for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________

2
Plaintiff Sulphur Mountain Land & Livestock Co. LLC sued defendants John and
Maureen Redmond in Ventura County Superior Court, and obtained a sizable judgment
against them. When plaintiff attempted to enforce its judgment, defendants sought
bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy, defendants claimed the California
homestead exemption to protect a portion of the equity in their Los Angeles home from
the bankruptcy estate, and therefore, to make fewer funds available to pay plaintiff’s
judgment. Defendants’ debts were not discharged by the bankruptcy court, and
ultimately, plaintiff sought to execute its judgment on defendants’ home by filing this
action for the sale of their home, contending defendants could not again avail themselves
of the homestead exemption. The trial court agreed, finding “there is no homeowners
exemption because it was used by the judgment debtor” in bankruptcy. The trial court
also concluded that plaintiff’s lien attached in 2002, giving it priority over all but the
mortgage lien.
Defendants appeal the order approving the sale of their home, contending the sale
order deprived them of their homestead exemption. We agree, finding no merit to
plaintiff’s contention that the homestead exemption evaporates after it has been claimed
in bankruptcy. Plaintiff’s novel theory that the homestead exemption may be claimed
only once has no support in the homestead law. The California homestead exemption
protects defendants’ equity up to the amount of the exemption even if the home is sold.
The homestead exemption is not like a retail discount coupon that can only be used once.
We also find that plaintiff’s lien was effective as of October 2002. We reverse the sale
order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
On October 4, 2002, plaintiff sued defendants and their daughter in Ventura
County Superior Court for breach of a commercial lease. The court issued a writ of
attachment against defendants’ property on October 11, 2002, which was recorded
against their Los Angeles County home on October 15, 2002. A notice of lien was
recorded with the California Secretary of State on October 25, 2002. In 2003, defendants
obtained an order quashing the writ of attachment, but plaintiff posted an undertaking to

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keep the attachment in place pending appeal or entry of judgment. Plaintiff’s appeal of
the attachment order was dismissed by this court in 2012 (case No. B168314).1
Meanwhile, the Ventura action proceeded, and in June 2005, defendants accepted
plaintiff’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise. The parties settled
and judgment was entered for $25,000, leaving open the issue of costs and fees. Plaintiff
then moved for recovery of attorney fees, and an amended judgment for $456,853.14 was
entered in February 2006 (the Ventura judgment). In March 2006, the Ventura court
issued an abstract of judgment and writ of attachment. Notice of the judgment lien was
filed with the Secretary of State. Defendants appealed the Ventura judgment, but their
appeal was dismissed in 2011 for failure to file an opening brief (case No. B189989).2
In May 2006, plaintiff executed on defendants’ bank account. Defendants filed a
bankruptcy petition later that month. In March 2008, on the bankruptcy trustee’s motion,
the bankruptcy court ordered a sale of the bankruptcy estate’s interest in defendants’
home (the equity), excluding their claimed $150,000 homeowners exemption.
Defendants obtained a loan from Lori Haynes to buy $210,600 of the equity in their
home. The Haynes loan was secured by a deed of trust recorded on the property on
August 6, 2008. The loan proceeds were used to pay defendants’ creditors, including
plaintiff. Plaintiff received $181,478.15 from the loan proceeds in October 2009.
Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint objecting to defendants’ discharge in the
bankruptcy proceeding, for failure to comply with their discovery obligations during the
bankruptcy. In April 2010, the bankruptcy court found the Ventura judgment against
1 The dismissal is not part of the record on appeal. Nevertheless, we take judicial
notice, on our own motion, of the order of dismissal, and of the other appeals by these
parties. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) The first appeal was filed on June 25,
2003, but was stayed by defendants’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2003. The stay was
lifted on August 24, 2012. On September 19, 2012, the appeal was dismissed as
abandoned, having been mooted by entry of judgment.
2 That appeal was originally filed in March 2006, but was also stayed because of
defendants’ bankruptcy. It was dismissed in April 2011, after the bankruptcy stay was
lifted and defendants failed to file an opening brief.

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defendants was a secured debt and entered judgment for plaintiff on the adversary
complaint, denying discharge of the judgment debt under Bankruptcy Code, title
11 United States Code sections 727(a)(2)(B), 727(a)(3), and 727(a)(4)(A). Defendants
appealed, but the judgment was affirmed by the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
In September 2011, the Ventura judgment was amended to $543,804.35, to add
postjudgment costs and interest, and to account for credits received during the
bankruptcy. A new abstract of judgment was recorded on October 3, 2011.
Therefore, as of October 2011, there were several liens on defendants’ home.
These included Citi Mortgage’s December 2001 purchase money first deed of trust,
plaintiff’s judgment lien (perfected by abstracts of judgment recorded in October 2002
and October 2011), Lori Haynes’s August 2008 deed of trust, and a March 2010 deed of
trust recorded by defendants’ attorney to secure payment of $50,000 in attorney fees.
On October 31, 2011, plaintiff sought an order to sell defendants’ home under
Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.750 and 704.760. The application and
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities posited that defendants used their
homestead exemption in the bankruptcy proceeding, and “are not entitled to utilize the
exemption twice.” Plaintiff also contended its judgment lien was junior only to Citi
Mortgage’s lien, and was senior to the remaining liens on the property. Therefore, based
on a recent appraisal, plaintiff estimated there was $397,735.93 in equity available to
satisfy its Ventura judgment.
Defendants opposed the application, contending plaintiff’s 2002 lien was
extinguished by the bankruptcy court order that the sale of equity from the bankruptcy
estate to defendants “shall be free and clear of any and all liens and other interests of
[plaintiff], and such liens and interests, if any, shall attach to the sale proceeds with the
same validity and priority as they may have had against the Property.” Defendants
argued that plaintiff’s lien did not attach until 2011, after their bankruptcy discharge was
denied and a new abstract of judgment was recorded, and was therefore junior in priority
to all other liens on the property. Defendants also contended they were entitled to a

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homestead exemption.
The trial court concluded that “there is no homeowners exemption because it was
used by the judgment debtor and their decision was to use their homeowners exemption
in the bankruptcy proceedings for the entire amount they were allowed at the time. So
there is no exemption to be employed here.” The trial court also concluded that
plaintiff’s lien was effective as of October 15, 2002, and accordingly, was only junior to
Citi Mortgage’s lien. On January 18, 2012, the trial court issued an order for the sale of
defendants’ home.
Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
We find the bankruptcy proceedings did not extinguish defendants’ homestead
exemption nor eliminate plaintiff’s 2002 lien.
1. Homestead Exemption
Resolution of this appeal turns on the interpretation of the homestead exemption
statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 704.710 et seq. Statutory interpretation is a
question of law, subject to de novo review on appeal. (People ex rel. Lockyer v.
Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) Similarly, when the facts are not
disputed, the effect or legal significance of those facts is a question of law. (Ghirardo v.
Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.)
“Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the
lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. [Citation.] We begin by
examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.
[Citation.] If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they
said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25
Cal.4th 268, 272.) We must construe the language of a statute “ ‘in the context of the
statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and we give “significance to every
word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative
purpose.” ’ [Citation.]” (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.)

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The homestead right is recognized by the California Constitution, which provides
that “[t]he Legislature shall protect, by law, from forced sale a certain portion of the
homestead and other property of all heads of families.” (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 1.5.)
“The object of all homestead legislation is to provide a place for the family and its
surviving members, where they may reside and enjoy the comforts of a home, freed from
any anxiety that it may be taken from them against their will, either by reason of their
own necessity or improvidence, or from the importunity of their creditors.” (In re Estate
of Fath (1901) 132 Cal. 609, 613.) “[T]he homestead law is not designed to protect
creditors, but protects the home against creditors . . . thereby preserving the home for the
family.” (Amin v. Khazindar (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 582, 588.) Because homestead
statutes are remedial, they are “given a liberal construction in favor of the exemptions
created.” (Thorsby v. Babcock (1950) 36 Cal.2d 202, 204.)
The limitations and requirements for the homestead exemption are set forth by
statute. (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 1.5; see also Noble v. Hook (1864) 24 Cal. 638, 639-
640.) A homestead is “the principal dwelling . . . in which the judgment debtor or the
judgment debtor’s spouse resided on the date the judgment creditor’s lien attached to the
dwelling, and . . . in which the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor’s spouse resided
continuously thereafter until the date of the court determination that the dwelling is a
homestead.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 704.710, subd. (c).) “A homestead exemption does not
preclude sale of the home but entitles the homesteader to receive the value of the
exemption if the property is sold to satisfy a judgment lien.” (Wells Fargo Financial
Leasing, Inc. v. D & M Cabinets (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 59, 68; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 704.730.)
A homeowner or spouse of an owner may declare and record a homestead exemption.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 704.920 [“A dwelling in which an owner or spouse of an owner
resides may be selected as a declared homestead . . . by recording a homestead
declaration in the office of the county recorder of the county where the dwelling is
located. From and after the time of recording, the dwelling is a declared homestead for
the purposes of this article.”].) California law also provides an automatic homestead

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exemption. The Legislature created an automatic homestead exemption to protect debtors
who do not file homestead declarations. (§ 704.720.) The automatic exemption does not
have to be memorialized in a recorded declaration. Rather, “[t]he automatic homestead
exemption is available when a party has continuously resided in a dwelling from the time
that a creditors’ lien attaches until a court’s determination in the forced sale process that the
exemption does not apply.” (In re Mulch (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 1995) 182 B.R. 569, 572, citing
Webb v. Trippet (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 647, 651; see also § 704.720.)
A declared homestead provides a debtor with greater protection than the automatic
homestead exemption. For example, a declared homestead is protected from a voluntary
sale, whereas the automatic homestead only entitles the debtor to protection from a forced
sale. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 704.960 [“If a declared homestead is voluntarily sold, the
proceeds of sale are exempt”]; 704.720; see also Legis. Com. com., 17 West’s Ann. Code
Civ. Proc. (2009 ed.) foll. § 704.720, p. 141 [“As under former law, proceeds of a
voluntary sale of [an automatic] homestead are not exempt under the proceeds
exemption”].) The proceeds from a voluntary sale of a declared homestead may be
reinvested within six months, thus allowing the debtor to invest in another residence, which
will also be afforded homestead protection to the same extent as the initial homestead.
(§ 704.960.) The proceeds of a forced sale of an automatic homestead are afforded the same
protection, and may be reinvested in a new homestead. (§ 704.710, subd. (c).)
A judgment lien does not attach to a declared homestead; rather, the lien only attaches
to the equity in the property that exceeds the declared homestead exemption and any
preexisting liens on the property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 704.950, subds. (a), (c); Smith v.
James A. Merrill, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 94, 99.) When no declaration of homestead
has been recorded, the lien attaches to the property, irrespective of the amount of equity in
the home. However, the judgment creditor is required to obtain a court order for sale of the
homestead under section 704.800, and the court must determine the amount of the homestead
exemption and the fair market value of the property. The homestead may not be sold unless
a bid is received that exceeds the amount of the homestead exemption plus “any additional
amount necessary to satisfy all liens and encumbrances on the property.” (§ 704.800,

