The Aviation Security Service of New Zealand Asia-Pacific A VSEC 2011 Canberra, Australia 29-30 March 2011Mark T. EverittGeneral ManagerAviation Security ServiceNew Zealand
Ensuring effective security through intelligence, international compliance and quality systems
Christchurch 22/02/2011 Ensuring effective security through intelligence,international compliance and quality systems
Threat Scenario PlanningThe following slides highlight major areas of risk or scenarios that were developed from previous years planning sessions. The scenarios were revisited and updated at the 2010 strategicplanning session to reflect the current climate. These scenarios willbe considered in the development of the current business planning process and updating of Avsec’ s risk management profile.
shock legislative / Governance business managementTerrorist Event Natural Pandemic or Global Conflict Statutory Loss of Significant Change in Disaster Bio security Decisions Confidence in Change in Management Avsec Business Leadership scenarios scenarios scenarios scenariosTerrorist threat in Natural Pandemic such NZ participates “Open borders Avsec action Global finance Loss of keyNZ; disaster as Spanish flu, in a major arrangements” impacts on market decline managers;Acts of unlawful impacting on SARS etc; and conflict, or (at Avsec stakeholder / recession; Diverginginterference on a NZ aviation; Bio security tarnished by locations) confidence New Zealand views anddomestic flight; Critical such as Foot association; between (reputational economy in opinions ofActs of unlawful infrastructure and Mouth. Deterioration Australia and risk); decline; Managers; andinterference to an damage; and in Pacific Island New Zealand; Government Change in Managementairport terminal or Significant affairs. Cargo establishes a tourist traffic; in-sourcing /infrastructure, environmental screening; single border Fluctuations in out-sourcing.including front-of- issues or Increased agency; and global oilhouse terminal disaster. domestic Avsec subject prices;areas; aircraft to industrial SignificantActs of unlawful screening; action. currencyinterference to an Increase in fluctuations;outbound flight; ICAO and other Failure of AirActs of unlawful regulatory / New Zealandinterference to an airline or other majoroutbound maritime requirements; airline;vessel; and .Continued…… Avsec model is perceived as too expensive (Govt could force.
shock legislative / Governance business managementTerrorist Event Natural Pandemic or Global Conflict Statutory Loss of Significant Change in Disaster Bio security Decisions Confidence in Change in Management Avsec Business Leadership scenarios scenarios scenarios scenariosContinued….. Continued….. Continued…….Threat due to a and Reconfigurationfailure arising from Governance of air travelsecurity / changes to routes in NZ;intelligence vetting. Avsec. Change in airportAustralia / Pacific ownership (e.g.terrorism; and overseasAnother significant ownership orterrorism incident resulting fromthat impacts on air Auckland supertravel city merger); Change in funding stream; Part of Avsec role is assumed by another entity; One provider of security in the Pacific Islands; and Failure of Avsec Insurance Underwriters.
The Aviation Security drivers to the responsesto the threat, must relate to the analysis of the threat itself, not because of the lack of robust Risk Management Procedures
Risk Management StrategiesAccess Weapons and Dangerous Unruly IntelligenceControl Passengers Explosives GoodsCAA Rules Education ICAO ICAO Conventions IATA Civil Aviation Act Aviation Security Service InterventionsPatrols Audit Reports IATA Training Cabin Crew Risk Training AssessmentIdentity Cards Investigation Recurrent T esting Investigation DeployGate Guards Prosecution resources ProsecutionRecurrent Recurrent accordingly toT esting T esting counter the threat
Managing Risk CAR 140 Aviation Security Service • The National Interest CAR 172 • Contracting States’ obligations to ICAO CAR 108 Airways AirlinesCorporation • Civil Aviation Act • Aviation Crimes Act • Civil Aviation Rules CAR 139 CAR 109 Airports • National Aviation Security Programme Air Cargo Airport Security Committees
QualityAnnex 17, Standard 3.4.4requires that:Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authorityto develop, implement and maintain a national civil aviationsecurity quality control programme to determine compliancewith and validate the effectiveness of its national civil aviationsecurity programme
Avsec’ s Quality and Management Systems arebased on:• ISO Certification – ISO 9001:2000• Civil Aviation Rule Part 140• Civil Aviation Rule Part 141• Moving to ISO 14001 certification• Risk Management Approach
• ISO Certification 9001:2000 - Requirements for a quality management system are set out in the ISO standard - For effective functioning the organisation has to identify and manage numerous linked activities - Based on a process approach - Measures performance and effectiveness Processes subject to continuous improvement
Vanuatu Supervisor Albert Nasse demonstrating the finer points of the new HBS Machine to NewZealand Aviation Security Service, General Manager, Mark Everitt and New Zealand HighCommissioner, Jeff Langley