This document discusses electricity restructuring and competition, including:
- Traditionally, electricity provision was regulated vertically integrated utilities. In the last 25 years, restructuring introduced competition through wholesale electricity markets.
- Factors leading to restructuring included deregulation of other industries and high electricity prices. Wholesale electricity trading illustrated the feasibility of electricity markets.
- Key aspects of restructuring included unbundling generation from transmission/distribution, establishing organized wholesale markets, and setting up independent system operators to manage grid operations and reliability.
1. Electricity Restructuring
and Competition
Electricity MarketsTraditional Organization of Electricity
Provision in U.S.Govt regulated, vertically integrated public
utilitiesLast 25 YearsWave of restructuring and introduction of
electricity trading and competition across U.S. and other
nationsNow large-scale wholesale electricity markets operate
across many parts of U.S.
Factors leading to restructuring & deregulation
Prior track record of deregulating energy markets and other
industries once considered natural monopolies
telecomm, airlines, railroads,
High electricity prices in spite of regulation
In U.S. states such as NY, California, New England
2. In other countries, such as U.K.
As the U.S. electricity transmission grid was built out in the
2nd half of 20th century, electric utilities started buying and
selling energy from each other
This illustrated feasibility of trading energy across the grid in
markets
Political Push
2nd Bush President
Electricity Restructuring – A How-To GuideUnbundle
generation from transmission and distributionIt’s important to
allow multiple business firms to own and operate generation
plants (independent power producers (IPPs) or merchant
generators)This may require forcing some vertically integrated
IOUs to divest some of their generation assets
Electricity Restructuring – A How-To GuideEstablish an
organized market for wholesale electricity tradingSellers are
firms like merchant generators that inject energy into the
gridBuyers are retail distributors and industrial users that
withdraw energy from the gridMarket rules might include an
advance-trading (e.g., day-ahead) market as well as a real-time
balancing market
Electricity Restructuring – A How-To GuideSet up an
organization to manage and coordinate energy flows over the
3. gridThis could be an independent system operator (ISO) or a
regional transmission organization (RTO)Key
responsibilitiesBalance energy supply and demand in real
timeMaintain system reliabilityCoordinate new transmission
investments
Wholesale Market Competition
Electricity Restructuring – A How-To GuideRetail
distributionOwnership and operation of local distribution
networks would typically continue as regulated public utilities
(natural monopoly rationale)But it is feasible to introduce retail
competition via brokers and energy re-sellers who purchase
wholesale energy, re-sell it to retail customers, and pay fees to
local distribution companies for use of the local network.
Wholesale Electricity MarketsLet’s examine a perfect
competition model of a short-run (hourly) wholesale electricity
marketDemand SideDemand varies hour by hour, as weather
conditions and desired electricity usage changeVery price
inelastic – most retail customers pay fixed retail pricesSupply
SideMost supply comes from fossil fuel generatorsFF supply is
driven by cost of generation and capacities of generation
units.Generation from renewables is intermittent
Fossil Fuel Generation and SupplySupply curve from FF
generation is comprised of a series of steps –Width of step is
generation capacity of a unitHeight of step is marginal cost
4. (MC) of the unitFF MC of generationMC = heat rate x fuel cost
+ emissions rate x emissions tax rate
Generation Example
TypeMarginal Operating CostCapacity
Nuclear$12/MWh1000 MW
Coal$25/MWh2500 MW
Gas$55/MWh1500 MW
Turbine (peaker)$90/MWh 500 MW
Example with Supply and DemandDraw the competitive supply
curve for the production of electric energy on this system
Assume that demand is 3000 MW and is completely price
inelastic in the very short run. What would be the spot price in a
perfectly competitive wholesale electricity market? Assume that
demand is 4500 MW and is completely price inelastic in the
very short run. What would be the competitive spot price be?
What if there is a downward sloping demand function:D(P) =
5050 – 10PWhat is the spot price in a perfectly competitive
market?Assume that demand is 6000 MW for prices up to
$110/MWh, but that 600 MW of this demand would be willing
to be curtailed for prices above $110/MWh or more. What is the
perfectly competitive market price in this case?
Competitive Supply Curve
5. Example - continuedLet’s use the example to tease out
wholesale purchase costs for buyers (distributors).Assume that
demand is 3000 MW for 8 hours/dayAssume that demand is
4500 MW for 12 hours/dayAssume that demand is 6000 MW for
prices up to $110/MWh, but that 600 MW of this demand would
be willing to be curtailed for prices above $110/MWh or more
for 4 hours/day
Example - continuedLet’s use the example to tease out
wholesale purchase costs for buyers (distributors).Assume that
demand is 3000 MW for 8 hours/dayAssume that demand is
4500 MW for 12 hours/dayAssume that demand is 6000 MW for
prices up to $110/MWh, but that 600 MW of this demand would
be willing to be curtailed for prices above $110/MWh or more
for 4 hours/dayThen prices are:P = $25 for 8 hours/dayP = $55
for 12 hours/dayP = $110 for 4 hours dayAverage purchase cost
for buyers = (8*$25+12*$55+4*$110)/24 = $50.4/MWh
Renewable Energy in Wholesale MarketsWhat happens when
renewable energy (wind turbines, solar panels) generation
capacity is added?Let’s look at how the example changes when
1000 MW of solar photovoltaic generation capacity is added to
the grid.Impact on wholesale prices and price volatility?
6. Competitive Supply Curve with 1000 MW renewable capacity
added
Electricity Markets over the GridWholesale Electricity
CompetitionThe scope and size of the market can be expanded
by using the transmission network to connect buyers and sellers.
A bigger market can enable more suppliers to compete for
sales.If there are no transmission bottlenecks, then a grid-
connected area can operate as a single market with a single
price.But sometimes transmission links will be capacity-
constrained, and prices in different parts of the network will
differ.Locational Marginal PricesCompetitive prices at each
node of the network that take into account transmission
constraints.See next 2 slides for LMP contour mapsGoogle
MISO-PJM LMP contour map to see current map
MISO-PJM pricing contour map – evening March 11, 2019
MISO-PJM pricing contour map – afternoon March 12, 2019
Trouble w/ Electricity Markets?California restructured its
electricity industry and opened wholesale market to competition
in 1998California Energy Crisis of 2000Why?High summer
demandLarge drop in hydro-electricity importsSpike in natural
7. gas pricesMarket power of IPPs – especially at peak demand
timesImpactBIG increase in wholesale prices (~400-
500%)Distco’s squeezedRolling blackouts
End of California CrisisDistribution utilities nearly bankrupt by
early 2001California ended its restructuring experiment in
2001State govt negotiates new supply contracts for utilities
(very costly contracts!)Arnold gets elected
governorRestructuring grinds to a halt in most of Western U.S.
Why did restructuring flop in CA?Problems with CA
restructuring planLimits on long-term forward contracts
between generation suppliers and distribution utilitiesLack of
retail buyer price response (no real time pricing)NIMBY
obstacles to generation investments (not enough slack in
system)
18 THE STANDARD PRESCRIPTION
FIGURE 2.1 Physical functions of electricity.
FINAL CUSTOMERS ( RETAIL SALES )
OFFICE HOUSEFACTORY
LOCAL DISTRIBUTION
8. SYSTEM
GENERATION
( POWER PLANTS )
TRANSMISSION
NETWORKS ( GRID )
FLOW OF POWERMETER
SYSTEM
OPERATIONS
Reforming the Industr y 45
This is all we will say about Model 2 structural issues. Models 3
and 4
are where the action is. It is, however, worth remembering that
the new
trading arrangements can be developed and put into operation
before Mod-
els 3 and 4 are actually introduced. Transmission and system
operations can
be separated from generation and new trading arrangements
instituted be-
fore any deregulation takes place or any competitors enter the
market. In
the United States, this would be somewhat similar to the
operation of the
old tight pools, where (for many years, and well before the
introduction of
competition) the final price to customers was regulated but the
dispatch and
transmission were coordinated over a wide area, and the pricing
9. rules for
wholesale sales between companies were approved by FERC.
This should
not be taken as a proposal that the rules of the old tight pools
should be
adopted in the United States. However, the rules we do propose
for trading
arrangements later in the text could be adopted in modified
form even be-
fore wholesale competition is introduced.
M o d e l 3 : W h o l e s a l e C o m p e t i t i o n
Model 3 as we define it here has a fully competitive generating
sector. There
is no cost-of-service regulated generation. Distribution
companies (now
FIGURE 3.3 Model 3—wholesale competition.
DISTCO
CUSTOMER
DISTCOLARGECUSTOMER
LARGE
CUSTOMER
CUSTOMER
ENERGY SALES
IPPIPP IPP IPP IPP
TRANSMISSION WIRES
10. WHOLESALE
MARKETPLACE
Renewable Energy
Main Types of Renewable EnergyDispatchable
RenewablesHydroelectric PowerGeothermalVariable Energy
ResourcesWind TurbinesOn-shoreOff-shoreSolarHot water
heatersConcentrating solar power (also called, solar
thermal)Solar Photovoltaic (PV)
Concentrating Solar Power
Solana station 280 MW parabolic trough solar plant, 70 miles
SW of Phoenix
11. Ivanpah, CA Solar Tower Plant (377MW, $2.2 billion)
Solar PVA PV cell consists of two or more thin layers of semi-
conducting material, most commonly silicon. When the silicon
is exposed to light, electrical charges are generated and this can
be conducted away by metal contacts as direct current (DC).
