1. 38426 5371
SUPPLEMENT TO
The London Gazette
OF FRIDAY, Sth OCTOBER, 1948
b?
Registered as a newspaper
MONDAY, 11 OCTOBER, 1948
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN BETWEEN THE
7TH SEPTEMBER, 1943 AND 28x11 NOVEMBER, 1943.
The -following Despatch was submitted to the 3. Following our successful landings in Sicily
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the with unexpectedly small losses of assault ship-
2fjth December, 1943, by Vice-Admiral Sir ping and craft, an attempt was made to plan
ALGERNON U. WILLIS, K.C.B., D.S.O., and mount " Accolade " using such forces as
Commander-in-Chief, Levant. were available in the Middle East or were
earmarked for India. Once again, it became
Levant. necessary to call on General Eisenhower to
Tfjth December, 1943. make up deficiencies, particularly in long range
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the fighters, and, as a result, " Accolade " was
attached report of Naval Operations in the cancelled by decision of the Combined Chiefs of
Aegean between the 7th September, 1943 and Staff, at the Quadrant Conference.* The Com-
«8th November, 1943. manders-inOhief, Middle East informed the
Chiefs of Staff on 3ist August that the only
(Signed) A. U. WILLIS, operations which could be mounted from Middle
Vice-Admiral, East were:—
Commandenn-Chief. (a) Small Scale Raids.
GENERAL REPORT ON AEGEAN (b) Sabotage and Guerilla operations by
OPERATIONS. Resistance Groups.
EVENTS LEADING UP TO OUR ENTRY INTO THE (c) Unopposed " walk-in" to areas
AEGEAN. evacuated by the enemy.
The possibility of capturing the island of PHASE I.
"Rhodes and subsequently opening up the
Aegean (Operation " Accolade") had been Surrender of Italy to the opening of the German
under active consideration since January, 1943. Air Offensive.
Outline plans were drawn up but the require- Sth to z6th September, 1943.
ments of the advance in North Africa and later 4. When it was known that Italy had sur-
the invasion of Sicily (" Husky "), prohibited rendered, it was decided to take advantage of
the allocation of forces necessary to mount such this situation by encouraging the Italian gar-
an operation. risons to hold such Aegean islands as they
2. In April, Force Commanders and their could against the Germans, and to stiffen their
staffs were assembled in Cairo to plan for resistance by sending in small parties of British
" Accolade " to take place shortly after the troops. Between Sth and i6th September,
landing in Sicily, when an Italian surrender Casteloriso, Kos, Leros, Samos, Kalymnos,
was considered possible. By the middle of Symi and Stampalia were all occupied by small
June, however, it became apparent that assault detachments of Raiding Force troops accom-
shipping, craft and air forces would not be panied by Civil Affairs Officers. Fairmile motor
available and the Naval Force Commander and
staff were sent to Algiers to plan " post-Husky" Admiralty footnote:
* Quadrant Conference—the British-American con-
operations in the Central Mediterranean. ference held at Quebec in August, 1943.
60584 A

2. 5372 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948
launches and caiques of the Levant Schooner and war material as they could lay their hands
Flotilla manned by Royal Naval crews provided on. With the exception of Syra they estab-
the transport. lished observation posts only and did not
5. In Rhodes our emissaries were unable to garrison the islands in force.
prevent the Italian Governor surrendering the 10. Apart from Rhodes, the Italians' atti-
island to the Germans after a short resistance. tude was co-operative in the islands visited by
(There were 30,000 Italian and 7,000 German us, though their fighting value was low. It
troops in the island.) The combined service was considered that even if Leros were rein-
mission waiting at Casteloraso and the 234 forced by such British troops as were avail-
Infantry Brigade waiting to proceed to Rhodes able and Kos airfields developed and defended
were therefore held available to reinforce the adequately, we should not be in a secure posi-
British forces in the other islands. tion to continue operations in the Aegean until
6. During this phase our naval forces, con- Rhodes was in our possession. Accordingly on
sisting of six Fleet destroyers of the 8th 22nd September the Chiefs' of Staff approval
Destroyer Flotilla, 2 Hunt class destroyers, ist was obtained to mount " Accolade " before
Submarine Flotilla, 6 motor launches, 4 the end of October with- such forces as were
L.C.F.* caiques and 8 R.A.F. high speed available in the Middle East and could be spared
launches and pinnaces were employed on:— from the Central Mediterranean.
(a) Building up British forces and supplies
in the islands. PHASE II.
(6) Intercepting enemy shipping proceed- The Start of the German Offensive.
ing from the Piraeus to the Dodecanese.
26th September-i2th October.
7. By 28th September, the following had
been landed:— n. With the arrival of large enemy air re-
inforcements from France and the Russian front
2,700 men, 21 guns, 7 vehicles, 450 tons and the proved inefficiency of the A.A. defences
of stores and ammunition. of Leros, as shewn by the sinking of H.M.S.
