Towards Permanently Resolving The Niger Delta Crisis

Middle East Journal of Applied Science & Technology (MEJAST)
(Peer Reviewed International Journal) Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 60-71, July-September 2019
60 | P a g e ISSN (Online): 2582- 0974 Website: www.mejast.com
Towards Permanently Resolving The Niger Delta Crisis
Loveday Enyinnaya Ogbuleke*
*Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, College of Arts, Law, Administration and Management Sciences, Legacy University, The Gambia.
Email: l.ogbuleke@legacyuniversitygm.org
Article Received: 19 February 2019 Article Accepted: 11 July 2019 Article Published: 26 August 2019
INTRODUCTION
The national development of any state depends to a very great extent on the security of the state. And one issue that
have been concern to every Nigerian is the Niger Delta crisis because the economic well-being of the nation as a
whole. Unfortunately, the issue has been perceived, nurtured, trivialized, treated and assumed to be of paramount
and sole concern to the people occupying this region which has culminated into minority question. The region
accounts for over 80% of government revenue, 95 % of export receipts and 90% of foreign exchange earnings
(Imobighe, 2004) but for nearly two decades the delta has been mired in conflict and violence that threatens human
security and the national economy. Furthermore, the Niger Delta is the “national cake” of Nigeria generating
grievances because Nigeria and the world still licking the honey whereas the bees are left to sting the indigenes.
Before independence crude oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta region at Otagbagi, very
close to Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa State. This ushered in lofty hopes for development coupled with Nigeria‟s
independence in 1960, which in turn gave high aspirations and expectations of development for the entire country.
These hopes have become frenzy excited and euphoric.
However, after fifty eight (58) years of independence Nigeria is still dabbling and dragging its feet on the path to
economic development and political stability. This is one of the paradoxes of want and plenty in the African
continent. The Niger Deltans have expressed dissatisfaction and discontent of their conditions through several
peaceful means including appeals, petitions and litigation. Unfortunately the Nigerian state in gross irresponsible
insensitivity has not adequately shown any empathy for this affliction. Being so sorrow about their future
consequent upon the state‟s irresponsible response to their plight the Niger Delta youths resorted to violent actions
to register their anger. This is what is today referred to as militancy in the region as freedom fighters in some cases
(Ibid). The federal government of Nigeria on the other hand and the host communities of Niger Delta have different
positional views about the crisis which had contributed to its persistent. Ironically, what peace and security means
ABSTRACT
Sustainable peace and security remains a key challenge in the Niger Delta region. But the Niger Delta question seems to defy all known solutions.
Due to fact that the parties are not sincere at getting the issues resolved because certain individual(s) or group(s) are benefiting or the government
lacks the will power to confront the problem politically. Despite the region justified for over 80% of government revenue, 95 % of export receipts and
90% of foreign exchange earnings, the region still nursing with communal tensions, political competition, organized criminality, and resource-based
conflicts, militancy, piracy, cultism, election violence, communal violence, armed robbery, kidnapping, unemployment, poverty, land disputes and
lack of infrastructures varying at state and Local Government Area (LGA) levels. The study therefore recommended: the development areas should
be funded by the Federal Government through direct budgetary allocations. The development areas would have the mandate to ensure urgent
infrastructural and socio- economic transformation of the Niger Delta. They should be domiciled in the oil producing communities, and should carry
the locals along in the execution of their mandate. Activities of the development areas should be subjected to periodic review through a feed- back
mechanism put in place by the Federal Government to ensure optimal performance, appropriate skill knowledge to ameliorate poverty, strengthening
of anti-corruption agencies among others.
Keywords: Crisis, Militant, Niger Delta, Oil, Conflict Resolution, Dialogue and National Development.