The electrical output from a single cell is small, so multiple
cells are connected together and encapsulated (usually behind
glass) to form a module (sometimes referred to as a "panel").
The PV module is the principle building block of a PV system
and any number of modules can be connected together to give
the desired electrical output.Modules are connected to inverters,
which convert DC power into AC power.
Crystalline silicon PV panels
Solar PVTypesCrystalline siliconThin filmConcentrating PVSet
UpFixed tilt (land vs. rooftop); facing directionSingle axis
trackingDouble axis trackingScaleUtility scale > 1 MW
Distributed generation (rooftops, building sites) 1 kW – 1 MW
12. Room for solar?Consider the following factsUS electricity
consumption = 4 billion MWh/yrSolar PV capacity factor (AZ)
= 20 %Solar PV space requirement = 3 acres/MW640 acres land
per square mileHow much land would be required to supply all
US electricity consumption from solar PV?
Growth in RenewablesI’ll focus on wind and solar – Fastest
growing renewables in electricityWind turbine capacity growing
~ 20%/yr in USSolar PV capacity growing ~ 30%/yr in USOther
renewablesHydro, geo-thermal, bio-fuelsWhy so much growth
in wind & solar?Falling prices Favorable policies – subsidies,
tax credits, RPS, …Concerns about environmental impacts of
fossil fuel use
Solar Generation as % of Total Generation, 2018
Experience Curve (Learning by Doing)
13. Economic comparisons of electricity generation
technologiesCommon metric in energy industry is the levelized
cost of energy (LCOE)LCOE is equal to the constant price per
unit energy that would equate NPV of revenues to NPV of costs;
alternatively; a measure of the real average total cost of
generation over the lifetime of a generation plant
EIA estimates of LCOE*
* Advanced coal has total system LCOE = 139
Classifying generation technologiesDispatchable
generatorsCoal, gas combined-cycle, nuclear,…Can be
controlled by a system operator; can be turned on and off based
on economic conditionsCan provide electricity generation as
well as reliability services – such as spinning reserves and
frequency regulationIntermittent generatorsWind, solar PV,
solar thermalProduction depends on weather conditionsCan’t be
controlled by system operator (unless coupled with energy
storage)
Public (or Social) vs Private Economics of Renewable
EnergyPublicFocus on overall economic costs and benefits,
taking into account things like environmental benefits, time-
varying benefits and costs, electricity system reliability, …
14. Public (or Social) vs Private Economics of Renewable
EnergyPublicFocus on overall economic costs and benefits,
taking into account things like environmental benefits, time-
varying benefits and costs, electricity system reliability,
…PrivateLook at costs and benefits from viewpoint of an
individual decision-maker:household considering installing
solar panels (EXCEL)Electric utility considering investing in
wind turbinesThese costs and benefits would be evaluated after
the effects of subsidies and/or tax breaks
Economic value of intermittent renewable generationTiming of
generationDoes generation occur when electricity is
valuable?Timing of (on-shore) wind, vs solar PVSolar PV vs.
solar thermalEnvironmental benefitsWhat fossil fuel generators
are displaced? How much of each type of emission is reduced;
how do you value emissions reductions?Grid integration costsAt
higher penetration of renewables, intermittency leads to more
supply variability and could reduce system reliability.Does this
require more spinning reserves, more backup generation
capacity?
Short run value of intermittent renewable generation*Notationy
= electricity load (quantity demanded) per period (random)C(x)
= fossil fuel generation cost of producing qty x; λ = C’(x)EM(x)
= emissions associated with producing qty x; ϕ =EM’(x)τ = $
damages per ton of emissionsK = renewable generation
capacitys = renewable generation output per unit of capacity
(random)
15. * See Baker, et al, “Economics of Solar Electricity” Annual
Review of Resource Economics, 2013.
Short run value of intermittent renewable generationNotationy =
electricity load (quantity demanded) per period (random)C(x) =
fossil fuel generation cost of producing qty x; λ = C’(x)EM(x) =
emissions associated with producing qty x; ϕ =EM’(x)τ = $
damages per ton of emissionsK = renewable generation
capacitys = renewable generation output per unit of capacity
(random)Value of KV(K)=E[[C(y) – C(y-sK) +τ EM(y) – τ
EM(y-sK)]
Short run value of intermittent renewable generationNotationy =
electricity load (quantity demanded) per period (random)C(x) =
fossil fuel generation cost of producing qty x; λ = C’(x)EM(x) =
emissions associated with producing qty x; ϕ =EM’(x)τ = $
damages per ton of emissionsK = renewable generation
capacitys = renewable generation output per unit of capacity
(random)Value of KV(K)=E[C(y) – C(y-sK) +τ EM(y) – τ
EM(y-sK)]Marginal value of KV’(K)=E[λ]E[s] + Cov[λ,s] + τ
E[ϕ]E[s] + τ Cov[ϕ,s]
Marginal Value of Renewable CapacityMarginal value depends
on:E[s] = Capacity factor of renewable E[λ] = Average of
marginal cost (MC) of displaced fossil fuel gen Cov[λ,s] =
Covariance of renewable generation and MCτ = $ damages per
ton of emissionsE[ϕ] = Average of marginal emission
ratesCov[ϕ,s] = Covariance of renewable generation and
ϕVariation in marginal value:Different types of renewable
16. energy – e.g., wind vs. solar – will differ across many of these
variables, and so their marginal value may be quite
differentEven for a given type – e.g., solar – marginal value
will vary based on local weather conditions and grid conditions
Net Metering for Solar PVA typical residential PV array will
sometimes yield more energy than the household is using. Net
Metering is a policy in which the distributor (eg, utility) buys
back or credits the household for energy it puts into the
grid.2005 federal law - all utilities are required to offer net
metering to their customers.ACC recently approved change from
1-for-1 net metering credits, to credits for excess generation
based on (lower) avg wholesale elec rate
Grid Parity for renewables?Grid parity for a renewable
technology is sometimes described as the point at which its
LCOE matches that of fossil fuel generation.Basic idea is that
once grid parity is achieved, that renewable technology
wouldn’t need subsidies or special incentives to compete with
fossil fuel technologies.OK, but here are a few other
considerationsIs it dispatchable; can it be used for reliability
svcs?Timing of generation and value?Magnitude of
environmental benefits?Are there major grid integration costs?
100% Renewables
Goalhttps://www.forbes.com/sites/trevornace/2017/08/01/califor
nia-goes-all-in-100-percent-renewable-energy-by-
2045/#3409408f570fhttp://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/112/49/1
5060.full.pdfhttp://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2017/06/16
/1610381114.full.pdf
17. Jacobson, et al Proceedings of National Academy of Science
2015
The large-scale conversion to 100% wind, water, and solar
(WWS) power for all purposes (electricity, transportation,
heating/cooling, and industry) is currently inhibited by a fear of
grid instability and high cost due to the variability and
uncertainty of wind and solar. This paper couples numerical
simulation of time- and space-dependent weather with
simulation of time-dependent power demand, storage, and
demand response to provide low-cost solutions to the grid
reliability problem with 100% penetration of WWS across all
energy sectors in the continental United States between 2050
and 2055.
Solution
s are obtained without higher-cost stationary battery storage by
prioritizing storage of heat in soil and water; cold in water and
ice; and electricity in phase-change materials, pumped hydro,
hydropower, and hydrogen.
PNAS 2017 – An assessment of 100% renewables claim
Previous analyses have found that the most feasible route to a
18. low-carbon energy future is one that adopts a diverse portfolio
of technologies. In contrast, Jacobson et al. (2015) consider
whether the future primary energy sources for the United States
could be narrowed to almost exclusively wind, solar, and
hydroelectric power and suggest that this can be done at “low-
cost” in a way that supplies all power with a probability of loss
of load “that exceeds electric-utility industry standards for
reliability”.
We find that their analysis involves errors, inappropriate
methods, and implausible assumptions. Their study does not
provide credible evidence for rejecting the conclusions of
previous analyses that point to the benefits of considering a
broad portfolio of energy system options. A policy prescription
that overpromises on the benefits of relying on a narrower
portfolio of technologies options could be counterproductive,
seriously impeding the move to a cost effective decarbonized
energy system.
Renewable SubsidiesThere is a vast array of federal, state, local
and utility subsidy programs for renewables – dsireusa.org is a
good info sourceMajor federal subsidies30% investment tax
creditElectricity production tax creditState subsidy
19. examplesRenewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) – eg California,
ArizonaSales tax exemptions - AZInterest rate subsidies for
loans - TexasCity solar PV subsidies - Texs
Grid integration and reliability challenges for
renewablesIntermittencyTiming and correlation with electricity
demandRenewable cost and capacity factorDispatchable vs non-
dispatchable generatorsSee Paul Joskow, American Econ Rev
(2012)
Load and solar output at 4 sites; 3 days in August 2011
California Duck Curve
20. The duck sinks – negative mid-day wholesale prices in CAISO
Why were generators willing to sell at negative prices??The
production tax credit. Some renewables owners (mainly wind)
are eligible for a production tax credit, which essentially pays
them for every MWh they produce. So, not producing means
foregoing this credit. In theory, producers will pay to sell into
the wholesale market as long as they’re paying less than the tax
credit.