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subd. (a); see also Rourke v. Troy (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 880, 885-886 [all liens senior to the
executing creditor’s lien, and the homestead exemption, must be satisfied or the home may
not be sold].)
Here, the trial court concluded that defendants had no homestead exemption because
defendants had claimed the homestead exemption in their earlier bankruptcy proceeding.
Nothing in the homestead law provides that the exemption expires after it was once claimed
in bankruptcy. Instead, the Legislature clearly intended the exemption to apply so long as a
dwelling qualifies as a homestead. For example, as mentioned above, homestead protection
generally survives the sale of a homestead. In both declared and automatic homesteads, the
proceeds of the sale of the homestead are also exempt, in the amount of the homestead
exemption, and may be reinvested within six months in a new property, which will be
afforded homestead protection to the same extent as the original property. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 704.960, 704.710, subd. (c) [“Where exempt proceeds from the sale . . . of a homestead
are used toward the acquisition of a dwelling . . . ‘homestead’ also means the dwelling so
acquired if it is the principal dwelling in which the judgment debtor . . . resided
continuously from the date of acquisition until the date of the court determination that the
dwelling is a homestead, whether or not an abstract or certified copy of a judgment was
recorded to create a judgment lien before the dwelling was acquired”]; see also SBAM
Partners, LLC v. Wang (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 903, 907-908.)
It is undisputed that defendants have resided in their home since 1997, and that
defendants recorded a homestead declaration in July 2003. Thus, before the trial court may
order the sale of defendants’ homestead, the court must follow the dictates of Code of Civil
Procedure sections 704.780 and 704.800 and all other statutes which control the forced sale
of a homestead. For example, the court may not order a sale of the homestead if no bid is
received that exceeds the amount of the homestead exemption plus the amount required to
satisfy all liens and encumbrances. There are limitations on the court’s ability to order a sale
if no bid is received that is 90 percent or more of the fair market value of the dwelling. Since
the trial court did not protect defendants’ homestead exemption and otherwise did not
comply with the restrictions on the forced sale of a homestead, the order for sale is reversed.

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2. Priority of Plaintiff’s Lien
The trial court also determined that plaintiff’s lien was effective as of October 2002,
and that the lien was not eliminated by the bankruptcy court. Defendants contend the
property was sold to them “free and clear” of plaintiff’s 2002 lien, and therefore, the 2002
lien was eliminated. (Defendants do not deny that a lien was created after defendants were
denied discharge in bankruptcy, when an amended abstract of judgment was recorded by
plaintiff in October 2011.) The question of the effect of the bankruptcy court’s order, and the
priority of plaintiff’s lien, is reviewed de novo. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1267; Bolton v. Terra Bella Irr.
Dist. (1930) 106 Cal.App. 313, 319.)
The trustee’s “Motion to Sell Estate’s Equity Interest in Real Property” was made
pursuant to title 11 United States Code section 363(b)(1) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, rule 6004. The bankruptcy order approving the sale recited that: “The Trustee
is authorized to sell the Estate’s interest in the Property to the Debtors for $210,600.00,
cash; [¶] . . . [¶] . . . A lender is authorized to record a deed of trust against the Property
for the purpose of securing a loan to the Debtors for the Debtors’ purchase of the Estate’s
equity interest; and [¶] . . . The sale shall be free and clear of any and all liens and other
interests of [plaintiff], and such liens and interests, if any, shall attach to the sale proceeds
with the same validity and priority as they may have had against the Property, pending
further order of this Court.”
We find the bankruptcy court ordered only a sale of equity in the dwelling, and the
equity was sold free of liens and encumbrances so that the entire amount generated from
the sale could be turned over to the trustee to distribute among the creditors. The
bankruptcy court’s later judgment denying discharge permitted plaintiff to continue to
pursue defendants’ nonexempt assets in full satisfaction of plaintiff’s judgment.
Bankruptcy Code section 363(b)(1) allows a trustee, “after notice and a hearing, [to]
sell . . . property of the estate.” (Ibid.) Moreover, section 363(f) permits the estate’s
property to be sold free and clear of any liens if one of five conditions is satisfied.
(C.H.E.G., Inc. v. Millennium Bank (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 505, 511; see also § 363(f).)

10
Property may be sold free and clear of an entity’s interests only if applicable
nonbankruptcy law permits sale of the property free and clear of such interests; the entity
consents; the property is to be sold for greater than the aggregate value of all liens on the
property; the interest is in bona fide dispute; or the entity could be compelled to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest. (§ 363(f).) A trustee seeking to sell property free
and clear of any liens under section 363(f) must do so by noticed motion to the
lienholder. (Fed. Rules Bankr.Proc., rules 6004, 9014 (11 U.S.C.).)
The trustee’s motion did not seek to sell the estate’s interest in the property “free and
clear of any liens” under Bankruptcy Code section 363 (f). Because section 363(f) and the
bankruptcy rules require notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the elimination
of any liens, and section 363(f) requires satisfaction of a condition precedent for the sale to
be free and clear of liens (that one of the five conditions of section 363(f) is satisfied), plainly
the sale order was never contemplated to eliminate plaintiff’s lien on the property.
The order for the sale to be “free and clear of any and all liens and other interests
of [plaintiff]” was meant to effectuate the sale of equity in the property, in other words,
the value of the property in excess of all liens, encumbrances and exemptions. As is
evident from the trustee’s accounting, numerous creditor’s claims were made in the
bankruptcy, and these were to be paid, in order of priority, from the proceeds of the sale
of the estate’s portion of the equity.
The order of the bankruptcy court denying defendants discharge allowed plaintiff
to pursue collection of its debt, because denial of discharge preserves the debtor’s
liability to creditors, and does not stop the administration of the case. (See 11 U.S.C.
§ 727.) Because defendants’ debts were not discharged, and a judgment lien relates back
to (and merges with) the filing of a writ of attachment, plaintiff’s lien became effective in
October 2002, when its writ of attachment was recorded. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 697.020; Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding
Corp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 290, 302-303; see also Brun v. Evans (1925) 197 Cal. 439,
442-443.)

11
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Appellants are to recover their costs on appeal.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
RUBIN, J.

EXHIBIT “B”

EXHIBIT “C”

Case 2:08-ap-01309-RK Doc 74 Filed 03/12/10 Entered 03/16/10 09:39:09 Desc

EXHIBIT “D”

EXHIBIT “E”

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JS-6
UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT
CENTRALDISTRICTOFCALIFORNU
SOUTHERN DIVISION
In re JOHN A.REDMOND AND
MAUREEN REDMOND,
Debtors.
SULPHUR MOUNTAIN LAND AND
LIVESTOCKCO.,LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
/
Caselio.:CVI0-025S2-CJC
ORDERAFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY
COURT'SORDERENTERING
TERMINATING SANCTIONS
AGAINSTDEFENDANTS
VS.
JOHN A.REDMOND and MAUREEN
C.REDMOND,
Defendants-Appellants.
INTRODUCTION
Thisappeal arisesfi^om an adversary proceeding beforethe United States
Bankruptcy Courtforthe Central DistrictofCaliforniain which the courtentered a
defaultjudgmentdenying debtors John and Maureen Redmonds'(collectively ^Ihe
Redmonds")dischargefrom Chapter7bankruptcy. Plaintiff-Appellee Sulphur Mountain

I I j#
1 Landand LivestockCo.,LLC("SulphurMountain"),onetheRedmonds'creditors,filed
2 an adversary proceedinginthe bankruptcy courtin March2008to objecttothedischarge
3 oftheRedmondsfrom bankruptcy,allegingthattheRedmondstransferred,destroyed or
4 concealed property andincome priortofilingfor bankruptcy and afterfilingfor
5 bankruptcy. InFebruaiy2010,afterfindingthattheRedmondshad repeatedlyfailed to
6 comply with theirdiscovery obligations pursuantto FederalRuleofCivilProcedure26
7 and hadfailedtocomply withthebankruptcycourt'sOctober2009order granting
8 SulphurMountain's motion to compel,the bankruptcy courtissued terminatingsanctions
9 againsttheRedmondsand enteredadefaultjudgmentin favorofSulphur Mountain. On
10 appeal,theRedmondsassertthatthebankruptcy courterred by granting Sulphur
n Mountain's motion tocompel because Sulphur Mountain did notcomply with the meet-
12 and-conferrequirementsimposed by theLocal Rules before bringing its motion,because
13 SulphurMountain'srequestsfor production ofdocumentswere overbroad,and because
14 the Redmonds'failureto provide theirRule26(a)initial disclosures washarmless. The
15 Redmondsalso argue thatthebankruptcy courterred by issuing terminating sanctions
16 againstthem becausethey madea good-faith effortto comply with the court's orders. In
17 lightofthe Redmonds'repeated failuresto providetlieirinitial disclosures,to appearfor
18 and answerquestionsattheir depositions,orto adequatelyrespond to Sulphur
19 Mountain'sdiscoveryrequests,the bankruptcy courtdid notabuse its discretion by
20 granting Sulphur Mountain's motion to compel. Nordid the bankruptcy courtabuse its
21 discretion by enteringjudgmentinfavorofSulphur Mountain,because thecourt
22 expressly warnedtheRedmondsthatfailuretocomply with itsOctober2009order woulc
23 resultin terminatingsanctionsand the Redmondsstill did notcomply with thatorder.
24 Accordingly,thejudgmententered by the bankruptcy courtin favorofSulphurMountain
25 11isAFFIRMED.
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I
1 BACKGROUND
2
3 In November2001,SulphurMountain entered into an"'Equestrian FacilityLease"
4 with an entityfonned bytheRedmonds'daughter(Geraldine)thattheRedmonds
5 personally guaranteed.(Ex.2 4-7;Ex.14at567K6.) After makingthefirst nine
6 monthly payments,the entity defaulted on thelease and vacatedthe property. (Ex.2
7 10-12.) In October2002,Sulphur Mountain broughtan action instate courtagainst
8 Geraldine Redmond and theRedmondsfor breach ofthelease,which endedina
9 settlementfor$25,000in 2005.(Ex.2. 13-14.) SulphurMountain alsoobtained a
10 judgmentfor attorneys'feesof$431,853.14from the state court.(Id) In May 2006,the
11 Redmondsfiledfor bankruptcy protection underChapter 11,which wasconvertedto a
12 Chapter7bankruptcy in November2007.(Ex.2H14;Ex.4f14.) Sulphur Mountain
13 filed asecuredclaimfor$489,412.34on October27,2006.(Ex.2H 14;Ex.4^14.)
14
15 In March2008,SulphurMountain commenced thisadversary proceeding byfiling
16 an objection totheRedmonds'dischargeftom Chapter7bankruptcy,alleging six causes
17 ofaction pursuantto 11 U.S.C.§727(a),including allegationsthatthe Redmondshad
18 transferred,destroyed orconcealed property andincome priortofilingforbankruptcy
19 and afterfilingfor bankruptcy,thattheRedmondshadfalsified orfailedto maintain
20 adequaterecordsoftheir property,that&eRedmondshad madefalsedeclarationsunder
21 oathregardingtheir property,and thattheRedmondshadfailedto adequately explain
22 theirlossofassetsduringtheir bankruptcy.(Ex.1.) Between March and December
23 2008,theRedmondsfiled several motionsto dismissthatthe bankruptcy courtgrantedin
24 part,which delayedthebeginningofdiscovery.(Exs.2,3,4,5.) InDecember2008,the
25 I bankruptcycourtgrantedtheRedmonds'motiontodismissSulphurMountain'sfirst
26 causeofaction and denied the motion to dismiss with respecttothe remaining causesof
27 action.(Ex.5.) Atthe hearingforthefinal motion todismiss,Sulphur Mountain raised
28 I severalconcemsabouttheRedmonds'refusaltomeetandconferregardingdiscovery