8. Acting on air reconnaissance, on reports INTREPID (Commander C. A. de W. Kitcat,
from agents in the Piraeus area and from R.N.) and H.H.M.S. QUEEN OLGA in Leros
Italian reporting posts and L.R.D.G.f patrols harbour on 26th September, operations of our
in the Cyclades, destroyers carried out sweeps surface forces in the Aegean were restricted to
; sweeps during the dark hours with forces who
n the Aegean by night, retiring to the south-
ward or lying up in Leros during the day. On retired to the south-eastward to obtain fighter
i8th September, H.M.S. FAULKNOR (Captain cover from Cyprus during the day. On ist
A. K. Scott-Moncrdeff, D.S.O., R.N.), H.M.S. October :all available Fleet destroyers were
ECLIPSE (Commander E. Mack, D.S.O., sailed to Malta as escort to H.M. Ships HOWE
D.S.C., R.N.) and H.H.M.S. QUEEN OLGA and KING GEORGE V, leaving us with the
(Lieutenant-Commander G. Blessas, D.S.O., Hunts whose speed and endurance made it
R.H.N.) sank a 3,000 ton merchant vessel and difficult for them to operate far into the Aegean
a 1,200 ton merchant vessel north of Stampalia and still be clear by daylight. As a result,
and damaged the escort vessel, which put into H.M.S. ALDENHAM (Lieutenant-Commander
Stampalia and was captured by one of our J. I. Jones, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.R.),
patrols assisted by the Italian garrison. This H.H.M.S. MIAOULIS (Commander C.
convoy was carrying specialist personnel and Nikitiades) and H.H.M.S. THEMISTOCLES
supplies to Rhodes. On 23rd September, (Lieutenant-Commander N. Sams, R.H.N.)
H.M.S. ECLIPSE sank a 2,500 ton merchant who were patrolling off Kaso Strait on the night
vessel off the S.W. point of Rhodes which had of the 2nd/3rd October, were short of fuel and
landed reinforcements in Rhodes and was re- in no position to take action on an aircraft
turning to the westward. An ex-Italian tor- report of an enemy convoy sighted off Naxos
pedo-boat was driven ashore and later and believed on all available intelligence to be
destroyed by the R.A.F. bound for Rhodes. They were ordered to with-
draw to Alexandria for fuel. This convoy, in
9. Prior to the Italian surrender, the fact, carried an invasion force which was landed
Germans had made preparations to take over on Kos at 0500 on October 3rd and captured
the entire military administration of Greece the island in spite of stubborn resistance from
as from 6th September and had disposed suffi- the British battalion, who received small
cient forces on the west coast of Greece, the assistance from the Italian garrison.
Peloponnesus, Melos, Crete, Scarpanto and
Rhodes, to ensure the retention of their control 12. No surface force was available to interfere
in these key positions. In the period im- with the landing, but submarines on patrol
mediately following the surrender, the Germans were ordered to proceed to the Kos area to
were in no position to undertake seaborne attack invasion shipping, and on 4th October
operations, owing ,to the kck of shipping, the i2th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of H.M.
escort vessels and landing craft, which they had Ships AURORA, flying the broad pendant of
to obtain from the Italians or transfer from Commodore W. E. Agnew, C.B., D.S.O.,
other areas. By the middle of September, how- R.N., PENELOPE (Captain G. D. Belben,
ever, they had collected enough craft to D.S.C., A.M., R.N.), SIRIUS (Captain
despatch raiding forces to the Cyclades to P. W. B. Brooking, D.S.C., R.N.) and DIDO
evacuate the Italian garrisons and such food (Captain J. Terry, M.V.O., R.N.), with five
Fleet destroyers sailed from Malta at high
Admiralty footnotes :
* L.C.F.—large landing craft converted to mount
speed to be available for operations in .the
A.A. guns for air defence in combined operations. Aegean. From the night of 5th/6th onwards
f L.R.D.G.—Long Range Desert Group. a force of cruisers and destroyers patrolled

3. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948 5373
close off the Kaso or Scarpanto Straits ready PHASE III.
to act on any enemy reports which might be We build up Leros and Samos whilst the
received, retiring to the south-eastward by day. Germans prepare to invade.
13. H.M. Ships SIRIUS, PENELOPE, 1.2th October-$th November.
FAULKNOR and FURY (Lieutenant-Com- 18. On their return from Tunis, the Com-
mander T. F. Taylor, R.N.) entered the Aegean manders-in-chief, Middle East, at a meeting
on the night of 6th/7th October when recon- presided over by the Foreign Secretary and
naissance indicated that enemy reinforcements attended by the First Sea Lord, confirmed the
were arriving from the westward, and assisted decision to hold Leros and Samos, using all
by an enemy report from H.M. Submarine means in their power to do so, and at the same
UNRULY (Lieutenant J. P. Fyfe, R.N.) time decided that it would be impossible to
received at 0630 on 7th, they located and sank recapture Kos with the forces at their disposal.
an enemy convoy consisting of an ammunition Approval was given for the use of four Italian
ship, an armed trawler and six landing craft. submarines (ZOEA, ATROPO, CORRIDONI,
This encounter delayed the retirement of our MENOTTI) and H.M. Submarines SEVERN
force, which was attacked in daylight in the (Lieutenant-Commander A. N. G. Campbell,
Scarpanto Strait by J.U.88s and 875, H.M.S. R.N.) and RORQUAL (Lieutenant-Commander
PENELOPE being hit by an unexploded bomb L. W. Napier, D.S.O., R.N.) to assist in run-
and her speed reduced to 23 knots. (The ning supplies. Preparations were made to run.
destruction of this convoy probably prevented a vessel of the Turkish ferry type through to
the enemy from making an immediate assault Leros with heavy vehicles during the November
on Leros.) non-moon period. This latter venture was sub-
sequently abandoned.
14. A force under H.M.S. CARLISLE
(Captain H. F. Nalder, R.N.) carried out a 19. On I4th October, Vice-Admiral Sir
sweep on the nights of 7th/8th and 8th/gth Algernon U. Willis, K.C.B., D.S.O. relieved
October to intercept any further enemy forces Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham, K.C.B.,
attempting to reach the Dodecanese from the " M.V.O. as Commander-in^Chief, Levant.