Why were generators willing to sell at negative prices??The
Renewable Portfolio Standard. Under California’s Renewable
Portfolio Standard (RPS), utilities are on the hook to provide
60% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and
100% by 2045. The utilities sign contacts with renewable
providers in order to try to meet their RPS targets; utilities pay
a penalty if not met. So utilities want to encourage the
renewable providers to produce. For example, under a very
simple power purchase agreement, the utility would pay the
renewable provider a pre-specified price per MWh irrespective
21. of the wholesale market price, leaving the renewable provider
no incentive to shut down when prices are negative.
Why were generators willing to sell at negative
prices??Operating constraints. For some power plants, varying
the output level entails high costs, particularly starting and
stopping the plant. I think of those as analogous to the extra
fuel, plus wear and tear, planes expend taking off. So, if it costs
a lot to restart a nuclear plant or a coal plant, for example,
you’re willing to pay not to have to turn it off to avoid
incurring those costs.
Renewable Intermittency & Grid ReliabilityElectricity system
operators need to balance demand and supply of electricity in
real time to maintain reliabilityManaged via operating reserves
and back-up generatorsIntermittency of renewables poses risks
to reliability at high penetrationRole for large-scale energy
storageAbsent more storage, system operators must to carry
more operating reserves and back-up generatorsRole for
improved use of demand-response
22. Research ApproachesStructural model #1G. Gowrisankaran, S.
Reynolds, M. Samano “Intermittency and the value of renewable
energy” Jour Political Economy (2016)“This paper develops a
method to quantify the social costs and reductions in carbon
emissions from large-scale renewable energy generation. We
estimate social costs by solving for the decisions that maximize
total surplus under different levels of renewable energy
capacity. Social costs depend crucially on (1) the variability of
the source including the extent to which the variability
correlates with demand; (2) the extent to which output from the
source is forecastable; and (3) the costs of building backup
generation required to maintain system reliability.”
“Intermittency and the value of renewable energy” Data from
TEP, Tucson solar sites, EPA, NOAA, EIAModel of optimal
elec utility operations – includes generator dispatch, operating
reserves, investment, demand response, forecastingModel
parameters either estimated by GRS or drawn from estimates in
other studies.Results for 10 – 20% solar generation
mandatesIntermittency adds 2 – 3.5 ¢/kWh to solar PV
costsSolar mandates estimated to be very costly at time of
23. study, based on solar PV cost of $4.40/W; current solar PV
costs much lower20% solar mandate is ‘welfare-neutral’ at PV
cost of $1.50/W if SCC = $40/ton CO2
*
Today in Energy
March 6, 2017
U.S. wind generating capacity surpasses hydro capacity at the
end of 2016
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Preliminary
Monthly Electric Generator Inventory
Note: Data include facilities with a nameplate capacity of one
megawatt and above.
Installed wind electric generating capacity in the United States
surpassed conventional hydroelectric generating capacity, long
the
nation’s largest source of renewable electricity, after 8,727
megawatts (MW) of new wind capacity came online in 2016.
24. However, given
the hydro fleet’s higher average capacity factors and the above-
normal precipitation on the West Coast so far this year, hydro
generation will likely once again exceed wind generation in
2017.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electricity
Data Browser
Note: Data include facilities with a nameplate capacity of one
megawatt and above.
Wind and hydro generation both follow strong seasonal
patterns. Hydro generation typically reaches its seasonal peak in
the spring and
early summer, especially in the Pacific Northwest and
California where about half of U.S. hydropower is produced.
Across most of the
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30212#
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?
t=epmt_6_02_b
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=14611
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=16891
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=20112
25. Today in Energy
March 6, 2017
U.S. wind generating capacity surpasses hydro capacity at the
end of 2016
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Preliminary
Monthly Electric Generator Inventory
Note: Data include facilities with a nameplate capacity of one
megawatt and above.
Installed wind electric generating capacity in the United States
surpassed conventional hydroelectric generating capacity, long
the
nation’s largest source of renewable electricity, after 8,727
megawatts (MW) of new wind capacity came online in 2016.
However, given
the hydro fleet’s higher average capacity factors and the above-
normal precipitation on the West Coast so far this year, hydro
generation will likely once again exceed wind generation in
2017.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electricity
Data Browser
Note: Data include facilities with a nameplate capacity of one
megawatt and above.
Wind and hydro generation both follow strong seasonal
patterns. Hydro generation typically reaches its seasonal peak in
the spring and
26. early summer, especially in the Pacific Northwest and
California where about half of U.S. hydropower is produced.
Across most of the
NREL | 26NREL | 26
19.0%
12.7%
11.2% 11.0% 10.7%
6.5% 6.4%
5.4%
4.7%
4.2%
2.3%
0%
2%
29. al
N
et
G
en
er
at
io
n
CSP DPV UPV
Solar Generation as a Percentage
of Total Generation, 2018
• The role of utility versus distributed
solar varies by state, with
northeastern states and Hawaii
relying more on DPV.
Note: EIA monthly data for 2018 are not final. Additionally,
30. smaller utilities report information to EIA on a yearly basis, and
therefore, a certain amount of solar data has not yet been
reported. “Net Generation” includes DPV generation. Net
generation does not take into account imports and exports to
and from each state and therefore the percentage of solar
consumed in each state may vary from its percentage of net
generation.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Electricity
Data Browser.” Accessed April 3, 2019.
NREL | 62NREL | 62
PV Experience Curve • This experience curve displays the
relationship, in logarithmic form,
between the average selling price of a PV
module and the cumulative global
shipments of PV modules. As shown, for
every doubling of cumulative PV
shipments, there is on average a
corresponding ~22% reduction in PV
module price.
– In 2010, the experience rate was 20%
31. • Since 2012, module ASP has been below
the historical experience curve.
• Analysts project that by 2022 ASP will be
approximately $0.2/W and globally we
will have shipped a terawatt.
Source: 1976-2018: Paula Mints. "Photovoltaic Manufacturer
Capacity, Shipments, Price & Revenues 2018/2019." SPV
Market Research. Report
SPV-Supply6. April 2019.
0.1
1
10
100
1,000
0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000
M
33. Table 1a. Estimated LCOE (weighted average of regional values
based on projected capacity additions) for
new generation resources, plants entering service in 2022
Plant Type
Capacity
Factor
(%)
U.S. Capacity-Weighted1 Average LCOE (2015 $/MWh) for
Plants Entering Service in 2022
Levelized
Capital
Cost
Fixed
36. Biomass N/B
Non-Dispatchable Technologies
Wind 42 43.3 12.5 0.0 2.7 58.5 -7.6 50.9
Wind – Offshore N/B
Solar PV4 26 61.2 9.5 0.0 3.5 74.2 -15.9 58.2
Solar Thermal N/B
Hydroelectric5 60 54.1 3.1 5.0 1.5 63.7 N/A 63.7
1The capacity-weighted average is the average levelized cost
per technology, weighted by the new capacity coming online in
each region. The
capacity additions for each region were based on additions in
2018 -2022. Technologies for which capacity additions are not
expected do not have
a capacity-weighted average, and are marked as “N/B.”
2The tax credit component is based on targeted federal tax
credits such as the production or investment tax credit available
for some technologies.
It only reflects tax credits available for plants entering service
in 2022. EIA models renewable tax credits as follows: new
solar thermal and PV
37. plants are eligible to receive a 30% investment tax credit on
capital expenditures if under construction before the end of
2019, and then tax credits
taper off to 26% in 2020, 22% in 2021, and 10% thereafter. New
wind, geothermal, and biomass plants receive a $23.0/MWh
($12.0/MWh for
technologies other than wind, geothermal and closed-loop
biomass) inflation-adjusted production tax credit over the
plant’s first ten years of
service if they are under construction before the end of 2016,
with the tax credit for wind declining by 20% in 2017, 40% in
2018, 60% in 2019, and
expiring completely in 2020. Up to 6 GW of new nuclear plants
are eligible to receive an $18/MWh production tax credit if in
service by 2020. Not
all technologies have tax credits, and are indicated as “N/A.”
The results are based on a regional model and state or local
incentives are not
included in LCOE calculations.
3Due to new regulations (CAA 111b), conventional coal plants
cannot be built without CCS because they are required to meet
specific CO2 emission
standards. The coal with CCS technology modeled is assumed to
remove 30% of the plant’s CO2 emissions. Coal plants have a 3
percentage-point
38. adder to their cost-of-capital.
4Costs are expressed in terms of net AC power available to the
grid for the installed capacity.
