Decentralized Wastewater Treatment and Reuse in Arid Regions 2003
PCIA presentation- Marwan Haddad
1. PCIA OF THE PALESTINIAN ISRAELI WATER CASE
Marwan Haddad
Professor of Environmental Engineering, Civil Engineering Department
Director of Water and Environmental Studies Institute (WESI)
An-Najah National University, Nablus, Palestine
Tel: 970-9 2345124, Fax: +970 9 2345982, Mobile +970 599 294952
e-mail: haddadm@najah.edu, haddadm50@email.com
7. Overview of Palestinian Israeli Peace
Accords on Water (1993-1995)
During round 2 meeting of the Middle East Multilateral Working Group on
water held in Vienna, Austria, May 14-15, 1992, Israel, Jordan and the
Palestinians agreed to cooperate on hydrological data sharing, which
had previously been withheld from the Palestinians.
In Oslo I agreement between Israel and PLO signed September 13, 1993,
the two sides agreed to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing
Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on
water (Annex III, article 1).
Gaza-Jericho agreement between Israel and PLO signed in Cairo, May 4,
1994 (Gaza Jericho Agreement 1994), tackled the water issue in the
context of environmental protection and prevention of environmental
hazards.
Oslo II interim agreement (interim agreement 1995). Article 40 of the
agreement’s annex III, was devoted to “water and sewage”.
8. Author’s Peace Building Experiences and
reflections
• Experiences in Academic and People-to –People
Efforts
• Palestinian/Israeli Water Negotiation (1993-95)
9. Experiences in Academic and People-to –
People Efforts
a. The Middle East Regional Water Study
The Middle East regional water study was highly technical and results
obtained were of high caliber quality and constituted the based for
almost all subsequent national supply-demand studies. All the teams
worked together and participated in joint meetings in harmony and in
cooperative atmosphere.
From peace building perspective, parties were very cautious on opening
their national accounts, especially Israel and concentrated on
developing regional options where there are no political implications.
Technical teams were tied in their subject coverage and detailing from
their political side (the political steering committee of the project
consisting of countries representatives plus the German side), and in
many cases delays were related to political sides responses.
10. Experiences in Academic and People-to –
People Efforts
b. Joint Management structures for the aquifers shared by Israelis and
Palestinians
• This study was special from peace building perspective. It started before
Oslo peace process and was dangerous to Palestinian participants who
could be called collaborator with the enemy at the time.
• Both teams started out on this study as adversaries and strangers, but
quickly became colleagues and eventually friends. Discussions,
although with different views and perspectives were friendly and open.
• The research team adopted the approach of transparency and rational
in dealing with all project activities including joint study teams meetings
and discussions and all international workshops.
11. Experiences in Academic and People-to –
People Efforts
b. Joint Management structures for the aquifers shared by Israelis and
Palestinians
• Two good choices helped in the high success of the study and for being
a positive example for peace building efforts: the size of the team and
that many local and international experts participated and joined the
study team in discussing the conflicting issues and in presenting their
experiences and potential resolving options.
• The joint management structure study outcomes (reports and
workshops proceedings) were passed to decision making people at both
sides and up to my personal knowledge were read carefully and
positively impacted their attitude towards joint water management.
This study is a good and positive example of efforts that helped in
paving the road to peace and stability between the two sides.
12. Palestinian/Israeli Water Negotiation (1993-95)
• The Middle East Madrid Peace Conference was convened on
October 30, 1991
• Shortly after the Madrid conference, author was appointed
by PLO in 1991 to head the Palestinian water technical
group for peace negotiating team.
• Later in 1993 author was appointed as Palestinian team
member to the Palestinian/Israeli bilateral as well as to the
Palestinian multilateral peace working group on water.
• In 1995, author was head of Palestinian negotiation team
for the transfer of water authority in the West Bank.
13. Palestinian/Israeli Water Negotiation (1993-95)
• At the start of the process, 1991/1992, PLO was not
prepared for detailed negotiation with Israel including that
on water.
• Also PLO did not have a negotiating team on water, and
policy or strategy on water negotiation with Israel.
• The selected Palestinian team was devoted but mostly
technical individuals from various institutions, without
previous knowledge of each other, and without proper
negotiating skills.
• All what was in hand is some archive files and reports
prepared by various experts and sides. Data in those reports
and papers was not verified or validated.
14. Palestinian/Israeli Water Negotiation (1993-95)
• Water negotiations on the transfer of authority on water in the Gaza Strip in
1995 went smooth
• Negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis on interim transfer of authority (of
water) in the West Bank started in Cairo Mid 1995 and continued for four months
with difficulties in defining the terms of reference. These negotiations ended in
Taba
• This agreement is what appeared in Oslo-B article 40 – Annex 3 (Oslo – B 1995).
It was not an agreement addressing Palestinian water needs and problems on
the contrary some of the articles in it harm the Palestinian cause such as the one
talking about the future Palestinian water needs estimated at 70-80 mcm.
• This agreement was intended, that this accord is only valid for the transient-
interim stage that will end in the year 2000 and the water issue at the end of
that stage will be settled among the other pending issues such as Jerusalem,
border, refugees, etc.
• This was a mistake and Palestinians as well as Israelis should not agree to
postpone important issues such as water to later times instead of facing and
settling them at the start.
15. Palestinian Israeli Negotiating Differences on
Water
• Problem Identification
• Peace definition
• Historic Facts
• Water Equity, Rights, and Needs
• Water Prior Use and Illegal Exploitation by Israel
• Water Supply to Jewish Colonies and Army Camps
• Water Infrastructure and Contractual Agreements
• Positive Realizations
• Palestinian Water Rights and National
Sovereignty
16. Peace Building Risks, Effects, and Concerns
The overall Attitude
Multiplicity of Efforts
Going for Bold and Comprehensiveness in Agreement
Gradual in implementation
Peace Building or Aid Hunting
Extreme Events Management
During Negotiations and Pre Agreement Accomplishment
Post Agreement Setting
Peace Governance
Care about Ecology and the Environment not only Allocations
17. Concluding Remarks
• Continuing the past and present approaches of dealing with the
Palestinian Israeli Conflict on land and water of historic Palestine will
result in a serious harm to both people with different proportions and
scales.
• Peace building process between Palestinians and Israelis including
national and shared water resources need to be well prepared.
• A bi-lateral negotiated long lasting just peace between the two sides
including an agreement on national and shared water resources based
on unified national rights, human values, and mutual living is the
solution.
• Mutual living between Palestinians and Israelis under the same values
and criteria in peace and stability requires reaching a practical – long
term solutions