Piraeus. No sightings were made and at 1215 20. Intelligence now suggested that the enemy
on gth October, when the force was proceeding would stage an invasion of Leros from Kos and
south through Scarpanto Strait, it was heavily Kalymnos with the 4,000 troops believed to be
atacked by J.U. 875 and although the escort- already there, as soon as he could transfer
ing Lightnings shot down 15 enemy aircraft additional shipping and landing craft from the
and ships accounted for three more, H.M.S. Piraeus. Our surface forces were therefore
PANTHER (Lieutenant-Commander Viscount employed in conjunction with air reconnaissance
Jocelyn, R.N.) was hit and sunk and H.M.S. and striking forces, to prevent the arrival of
CARLISLE, was hit aft and was towed to such shipping.- A striking force was kept almost
Alexandria by ROCKWOOD. continuously available in the area, which was
15. It now became apparent that our forces employed on anti-shipping patrols, bombard-
could not enter the Aegean to intercept enemy ments of ports and harbours in Kos and
shipping and be clear again by daylight, and Kalymnos islands. It was hoped by a display
that further attempts would lead to unaccept- of activity to induce the enemy to believe we
able losses, more especially as the Lightning were capable of exerting greater naval strength
Squadrons were withdrawn to the Central in the area than was actually the case.
Mediterranean. Accordingly the policy was 21. Reports at noon on I5th October showed
adopted of operating destroyers only as an anti- an enemy convoy of two merchant ships and
invasion force, and using cruisers to provide two landing craft off Naxos proceeding to the
A. A. and fighter direction during approach and eastward and H.M. Ships B E L V O I R
retirement from the Aegean and for operations (Lieutenant J. F. D. Bush, D.S.C., R.N.) and
in such areas they could reach during the night. BEAUFORT (Lieutenant-Commander Sir
16. The loss of Kos airfields, besides finally Standish O'G. Roche, Bt., D.S.O.) were ordered
destroying our hopes of fighter cover for our to intercept and destroy it. They were reported
surface forces, greatly increased the difficulties and heavily attacked by J.U. 88s and J.U. 875
of supply as it prevented the passage and un- though fortunately without incurring damage,
loading of merchant ships and heavy lift ships and the convoy was diverted to the northward,
which were urgently required to provide heavy thereby evading our force who had to withdraw
A.A. defences and to improve the transport to the southward due to lack of fuel. H.M.
situation in Leros. The capture of Rhodes Ships PHEOBE (Captain C. P. Frend, R.N.),
became increasingly important for the continua- FAULKNOR (Captain M. S. Thomas, D.S.O.,
tion of our operations. R.N.) and FURY who entered the Aegean at
dark, continued to search, but made no sighting
17. On gth October, a meeting was held at and had to withdraw from the Aegean before
Tunis, attended by General Eisenhower, the daylight. At 13006 on i6th October, H.M.
First Sea Lord (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Submarine T O R B A Y (Lieutenant R. J.
B. Cunningham, Bt, G.C.B., D.S.O.) and all Clutterbuck, R.N.) sighted the convoy to the
Commanders-in-Chief in, the Mediterranean northward of Levitha and sank one of the
and Middle East, including the Commander-in- merchant ships. During the night of the
Chief, Levant, Admiral Sir John H. D. i6th/i7th, H.M.S. HURSLEY (Lieutenant-
Cunningham, K.C.B., M.V.O., to cpnsider the Commander W. J. P. Church, D.S.O., D.S.C.,
situation, and it was finally decided that our R.N.) and H.H.M.S. MIAOULIS (Commander
resources would not allow us to mount Opera- E. Boudouris, R.H.N.) searched Kos roads
tion " Accolade ", but that we should try to and the east side of Kalymnos, setting a small
hold Leros and Samos as long as supplies could merchant ship on fire in Port Vathi, sinking an
be maintained. E-boat and a landing craft and setting a sloop

4. 5374 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948
on fire in Port Akti. This was a very spirited guns and equipment to make it reasonably
close range action. On the following night H.M. tactically secure and capable of beating off an
Ships J E R V I S (Captain J. S. Crawford, attempt at invasion by the enemy. This was
D.S.O., R.N.) and PENN (Lieutenant-Com- all the more necessary in view not only of the
mander J. H. Swain, D.S.O., R.N.) bombarded difficulty of intercepting an assault across the
Port Kalymnos and set a merchant ship in the very short distances from the harbours and
harbour on fire. This was evidently the second bays of Kos and Kalymnos islands and the
ship of the enemy convoy. quantity of minefields in the area, but also
22. The above enemy losses, with the because of the approach of winter and the strain
addition of the damage of four F-lighters on on the destroyers, for owing to losses, the
the i8th and 2oth by Mitchell aircraft of the distance from Alexandria, and other factors, it
U.S.A.A.F. and Beaufighter aircraft of the was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain
R.A.F. and torpedoing of a 600 ton merchant a striking force constantly in the area.
ship and a lighter by motor torpedo boats on 27. Every possible means was utilised for
the night I9th/20th, reduced the chances of the passing in these reinforcements, destroyers,
enemy being in a position to invade Leros for submarines, M.L.s, M.G.B.s, M.M.S.s,
the time being and our naval forces then con- B.Y.M.S.,* caiques and schooners, and be-
centrated on the reinforcement and supply of tween 3ist October and 7th November, the
Leros and Samos during the non-moon period. following were put into Leros:—
23. The supply of the garrison at Leros had By Surface Craft:— By Submarine:—
by this time (i8th October) become unsatis- 1,280 men, 33 tons of stores.