5As modeled, hydroelectric is assumed to have seasonal storage
so that it can be dispatched within a season, but overall
operation is limited by
resources available by site and season.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual
Energy Outlook 2016, April 2016, DOE/EIA-0383(2016).
U.S. Energy Information Administration | AEO2016
Levelized Costs 6
Table 1a. Estimated LCOE (weighted average of regional values
based on projected capacity additions) for
new generation resources, plants entering service in 2022
Plant Type
Capacity
Factor
(%)
U.S. Capacity-Weighted
1
Average LCOE (2015 $/MWh) for Plants Entering Service in
41. 26 61.2 9.5 0.0 3.5 74.2 -15.9 58.2
Solar Thermal
N/B
Hydroelectric
5
60 54.1 3.1 5.0 1.5 63.7 N/A 63.7
1
The capacity-weighted average is the average levelized cost per
technology, weighted by the new capacity coming online in each
region. The
capacity additions for each region were based on additions in
2018 -2022. Technologies for which capacity additions are not
expected do not have
a capacity-weighted average, and are marked as “N/B.”
2
The tax credit component is based on targeted federal tax
credits such as the production or investment tax credit available
for some technologies.
It only reflects tax credits available for plants entering service
in 2022. EIA models renewable tax credits as follows: new
solar thermal and PV
plants are eligible to receive a 30% investment tax credit on
capital expenditures if under construction before the end of
2019, and then tax credits
42. taper off to 26% in 2020, 22% in 2021, and 10% thereafter. New
wind, geothermal, and biomass plants receive a $23.0/MWh
($12.0/MWh for
technologies other than wind, geothermal and closed-loop
biomass) inflation-adjusted production tax credit over the
plant’s first ten years of
service if they are under construction before the end of 2016,
with the tax credit for wind declining by 20% in 2017, 40% in
2018, 60% in 2019, and
expiring completely in 2020. Up to 6 GW of new nuclear plants
are eligible to receive an $18/MWh production tax credit if in
service by 2020. Not
all technologies have tax credits, and are indicated as “N/A.”
The results are based on a regional model and state or local
incentives are not
included in LCOE calculations.
3
Due to new regulations (CAA 111b), conventional coal plants
cannot be built without CCS because they are required to meet
specific CO
2
emission
standards. The coal with CCS technology modeled is assumed to
remove 30% of the plant’s CO2 emissions. Coal plants have a 3
percentage-point
43. adder to their cost-of-capital.
4
Costs are expressed in terms of net AC power available to the
grid for the installed capacity.
5
As modeled, hydroelectric is assumed to have seasonal storage
so that it can be dispatched within a season, but overall
operation is limited by
resources available by site and season.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual
Energy Outlook 2016, April 2016, DOE/EIA-0383(2016).
In addition, Arizona’s Renewable Portfolio Standard mandates
that 30% of total renew-
able energy consist of distributed generation, e.g. solar PV on
customers’ rooftops. Our
model allows distributed solar to have di↵ erent capital costs
from non-distributed solar and
to reduce electricity transmission costs.
44. Figure 2: Load and solar output for di↵ erent U.S. sites, Aug.
14-16, 2011
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Aug 14 00:00 Aug 14 12:00 Aug 15 00:00 Aug 15 12:00 Aug 16
00:00 Aug 16 12:00 Aug 17 00:00
Local Time
N
or
m
al
iz
46. Legend
Berthoud, CO
Rated 9.88 kW
New York, NY
Rated 5.7 kW
San Diego, CA
Rated 5.7 kW
Tucson, AZ
Rated 9.2 kW
(One Site Used
in Analysis)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
47. Aug 14 00:00 Aug 14 12:00 Aug 15 00:00 Aug 15 12:00 Aug 16
00:00 Aug 16 12:00 Aug 17 00:00
Local Time
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
L
oa
d
(L
oa
d/
M
ax
48. im
um
L
oa
d)
Legend
Xcel Energy Inc.
(Berthoud, CO)
New York ISO
(New York, NY)
San Diego Gas & Electric
(San Diego, CA)
Tucson Electric Power
(Tucson, AZ)
Note: The Berthoud, New York, and San Diego solar generation
data are from SMA Solar Technology AG’s
Sunny Portal (https://www.sunnyportal.com/). The Tucson data
49. displayed here are from one of 58 sites
used in our main analysis and are from the University of
Arizona Photovoltaics Lab. The site shown here
was chosen because it is the near the center of the city. The load
data are from Federal Energy Regulation
Commission Form 714. Load is measured hourly while solar
output is measured at the 15-minute level.
To illustrate the issues of intermittency, Figure 2 shows load
and solar PV output for
four sites across the U.S., for three summer days during our
sample period, Aug. 14-16, 2011.
We chose three sites from the Western U.S. with high solar
potential (Figure 1), as well as
New York. During these three days, the solar installation in
New York produces far below
its rated capacity at all times. The other installations all reach a
peak output of 75% of
9
50. The first ramp of 8,000 MW in the upward direction (duck’s
tail) occurs in the morning starting around
4:00 a.m. as people get up and go about their daily routine. The
second, in the downward direction,
occurs after the sun comes up around 7:00 a.m. when on-line
conventional generation is replaced by
supply from solar generation resources (producing the belly of
the duck). As the sun sets starting around
4:00 p.m., and solar generation ends, the ISO must dispatch
resources that can meet the third and most
significant daily ramp (the arch of the duck’s neck).
Immediately following this steep 11,000 MW ramp
up, as demand on the system deceases into the evening hours,
the ISO must reduce or shut down that
generation to meet the final downward ramp.
Flexible resources needed
To ensure reliability under changing grid conditions, the ISO
needs resources with ramping flexibility
and the ability to start and stop multiple times per day. To
ensure supply and demand match at all times,
controllable resources will need the flexibility to change output
levels and start and stop as dictated by
51. real-time grid conditions. Grid ramping conditions will vary
through the year. The net load curve or duck
chart in Figure 2 illustrates the steepening ramps expected
during the spring. The duck chart shows the
system requirement to supply an additional 13,000 MW, all
within approximately three hours, to replace
the electricity lost by solar power as the sun sets.
Oversupply mitigation
Oversupply is when all anticipated
generation, including renewables,
exceeds the real-time demand.
The potential for this increases
as more renewable energy is
added to the grid but demand
for electricity does not increase.
This is a concern because if the
market cannot automatically
manage oversupply it can lead
to overgeneration, which requires
manual intervention of the market
to maintain reliability. During
oversupply times, wholesale prices
can be very low and even go
negative in which generators have
53. Energy, Externalities & Climate
Emissions & ExternalitiesMuch of energy produced and used in
U.S. and around the world is from fossil fuelsBurning fossil
fuels yield air-borne emissionsSO2NOxCH4VOCPM2.5Mercury
(from coal)CO2
Emissions & ExternalitiesMuch of energy produced and used in
U.S. and around the world is from fossil fuelsBurning fossil
fuels yield air-borne emissionsSO2NOxCH4VOCPM2.5Mercury
(from coal)CO2So??Damage to natural environment,
cropsDamage to buildings, infrastructureMost important of all –
ill health and even deathCO2 – greenhouse gas that can affect
54. climate
EmissionsOK, sure there is some bad stuff coming from fossil
fuels, but they yield a tremendous amount of valuable, low-cost
energyThe economic problem is negative externalities. If the
people who produce and/or consume fossil fuels actually
(somehow) bear the costs and adverse consequences of
emissions, then you could say the benefits of this energy
outweigh the costs.But if NOT then this
production/consumption imposes negative externalities on
others. As a result, too many fossil fuels are produced and
consumed.
Energy and the EnvironmentBefore Climate Change (BCC)
EraMajor environmental challengesAcid rain – SO2 and NOx
emissions from burning coalUrban smog and air pollution –
mainly from NOx , PM, and VOC from cars/trucksPolicies in
BCC EraClean Air Act Amendments of 1990Established EPA
Acid Rain Program – Innovative Cap & Trade
ProgramRestricted auto emissions via technology standards
55. (e.g., catalytic converters), tighter CAFÉ standards, and blended
fuel requirements
Energy and Climate Change
Energy and Climate ChangeProduction and consumption of
fossil fuels results in greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions – mainly
CO2 and CH4 (methane)The greenhouse effect from GhG
emissions results in climate change – a multi-faceted
impactHow has CO2 in atmosphere been changing?
56. Energy and Climate ChangeProduction and consumption of
fossil fuels results in greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions – mainly
CO2 and CH4 (methane)The greenhouse effect from GhG
emissions results in climate change – a multi-faceted
impactHow has CO2 in atmosphere been changing?And what are
the impacts of this?
Economic Analysis of Environmental ImpactsBefore we go too
far into climate issues, let’s look at how we can analyze
environmental policy related to energy issues.And look at
lessons from prior environmental policy efforts
57. Model of emissions regulationTwo sides of emissionsDamages –
Changes in emissions result in marginal cost of emissionsFor
CO2, we refer to MC of emissions as Social Cost of Carbon
(SCC)“Benefits” – Emissions are a side-effect of productive
economic activity (like burning natural gas to generate
electricity)Marginal benefit (MB) of emissions is extra benefit
as emissions increase.Mirror image of MB is marginal
abatement cost of reducing emissions.