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betweenMarchand December2008,sothe bankruptcycourtorderedtlie Redmondsto
lodgeanamendedschedulingordersettingforth thediscovery and motion deadlines,
includingadiscoverycut-offdateofSeptember30,2009,and ordered the partiesto meet
and conferand providetheirRule26(a)initial disclosuresnolaterthan January 16,2009.
(Ex.6at61^3.) SulphurMountain'scounsel madeseveral phonecallsto attemptto
meetandconferregardingtheparties'initial disclosuresin early January2009,(Ex.6at
62If4),andsentafollow-upletterrequestinga meetandconferon January 12,2009{id.
at62^4,67),butreceived noresponsefrom the Redmonds'counsel,{id.at62^5). The
Redmonds'counselstatedthatheeventually did call SulphurMountain'scounselafter
thecloseofbusinesson January 16,2009,and sentafollow-upemailregardingthe meet
andconferon January20,2009.(Ex.7at160^3,172;Ex.40at2142:5-14.) On
February6,2009,SulphurMountain provided itsinitialdisclosurestotheRedmonds.
(Ex.6at69.) On thesame day,the Redmonds'counselsentanotherfollow-up email
regardingthe meetand confer,butthe partiesdo notappeartohaveactually conferred
regarding theirinitial disclosuresortheirdiscovery plan. {SeeEx.7at160^4,174.)
Nevertheless,between February and June2009,Sulphur Mountain served several
requestsfor production ofdocumentson Mr.and Mrs.Redmond,(Ex.6at70-85,92-
111),and madeseveral unsuccessfulattemptsto schedulethe depositionsofMr.and Mrs.
Redmond in connection with those requests,(Ex.6at62-63^If7-9). In responseto
SulphurMountain'srequestsfor production,the Redmondsproduced some700
documents(Ex.7at 161^7),but made general objectionsto otherrequestssuch as,
'Vague,""overbroad,"or"financial privacy",and for many categoriesofinformation
simply refused to producethedocuments.(Ex.7at195-226,229-60.) On June 19,
2009,Sulphur Mountain'scounsel notified the Redmonds'counsel thathe wasstill
waitingfortheRedmonds'Rule 26(a)initial disclosures,and requested a meetand confer
regarding the Redmonds'responsesto the requestsfor production.(Ex.6at91.) After
miscommunications between counsel asto who wasresponsiblefor setting datesforthe
Redmonds'depositionsand whatdaystheRedmondswere available,(Ex.6at91-92,

1 102,112-13,123,133),Sulphur Mountain noticed the deposition ofMr.Redmond for
2 July 28,2009andthedeposition ofMrs.Redmond for August 17,2009,{id at 113,134).
3 Mr.Redmond didnotappearfor hisdepositionon July28,2009.(M at144-46.) Mr.
4 Redmond stated thathe missed his deposition because he wasrecoveringfrom asevere
5 boutoffood poisoning. (Ex.15 at576^ 12.) On August14,2009,the Redmonds'
6 counselrepresented during atelephone conference with Sulphur Mountain'scounsel that
7 Mrs.Redmond would appearon August 17,2009for her deposition,and thatthe
8 Redmondswould provide their initial disclosures withinten days.(Ex.6at64^17.) On
9 August17,2009,thirty minutes beforethe deposition wasscheduledto begin.Sulphur
10 Mountain'scounsel received an email notifying him thatMrs.Redmond would not
11 appearforher deposition,butthatMr.Redmond wouldappearinstead.(Mat65^18;
12 Ex.7at164^ 14;Ex.15 at576^ 13.) Mrs.Redmond stated thatshefailed to appear
13 because heradultdaughterwasscheduledto undergo a medical procedure and needed
14 someonetoaccompany her.(Ex.14at566^5.) Atthe deposition,Mr.Redmond was
15 uncooperativeandrefusedto answercertain questions,even though hiscounsel did not
16 Iinstructhim nottoanswer.(Ex.6at65^19.) OnAugust18,2009,theRedmonds
17 finally provided theirRule26(a)initial disclosuresto SulphurMountain,(Ex.9),more
18 than eightmonthsafterthedate ordered bythe bankruptcycourt. TheRedmonds'
19 I counselstatedthat"hewasnotaware"thattheinitialdisclosureshadnotbeenprovided
20 andthatassoon ashebecameawareofthatomission,he provided theinformation to
21 SulphurMountain.(Ex.40at2143:4-5.) TheRedmonds'initial disclosureslisted the
22 relevantwitnessesbutdidnotdescribeor produce the documentsthatthey would rely on
23 and specificallyreserved the righttosupplementtlieir responsesand to"introduce atthe
24 time oftrial any evidencefrom anysource andfrom testimony ofany witness."(Ex.9a
25 430-34.)
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27 On August28,2009,Sulphur Mountain'scounsel called the Redmonds'counsel
28 11andleftamessagerequestingthatheagreetoastipulationtobesubmittedtothecourtfor

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anorderspecifying thedeadlinesfortheRedmonds'Rule26(a)disclosures,depositions,
and production ofdocuments,aswellasforan extension oftlie discovery and motion
cut-offdates.(Ex.6at66f22.) Nobodyreturned hisphonecall.(Id.) On September4,
2009,SulphurMountain broughtamotiontocompeltheRedmondsto providetheirRule
26(a)disclosures,toappearattheirnoticed depositions,andto producethedocuments
requestedin connection with the previously noticed depositions withoutobjections. (Ex.
6at49-50.) TheRedmondsopposedthe motiontocompelon thegroundsthatthey had
madetheirRule26(a)initial disclosuresin mid-Augustand otherwise had cooperated
with SulphurMountain'sdiscoveiy requests,and thatSulphurMountain hadfailedto
makeagood-faith effortto meetand confertoresolvethe discovery disputesasrequired
byLocalBankruptcy Rule7026-1(2).(Ex.8at409-21.) On September29,2009,the
bankruptcycourtfound thatbecausetheRedmondshadrepeatedlyfailed tocomply with
theirdiscovery obligations,byfailingto producetheirRule26(a)initial disclosuresuntil
mid-August2009despitethe court'sorderto providethosedisclosureseight months
earlierin January2009,failingtoshow upfortheir noticed depositions,and objectingto
therequestsfor production withoutfilingaprivilegelog,thecourtintended toissue
terminating sanctionsagainsttheRedmonds.(Ex.39at2133-34.) Thecourtissued an
orderto show cause to the Redmondswhyterminating sanctionsshould notbe entered
againstthem andcontinued thehearing on Sulphur Mountain's motion tocompel until
October 19,2009.(Id.at2135.) TheRedmondsfiled a written opposition tothe orderto
show causeon October9,2009,claimingthattheirfailuretotimely providetheir initial
disclosures wasnotdueto badfaith,thatSulphurMountain had notbeen prejudiced by
the delaysin discoveiy,and thatthe bankruptcy courthad notconsidered ortried lesser
sanctions before issuing theordertoshow cause.(Ex.13 at557-62.) Specifically,the
Redmondsstated thatthefailure to providethe initial disclosures was'inadvertent." (Id.
at558.) TheRedmondsalso stated thatSulphur Mountain wasfamiliar with the relevant
witnesses,documentsandfacts atissuein the adversary proceeding because it had
broughtastatecourtaction againsttheRedmondsand an adversary action in the

1 bankruptcycourtagainst Geraldine Redmond based on thesamefacts. (Id at559-60.)
2 Afterconsidering the parties'papersand argumentsatthe October 19,2009 hearing,the
3 bankruptcy courtrejected theRedmonds'arguments,findingthatin lightofthe
4 Redmonds'failure to meetand conferpriorto Januaiy 16,2009,the courtdid notfault
5 SulphurMountain'scounselfornotconferring with counselin late Januaiy and early
6 Februaiy and stating"Idon't understand how[the Redmonds'counsel]wasnotaware
7 that he hadn't provided hisinitial disclosures."(Ex.40at2147-48.) The courtalso
8 found thatthe factthatdiscovery had been taken in the state courtaction did notexcuse
9 the Redmonds'failuretocomply with their discovery obligationsin thisaction,
10 especiallysince thisactionisa denial ofdischarge action thatlikely raisesissuesthat
11 were notpresentin thestate courtaction. (Id.at2148-49.) Thecourtalso reiterated its
12 displeasure atthe Redmonds'repeated failuresto comply with their discovery
13 obligations,includingfailing toshow upfor depositions and making broad and
14 "^nonsense"objectionstothe requestsforproduction withoutsubmittingaprivilegelog.
15 (Id.at2149-52.) Accordingly,thecourtordered theRedmondsto appear atdepositions
16 on November24,25,or27,2009and to producethe documentsrequested by Sulphur
17 Mountain andimposed sanctions againsttheRedmondsbarring them ft
'om using any
18 documentsorwitnessesotherthan forimpeachmentpurposesthat were not disclosed by
19 January30,2009.(M at2162,2154-55.) The courttlien continued the hearing on the
20 issue ofwhetherSulphurMountain wasentitled toan award ofattorneys'feesand costs
21 I asanadditionalsanctiontoOctober27,2009.(Id.at2155.)OnOctober27,2009,the
22 courtfoundthatSulphurMountain'sonlyattemptto"meetand confer"regarding its
23 motion to compel wasaJune 11,2009letterin which SulphurMountain'scounsel
24 incorrectly stated thattheRedmonds'counsel had promisedto provide datesthattliey
25 were availablefortheir depositions.(Ex.41 at2163.) Thecourtfound thattheletter was
26 insufficienttosatisfythe"meetand confer"requirementimposed by tlieLocal
27 I BankruptcyRulesandthereforedeniedSulphurMountain'srequestforattorneys'fees
28 Iandcosts.(Id.at2164.)ThecourtissuedanorderdirectingtlieRedmondsto:(1)