factory. An organisation was being set up for 180 tons of stores,
supply by caique through Casteloriso and 14 jeeps,
through Samos, but owing to various difficulties, i trailer;
only very small quantities of supplies had so 28. During this period of build up no contact
far reached Leros by either of these methods, was made with enemy forces, though our ships
though supplies to Samos were going well. carried out occasional bombardments of enemy
Some supplies were being put into Leros by ports whilst entering and leaving the Aegean.
air, but this was falling off owing to shortage We were unfortunate in that three destroyers
of transport aircraft. Supply by submarine were mined to the eastward of Kalymnos, H.M.
could not start for a week and these would only Ships HURWORTH (Commander R. H.
provide a proportion of the tonnage needed to Wright, D.S.C., R.N.) and ECLIPSE were sunk
maintain the garrison, much less build up a and H.H.M.S. ADRIAS had her bows blown
reserve. The situation was complicated by the off. On board H.M.S. ECLIPSE were some 200
fact that the reinforcement of the garrison of military reinforcements for Leros among whom
Leros, which then consisted of one battalion and casualties were heavy. Although subject to a
one company of infantry plus various details considerable weight of air attack both by day
"naking about 1,200 hi all, was dependent to a and night no ships were sunk by this method,
considerable extent on the creation of a regular though H.M. Ships SIRIUS and AURORA
supply service. were both hit and damaged seriously and
24. In these circumstances—at any rate H.M.S. BELVOIR sustained minor damage
temporarily until the caique service and sub- from an unexploded bomb.
marines got going—-it was decided that the 29. During the last week of October there
Navy would have to undertake the supply of were clear indications of the mounting of a
Leros with destroyers by night. This proved major assault force in the Piraeus. To over-
arduous and trying work for the destroyers come the shortage of landing craft, thirteen
who were constantly shadowed and attacked by 60 ft. powered lighters of the I-boat class
enemy aircraft during their approach and with- arrived by rail from the north. Simultaneously
drawal from the island. That the destroyers a group of three escort vessels of U-J type were
avoided damage in harbour was due primarily sailed from Piraeus to the Cyclades. The load-
to the careful organisation and good judgment ing of several merchant vessels with munitions,
of the Senior British Naval Officer, Aegean guns and supplies suggested preparations for a
(Acting Captain E. H. B. Baker, R.N.) follow-up convoy.
who, by varying the timing of the visits and 30. It was not clear if the assault was in-
the unloading ports and by reducing the time of tended for Samos or Leros, but a series of heavy
discharge to a minimum, was able on most air raids suggested the former. The sinking of
occasions to frustrate the enemy efforts to locate a 1,200 ton eastbound merchant vessel off
and bomb our ships whilst they were unloading. Anaphi by H.M. Submarine UNSPARING on
25. During the period i6th to 30th October, 29th October made it probable that the opera-
the following reinforcements were put into tion would be postponed, and this impression
Leros: — was confirmed by the return of a 2,000 ton
By Surface Craft:— By Submarine:— merchant vessel from Syra to Piraeus on ist
950 men, 17 men, November.
290 tons of stores, 255 tons of stores, PHASE IV.
6 guns, 12 guns, Invasion of Leros—yd November to
ii jeeps, i jeep. i6th November.
ii trailers; 31. On 3rd November, landing craft and
26. As a result of a visit to Leros of senior escorts were in Lavrion and agents reported
Army Staff Officers from General Headquarters, they were carrying out landing exercises.
Middle East, policy was reviewed by the three Photographic reconnaissance on 4th November
Commanders-in-Chief on the 3Oth October. It Admiralty footnote :—
was then decided still further to reinforce the * M.L.—Motor Launch ; M.G.B.—Motor Gun Boat;
island, which the Army considered needed M.M.S.—Motor Minesweeper; B.Y.M.S.—British Yacht
some 1,200-1,300 more troops and additional Minesweeper,

5. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948 5375
showed nine landing craft and two escort vessels Limassol ships could only remain in the area
in Lavrion with a further four landing craft at for a short period. For example, the Hunts
Zea. They were reported moving eastward on had only enough fuel for one whole night's
5th November. Between then and the evening sortie at high speed and the return journey
of loth November when they arrived in the to Alexandria or Limassol.
Kos/Kalymnos area, they moved only by day (d) The short haul for enemy invasion craft
under heavy fighter protection, dispersing and for the actual assault, particularly if, as was
lying up during the night, first in the Paros/ expected, they assembled first in the various
Naxos area and later in Amorgos, Levitha and bays of Kalymnos Island and then moved off
Stampalia. to attack at the selected moment.
32. Every effort was made to intercept the 36. Accordingly it was decided that if Leros
force. Beaufighters and Mitchells of 201 (Naval was being invaded, destroyers could best con-
Co-operation) Group attacked it by day, and tribute by endeavouring to intercept at night
at night our destroyers often under an attack and destroy the follow-up convoys, which it was
searched the areas where the landing craft were considered would be vital to the enemy.
expected to be lying up, and bombarded har- Destroyers were therefore instructed that they
bours in these areas. Our efforts met with should not leave their lying up positions by
small success, due by day to the heavy scale day in order to intercept invading forces unless
of fighter protection the enemy maintained over specifically ordered to do so by the Com-
the convoy and by night to the difficulty of mander-in-Chief.
spotting the craft which were probably beached
and camouflaged in the many small bays avail- 37. Motor launches, motor torpedo boats and
able. One F-lighter, one landing craft and two motor gun boats were placed under the orders
caiques remained behind in Amorgos on gth of the Senior British Naval Officer, Aegean.