Managing Emissions Externalities
$
E
MB
MC
Managing Emissions Externalities
59. Policy OptionsDo NothingSo called business as usualEmissions
TaxWhere do tax revenues go?Emissions CapTechnology
Standard(s)Cap and Trade ProgramIssue emissions permits
equal to capped emissions levelAuction off permits or give
away (grandfather)
Managing Emissions Externalities
$
E
MB
MC
abatement
marginal abatement cost
Managing Emissions Externalities
$
E
MB
MC
60. abatement
marginal abatement cost
Managing Emissions Externalities
$
E
MB
abatement
marginal abatement cost
CAP
Cap & Trade
$
E
MB
abatement
marginal abatement cost
CAP
61. Measuring Economic Damages from EmissionsA wide variety of
damagesContaminated air and water, damage to crops,
illness/deathTwo main approaches for measuring
damagesContingent ValuationAsk people about WTP for better
environmental quality, reduced health/mortality risksBased on
survey or questionnaire responsesMarket-based
ValuationIndirect method to reveal WTP for enviro quality,
reduced health/mortality risksBased on market price or wage
changes as enviro quality, health/mortality risks vary
Illustration – Mortality RiskSuppose you knew for sure that
reducing air emissions by some amount would save one life; you
don’t know which person’s life, just that one life is saved. How
much is this worth in dollars? How much should society and
policy-makers value this life?
Illustration – Mortality RiskSuppose you knew for sure that
reducing air emissions by some amount would save one life; you
62. don’t know which person’s life, just that one life is saved. How
much is this worth in dollars? How much should society and
policy-makers value this life?Gov. Andrew Cuomo: “My
mother’s not expendable. You cannot put a value on human life.
You do the right thing. That’s what Pop taught us.”But let’s
suppose you needed to come up with a $ value for saving a life
– how would you do it? What would you come up with?
Illustration – Mortality RiskSuppose you knew for sure that
reducing air emissions by some amount would save one life; you
don’t know which person’s life, just that one life is saved. How
much is this worth in dollars? How much should society and
policy-makers value this life?Gov. Andrew Cuomo: “My
mother’s not expendable. You cannot put a value on human life.
You do the right thing. That’s what Pop taught us.”But let’s
suppose you needed to come up with a $ value for saving a life
– how would you do it? What would you come up with?
Putting an economic value on lifeContingent Valuation
ApproachGather survey responses about (hypothetical) WTP to
avoid various mortality risks [reduced auto crash risk,
63. workplace death risk, etc.]
From EPA website …
In the scientific literature, these estimates of willingness to pay
for small reductions in mortality risks are often referred to as
the "value of a statistical life.” This is because these values are
typically reported in units that match the aggregate dollar
amount that a large group of people would be willing to pay for
a reduction in their individual risks of dying in a year, such that
we would expect one fewer death among the group during that
year on average.
From EPA website …
This is best explained by way of an example. Suppose each
person in a sample of 100,000 people were asked how much he
or she would be willing to pay for a reduction in their
individual risk of dying of 1 in 100,000, or 0.001%, over the
next year. Since this reduction in risk would mean that we
would expect one fewer death among the sample of 100,000
people over the next year on average, this is sometimes
described as "one statistical life saved.”
64. Now suppose that the average response to this hypothetical
question was $100. Then the total dollar amount that the group
would be willing to pay to save one statistical life in a year
would be $100 per person × 100,000 people, or $10 million.
This is what is meant by the "value of a statistical life.”
Importantly, this is not an estimate of how much money any
single individual or group would be willing to pay to prevent
the certain death of any particular person.
Putting an economic value on lifeMarket-based Valuation
ApproachCompensating wage differences – how do wages differ
across occupations as mortality risk varies?You can find this via
regression analysis of market wage dataCan derive VSL – value
of a statistical life – based on the mortality risk coefficient in a
wage regression.
Earnings Regression Approach
Run a regression of annual income (I) on explanatory variables
including occupation (OCCP) and mortality rate for jobs in
occupation (MORT), where MORT indicates number of deaths
65. per 100,000 workers per year.
I = a + b*EDUC + c*OCCP + d*MORT + … + error
How do you interpret d coefficient?
Earnings Regression Approach
Run a regression of annual income (I) on explanatory variables
including occupation (OCCP) and mortality rate for jobs in
occupation (MORT), where MORT indicates number of deaths
per 100,000 workers per year.
I = a + b*EDUC + c*OCCP + d*MORT + … + error
d = △I/ △MORT = Change in annual income for having one
more death/100,000 per year.
VSL = d*100,000
Unique Environmental Challenges Posed by Climate
ChangeHealthy climate is global public goodMultiple large
66. uncertaintiesInequality and welfare analysisLong-term
persistent impactsRole of discount rate for NPV analysis
Climate, the Economy, and Climate PolicyMany areas of the
natural and social sciences involve complex systems that link
multiple areas and disciplines. This is particularly true for the
science, economics, and policy of climate change, which
involve a wide variety of fields from atmospheric chemistry to
game theory.Integrated assessment analyses and models play a
key role in putting the pieces together. Integrated assessment
models (IAMs) integrate knowledge from two or more domains
into a single framework. These are sometimes theoretical but
are increasingly computerized, empirical, dynamic, non-linear
models of varying levels of complexity.
67. Climate, the Economy, and Climate PolicyMany areas of the
natural and social sciences involve complex systems that link
multiple areas and disciplines. This is particularly true for the
science, economics, and policy of climate change, which
involve a wide variety of fields from atmospheric chemistry to
game theory.Integrated assessment analyses and models play a
key role in putting the pieces together. Integrated assessment
models (IAMs) integrate knowledge from two or more domains
into a single framework. These are sometimes theoretical but
are increasingly computerized, empirical, dynamic, non-linear
models of varying levels of complexity.
STERN REVIEW: The Economics of Climate Change
iv
Figure 1 Greenhouse-gas emissions in 2000, by source
Power
(24%)
69. Energy emissions are mostly CO2 (some non-CO2 in industry
and other energy related).
Non-energy emissions are CO2 (land use) and non-CO2
(agriculture and waste).
Total emissions in 2000: 42 GtCO2e.
Source: Prepared by Stern Review, from data drawn from
World Resources Institute Climate
Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) on-line database version 3.0.
Under a BAU scenario, the stock of greenhouse gases could
more than treble by the
end of the century, giving at least a 50% risk of exceeding 5°C
global average
temperature change during the following decades. This would
take humans into
unknown territory. An illustration of the scale of such an
increase is that we are now
only around 5°C warmer than in the last ice age.
70. Such changes would transform the physical geography of the
world. A radical
change in the physical geography of the world must have
powerful implications for
the human geography - where people live, and how they live
their lives.
Figure 2 summarises the scientific evidence of the links
between concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the probability of different
levels of global
average temperature change, and the physical impacts expected
for each level. The
risks of serious, irreversible impacts of climate change increase
strongly as
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere rise.
STERN REVIEW: The Economics of Climate Change iv
Figure 1 Greenhouse-gas emissions in 2000, by source
Power
(24%)
Transport
(14%)
71. Buildings
(8%)
Industry (14%)
Other energy
related (5%)
Waste (3%)
Agriculture
(14%)
Land use
(18%)
NON-ENERGY
EMISSIONS
ENERGY
EMISSIONS
Energy emissions are mostly CO
2
(some non-CO
2
in industry and other energy related).
Non-energy emissions are CO
2
(land use) and non-CO
2
(agriculture and waste).
Total emissions in 2000: 42 GtCO2e.
72. Source: Prepared by Stern Review, from data drawn from
World Resources Institute Climate
Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) on-line database version 3.0.
Under a BAU scenario, the stock of greenhouse gases could
more than treble by the
end of the century, giving at least a 50% risk of exceeding 5°C
global average
temperature change during the following decades. This would
take humans into
unknown territory. An illustration of the scale of such an
increase is that we are now
only around 5°C warmer than in the last ice age.
Such changes would transform the physical geography of the
world. A radical
change in the physical geography of the world must have
powerful implications for
the human geography - where people live, and how they live
their lives.
Figure 2 summarises the scientific evidence of the links
73. between concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the probability of different
levels of global
average temperature change, and the physical impacts expected
for each level. The
risks of serious, irreversible impacts of climate change increase
strongly as
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere rise.
STERN REVIEW: The Economics of Climate Change
v
Figure 2 Stabilisation levels and probability ranges for
temperature increases
The figure below illustrates the types of impacts that could be
experienced as the world comes into
equilibrium with more greenhouse gases. The top panel shows
the range of temperatures projected at
stabilisation levels between 400ppm and 750ppm CO2e at
74. equilibrium. The solid horizontal lines indicate
the 5 - 95% range based on climate sensitivity estimates from
the IPCC 20012 and a recent Hadley
Centre ensemble study3. The vertical line indicates the mean of
the 50th percentile point. The dashed
lines show the 5 - 95% range based on eleven recent studies4.