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Respondfiilly"to SulphurMountain'srequestsforproductionofdocumentsserved on
JohnRedmondand Maureen Redmond,respectively,on February 11,2009and deliver
the documentsnolaterthan November 13,2009,(2)haveJohn Redmond appearforhis
depositionon November25,2009at10a.m.,and(3)haveMaureenRedmond appearfor
herdeposition on November27,2009at 10a.m.(Ex.28.) Theorderstated thatin the
eventthateitheroftheRedmondsfailed tocomply with any ofthesedirections,judgment
would beenteredinfavorofSulphur Mountainintheadversary proceeding. (Id.) The
orderalso stated thattheRedmondswere prohibited from using any documentsor
witnessesandtrial orin any pretrial motionsthat werenotdisclosedtoSulphurMountain
by January30,2009.(Id.) Thecourtdenied SulphurMountain'srequestforsanctionsin
theform ofattorneys'feesand costs. (Id.)
By November 13,2009,theRedmondsproducedmorethan 3500documentsin
compliance withthe bankruptcy court'sorder.(Ex.33at1308-09^9.) Mrs.Redmond
appearedforher depositionon November25,2009,whereitbecameapparentthatshe
hadfailed to produceanyofthe"depositslips"thatsheusedto preparethe monthly
operatingreportsforthetrustee duringtheRedmonds'Chapter 11 bankruptcy,which
SulphurMountain had requested.(Ex.31 at 1234-35.) Mrs.Redmondclaimed thatthis
failure wasinadvertent.(Ex.33at1309T[ 12,1310^14.) Mr.Redmond appearedforhis
deposition on November27,2009,whereitbecameapparentthathe had notproduced
any ofthecomputer-generated recordsofhisbusinessinvoices,which hetestified were
notidentical tothe paperinvoicesthathehad produced.(Ex.31 at 1241-42.) Mr.
Redmond stated tliathe had notproduced thecomputer-generated recordsin orderto
protectthe privacy ofhisclientsor because he did not believe thathe wasrequired to
producethose documents. (Id. at 1242,1249;Ex.34at1769-71 13-18.) In addition,
many ofthe documentsthattheRedmondsdid producehad been redacted. Mr.Redmond
stated thathedid notknow who hadredactedsomeoftherecords,such aspay stubsand
check stubs,(Ex.31 at 1244-48),butstated that hisclients'namesand addressesand

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Other private information had to be redacted from otherrecordsto protect tlieir privacy,
id. at 1251-53). Mr.and Mrs.Redmond also refused to answerquestionsabouta
)articular loan they received,including their relationship to thelender,on the ground of
confidentiality"even though their counsel did not instructthem notto answer the
questions. (Ex.31 at 1231-33;Ex.34 at 1772 T|21.) The Redmondsproduced an
additional 2132documentsafter their depositions,which they stated they hadfound
while searchingfor the bank depositslips and which they delivered on November 30,
December 1,2,4,and 7,2009. (Ex.33at 1310H 14;Ex.34 at 1768-69H 12.) On the
basisofthe Redmonds'conduct.Sulphur Mountain broughta motion forjudgment
againstthe Redmondsforfailure to comply with the Court's October27,2009 order.
(Ex.31.) The Redmonds opposed the motion on the groundsthatthey had made a good
faith effort to comply with the court's orderin theface ofphysically taxing,onerous
document production,and thatthe redactions ofthe documents were proper based on
concernsfor the privacy ofthird parties. (Ex.35 at2089-94,2096-98.) TheRedmonds
also asserted thatSulphur Mountain had not been prejudiced by their non-compliance.
{Id. at2099.) Ata final hearing held on February 3,2010,the bankruptcy court
disagreed,finding instead that tlie Redmonds'non-compliance with the December 17,
2008 and October 27,2009 orders had been willful,that Sulphur Mountain had been
prejudiced by the non-compliance,and thatthe prior discovery sanction had notbeen
effective in forcing the Redmonds to comply with theirdiscovery obligations. (Ex.42at
2194-96.) The courtissued terminating sanctions,striking the Redmonds'answer,(Ex.
38),and entering defaultjudgmentin favor ofSulphur Mountain.(Ex.43.) This appeal
followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district courtreviews a bankruptcy court's decisionsto compel discovery and
toimpose discovery sanctions pursuantto Federal RuleofCivilProcedure37forabuse

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ofdiscretion. SeeHallet v.Morgan,296F.3d732,751-52(9th Cir.2002)(affirming
districtcourt'sdenialofmotion tocompel);ComputerTaskGrp,,Inc. v.Brotby,364F.3d
1112,1115(9th Cir.2004)(affirming districtcourt'sadoption ofmagistratejudge's
decision toimpose terminating sanctions), "Absentadefinite and firm conviction that
the[trial]courtmadeaclearerrorinjudgment,thiscourt will notoverturn aRule37
sanction." ValleyEng>sInc.v. ElectricEng*gCo.,158F.3d 1051,1057(9th Cir.1998).
However,"wherethedrasticsanctionsofdismissalordefaultareimposed,... therange
ofdiscretionisnarrowed andthelosingparty'snoncompliance mustbedueto
willfulness,fault,orbadfaith." ComputerTaskGrp.,Inc.,364F.3d at1115(internal
citationsand quotationsomitted).
ANALYSIS
L The Bankruptcy CourtDid NotAbuseits Discretion By GrantingSulphur
Mountain's Motion to Compel
FederalRule ofCivilProcedure26allowstlie partiesto seek discovery ofany
nonprivileged materialthatisrelevanttoaparty'sclaim or defense. Fed.R.Bankr.P.
7026(applyingFederalRuleofCivilProcedure26foradversary proceedings);Fed.R.
Civ.P.26(b)(1). Ifapartyfails to make adisclosurerequired by Rule26(a),failsto
answeraquestion during adeposition,failsto respondto arequestfor production of
documents,orgivesan evasiveorincomplete disclosure,answerorresponse,the
opposing party may movefor an order compellingthe disclosureor response. Fed.R.
Bankr.P.7037(applyingFederal RuleofCivilProcedure37foradversary proceedings);
Fed.R.Civ.P.37(a)(l),(3),(4). Todetermine whethera party isentitled to compel
discovery,a courtshould consider whetherthe moving party hasshownthatit will suffer
actualandsubstantial prejudice ifthe discovery is denied and whetherthe benefitsofthe
discovery sought would be outweighed by the burdensimposed on theresponding party.

1 Fed.R.Civ.P.26(b)(2)(C);Hon.William W.Schwarzeretal.,CaliforniaPractice
2 Guide:FederalCivilProcedure Before Trial§§ 11:2379.1-.7(4th ed.2011). The
3 bankruptcy courtproperly considered thesefactorsand did not abuse its discretion by
4 granting SulphurMountain'smotion tocompel.
5
6 First,the bankruptcy court properly determined thatthe discovery that Sulphur
7 Mountain soughtwasrelevantto itsclaims. Sulphur Mountain allegesthatduring tlieir
8 Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2006,theRedmondsconcealedincomeearned,misrepresented
9 the value oftheir home,failed to maintain recordsofaFord diesel truck and Sooner
10 HorseTraileraswell asseveral'loans"thatthey madeto their daughter Geraldine and
11 otherthird parties,and madefalsestatementsunder oath regardingtheirincome and
12 property.(Ex.3at22-25 16-17,20,23,27-31.) Inaddition toseekingto compelthe
13 Redmondsto providetheir initial disclosurespursuantto Rule26(a),Sulphur Mountain
14 soughtto depose botli Mr.and Mrs.Redmond,and requested production ofdocuments
15 thatarerelevantto Sulphur Mountain'sallegations,such asall bank recordssince2002,
16 any appraisalofany real property prepared since January 1,2004,all motor vehicle
17 registrations,allrecordsofaccountsreceivable and payable,paymentsfrom clients,
IB amongother documents.(Ex.6at80-84.)
19
20 Second,thebankruptcy courtreasonably concluded thatSulphur Mountain would
21 be actually andsubstantially prejudicedifthecourtdid notgrantitsmotion to compel
22 discovery. SeeHon.William W.Schwarzeret al.,CaliforniaPracticeGuide:Federal
23 CivilProcedureBefore Trial§ 11:2379.1(stating that moving party bears burden of
24 I showingactualandsubstantialprejudicefromthedenialofdiscovery). Therecord
25 demonstratesthatthe Redmondshad notsubmitted their initial disclosures until a month
26 before the discovery deadline,theRedmondshad repeatedly rescheduledtheir
27 depositionsandthenfailed to appearattheir noticed depositions,when Mr.Redmond hac
28 11shownupforhisdeposition hewasuncooperativeandrefusedtoanswerquestionseven