November, after the rest of the force had sailed, At night the motor launches carried out anti-
and these were probably damaged by Beau- invasion patrols, whilst the motor torpedo boats
fighters during their attack p.m. on 8th Novem- and motor gun boats were held at immediate
ber. H.M. Ships PENN and PATHFINDER notice in harbour to act on enemy reports. Fuel
(Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Malins, R.N.) stocks for coastal forces were established in
sank a caique (probably a Naval Auxiliary) Samos and in caiques, with small emergency
south of Paros on the night 6th/7th November. stocks in Leros.
33. With the arrival of this force at Kos and Situation on evening of loth November.
Kalymnos on nth November, the enemy had
available a total force of 4 serviceable F-boats, 38. The bulk of the enemy invasion flotilla
13 I-boats, 5 Auxiliary Naval craft and a num- having arrived at Port Kalymnos and Kos har-
ber of armed caiques, and into these he loaded bour, it was hoped that they would have to
troops and equipment already assembled in spend at least one night there fuelling and pre-
these islands. paring to move up to the northern bays of
Kalymnos, from which the invasion was ex-
pected to be launched.
APPRECIATION ON THE MORNING
ENEMY INVASION FLOTILLA REACHED 39. Bombardments of Port Kalymnos and
KOS/KALYMNOS (IOTH NOVEMBER). • Kos harbour and roads were therefore carried
out in bright moonlight on night loth/nth
34. Despite the efforts of our destroyers and November respectively by destroyer forces
Air Force, the enemy had, as previously under Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PETARD
described, succeeded in getting the bulk of his (Commander R. C. Egan, R.N.) and
invasion flotilla to its destination. The delays Captain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla (Captain
imposed upon him by our activities had at M. S. Thomas, D.S.O., R.N.) in FAULKNOR
any rate given time to the reinforced Leros H.M.S. PETARD'S force, consisting of H.M.
garrison to re-organise and prepare for the im- Ships PETARD, ROCKWOOD (Lieutenant
pending invasion. It was now necessary to S. R. le H. Lombard-Hobson, R.N.) and
decide on the policy for the employment of O.R.P. KRAKOWIAK, spent one and a half
destroyers in the event of Leros being assaulted hours close off Port Kalymnos and pumped
from the neighbouring islands. 1,500 rounds of 4-inch into this small harbour.
35. The following factors governed the A ship which had been damaged previously
matter: — was set on fire and capsized, but it is not known
(a) The opinion of the Army Command whether damage was done to landing craft.
that the reinforced garrison of Leros should 40. Both forces were bombed and H.M.S.
be able to beat off, or at any rate destroy ROCKWOOD in PETARD's force, damaged
after landing, an initial attack provided that •by an unexploded glider bomb, hit in the gear-
reinforcements in strength and heavy equip- ing room. By a fine feat of seamanship,
ment could be prevented from reaching the ROCKWOOD was towed by H.M.S. PETARD
enemy. under constant bombing attack to Losta Bay
(6) The enemy's complete air superiority in the Gulf of Doris, where they arrived by
in the area, and the heavy scale of attack he daylight.
could inflict on the ships by J.U. 88s and
J.U. 875 with fighter escort. Experience has 41. Captain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla who
shown that the enemy had no intention of had been instructed to proceed with his force
refraining from attacking ships under way on completion of his bombardment remained in
in Turkish waters. the Gulf of Kos so as to be in a position to
(c) The limited number of destroyers it was assist H.M.S. PETARD with H.M.S. ROCK-
possible to maintain in the area over the WOOD if required.
period of waiting for the invasion to start. 42. During nth, air reconnaissance showed
Due to the distance from Alexandria or considerable movement of landing craft between
60584

6. 5376 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948
Kos and Kalymnos, and it appeared that pre- 0145/i3th and sunk. ECHO and BELVOIR,
parations to mount the assault on Leros were after picking up survivors, proceeded. Mine-
in train. The afternoon reconnaissance showed sweepers and motor launches which had 'been
a concentration of landing craft in Kos harbour. sent to Samos from Leros were loaded with
reinforcements and ammunition, but since time
43. The enemy intentions were still not clear. would not permit their reaching Leros that
As the next force of destroyers could not reach night, they were held at Samos.
the area until late on the night I2th/i3th, it
was essential to conserve fuel in Captain (D), 47. During the night I2th/i3th November
8th Destroyer Flotilla's force. He was there- a southerly gale blew up which restricted the
fore ordered to move to an anchorage nearer to operation of light craft on both sides. On I3th
Kos Channel and to send his two Hunts to November fighting continued ashore, and in
attack any landing craft in Kos roads reported spite of very heavy bombing by the enemy
by air reconnaissance. and a further parachute landing at ogooB / i3th
November, which suffered high casualties due
44. Motor Torpedo Boat 307 (Lieutenant to the strong wind blowing, our forces kept the
J. G. G. Muir, R.N.V.R.) on passage from enemy pinned down to the eastern shore in the
Casteloriso to Leros was in action with two Alinda Bay area. During the night of I3th/
unknown destroyers off Kalymnos at 0330/I2th I4th November, H.M. Ships FAULKNOR,
November, and at 0445/I2th the motor torpedo BEAUFORT, and H.H.M.S. PINDOS after
boat force sailed from Alinda Bay at full speed attempting to bombard enemy positions in
to search for an enemy merchant ship reported Leros, left the Aegean owing to shortage of fuel.