The bottom panel illustrates the range of
impacts expected at different levels of warming. The
relationship between global average temperature
changes and regional climate changes is very uncertain,
especially with regard to changes in
precipitation (see Box 4.2). This figure shows potential changes
based on current scientific literature.
1°C 2°C 5°C4°C3°C
Risk of weakening of natural carbon absorption and possible
increasing
natural methane releases and weakening of the Atlantic THC
400 ppm CO2e
450 ppm CO2e
75. 550 ppm CO2e
650ppm CO2e
750ppm CO2e
5% 95%
Sea level rise threatens
major world cities, including
London, Shanghai, New
York, Tokyo and Hong Kong
Falling crop yields in many developing regions FoodFood
WaterWater
EcosystemsEcosystems
Risk of rapid Risk of rapid
climate climate
change and change and
major major
irreversible irreversible
impactsimpacts
76. Eventual Temperature change (relative to pre-industrial)
0°C
Rising crop yields in high-latitude developed
countries if strong carbon fertilisation
Yields in many developed regions
decline even if strong carbon fertilisation
Large fraction of ecosystems unable to maintain current form
Increasing risk of abrupt, large-scale shifts in the
climate system (e.g. collapse of the Atlantic THC
and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet)
Significant changes in water availability (one
study projects more than a billion people suffer
water shortages in the 2080s, many in Africa,
while a similar number gain waterSmall mountain glaciers
disappear worldwide –
potential threat to water
supplies in several areas Greater than 30% decrease
77. in runoff in Mediterranean
and Southern Africa
Coral reef ecosystems
extensively and
eventually irreversibly
damaged
Possible onset of collapse
of part or all of Amazonian
rainforest
Onset of irreversible melting
of the Greenland ice sheet
Extreme Extreme
Weather Weather
EventsEvents
Rising intensity of storms, forest fires, droughts, flooding and
heat waves
Small increases in hurricane
intensity lead to a doubling of
78. damage costs in the US
Many species face extinction
(20 – 50% in one study)
Severe impacts
in marginal
Sahel region
Rising number of people at risk from hunger (25
– 60% increase in the 2080s in one study with
weak carbon fertilisation), with half of the
increase in Africa and West Asia.
Entire regions experience
major declines in crop yields
(e.g. up to one third in Africa)
2 Wigley, T.M.L. and S.C.B. Raper (2001): 'Interpretation of
high projections for global-mean warming', Science 293:
451-454 based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2001): 'Climate change 2001: the scientific basis.
79. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'
[Houghton JT, Ding Y, Griggs DJ, et al. (eds.)], Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
3 Murphy, J.M., D.M.H. Sexton D.N. Barnett et al. (2004):
'Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large
ensemble of climate change simulations', Nature 430: 768 - 772
4 Meinshausen, M. (2006): 'What does a 2°C target mean for
greenhouse gas concentrations? A brief analysis based
on multi-gas emission pathways and several climate sensitivity
uncertainty estimates', Avoiding dangerous climate
change, in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp.265 - 280.
STERN REVIEW: The Economics of Climate Change v
Figure 2 Stabilisation levels and probability ranges for
temperature increases The figure below illustrates the types of
impacts that could be experienced as the world comes into
equilibrium with more greenhouse gases. The top panel shows
the range of temperatures projected at stabilisation levels
between 400ppm and 750ppm CO2e at equilibrium. The solid
horizontal lines indicate the 5 - 95% range based on climate
sensitivity estimates from the IPCC 20012 and a recent Hadley
Centre ensemble study3. The vertical line indicates the mean of
the 50th percentile point. The dashed lines show the 5 - 95%
80. range based on eleven recent studies4. The bottom panel
illustrates the range of impacts expected at different levels of
warming. The relationship between global average temperature
changes and regional climate changes is very uncertain,
especially with regard to changes in precipitation (see Box 4.2).
This figure shows potential changes based on current scientific
literature. 1°C2°C 5°C4°C3°C
Risk of weakening of natural carbon absorption and possible
increasing
natural methane releases and weakening of the Atlantic THC
400 ppm CO
2
e
450 ppm CO
2
e
550 ppm CO
2
e
650ppm CO
2
e
750ppm CO
2
e
81. 5% 95%
Sea level rise threatens
major world cities, including
London, Shanghai, New
York, Tokyo and Hong Kong
Falling crop yields in many developing regions
Food
Food
Water
Water
Ecosystems
Ecosystems
Risk of rapid
Risk of rapid
climate
climate
change and
change and
major
major
irreversible
irreversible
impacts
impacts
Eventual Temperature change (relative to pre-industrial)
82. 0°C
Rising crop yields in high-latitude developed
countries if strong carbon fertilisation
Yields in many developed regions
decline even if strong carbon fertilisation
Large fraction of ecosystems unable to maintain current form
Increasing risk of abrupt, large-scale shifts in the
climate system (e.g. collapse of the Atlantic THC
and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet)
Significant changes in water availability (one
study projects more than a billion people suffer
water shortages in the 2080s, many in Africa,
while a similar number gain water
Small mountain glaciers
disappear worldwide –
potential threat to water
supplies in several areas
Greater than 30% decrease
in runoff in Mediterranean
and Southern Africa
Coral reef ecosystems
extensively and
eventually irreversibly
damaged
Possible onset of collapse
83. of part or all of Amazonian
rainforest
Onset of irreversible melting
of the Greenland ice sheet
Extreme
Extreme
Weather
Weather
Events
Events
Rising intensity of storms, forest fires, droughts, flooding
andheat waves
Small increases in hurricane
intensity lead to a doubling of
damage costs in the US
Many species face extinction
(20 –50% in one study)
Severe impacts
in marginal
Sahel region
Rising number of people at risk from hunger (25
–60% increase in the 2080s in one study with
weak carbon fertilisation), with half of the
increase in Africa and West Asia.
Entire regions experience
84. major declines in crop yields
(e.g. up to one third in Africa)
2
Wigley, T.M.L. and S.C.B. Raper (2001): 'Interpretation of
high projections for global-mean warming', Science 293:
451-454 based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2001): 'Climate change 2001: the scientific basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'
[Houghton JT, Ding Y, Griggs DJ, et al. (eds.)], Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
3
Murphy, J.M., D.M.H. Sexton D.N. Barnett et al. (2004):
'Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large
ensemble of climate change simulations', Nature 430: 768 - 772
4
Meinshausen, M. (2006): 'What does a 2°C target mean for
greenhouse gas concentrations? A brief analysis based
on multi-gas emission pathways and several climate sensitivity
uncertainty estimates', Avoiding dangerous climate
change, in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge:
85. Cambridge University Press, pp.265 - 280.
13
new investments made, new infrastructure put in place, and
changes occur
in the decisions, practices, and behaviors of millions of
business managers,
workers, and consumers.
Exhibit 4
A “CARBON REVOLUTION” NEEDS TO BE THREE TIMES
FASTER THAN
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION RISE IN LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY
Source: Contours of the World Economy 1 – 2030 A.D.,
Maddison, 2007; McKinsey analysis
0
86. 2
4
6
8
10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Index
Year 0 = 1
Years
Carbon productivity
growth required
2008–50
US labor
productivity growth
1830–1955
87. Technological innovation often plays a critical role in
productivity growth, but
just as important are changes in the wider political,
institutional, and cultural
environment that enable technologies to be exploited and
provide incentives
for their deployment. For example, the productivity increases of
the Industrial
Revolution were partly the result of technological innovations
such as the spinning
jenny and the steam engine. But just as important were
innovations in the way
people organized and managed their businesses, such as Richard
Arkwright’s
creation of the first large-scale factories, Henry Ford’s
invention of the production
line, or Alfred Sloan’s development of the divisionalized
88. corporation. These
technological and organizational innovations were in turn
encouraged and enabled
by a series of changes in government policy, institutional
structures, and the
regulatory environment. For example, governments created a
legal framework for
public companies, enabling large amounts of capital to be
pooled for the first time.
They also strengthened property rights, enabling businesses to
make long-term
investments. And they passed consumer protection laws,
enabling customers to
trust the products and services they were buying, thus spurring
demand.
89. 15
Exhibit 5
The first conclusion that stands out is that a significant portion
of the abatement
potential, approximately 7 gigatons of annual emissions on the
left side of the
curve, would be at a negative cost to society. In other words,
these actions
would earn a positive economic return derived largely from
savings in energy
costs through, for example, more energy-efficient lighting or
more fuel-efficient
vehicles.
The second key point is that under the cost curve’s assumptions,
the world can
achieve the 27 gigatons per year of abatement required in 2030
90. to stay below
500 ppmv for a marginal cost of under €40 per ton. Finally, the
cost curve
counters a number of myths about carbon abatement—for
example, that there
are only limited low-cost abatement opportunities in the
developed world or that
we can only achieve abatement with new technologies (Exhibit
6).
If the world were to take these abatement actions, the annual
total cost to
society would be €500 billion–€1,100 billion in 2030 or 0.6–1.4
percent of that
year’s projected global GDP, assuming growth continues on its
long-term trend.