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when notdirectedtodoso by hiscounsel,and tlieRedmondshadbroadly objectedtothe
requestsforproduction ofdocumentsandsimply refused to produce thedocuments
withoutprovidinganykindofprivilegelogor morespecificobjections.(Ex.6at61-65;
X,39at2134;Ex.40at2146,2148-52.) The Redmonds'repeatedfailurestocomply
withtheirdiscovery obligationseffectively prevented SulphurMountainfrom conducting
meaningfuldiscovery tosupportitsclaims.
Finally,the bankruptcycourtalso reasonablyfound thattheRedmondshad not
shownthattherequested discovery wasnotwarranted. SeeCable& Computer Tech.,
Inc. V.LockheedSounders,Inc.,175F.R.D.646,650(C.D.Cal.1997)(party resisting
discovery hasburden to supporteach ground on which itobjectsto discovery). First,the
bankruptcycourtfound thatthefactthatthe partieshadengagedin discoveryinthe2002
state courtactionforbreach ofthe lease agreementdid notexcusethe Redmonds'failure
tocomply with tlieirdiscovery obligationsin this objectiontodischargefrom bankruptcy
action,which raised differentissuesregarding theRedmonds'property and income and
theirrecordsofthatincome.(Ex.40at2148-49.) Second,the bankruptcy courtfound
thatmany oftheRedmonds'objectionsto SulphurMountain'srequestsfor production
and documentsweretoo broad or nonsensical. {Id.at2150-52.) Forexample,in
responseto Sulphur Mountain'srequestfor production of'"any appraisal ofany real
property owned by[theRedmonds]prepared between January 1,2004and the present,"
theRedmondsobjectedthattherequestwas'Vague and ambiguousastothe term
appraisal."(Ex.7at233-34;Ex.40at2150-52.) Similarly,in responseto Sulphur
Mountain'srequestfor"all motor vehicle registrationsfor vehiclesowned by John
Redmond between January 1,2001 to thepresent,"the Redmonds objected to the request
as"overbroad asto time and scope"and"vague and ambiguousasto'o^vned'"and
simply refused to produceany documentsin connection with thatrequest. (Ex.7 at234-
35;Ex.40at2152.) In response to several additional requestsfordocumentsthatthe
Redmondsdeemed"overbroad astotime"or"oppressive and burdensome,"the

1 Redmondsalsoflatlyrefused to produceany documentsresponsivetothe request.(See,
2 U-g-,Bx.7at233,234,236.) Although theRedmondsargueagainonappealthatSulphur
3 Mountain'sdiscoveryrequests were overbroad and irrelevant,they donotspecifically
4 identify which requestsfor production weretoo broad orirrelevantoroffer any legal
s authority or other explanation asabasisforthose objections.
6
7 The Redmondsalso assertthat bankruptcy courterred by allo^ving Sulphur
8 Mountain to bring amotion to compelinthe first placebecauseSulphur Mountain did
9 notsatisfy the meetand conferrequirementsofLocalBankruptcy Rule7026-1. The
10 LocalRule providesthat""unlessexcusedfrom complying with thisrule by orderofthe
11 courtfor good cause shown,"a partyseeking to bring amotion tocompel must""meetin
12 person or bytelephonein agood faith efforttoresolve adiscovery dispute"and mustfile
13 awritten stipulationfrom both partiesthatidentifies""separately and with particularity"
14 I each disputedissuethatremainsto bedetermined andthecontentionsofeach party asto
15 each issue. LocalBankr.Rule7026-1(1),(2),(3). ""In the absenceofsuch stipulation or
16 adeclaration ofcounsel ofnoncooperation by the opposing party,thecourtwill not
17 considerthe discovery motion." Local Bankr.Rule 7026-1(3)(C). The bankruptcy court
18 determinedthatSulphur Mountain hadnotfully complied mUh the requirementsofthe
19 LocalRule.* (Ex.41.) Theonly letterfrom SulphurMountainthatexplicitlystatedthat
20 IitwouldbringamotiontocompeliftheRedmondsdidnotcomplywiththeirdiscovery
21 obligationswassenton June 11,2009,several monthsbefore Sulphur Mountain filed its
22 motion tocompel,and incorrectly statedthatthe Redmondshadfailedto provide new
23 datesfortheirdepositionsas previously agreed bycounsel,whenin fact,counsel had
24 I agreedtliatSulphurMountainwouldberesponsibleforsuggestingpossibledatesforthe
25
26 r Accordingly,thebankruptcycourtproperlydenied SulphurMountain*srequestfortheattorneys*fees
andcostsrelatedtothemotiontocompelasanaddition^sanction againsttheRedmonds. SeeFed.R.
27 IICiv.P.37(a)(5)(A)(i)("Butthecourtmustnotorderthispaymentif:(i)themovantfiled themotion
beforeattemptingingoodfiuthtoobtainthedisclosureordiscovery withoutcourtaction;....").
28

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depositions.(Ex.6at86,88;Ex.41 at2163.) AlthoughcounselforSulphurMountain
didsend additionallettersin June2009proposinganin-person meetandconferregarding
theRedmonds'initial disclosures,(Ex.6at63 12-13),andthepartiesdid meetand
conferbytelephoneon August14,2009regardingthe Redmonds'failureto provide their
initialdisclosuresandMr.Redmond'sfailureto appearathisdeposition,{id at64^17),
andin person after Mr.Redmond'sdepositionon August 17,2009,(id at65 19-20),
noneoftheseexchangesappearto have madeany specificreferencetoSulphur
Mountain'sintentionto bringamotiontocompelortocontemplatethejointstipulation
ofdisputed issuesthatisrequired bytheLocalRule. However,nothingin the Local
Rule,theFederalRulesofBankruptcyProcedure,orthefederalstatutesgoverningthe
bankruptcycourt'sjurisdiction suggeststhatthe parties'failureto meetand confer
regarding discovery disputesstripsthe bankruptcy courtofjurisdictionto heara motion
to compel. Seegenerally28 U.S.C.§§ 151,157(2006);Fed.R.Bankr.P.7026,7037;
LocalRule7026-1. Indeed,the plain language ofthe LocalRuleindicatesthatthe
bankruptcycourtretainsdiscretion toconsider motionstocompeleventhough theparties
havefailed to makea''good faith effortto resolveadiscovery dispute"becausethe
bankruptcy court mayexcusethe partiesfrom complying with theLocalRule"forgood
causeshown." Local Rule 7026-1(c)(1). Here,Sulphur Mountain setoutalong history
ofnon-cooperation bytheRedmondsin a declarationfrom Sulphur Mountain'scounsel
accompanyingthe motion tocompel,including theRedmonds'failuretocomply with the
bankruptcy court's priororderto providetheir initial disclosuresby January 16,2009.
(SeeEx.6at61-66.) Thatdeclaration issufficientto establish"good cause"forthe
bankruptcy courttoexcuse Sulphur Mountain from complying with therequirementsof
the Local Rule and to considerthe motion tocompel.
TheRedmonds also assertthatthe bankruptcy courterred byimposing discovery
sanctions precludingthem from using any witnessesordocumentsthat were notdisclosed
priorto January30,2009,because tlie Redmonds'failureto provide their initial

11
1 disclosureswasharmless. SeeFed.R.Civ.P.37(c)(1)("Ifapartyfailsto provide
2 information oridentifya witnessasrequired by Rule26(a)or(e),the party is notallowed
3 to usethatinformationor witnessto supply evidence ... unlessthefailure was
4 substantiallyjustified oris harmless.")- Specifically,theRedmondsclaim thatcertain
5 witnesses,such asMr.and Mrs.Redmond andtheir daughter GeraldineRedmond,were
6 "obvious"and alreadyknown to SulphurMountain.(App.Opening Br.at 11-12.) But
7 the bankruptcy court'sdecision toimpose discovery sanctions wasbasedonitsfinding
8 that notonly hadtheRedmondsdisobeyed thecourt'sown orderto provide their initial
9 disclosuresby January 16,2009and offered abaselessexplanation thatthefailure was
10 "inadvertent,"butalsothatSulphur Mountain had been"putin animpossiblesituation"
11 because itdid notreceivethe Redmonds'initial disclosuresuntil one month priorto the
12 discoveiy cut-off,the Redmondshadfailed to appearfortheirnoticed depositions,which
13 had been repeatedlyrescheduled to accommodatethem,andtheRedmondshadfailed to
14 producethedocumentsthatSulphurMountainrequested based on broad,unfounded
15 objectionsand withoutproviding aprivilegelog.(Ex.40at2146-52.) Thecombination
16 oftheRedmonds'repeatedfailuresto comply withtheir discovery obligations wasmore
17 than sufficienttosupportthebankruptcy court's decision toimpose discovery sanctions.
18 Fed.R.Civ.P.37(b)(2)(A)(ii),37(c)(1)(C).
19
20 111.TheBankruptcyCourtDid NotAbuseItsDiscretionByEnteringTerminating
21 Sanctions AgainsttheRedmonds
22
23 The bankruptcy courtalso did notabuseitsdiscretion byenteringterminating
24 I sanctionsafterfindingthattheRedmondshadfailedtocomplywithitsOctober27,2009
25 IIorder. Drasticsanctionssuch asdismissalordefaultshould bereservedfor"extreme
26 situations,"and mustonly beordered wherethe party'sconductdemonstrates"willful
27 I disobedience"ofthecourt'sorder,"badfaith,"or"fault"oftheparty. In reExxon
28 Valdez,102F,3d429,432(9diCir.1996). To demonstrate"willfulness"or"badfaith,"

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the court mustfind''disobedientconductnotshown to be outsidethe control ofthe
litigant." Henry v.GUIIndustries,Inc.,983F.2d943,948(9th Cir.1993). In addition,
the Ninth Circuithassetoutfivefactorsthatcourts mustconsiderto determine whethera
dismissal sanctionisjust:(I)the public'sinterestin expeditiousresolution oflitigation,
(2)thecourt'sneedto manageitsdockets,(3)theriskofprejudicetothe party seeking
sanctions,(4)the publicpolicyfavoring disposition ofcaseson their merits,and(5)the
availabilityoflessdrasticsanctions. ConnecticutGeneralLifeIns.Co. v.NewImagesof
BeverlyHills,482F.3d 1091,1096(9th Cir.2007)(citing ValleyEng*rsInc. v.Electric
Eng'gCo.,158F.3d 1051,1057(9th Cir.1998)). Where,ashere,acourtorderis
violated,thefirstand second factors weigh in favor ofdrasticsanctionsand thefourth
factorweighsagainstdrasticsanctions,sotheNinth Circuithasheld thatthe"prejudice'
and"availabilityoflessdrasticsanctions"factorsare decisive. ValleyEng'rsInc.,158
F.3d at1057(citingAdrianaIntHCorp.v. Thoeren,913F.2d 1406,1412(9th Cir.
1990)). The Ninth Circuithasalso stated thatthefifth factorinvolvestheconsideration
ofthree subparts:(1)whetherthecourtexplicitly discussed alternative sanctions,(2)
whetherittriedthem,and(3)whetheritwarned theparty aboutthe possibility of
dismissal. Id. The bankruptcycourtexpressly considered tliesefactorsandreasonably
concluded thatthefactorssupportedenteringterminating sanctionsagainsttlie
Redmonds.
Therecord clearly supportsthe bankruptcy court'sfindingsthattheRedmondshad
failed tocomply with thecourt'sOctober27,2009orderandthattheirfailure to comply
was"willful."(Ex.42at2186-93,2195.) SeeAdrianaInt7Corp.,913F.3d at 1411
(stating thata districtcourt'sdetermination thatan order wasdisobeyed is entitled to
considerable weight). Despitethecourt'sexpressordertliattheRedmondsfully produce
allofthe documentsthatSulphur Mountain requested,theRedmondsfailed to produce
entire categoriesofdocuments,including their bank depositslips,thecomputer-generated
invoicesfor Mr.Redmonds'sbusiness,orany oftlie back up documentsforthe