4-5 miles south-east of Leros. No sighting was H.M. Ships ECHO and BELVOIR however
made, but later when sweeping to the north- bombarded enemy positions on Leros at the
ward, two destroyers were sighted off request of the Army, and later carried out a
Pharmaco. These were mistaken for British sweep in the area without making a sighting.
destroyers. Reinforcements from Samos in the motor
45. At approximately 0400/I2th November launches and minesweepers were turned back
Motor Launch 456 (Lieutenant-Commander by the weather. H.M. Ships PENN, ALDEN-
F. P. Monckton, R.N.R.) on patrol to the east HAM and BLENCATHRA (Lieutenant E. G.
of Alinda sighted and reported enemy forces Warren, R.N.) entered the Aegean.
12 miles east of Leros proceeding north and 48. At Leros all naval signal publications
later engaged a force of two destroyers and ten were destroyed at 0700 /I4th November when
landing craft. After a short and gallant action an enemy attack threatened to overrun the
Motor Launch 456 was damaged and forced to naval headquarters and this seriously inter-
return to Alinda Bay where she landed fered with communications and therefore with
wounded. operations. From then on, signalling with the
46. Between 0600 and 0830/I2th November Senior British Naval Officer at Leros had to be
the enemy succeeded in landing both north and done through army channels using army
south of Alinda Bay with the object of " pinch- cyphers.
ing out " the bay where he would then be 49. During the day of the I4th November,
able to land heavy support weapons. A further fighting in Leros continued, our forces counter-
landing was attempted at Blefuti Bay on the attacking with some success in the forenoon,
north of the island, but was repelled with the but with the growing weariness of our garrison
loss of two landing craft. It would appear that who had been fighting for 48 hours with no
the Italian C.D.* guns did not open fire until real rest under heavy scale air attack, fresh
too late, and this coupled with the fact that troops and more ammunition were urgently re-
our close range weapons were sited to cover the quired. These were collected during the night
more important bays, enabled the enemy to from Samos by H.M. Ships ECHO and
land forces at iPalma, Pasti Di Sotto, Grifo and BELVOIR. ECHO, by proceeding at 30 knots,
N. Appetici with the loss of only one more managed to land her 250 troops at Portolago
landing craft. Landings were counter-attackefl before daylight, but BELVOIR with her slower
and held by our forces, but at 13406/12 the speed was forced to lie up.
situation was made more difficult by the land-
ing of parachute troops to -the west of Alinda, 50. Enemy positions were attacked from the
When darkness fell, H.M. Ships FAULKNOR, seaward by H.M. Ships PENN, ALDENHAM
BEAUFORT and H.H..M.S. PINDOS and BLENCATHRA who arrived at Alinda JBay
(Lieutenant-Commander D. Fifas, R.H.N.) at dusk on I4th November. Unfortunately only
together with Motor Torpedo Boats 315 three enemy caiques were in the bay, but these
(Lieutenant L. E. Newell, D.S.C., were engaged and targets ashore, pointed out
R.N.Z.N.V.R.), 266 (Sub-Lieutenant J. N. by our forces, were taken under fire. H.M.S.
Broad, R.N.Z.N.V.R.), and 263 (Lieutenant PENN and her force then patrolled in this
A. G. Fry, R.A.N.V.R.) swept in the Leros/ area being repeatedly attacked by enemy air-
Kalymnos/Levitha area to prevent enemy re- craft including glider bombers. She was search-
inforcements reaching Leros, and at 2210, ing for landing craft reported by Leros, but
Mount Clido battery, Leros was bombarded failed to find. They had evidently turned back
from the eastward at the request of the Army as a result of enemy air reports of H.M.S.
ashore. They made no sightings. H.M. Ships PENN's force.
DULVERTON, ECHO (Lieutenant^om-
mander R. H. C. Wyld, R.N.) and BELVOIR 51. Motor torpedo boats again patrolled the
were picked up by enemy aircraft whilst enter- area and shortly before daylight they joined'
ing the Aegean and shadowed, and H.M.S. H.M.S. ECHO, who was returning from
DULVERTON was hit by a glider bomb at Portolago, in attacking an enemy force which
was approaching Alinda Bay, sinking an F-
Admiralty footnote: lighter and two landing barges all laden with
* C.D.—coast defence. troops.

7. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948 5377
52. Thus, on the morning of I5th Novem- 58. The course taken by the fighting in
ber, our forces had been reinforced, whereas Leros, however, prevented any action by these
the enemy, though possibly reinforced late on caiques though in the final stages a number
the I4th,. had been deprived of some of the re- of army and naval personnel managed to escape
inforcements due to arrive on the morning of in various craft.