This cost estimate is roughly in the middle of the range of 0.2–
3.0 percent of
91. Stanley Reynolds
Energy Efficiency
Energy EfficiencyImprovements in energy efficiency are a
major part of all proposals for significant reductions in global
GhG emissions. Higher energy efficiency can also yield other
air quality improvements as energy use fallslower emissions
from autos & electricity generatorsMoreover, energy efficiency
gains are often described as being among the very least
expensive ways to reduce emissions. Indeed, it is often argued
that many energy efficiency gains can be achieved with direct
92. economic benefits that exceed the costs. As environmental
economist Robert Stavins puts it: EE gains are not just a free
lunch, they will pay you to have lunch.For example, see the
McKinsey global GhG emissions abatement curve
Energy EfficiencyImprovements in energy efficiency are a
major part of all proposals for significant reductions in global
GhG emissions. Higher energy efficiency can also yield other
air quality improvements as energy use fallslower emissions
from autos & electricity generatorsMoreover, energy efficiency
gains are often described as being among the very least
expensive ways to reduce emissions. Indeed, it is often argued
that many energy efficiency gains can be achieved with direct
economic benefits that exceed the costs. As environmental
economist Robert Stavins puts it: EE gains are not just a free
lunch, they will pay you to have lunch.For example, see the
McKinsey global GhG emissions abatement curve
Global CO2 Abatement Cost
93. An Energy Efficiency (EE) GapMcKinsey MAC graph
highlights EE opportunitiesIt includes many EE improvements
with positive NPV (negative abatement cost)But there is also
lots of evidence that firms and households are slow to make EE
investments on autos, appliances, HVAC, housing, etc.Big
question – WHY aren’t more of these investments being made??
An Energy Efficiency Gap Economic studies from 1980s
document very high implicit discount rates implied by consumer
choices over appliances with different costs and energy
efficiencies. Analysts using a variety of methodologies found
implicit discount rates ranging from 25 % to over 100
%.incentives (e.g., landlord vs tenant)
An Energy Efficiency Gap Economic studies from 1980s
document very high implicit discount rates implied by consumer
94. choices over appliances with different costs and energy
efficiencies. Analysts using a variety of methodologies found
implicit discount rates ranging from 25 % to over 100
%.Possible reasons for an EE gap? Lack of information about
EE opportunities, or about size of savingsLack of access to
financing for householdsMyopia or bounded-rationality of
decision-makersSplit incentives (e.g., landlord vs tenant)
Federal EE Programs
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (1987)
Mandatory standards for energy efficiency of household
appliances. To ensure that manufacturers are building products
that are at the maximum energy efficiency levels that are
technically feasible and economically justified.
Energy Star program - https://www.energystar.gov/
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ)
Regulations first enacted by Congress in 1975, after the 1973–
74 Arab Oil Embargo, to improve the average fuel economy of
cars and light trucks produced for sale in the US
95. State/Local EE ProgramsState ProgramsThere are many, many
state-level EE programs – see the Database for State Incentives
for Renewables and Energy Efficiency (DSIRE)ArizonaProperty
tax exemption for certain energy-efficient technologies or
improvementsAZ Corporation Commission Energy Efficiency
mandate for utilities Utility
Programshttps://www.tep.com/efficiency/
Potential Market FailuresPotential Policy Options
Energy market failures
Environmental externalities Emissions pricing (tax, cap-and-
trade)
Average-cost electricity pricing Real-time pricing; market
pricing
Energy security Energy taxation; strategic reserves
Capital market failures
Liquidity constraints Financing/loan programs
Innovation market failures
96. R&D spillovers R&D tax credits; public funding
Learning-by-doing spillovers Incentives for early market
adoption
Information problems
Lack of information; asymmetric info Information programs
Principal–agent problems Information programs
Learning-by-using Information programs
Potential Behavioral Failures
Bounded rationality Education; information; product standards
Heuristic decision-making Education; information; product
standards
Buildings and EEWe know that there are some market failures
regarding energy use for buildingsWhat does EE look like in the
building/construction sector?
U.S. Energy Consumption by Sector*
97. * DOE Buildings and Energy Data Book (2010):
http://buildingsdatabook.eere.energy.gov/
Residential BuildingUses more energy than commercial
buildingsMajor industry in Arizona (historically)Pepper Viner
HomesWhat are main household energy uses? See next slide
* DOE Buildings and Energy Data Book (2010):
http://buildingsdatabook.eere.energy.gov/
How do I know if my house or building is green?The world of
environmental certification for homes and buildingsUS Green
Building Council introduced its Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) program in 2000LEED Video
ClipOther private programsE.g. – NAHBGreen – National Green
Building ProgramFederal programsEnergy Star
98. Evidence on value of green certification for commercial
buildings?
Split incentive problem can cause market failure – Do we need
government intervention to solve this?A couple of recent
studies provide evidence that green certification is a signal
translates into extra market value – the studies and results are
described in: http://insight.gbig.org/leed-value-of-a-market-
signal/
Installed costs lagged wholesale PV module price (2007-2009)
decline $0.2/W compare with $1.3/W
*
Economic Impact of EEEE programs lead to appliances –
refrigerators, AC units, TV’s, … – that are less costly to use,
since they use less energy.Does this cause behavior to change??
Do EE standards deliver?Note that more energy efficiency
means that the effective price-per-unit of energy services
fallsGreater EE implies LOWER price per unit of energy
99. servicesWhat happens when you lower the price of
something??For EE, this change in behavior is called the
rebound effect.An extreme version is, backfire effect.
Energy Efficiency in TransportationThe centerpiece of US
energy efficiency policy for transportation is the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) policyCAFÉ established in
1975Mandated an 18 MPG fleet average for model year
1978CAFÉ progressively raised since 1978 for cars and light
trucks
CAFÉ over time
Year CarsLight Trucks
1980 2015
1990 27.520
2000 27.520.7
2010 27.523.5
2015 35.028.2
2025* (goals) 54 46
100. CAFÉ ComputationsEach automaker is required to meet the
CAFÉ MPG standard for the average MPG of their fleet of new
model autos (and light trucks).An automaker that sells cars in
U.S. must pay penalties if its fleet doesn’t meet CAFÉ
standardCurrently $55 per MPG above standard, per vehicle
sold (had been scheduled to rise to $140)
Do EE standards deliver?
Reformed CAFÉ*In 2008, under the Energy Independence and
Security Act (EISA), NHTSA’s authority to set the CAFE
standards was altered. First, EISA mandated attribute-based
standards for cars, meaning that each vehicle would be subject
to its own standard based on its attributes (in this case vehicle
size), rather than using one standard for all cars or for all
trucks. In addition, under the new rules, NHTSA was required
to set standards for vehicle fuel efficiency each year (whereas
101. before, the agency was allowed to do so) and was required to set
them at the “maximum feasible” levels through 2030. The other
major change was that EPA was given authority to regulate
GHG emissions and would now do so under the CAFE
standards. The so- called “reformed standards” were established
jointly by NHTSA and EPA, with the first phase for model year
(MY) 2012–2016 vehicles finalized in 2011, and the second
phase for MY 2017– 2025 vehicles finalized in August of 2012.
* See Virginia McConnell, RFF 2013
Main Economic Effects of
CAFÉ StandardBenefits of reducing U.S. demand for oilSmaller
macroeconomic effects of oil price shocksCounter OPEC market
power (reduce oil price mark-ups and final oil prices)Reduced
environmental impactsLower CO2 emissionsCan we quantify
these benefits?Improvements in local air quality?
Main Economic Effects of
102. CAFÉ StandardChanges in incentives for automakersPricing and
production of auto and truck models – go through analysis in
classIncentives for design features and for R&D and
innovationAre there market failures here?Auto designAuto R&D
and innovation
Other Economic Effects of
CAFÉ StandardRole of prior fuel taxesRebound EffectCAFÉ
standard reduces gallons/mile; may increase # miles travelled
(by lowering relative cost of driving)Rebound effect likely
offsets 10 – 20% of overall fuel reductionMore miles travelled
Greater congestion costsMore accidents/deathsFleet mix and
safety
15
Exhibit 5
The first conclusion that stands out is that a significant portion
of the abatement
103. potential, approximately 7 gigatons of annual emissions on the
left side of the
curve, would be at a negative cost to society. In other words,
these actions
would earn a positive economic return derived largely from
savings in energy
costs through, for example, more energy-efficient lighting or
more fuel-efficient
vehicles.
The second key point is that under the cost curve’s assumptions,
the world can
achieve the 27 gigatons per year of abatement required in 2030
to stay below
500 ppmv for a marginal cost of under €40 per ton. Finally, the
cost curve
counters a number of myths about carbon abatement—for
example, that there
104. are only limited low-cost abatement opportunities in the
developed world or that
we can only achieve abatement with new technologies (Exhibit
6).
If the world were to take these abatement actions, the annual
total cost to
society would be €500 billion–€1,100 billion in 2030 or 0.6–1.4
percent of that
year’s projected global GDP, assuming growth continues on its
long-term trend.