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spreadsheetofloansthattheRedmonds madeto third parties. (Ex.31 at 1225-26 3-4,
234-37,1241-43,1249-50.) TheRedmondsproduced morethan2000documents
)etween November30 and December7,2009,several weeksafterthe bankruptcy court's
deadline. (Ex.31 at 1223H 2;Ex.33;Ex.34.) In addition,the Redmondsredacted many
ofthe documentsthatthey did produce,(Ex.31 at 1244-48,1289-99;Ex.33 at 1310^
15-16;Ex.34at 1770-71 15-18),withoutseeking aprotective orderfrom the
)ankruptcy court,even though the bankruptcy courthad expressly admonished the
ledmondsfor unilaterally withholding documentsorredacting information in its prior
learing,(Ex.40at2149-52). TheRedmondsalsorefused to answer questionsattheir
depositionsregarding aloan obtainedfrom athird-party on the groundsof
confidentiality,even though theircounsel did notadvisethem nottoanswer,(Ex.31 at
1231-33;Ex.33at 1311 ^18;Ex.34at 1772H 21),and the bankruptcy courthad also
previously admonished Mr.Redmondthatsuch conduct wasimproper,(Ex.40at2149).
InlightoftheRedmonds'repeatedrefusalsto comply with theirdiscovery obligations
priortothe bankruptcy court'sOctober27,2009order,the bankruptcy courtfound that
the Redmonds'continued unilateral refusalto produce certain documentsorto answer
certain questionsintheir depositionswasadeliberatechoice,orawillful violation ofthe
court'sorder.(Ex.42at2914-95.) TheRedmondsargued beforethe bankruptcy court,
and argue again on appeal,thatthey madea"good faith effort"tocomply with the
bankruptcy court'sorder,and thatthefailureto produce certain documentswas
inadvertent"and attributableto thefactthatthe Redmondshad only afew weeksto
producetherequested documents.(Ex.33at 1308-10If8-14;Ex.34at 1767-70 8-
15). TheRedmondsstated they workedlong,physically taxing hoursin an effortto
producethe documents,butthatthey were unabletofullycomply witli the bankruptcy
court'sorder becausethey had onlytwo weekstolocate and producethedocuments.
(Ex.33at 1308^8-9;Ex.34at1767^8-9.) However,asthe bankniptcy court
accurately pointed out,theRedmondswereon noticefrom the bankruptcy court's
October 19,2009orderthatthey would berequired to produce the documents,(Ex.40ai

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2009ordergrantingthe motion tocompel wouldresultin terminatingsanctions. (Ex.
28.) TheRedmondsdid notcomply with the court'sOctober27,2009order. Therefore,
the bankruptcycourtreasonably concluded thatitsprevious discovery sanctionshad not
Deen effectivein compellingtheRedmondstocomply with theirdiscovery obligations,
and anyfurtherattemptsatsanctions wouldbefutile. (Ex.42at2194,2196.)
CONCLUSION
Fortheforegoingreasons,the bankruptcy court'sdecision to enterjudgmentin
favorofSulphurMountain is AFFIRMED.
DATED: May 2,2011
CORMAC J.CARNEY
UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGE

EXHIBIT “F”

LEAD SHEET
RECORDING REQUESTED BY
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO
NAME
CITY.STATE
ZIP CODE
K -l2.l?reo
02 2418011
iS55S^^ro®5i5Sr
1;21PM OCT 15 2002
SPACE ABOVE THIS UNEFOR RECORDERSUSE
▲ ▲
TITLE(S)
^oTSef)- pQ fiTTfiCHx^efi/f
FEE D.T.T.
;f
OXFEEOofctt I UB.,
20
CODE
19
CODE
9
CODE
24
fE
§3
s»
Assessor's Identification Number(AIN)
To Be Completed ByExaminer ORTitle Company In Black Ink NumberofParcelsShown
▲ ▲
THIS FORM IS NOTTO BE DUPLICATED
Exhibit 1.oaae-000029

ATraaidvoaejumwRKOurvwttcvfiM*.*
iX 1itewfteneiweiinflimflBirPavlii B)akcChalfi6td(B8r^88991)
Law OfficesofDavid Blake Chatfield
425Zeno Way
Oak Park,Califomia 91377
nMPiciiiML;(8I8)879.1289 '«"o-(818)879-9138
ATn»i(CirnMnir«d SulplntrMAtifttAiitIflnd And l.lvMtAek Ta..fJr..PhtnttfT
leneounrusfoxy
02 3418011
NuiiorcwRit SuperiorCourtofCalifomia,CountyofVentura
tmccTMwin:800S.Victoria Avenue
W«a«0AB8MU:
coyMospcoQS:Ventura 93009-0001
otuKiMMMii:Ventura
piAiNTiFRSy^lmfMountain Land and Livestock Co.,LLC.
DEFEKOANT:Semcnd UjCaksSomaxiFsnnsLLC,OnaUiuRedBUUMltJeffOhaoo.andJcsio
NOTICEOFAITACHMEMT
(IhlefenntouaedInoenneettonvdthfovyunderawritofattaehmeittl
innmaQFTcaii
(teauMMMM)*
levmoomeurteNo.: counrcAStMO;
CIV 214702
TOTHEPERSON NOTlPlEO(lnamo):Maureen Redmond
1. PlaInltilliiiMsadtoiiiQ8fc8toatl8ClipnpertyiAwhlehdefsndantti3ianlntsmt'nieptopertylobeaBacnedlB
a. CtfsseribtArapofiyj:
a
b. nOi dfisolbedinthemdo(>U(scftfi»nt8nd0/tferibfitouanceofWdtcfAffaebnwnLatiaehedheretoand(noorporBtad by
raferenea.
2. Youam notified 89
a adafmdant.
b. aponenoIharlhanderendintfsfafacflipactyiiiiHUBbpeaoablMAsrnotnM!!:
(ReatfAifwmatfonliDfOafaorftnfOffflfmaftoRforPtmoffOther(hinOefMitfsnronrevame.;
2. AnoUeowaafSedwimiha
&^3SacrataryofState.
b.Q DepartmentoffytotorVehldaa.
0. CD DapaitmemefKoualnflandCommunityDevdopmenl.
4. NotteeofAttachmeniwas
& CD meiledenfdlsfa;:
b. CD daitveradonfdBiej:
c. Q postedonfdsfa;:
d 1 1 (ttadonftfafo^
e. reeenfed en QCT 15 2802
»■ ■icawmtr
Signed by;
►
I 1 l.evytngotnfier
(Cortimari en lOMfu)
NOTICEOF ATTACHMENT
ser CQ^egiot
Regioterad preoesa server
GMitfCMMwSr
Exhibit 1. oaoe 000030

-INFORMATIONFORDEFENDANT- 02 2418011
1. ThalevytnooffieerfflaybefequlredtoUkeeusiodyofpfOpeftydssoibedliiilem1in yourpotsessionorunderyour
eentfcl.Youhavearightfobsreproterdedbyenattorneyin(hitlawiull.
2. YoumaydatinanyavallabteexempUonforyourprepeity. Aneraniptlonforrealpropertymay!»claimedanylima
beforetheentryofJudgment.IftherighttoattachorderorwritofattactunentwasIssuedwiltioutanoticedhearing and
youwishtodsimanoxempllonforpersonalproparty,youmustdosowithin30diqrsafterthel^ngofRoersarvosyou
withtheNotlooofAttachmentdascriblngtheproperty.Ifyoudonotdalmanoiteinptlon.youmaylosaltandtheproptfty
Issut^toattachmentIfyouwishtoseekthoadvtoofanattorney,youstioutd dosoImmediatelysotliata of
eiefflptioncanbafiledonlime.
3. PlalnMhattttedanundertaldng.Youhavatherighttoobjecttotheundertakhtgandmayapplyforanorderto
•ubitituleanundsriaUngforyourpropcitywhichhasbeenorIsstibieoitoba'ng attached.
4. YouhaveadutytoreleaselangtUapersonalpropertytothelevying oflteer.YouhavetherightsandduttestpedlledIn
CodeofCIdlProcsdurasection468.3BSifyourferni productsorInventoryofagoing bustnasihavobeenoraresubject
toatteehment.
5. IfthapropertyIspertshobloorwiagraailydeteriorateInvalue,orforothergoodreason,youmayapplyoxparto,orIfthe
courtoroowtndotegulras,bynotioad moUon.foranorderappointingarocdverorErodingthele^ngoffloertotalie
anyaetlainaeeseaiytoproseivethovalueofthoproperty,Indudingsellingtheproperty.Theoouitmayordarany
reeeiverlobepddhom theproceedsofthosafeofyour property.
6. YoumayapplyforareleaseoftheattachmeidtotheedenltbatthevalueofyottfInterestInthepropertyexceedsthe
ifflounlnecessarytosatisfythoattadunenL
7. YoumayapplytothicourttoranordormodifyingorvacalinganytemporarypcotocUveordorinlite{nterastsofJuitloa
orCsranordertsrmlnallngthasemeuponfilinganundertaking.
e. tllhawittofevadimamhasbeenissuedagainstyoubecauseyouareanonresident,you mayhavetherigttttoattach
ordersetatldobyfiUngagenataiappearance.
e. ItthewttofatlBGhmenlwaslasuedonanexperteappilcaUon,youmayapplyforanordarthattherighttoattachorder
besetadde,thawritquashed,andanyprop^levieduponpursuanttothewritbereleased.
to. IfyourecoverJudgmentegabislplBlnttff,youmayapplyforardoaseofoU propertyattachedliyplaintiffundertheWrit
ofAnachmentIfludgreenilireeoveiedagainstyouand youeppaal,youhavetherighttoobtaintheretesaeofyour
prepflK^by(Ulngalirfttdentundertaking.
11. YoumayobjectIdtheamountsoughttobesecuredbytheattadunent.
12. YeumayteeeverdamegBStorwnngkdanaGhmenL
•INFOflMATJON FORPERSONOTHERTHANDEPENDANT-
1. tfthapropertyatttchedtfsougtrttoboatlBChedfslnyourpoisasslonQfundery^controiefldyoudoMctaimtlie
rightSpeaemlcnerasecurityinierMi,youmustdflMilwprapenytothelevybigomoer,Ifyeutenotdenyan
oBlgatlsnlevtedupenerdonotelaim aprierityovertheplalntureflen.ymimustpaytothelevyingofficertheamount
ihalfaduaandp^ttteandihalbeeamesdueandpayauaduringthaperiodoftheattachmentHen.Youmustexecute
anddcBveranydocumentsneededtotransftftheproperty.
2. VoumuiteQfiiplcletheaecoinpBnylngMemerandumofQamlshQe.
3. jfyoudalrnownflfShlportherigldtopoaieeitenmremwpersonalpfo^tevWuiKmorlfypuddraasew^
InteraitinorlUm00pereonalpropmtyleviedupon,youmaymakeethlFd«paityddm andobtainthewlesseofthe
fuepertypmsuanltoCSodeofCMlPirocsdurosedioni720.013-720.600.
4. ifyoutiivoaniniereitIntheptopsftyattadmdorsougitttobeffitechodandtheproperlyIspenshabtaorwIUgrwOy^
deletsiatelnvalue,orforothergo^reason,youmayapptyexpaiie.orliOiacourtorpouitralefoqulfes,bynotm
motion,forsnordifappointingalaoelverordirectlnBthelevyingofficertolakeany neonmto
vatuDofthepropetly.Includingeeltlnobioproperty.Thecourtmayorderanyreceivertobepaidfromtheproceedsof
thssaleofyourprop^.
5. Makecbecfcapayabletothotovylngofficer.
M.tfti{R«..Myi.)n} NOTICEOF ATTACHMENT vm***
Exhibit l.oaae000031