the i5th. We were, however, owing to the 59. After its fall on i6th November, evacua-
heavy bombing, and the physical condition of tion of such troops as could foe got out of
our -troops, unable to score decisively against Leros was conducted by Lieutenant-Comman-
the enemy during the day. der L. F. Ramseyer, R.N.V.R., from a caique,
53. H.M. Ships PENN and ECHO'S forces he himself having escaped from Leros by
had been shadowed continuously by aircraft caique 12 hours after its surrender. Naval
during the night of I4th/i5th November, and craft and a number of R.A.F. high speed
bombed from time to tune, and it was evident launches were used, S.B.S.* patrols being
that the enemy were making use of air recon- landed to round up British troops still at
naissance to keep their forces clear of ours; liberty. An R.A.F. launch and Levant
on the night I5th/i6th, therefore, H.M.S. Schooner No. 2 successfully evacuated the
PENN and her force were ordered to remain L.R.D.G. patrols from Seriphos and Mykoni
at immediate readiness and to act on enemy respectively.
reports, hoping thereby that enemy forces 60. Following the fall of Leros it was decided
would be committed to a landing and that we to withdraw Allied forces still remaining in
would be able to intercept them. Owing to Samos. These consisted of 220 British troops
breakdown of W/T in Leros, reports of enemy and 380 of the Greek Sacred Squadron. This
landing craft, relayed through Alexandria, was successfully carried out by caiques on the
arrived in H.M.S. PENN too late for action night of igth/2Oth November; in addition,
to be taken on them, and the dawn sweep 8,300 Italian troops, Greek guerillas and civi-
ordered by Commander-in-Ghief, Levant pro- lians were evacuated. This movement was
duced no enemy sighting. In point of fact, had covered by various naval and R.A.F. craft.
the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. PENN The majority of these .troops together with a
acted as soon as he received the report, it is number of Italians from the Samos garrison
possible that he might have interfered with the and Greek refugees, were sent 'by train to
landing craft off the beaches in Alinda Bay. Syria, having turned over their arms.
54. Motor torpedo boats, minesweepers and 61. The remainder of the British naval and
motor launches landed the troops ex H.M.S. military personnel from Samos and the
BELVOIR at Portolago during the night. H.M. escapees from Leros found their way south
Ships ECHO and BELVOIR left the Aegean in a variety of craft, including two Italian
short of fuel, and H.M. Ships FURY, EX- F-lighters, one towing an L.C.M., two
MOOR (Commander J. Jefferies, R.N.) and L.C.T.sf, an Italian tug towing a M.M.S.,
O.R.P. KRAKOWIAK arrived to take their various minesweepers and coastal craft, all of
place. whom arrived in Levant ports by 2nd Decem-
55. On the i6th November the situation ber. One of these F-lighters which left Leros
ashore in Leros became critical as reinforce- on i5th November under the command of
ments received during the night allowed the Lieutenant Stowell, R.N.R., reached Haifa via
enemy to overrun our headquarters and posi- Samos with 177 German prisoners from Leros
tions in the Merviglia area, and though they still on board on 25th November.
were driven out again by the reinforcements 62. The direction of these operations was
we had received, the continued bombing and seriously 'hampered by the capture of B.Y.M.S.
the incessant fighting over nearly five days 72 at Kalymnos on the night of nth/i2th
had so reduced the fighting power of our forces November, which resulted in all the codes
that they were unable to continue the battle carried by these small craft being compromised.
and the island surrendered at approximately
17006. 63. Following our withdrawal from the
Aegean it was decided to reduce the status
56. During the night i6th/i7th November of Casteloriso to that of an outpost which
H.M.S. EXMOOR and O.R.P. KRA- could be evacuated if a heavy attack developed
KOWIAK, who had been ordered to Samos against it; accordingly on the night of
to transfer the Greek " Sacred " Squadron to 27th/28th November surplus men, guns and
Leros, rejoined H.M.S. FURY. H.M. Ships equipment were withdrawn to the Levant -by
PENN and ALDENHAM's bombardment of destroyer and L.C.T. without incident.
the Alinda Bay area had to be cancelled and
they bombarded Kos harbour on their way 64. A satisfactory sequel to these disappoint-
south to join H.M.S. BLENCATHRA, who ing operations was the successful withdrawal
was towing H.M.S. ROCKWOOD from the of the damaged H.H.M.S. ADRIAS through
Gulf of Kos to Alexandria. Kos Channel and north of Rhodes. She left
on ist December, and reached Alexandria
PHASE V. under her own steam on 6th December. For-
tune favoured this hazardous passage in that
WITHDRAWAL FROM AEGEAN. unforeseen circumstances prevented her move-
57. Plans were made in mid-October to col- ments being known to the enemy until she was
lect a number of caiques to be available in east of Casteloriso. In the first place a German
case it became necessary to withdraw our hospital ship on opposite course passed her
troops from Samos and Leros. The number
of small craft under the orders of the Senior Admiralty footnotes :
British Naval Officer, Aegean was also in- * S.B.S.—Special Boat Squadron, an Army unit
(see paragraph 71).
creased for general operational purposes and f L.C.M.—Landing Craft, Mechanis3d vehicles;
to assist in a possible withdrawal. L.C.T.—Landing Craft, Tank.