This cost estimate is roughly in the middle of the range of 0.2–
3.0 percent of
1
105. Economics 473 Spring 2020
Problem Set Four – Answer Notes
1. (10 points) The graph below depicts the marginal benefit
(MB) of carbon emissions and the
social cost of carbon (SCC) curve. Use this graph to answer the
questions below.
a) Explain in words why the socially optimal level of Carbon
emissions is not zero.
In the graph above, at a level of zero emissions, the marginal
benefit (MB) from emissions is much
higher than the marginal cost (or, social cost of carbon, SCC) of
emissions. From an economic point
of view, some modest positive level of emissions has economic
benefits that dramatically exceed
the economic damages associated with the emissions. My own
view is that the real-world empirical
situation regarding zero emissions is similar to what is depicted
106. in the graph above.
b) Suppose that the government sets a tax on Carbon emissions
(e.g., a carbon tax). Show the
optimal level for the tax on emissions on the graph. Explain in
words how the tax is determined.
Whatever the per unit tax on carbon emissions is, polluters
would (collectively) choose their amount
of emissions at the quantity where the tax rate intersects the MB
curve. So, if you want to achieve
the optimal emissions level E* (and optimal emissions
reductions), set the tax rate at the dollar
amount equal to the dollar amount where MB and SCC intersect.
In order to implement this in
practice, you would have to know – or have estimates of – the
MB and SCC curves.
c) Suppose instead that the government establishes a cap and
trade program for Carbon emissions.
Show the optimal level for the emissions cap on the graph.
Compare the outcome this cap and trade
program with the outcome for the emissions tax from part (b).
The cap should be set equal to E*. The outcome in terms of
107. emissions and emissions abatement
would be the same as with the tax in part (b). The cost of
abatement would also be the same. The
cost of acquiring permits in the cap and trade program may
differ from the tax payments under
emissions taxation, depending on how permits are issued under
cap and trade.
$
Emissions
SCC
MB
E* E’
p’
2
108. d) Now suppose that the government sets a cap that is too
lenient; that is, the cap allows more
emissions than the optimal cap you identified in part (c). Show
the equilibrium trading price for
emissions permits with this ‘too lenient’ cap, and compare this
equilibrium trading price with the
optimal emissions tax from part (b).
Let’s say the cap is set at E’ > E*. The equilibrium trading price
is determined by the MB at the
capped emissions quantity of E’. This is illustrated by price p’
on the graph.
e) The social cost of carbon is based on the net present value of
current and future damages from an
additional ton of carbon emissions now. Suppose that a higher
social discount rate is used to
calculate these damages. Explain how this change in the social
discount rate would affect the
position of the SCC curve, and the optimal current level of
emissions and emissions abatement.
Since much of the damage from CO2 emissions are in the
109. future, a higher social discount rate
would lower the NPV of damages from current CO2 emissions
and reduce (shift down) the SCC
curve. This shift would increase optimal emissions and reduce
optimal emissions abatement.
2. (5 points) Explain in words the meaning of the term,
‘levelized cost of energy’. LCOE is often
used to compare the costs of different technologies for
generating electricity. Explain pros and cons
of using LCOE for such comparisons.
LCOE is equal to the constant price per unit energy that would
equate NPV of revenues to NPV of
costs. Alternatively, a measure of the real average total cost of
generation over the lifetime of a
generation plant.
PRO – LCOE provides a way to compare average costs of
different methods for generating
electricity.
CON – LCOE is focused on cost rather than benefits or value.
Value of different technologies may
differ due to: (1) timing of generation – e.g., wind turbines tend
to generate electricity at night when
110. electricity is not valuable, (2) dispatchable vs. non-dispatchable
generators.
3. (10 points) A variety of government policies promote greater
energy efficiency. Examples
include programs for more energy efficient lighting and the
federal CAFÉ program for autos and
light trucks. Consider the following claim –
“Government policies promoting energy efficiency are bound to
fail because of the rebound effect.
These policies have the unintended consequence of lowering the
effective price of energy services
and thereby encouraging greater energy use.”
Discuss this claim and explain whether or not you agree with it.
It’s true that EE policies have this unintended consequence.
You can make an argument on either
side of this. The argument turns on how large the rebound effect
is. If this effect is large for a
particular EE program, then the claim is basically correct – an
example would be the Mexico Cash
for Coolers program for air conditioners. If the effect is small –
which is likely true for most
programs, then the claim is wrong.
111. Final Take-Home Exam
Economics 473 - Spring 2020
NAME________________________
There are 6 questions worth a total of 150 points. Make sure to
answer all parts of all questions fully on the exam. Write your
answers in sentences. Make sure to explain where any
numerical results that you derive come from. A final answer
without a clear explanation of how you obtained it is a failing
answer. In cases where your final answer may be incorrect,
many of the logical steps you followed might well be correct.
We will not be able to award you partial credit if you do not
show the process through which you obtained your answer.
You may use the lecture notes, the videos, the slides, D2L
course material, your assignments, and the readings when
answering the questions. You may not use any other material.
Good luck and Perform well.
1. (20 points) Renewable energy technologies such as wind
turbines and solar photovoltaic panels are characterized by
variable and intermittent power generation.
a. Why does renewable intermittency present problems for the
112. electric power grid?
b. What can electricity utilities do to address problems posed by
intermittency?
2. (36 points) Consider a dispatchable electricity generation
technology and an intermittent renewable generation
technology. The 2 technologies have the following
characteristics:
Dispatchable Technology
Renewable Technology
Annual Construction cost ($/MW/yr)
$200,000
$100,000
O&M fixed cost ($/MW/yr)
$36,520
113. $22,640
Operating cost ($/MWh)
$30
$0
Capacity factor
90 %
20 %
Note that construction and O&M fixed costs have been listed on
an annual basis per MW of capacity.
a) Find the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) in $/MWh for each
technology.
b) Would a subsidy for the renewable technology be required in
order for it to achieve the same LCOE as the dispatchable
technology?
c) Electricity generated from these technologies can be sold into
the wholesale market. Suppose the wholesale price of electricity
is $100/MWh during peak hours (which occur one-half of the
time) and $30/MWh during off-peak hours (the other half of the
time). Assume that one-half of generation occurs during peak
114. hours and the other half occurs during off-peak hours for each
technology. Find the wholesale market profits per MW per year
for each technology. Does the technology with the lower LCOE
yield the most profit per MW per year? Explain why or why not.
d) Suppose as in part c that electricity generated from these
technologies can be sold into the wholesale market. Assume that
the wholesale price of electricity is $100/MWh during peak
hours (which occur one-half of the time) and $30/MWh during
off-peak hours (the other half of the time). Now assume that
one-half of dispatchable generation occurs during peak hours
and the other half occurs during off-peak hours and assume that
all of the renewable generation occurs during peak hours. Find
the wholesale market profits per MW per year for each
technology. Does the technology with the lower LCOE yield the
most profit per MW per year? Explain why or why not.
3. (24 points) The graph below depicts the marginal benefit
(MB) of carbon emissions and the social cost of carbon (SCC)
curve. The MB curve is linear, starting at $100/ton at zero
emissions and falling to $0/ton at emissions equal to 1,000
tons/day. SCC is constant at $60/ton. Use this graph to answer
the questions below.
116. a) Suppose that the government sets a tax on Carbon emissions
(e.g., a carbon tax). What is the optimal tax on CO2 emissions
for the situation depicted in the graph? How much emissions
abatement would occur? How much tax revenue would this tax
raise?
b) Suppose instead that the government establishes a cap and
trade program for CO2 emissions, and sets the cap for CO2
emissions at 800 tons/day. How much emissions abatement is
required to meet this cap? What is the total cost of emissions
abatement?
c) The social cost of carbon is based on the net present value of
current and future damages from an additional ton of carbon
emissions now. Suppose that a higher social discount rate is
used to calculate these damages. Explain how this change in the
social discount rate would affect the position of the SCC curve,
and the optimal current level of emissions and emissions
abatement.
4. (30 points) The government provides subsidies for consumers
who purchase energy efficient appliances and automobiles.
a) What is the argument for providing such subsidies? What
117. market failure(s) are these subsidies aimed at correcting?
One type of unintended consequence of this kind of subsidy
policy is the rebound effect.
b) Explain what the rebound effect is; use one or more examples
in your explanation. Explain why it is important to consider the
rebound effect when estimating the impact of the subsidy policy
on energy use.
c) How would the size of a rebound effect depend on the price
elasticity of household demand for energy (for example, the
demand for electricity for appliances or the demand for gasoline
for autos)? Explain.
5. (24 points) Environmental externalities can lead to illness
and death for people.
a. Explain the concept of 'value of statistical life' (VSL).
b. Explain how VSL factors into the economic benefits of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
c. Suppose that new evidence emerges to show that VSL is
lower than previously believed. How would this new evidence
affect your recommendations about what to do about greenhouse
gas emissions and global warming.
118. 6. (16 points) Electricity restructuring led to deregulated
wholesale electricity markets in many parts of the U.S.
Merchant generation suppliers compete with one another to
supply electricity in these markets. Market power (or,
monopoly power) is a potential concern when the number of
suppliers in a market is fairly low. Why might supplier market
power be a serious concern in wholesale electricity markets?
Explain your answer.
1