i
AtreMitTOM/MrrnrmQUT«n6lbitT mef»miicCHo
J)avid Bbk« Cl»t(ieId(6Br088V..) (818)879-1289
LawORtcesofDavid BbkcChatfteld faxno.
425ZenoWay (818)879-9138
OakPbfivColiromia 91377
AttmMttnHftuttr Sulphur Mountam Landand UvesiockCo.,LLC.,plaiiUiff
MutvcotNt SuperiorComofC&lifonua»CountyofVentura
ftmccTAaoRBsi: 800S.Viclona Avenue
MUlKOAOOPfiSS'
cnvwowc^tci; Vemura 93009-0001
iwNCHittui: Ventura
PwMtfrvr; SulphurMountainLand and Livestock Co.,LLC.
OEFBNOMrr: John Redmond,Maureen Redmond,GeraldineRedmond,etceial.
WRirOFAnACHMENT
OafterMEARINO fTlBtPARTE
■mneoneart uuon.t
02 2418011
4
CMSMWOCP
CIV 214702
ABU ADUnriBUI
1. TOlHSSKEIWFOnANVIMRSHM.OflCONSIABiaOF'mSCOUHTYOF:
Los Angeles .
3. TOANY RE8ISTERE0PROCESS KRVER: Youctieenfir sutherissd lessrve
ihit writ In aeeora with COP 4flB.080.
a. Tliir wSli to tfichprapai^cfifelBnetartfnami endtut
^ JefcaRndmeed
^ 12101 Cm Avbsc
IaAfllUflkCA 90015
and ttio atiBeiimeAi It to tootre: $ 74,610.19
4. Namo and addmu d fUfliiff:
Sulphur Mouniihi Lend and UvcUisk Co, LLC
P.O. Bw 25070
Vcmum,CA93002
5. YOU ARE DIRECTED TO ATTACH the (oBaNtAn prapBrty or Miratch thereof
at ii Unify cuSclaid to toe emfluid to be ncuted by ttia attsdi-
mam fdnabe prepwhfOld aflsto to tedflwe e«Ae by tiflbiy:
□ TMs intormatlen {» on an attached ahceL
a: Real Property comroonly known as 12808 Oieene Avenue, Los Angeles, OA 90066
b. Any and all bank accounts held atJackson Federal Baidc, including, but not Undted to account
numbers 1100017321 and 1100038894
a. m An lateifft In Ito nal pnpaily daaeKbod in Sam 6 n standa upon Dm records d the esunly. in ew name of tre
WlMinepareonolMrthmliw^fendBre
a. Hams Maureen Redmond
U MtUing eddroM, If hnewn, m ahown by ttie rocorda of Ure efttes of too county lax tfaoaaor (apacfiy;.-
1280BQic«reAvcRuo
y.rn Tho real pmpartyenstofchthe ^Aagd«.CA90066
Bcrcpadoscdbedintama_aresreMfng
dntoerdaertbod to ten 5.^(0 bo cut U tundino atanda upon Iho leeBids el too eeuaiy in ttte wna or
o.NiRw:
b. Addfms:
HUM
•
oma
.tlC'-lAFi. r» J'LAHEt
OCTll20n c«.b.
1
.1 •» •: sOwui*
laimAworMWM
MiiOCewel«C«ilsi<e . . vmn or AirACHMENT eG»4Ucio
Exhibit 1. DBoe 000032

AMERICr JONTRACTORSINDEMNll
^ MPAN
Id The SUPERIOR Cburt
Countyof VENTURA
* State ofCalifornia
02 2418011 ^
SalpharMoenlatn Laud and UvenockCo,L.L.Cn
PtalBliil,
vt.
Jeba Rcdmesdt MaarttalledBMBd;
GcraldlBeBidmandtandSoBteiact,LLC,aka
SemendAnas,LLC,
DefcfldaBia.
CaseNo. CIV 214701
UNDERTAKING UNDER
SECTION 489JtlB C.C.P.
AllpipotniQotlaiiakybo Mmd•!
B0ND8BaVICeSQFCAUr0l01U.UC
900«iliUnBlvl,8bl1i 1400.iMAogdif.CA90011
WBBREASi(heabovesaned.
deaiatosivcttaodcnaldBEfbr.
PlalBllR •asFkiodpal
provided bySedioa 4B9JU0 C.CP.
NOW,lBE8BPORB;(heSomy,docsherebyobfidateittdCjoiQiiyandlevoalty.toj^
•• w
flRdqBMi(att(«yebI^idffBtfatitaMmaf TttThoaaaad aadaenOO-***^*'*—****—
IN WITNESS^nEREOF,HiecoipoiBtesealnd nameofOiesaidSvctyODiiipaqrisheretoaffixedandattested by
ChriltePherMLHacntl phodcdarcs«'***'* HfpwjMyihnhefafatrffllymthmfarfAttameyJa^Baelaetingmtiliran
oarevokcdpowerQraOBineyoafilewithdieQofcoftheCoaniyinwtdebabovecniiiledGoutislocated.
Esttotedai LoaAagdea iCaUfooiaoo. Odober ILTflOl
BoadNo. dOWSI
IheprcmhttDchargeforthisbead
iaS >00.00 Bgautaai.
AMERICANCONTRACTORSINDEMNrTV COMPANY
Chiiitopher M.Haead Anemqf*m-F2ct
CIVILBOND
Exhibit1.oaoe000033

ivKR BlakeOiatseld(Barfr
'..Jî)
"Law OfiBcesVDavid Blake Chatfiekl
425Zeno Way
OakPark,CBômia 91377
msPKocM:(818)879-12B9 rwmz(818)879-9138
AnwwprfflWM>i»» Sulphur Mountoin Land andLivestockCo^ LLC..Plamtiff
itânrtT.fvfgorirO> Tir
AT.128
NMnoFcwjiii Superior(k)urtofCaliTonua,CountyofVea
mierAeMtiss;800S.Vietcria Avenue
IWUi9AfiBRCIft
cnYMovceoE;Ventura 93009-0001
wmtcHHme Ventura
eotura
nAfHTiFF:SutphurMountabLand amiLivestockCo^LLC.
DEFENQANr:JohnRedmond;etc.etal
MneowruxoMir
02 2418011
VtM'fUH*
SUPEWORCOUf-
FH FD
am t)wn
MlCHAfcL U.»'l.ANFT
^kCC(ji*vA OH«cn» wnrtCV-•
BY-
<
eXPARTE
CSRiOHTlOATrACHOROERAIfOORDERFORtSSUANCEOP
WRrrOFAnACKRENT(REStOENT)
C3OROERPORISSUANCEOFAODmONALWRITOFATTACHMENT
9E8IDEND
1.1heap|X(eai(oo8iidtunpQrtiiwdedaraiionerafndBvHorptslRlifr(taRM!l:S4tkurMouotaaiLandandLivestock(k>.,LLC.
feranvcpaitoCS]fl^toattSGhontarandoiilerfBrluoaQnetwittorattachmant CZ}erdarforlsauanoaofaniAfittQnal
vffttofiUacHtneftt tBsbeoioomlderadbythecourt.
FINDIN08
Z TKEOOtniTFiNOS
a DeMaM(NWc8yAanis);MtttireeDRedni^ ba CZl natualponon
I 1 partner*^ I I irtnoofpofatadaBsodatfon I I oaporatfoa i i other(Sipsdy;:
b. ThodaiAiuioaaMdilfwapplleallailtbatQdbonauponiiMChanattadunQnltnaybobsuadiaidarCodaefCMIPioeodure
6QCllGa483.010.
a PtalnWhasostabUshodthoprobabtovalUrtyofthedalmuponwhichtheBttaohmsRiifbaood.
d. The•ttadvTKRtIfnotsoughtfiorapuiposoottwrthanU»reoavoryonIhodabn uponVKtitctittwoppticattanlabased.
0. ThaamoumioboeaouredbythaaUaohfnsntiaeraMvthanzarD.
f. TliBaffMs«ltordaGl8rattoQacQompaiiyln9th98pplleaOon6hMisthQttftopropoftyiou9httobeBttached,ortttaport]oi»thereor
tobQ8peeMQd(ntftfltMtt,afan6lfla8mptftomaHadinani
g. llnpcftloDerihepraiMtyaauBMIotMettaoheddBiafbedlAi&einablanolflMemplfrofn&ttadwioRL
h. AnundsrtBUngtnthoametBttefcl10,000.00 l8rQqidredbeliDfaaiMitshaOb8ue,8ndpl8ZRtiff
Ohas CD(laanot StodanindertaMnsbilhalimouRL
L QmstorbnparabtolnluiywairesuRtothoplalmtfflfbsuanDOOftheoRlerbddayBdunQIUiamattorcanbohQanlonnotioa,
baaadenthofonowbg:
(1)CQ niemlsadangerthaldwprepflilysooeliltebeêhedwecddbo
(a>^n CBnceatod (h}^D lubstantfallirlininlrodlnvBhio.
madowBwgllablototovyhyolfttfthaneonoasimontorlmpalnnanllnvalua
mm DerenilanltiasfiBadtopaytfwdobtuiidQrfytfiatheiecuestodattaahmentandlalnaolvenlaadsftfiedlACedaorCMl
PkoeedtiresoettoftdasoiO.subtSsblonOdM).assolforth(nIhaaffidavitordadanieonffiadinsupportofUili
appBoallon.MhkhspodfiasthedefondanrstoMMmunffisputaddebtsendthabasisforplatatHlsdelerinlnQlIonthattho
derendaRfsdOblBareundisputed,
ml—IAtMiksalesnodoewasrecordedand pubflBftadpursuanttoDhdsionOofUncommercialCodswhhrespect
toabuBttraiuferbythodefendaid.
(4)0 AnascrawhasbeanopenedpmuanttofheprovWonsofBusinassandProfessionsCodesection24074wRh
iBspeeilolhoaalebythedeTondvilofaUquw Hoertto.ThefiquorBoensanumberla:
(5)11^ otherdroflnitanoesftpocgyj:
I r 1ARkihttoAttachOrderwasfgttfffd on(dsiofi pursuentto
^ C^rdeefOvaProcedurosodfoodUcm OCodaorCMPmoadumeeeUon485.220(expaitfi)
k.O other
(Costnued on imene)
CXPARTE RtOHTTO ATTACHORDER AND ORDERFOR -
••TO#*30*11*
Exhibit 1.08060DQ034