8. 5378 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948
in the Kos Channel and the enemy searchlight Operations of Raiding and Reconnaissance
was extinguished during a critical period; later, Forces.
when north of Rhodes, the ship escaped detec- 71. The activities of the Raiding and Recon-
tion in continuous rain storms. naissance Forces merit special mention. When
the Axis had been expelled from North Africa
GENERAL REMARKS ON THE OPERATIONS AS A the Long Range Desert Group and Special Boat
WHOLE. Squadron- of the Special Air Support Regiment
returned to the Middle East. As it was now
Air Cover. necessary for them to cross the sea to continue
65. Throughout the operations our surface their activities against the enemy, they were
forces were unable to exercise that command trained on the Levant coast to operate from
of the Aegean to which their superiority to the submarines, Fairmile motor launches and
enemy surface forces entitled them due to the coastal force craft of all types, and a force
complete enemy command of the air. of caiques and schooners, known as the Levant
Schooner Force, was formed under Commander
66. With the help of our submarines and air, Coastal Forces, Eastern Mediterranean, manned
and by accepting heavy losses from air attacks by specially selected officers and men to work
by day and latterly with increasing accuracy with them. These latter craft were fitted with
by night, we were able to interfere seriously Tank engines giving them a speed of 6 knots
with enemy merchant ship convoys to Rhodes and an endurance of 2,000 miles. With the
and the Dodecanese, but we were unable to mast down they could be camouflaged so effec-
stop craft of all types moving by day only tually that they could not be spotted when
with heavy fighter cover and hiding up hi out lying up close inshore.
of the way bays and inlets by night. Once
again the fact that surface forces cannot exer- 72. These forces were acting over the
cise their proper functions in restricted waters Southern- Aegean throughout the period of
without air cover, was clearly demonstrated. operations. They were the first to arrive and
the last to leave, and carried out many daring
Distance of Area of Operations from our Bases. and successful operations in enemy-occupied
islands. There is no doubt that forces of this
67. The fact that the centre of the area of type, well-trained and led, can be of great
operations was 350 miles from our bases in value both for harassing the .enemy and ob-
Alexandria and Cyprus had the following ad- taining important intelligence.
verse effect on- the operations of surface
forces:— Submarine Operations.
(a) Operations of the destroyers were 73. In common with all other forces operating
limited to two nights in the Aegean at the in the Aegean during this period the sub-
most, after which they had to return to refuel. marines were driven hard. Their patrols, which
(fe) Even when fighter cover was available, were largely carried out in narrow waters in
long gaps were inevitable, as our fighters close proximity to known or suspected mine-
usually had to return to base after the first fields, were often considerably prolonged owing
attack owing to shortage of petrol, and it took to the series of local emergencies which kept
anything up to 3 hours for reliefs to arrive. developing, and which required the presence
of a submarine in the area.
68. It was impracticable to base small craft 74. In- the majority of areas the submarines
on- Casteloriso or any of the Aegean islands were subjected to continual surface and air
owing to enemy air attack which was very anti-submarine activity, and in addition our
accurate by day, and the policy was for all own surface forces were always liable to be
craft to lie up during daylight. encountered at night. These factors, coupled
with the fact that few torpedo targets were
Command. encountered, threw a very heavy strain- on all
69. The question of command was not en- concerned, and particularly on Commanding
tirely satisfactory. Policy and major decisions Officers.
were made by the Commanders-in-Chief Com- 75. -It speaks well for the aggressive and
mittee in Cairo, but whereas naval operations determined temper of the First Submarine
were conducted by the Commander-in-Chief, Flotilla that under these difficult conditions
Levant from his headquarters, which was com- three merchant ships, totalling 7,500 tons, and
bined with that of No. 201 (Naval Co-opera- a 400 ft. floating dock were torpedoed and
tion) Group, R.A.F., at Alexandria, the Army sunk, and twenty-one caiques and schooners
appointed a Corps Commander with a Head- destroyed, mostly by gunfire.
quarters in • Cairo, and the R.A.F. an Air
Vice Marshal who, though himself in- Cairo, 76. The task of the supply submarines was
had his operational headquarters in Cyprus. not easy, owing chiefly to dislocation in the
This did. not work out well in practice, and working of the ports at Leros. The heavy air
finallv General Headquarters, Middle East and attacks which developed at night during moon-
Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East light periods, made unloading submarines im-
took over the direct control of operations. practicable at these times.
70. On the naval side, experience in the 77. H.M. Submarine SEVERN had to be
Levant has shown that the best results are withdrawn from the supply service after one
obtained by using the normal station opera- trip owing to complete failure of her main
tional organisations to the maximum, and that and auxiliary engines. Of the five Italians, one
new operational staffs should be limited to those never left Haifa, and the mechanical condition
required to enable local naval commanders of the other four was giving rise to consider-
to exercise operational control in the area of able concern. They carried out their tasks
operations. efficiently and with considerable enthusiasm.

9. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948 5379
CONCLUSION. particularly trying conditions. They achieved
considerable success against the enemy and held
78. These operations were carried out to take off the attack on Leros for some time, but not
advantage of the Italian surrender to obtain a without heavy casualties to our own forces.
foothold in the Aegean with such forces as were
available in the Middle East. We failed be- 81. Had more aircraft been« available,
cause we were unable to establish airfields in especially modern long range fighters, and given
the area of operations. more luck, the operations might have been pro-
longed, but after the loss of Kos, if the enemy
79. The enemy's command of the air enabled was prepared to divert the necessary effort, it
nim so-to limit the operations and impair the is doubtful if Leros could have been held in-
efficiency of land, sea and air forces that by definitely without our embarking on- a major
picking his time he could deploy his compara- operation for which no forces were available.
tively small forces with decisive results. 82. It may be, however, that the inroad made
So. The naval forces engaged on these opera- in the enemy's shipping resources—which pro-
tions, cruisers, destroyers, submarines and cess is still going on—will prove a fatal handi-
coastal craft, and the small force of aircraft cap to him when the time comes for us to
available to 201 (Naval Co-operation-) Group embark on an " all in " offensive hi the Aegean,
all fought hard and did valiant work under with adequate forces.
LONDON
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