SKQftrTmfi: f ^ iCKUWitt
'SulphurMbuiUatov*JohaRedmond I
ORDER 02 2418011
3. THECOURTOROERS
0. PtB!nflfrtiaiarisMto8tt«3bpfop«tyoldefQiulanlfMm9j:MBureenRfidfnond
bitheamountofc 174,610.19
b. Thodofcihailisaie GG awiRofaltactunent anatftStioRalwfllofattachnrant miheamountstaledbiUem3a
CZ]tbtfhwtlh GG uponthefUngofenumiertaMRBbithaamounlof;110,000.00
(1)0(orthepnpeitycoveredbyabtitksatesROlteawKhraspeeltoabulktransferI)/defendantortheiiroeeedsofttwsals
dsuctisfoperty.deaorflwd88(iBUflw(spsolW
C2)GDftrpiiM0repiofSia8haroefpiooeedsfiomBnesonM[n«vhidiita(iBndanfeeqijarlioensotsio(d.TliDUoeR5einimb«
IsRipeeO!!:
(9)0foraiypmiiertyofBdetbndsfdiitioIsnelaiHrtunIperBMTtbniitilGliamethodoriivyisprovided.
(4)[ZforpnpiBdyofadefendaRlviiliolianaliBalpenonsiSjacttoalfachmentundarCadedGMIfHooedurosedfon
407JlHO(jpoc0y/.
iDtcnstsfaifealproperty;depositaoeounts;accounUieoeivable;clattelpaper;geoeral
fatapgDiks;ecpi^uneat;finiiproducts;biveotoiy;nonqrjudgmenla;nonpyonlbspreuiises;
negotiablBdocumentsoftitle;instnimeiiis;seeuiiUes;ndoenls;andcoimnunhypopertymteiest
Inpropertyofaspouse.
& i I DefcndamahBBtmnsfartothalgvyfnooWioefpowestfnoef
(1)0anydooumerdaiyOMldanoBlndafondanlSposietstonofWatoanypropertydnotibedInham3b.
PDCDanydoQumeidaiyewtdenoBtndefondantfSpoeeesalonofdeM0M«dtodefendantdeaoribedtoItem3b.
(3)OthefoIlovdngpiopeftyfodefondanlf6pes8esiton(!9eGB)d:
NOTWeTODEFENDAIfr:PAIUIRETOOOMPLYWIIIITHISORDERMAYSUBJ^YOUTO
ARREBTANDPUNiBHIIEIfrFORCONrEAIPrOFCOURT. .j
«>
d.CD Othorppecfliyd:
a.TotatnumbarofboxeschedcodInhem3: 3
Datac IO-ji.02. in
.Htf w ► n{J^
/ ^
vim EX PARTE RtOHT TO ATTACH ORDER AND ORD
Exhibit 1. oaae 000035

EXHIBIT “G”

^230160976
NOTICEOF ATTACHMENT UEN /TERMINATION/ AMENDMENT
Follow WSTWUCTtOHSeWTUlLrthttM »nibieksftom
Ba
•llNDACiCiOvxiOOUlNr lOr(HUitAMOASOntSSl
c/o Ventucj Co. sheriff '
Civil Division
800 S Victoria Rm 101 FILED
Ventura, CA 93009 SftCRflMEHTO, CB
( OCT 25, 2002 BT 1700
' BILL JONES
SECRETBRY OP STBTE
1. COURT " ' " '
Ventura Co. Superior Court 800 S Victoria, Ventura# CA 93009
arms LLC
M.noiviouArsiAS SUFfK
CGUSTRF
qfTY
501 Canada Larga I Ventura CA |
93
i*"ir7'Jr'TT'.T-rj.Tr
<.FIAIH71FF8SBCU8EPPARTY^EMCT NAME
•
Er<e'on*name allM,A* orAb. Oo net ibbnifUl* ar csmUniflimti
Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., LLC c/o David Chatfield, ESQ
4«.
(NOtVIOUAl-SCAST NAME iCTr.ri'arnrs
4c. MAB.M8A0D
425 Zeno Way
irr
Oak Park ^1377
S. NOTCE B HEREBY OVEN THAT:
0Piake((>tu«cqiMHtal»chfnntMntaaeoe,4«M«WU»lii*pmitiafl«ftl»iaCitfQ>nUCad«efCk,ipnx*d.o«eAUiiapK<AepraMfty4«cHb«dbeiw.A
WKlelABKbfflaM b*s bitAkCMatf br Cnvton
w*Hj Oct 11, 2002
□ awnidt,atotAemAMNA piaJrUfSnelon|«rhai»AUetfuMn| BtrtenUMeei>itt>s'eftfHiii<ani TbewiieeerfsHilfHttfvrfiAVia
aaawttfwaiamadatid aartPBaWa. h PianmnawntMUrf.
PtahjMmtBAierdstnuBBKtvneHDenanBteaBluiealW dalendire. —aw OmAacih B«oaiia«H«uu
aadHNNa h IhawbvtamibiMad. ■
P j Byera*,d«•■nmnMni B*netfc*dihitfwiefttli#nm(9!nieyntdwentheSaemunrdtele
Amima Bid FteNo. l* emenbid u lel foMh enthe aiucAM page.
b. oeseniPTiON op bpscvic propCKPr attacmso
Equipment oC going business., including paddocks, tack, fences, etc
at 3501 Canada Larga Road, Ventura
Accounts receivable
HAL (Pnnieenemel
ATTAOAtCMt UfHrOAU (Rm.MIMI)
COPY 4#eei*CA Saeiw,«, sen
Exhibit 1. Dace 000036

EXHIBIT “H”

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David BlakeChalfield,Slate Bar No.88991
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
2625TownsgateRoad,Suite330
WestlakeVillage,CA91362
Phone(805)267.1220
Fax(805)267-1211
Attorney forPlaintiiT
Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co.,LLC
®l*^«OOUOT
filed
JUL 1 12O05
•PLANET
wandClerk
Deputy
SUPERJOR COURTOFTHESTATE OFCALIFORNIA
FORTHECOUNTY OF VENTURA
CaseNumber:CIV 214702
TEMPORARYPROTECTIVEORDER
LIVESTOCK CO.,LLC,aCalifornia limited
liabilitycompany
Plaintiff,
V.
JOHNREDMOND;MAUREEN
REDMOND;GERALDINEREDMOND;
SOMERSET,LLC.akaSOMERSETFARMS
LLC,aCaltfomialimited liabilitycompany;
DO^1-25,inclusive.
Defendants
TheCourthasconsidered theapplicationofplaintifffrom atemporary protectiveorder.The
CourtfindsthatdefendantsJohnRedmond and MaureenRedmond are naturalpersons,there is
dangerthatassetsofdefendantsJohn and MaureenRedmond would beconcealed,transferred,sold,
encumbered,hypothecated,substantiallyimpaired in value,ordisposed of. TheCourt findsthat allof
thedefendantsin this matterhave filed aNoticeofAcceptanceofStatutoryOffer permitting
judgment to beentered againstthem,includingattomeysfeesand costs. Plaintiffs Motionfor
Attorneysfeesispendingasis plaintiifsmemorandum ofcosts.There isgood causefound for
preservingthestatusquountilthejudgment,including attomeysfeesand costs,becomesfinaland the
assetscan be levied upon..
TEMPOAARV PonTPrm/P rwnPD Exhibit 1.Dane000037

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23
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THECOURTORDERS thaidefendantsJohn Redmond and Maureen Redmond
arerestrained from selling,transferring,encumbering,hypothecating,concealingorin any way
disporingof until thefulljudgmentin this matterbecomefinaland the assetscan
belevied upon. ' * •^
Dated:July[1,2005
JudgeSuperior Court
riuc oonco Exhibit 1.oaoe00003!

EXHIBIT “I”

• I
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7
B
9
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David Blake Chatfietd Bar No.88991
Westlake Law Group
2625Townsaate Road,Suite 330
Westlake Village,OA 91361
phone:80526^1220
fax:806 267-1211
AttorneysforPlaintiff MICHAEL0.PLANET
siitlve Officer and
ismm
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA
LIVESTOCK CO.LLC.etc etal
Plaintiff.
Case No.:CIV214702
AMENDED JUDGMENT
V.
JOHN REDMOND,etc..etal..
Defendants.
WhereasdefendantsJohn Redmond.Maureen Redmond,Geraldlne Redmond and
SomersetFarms,LLC(collectively"defendants")filed their NoticeofAcceptanceof
StatutoryOfferto Compromise(CCP Section 998)of plaintiffSulphur Mountain Land &
Livestock Co.LLC("Sulphur")on June 1.2005;and,
WhereasthisCourtawarded Judgmentagainstdefendantsin favorofSulphurin the
amountof$25,000.00 pluscostson July28.2005;
Whereas,this Court previouslygranted in partand denied irrpartdefendants'
motion totax plaintiffs'costs and granted plaintiffs' motionfor attorneysfees against
defendants;and QKMvljLAJtJ A'j
5 J ^ '
I Whereas;this Court previously denied defendants'motion for new trial and denied
defendants'motion for reconsideration ofdefendants'motion to tax costs and motion for
attorneysfees;
AMENDED JUDGMENT

52.decl miyamotooppmotavoidlien

52.decl miyamotooppmotavoidlien

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