for the federal government is at variance for the people as well as development. In 2009, the government of
President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua introduced the amnesty programme in order to ensure peace and security till
2015 under the leadership of President Jonathan a very citizen of the region. Notwithstanding, the amnesty has
guaranteed negative peace and relatively peaceful in the region with its high skepticisms of transforming it to
enduring and lasting peace.
According to Mbachu and Bala-Gbogbo (2019) fresh from his comfortable re-election in 2019, Nigerian President
Muhammadu Buhari faces a huge hurdle to keep his vow to end the economy‟s addiction to oil: win a lasting peace
in the crude-rich Niger River delta that Oil revenue is still what dictates government spending and they will need to
keep production going,” said Jubril Kareem, a Lagos-based analyst at Ecobank Energy Research. “Buhari has to be
very smart in handling the situation because any disruptions will impact government revenue” (Ibid).
This paper will make a brief overview of the Niger Delta crisis, for a proper understanding of the different opinions
of the actors. It will discuss the amnesty programme as a means to peace building in post conflict Niger Delta.
Finally, an appraisal of the sustenance of amnesty programme will be critically looked at with recommendations
that will strengthen the peace process for a long lasting peace to be the lot of the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general.
A BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Overview of the Niger Delta Crisis
The effort of this paper is not to given account historically of the Niger Delta conflict but it is proper to state that
conflict in the Niger Delta precedes formal colonialism, crude oil discovery and Nigerian independence. Ipso facto,
it is well to assert that militancy has been in the region before crude oil discovery alas, the trend since then and now
emanated from the struggle for wealth control among other things. Historians (Ayodele, 1999; Hargreaves, 1996;
Tamuno, 1999) have traced the era of militancy in the Niger Delta to the time of Jaja of Opobo, Ovonramwem
N‟Ogbaisi of Benin establishing that the British interest in the Niger Delta or Oil Rivers goes back to 1851 earlier
before the 1885 proclamation of the region as a British Protectorate. The militancy at this era was the resistance of
British dominance and control of the oil palm trade by noble Delta kings like Jaja of Opobo.
However, the British dominated the Niger Delta trade without developing the region owing to its fragile, delicate
and swampy topography. Oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in August 1956 at Oloibiri, Bayelsa
State and exploration began in February 1958. There were 24 oil fields by 1967 and a production of 582, 025 barrels
per day (bpd) (Etekpe 2007). The inception of oil exportation got the accompaniment of high hopes for massive
development of the region. Pathetically the joy has become dysphoria as the natural endowed blessing has earned
agony and penury to the people. The Niger Deltans have used a plethora of means to decry their plight which
include petitions, civil agitations and now militant agitation.
As a result, Adaka Boro resorted to revolts and nationalism in order to cause the state power to effect the
development of Niger Delta. On February 23, 1966 he unilaterally declared the Niger Delta Republic which more
the federal government to declare war against him, wrestled and conquered the insurrection within twelve days. In
the 1990s, the emergence of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the activities of his group, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni

People (MOSOP) gave much leeway to the conflict. For Ken Saro-Wiwa, it was a struggle and quest for
self-determination as Naanen (1995) and Osaghae (1997) argue in similar view that the crisis is a struggle against
colonialism and minority agitation for a fair deal in a negatively skewed federalism. The arrest and death of the
author Ken Saro-Wiwa gave the Niger Delta struggle an international status and instead of deterring others, myriad
of militant groups started emerging.
According to Ikelegbe (2010) the turning point in the transformation of demands into political and volatile ones and
in the militant agitation for the demands was the Kaiama Declaration of December 1998 made by Ijaw youths. It
was this declaration that put resource control in the front burner. It also was the start point of militant agitation and
militia formation and engagements. All these emergent militant groups have taken up arms to press home their
demands. After waiting for over fifty years, they realized that oil has brought untold misfortune and severe misery.
Their land has been over taken for exploitation and exploration, their rivers and waters polluted just like the air, and
their occupation fishing and growing of crops has become impossibility without any alternative. The plight of the
Niger Deltans is captured in the words of Ikelegbe Augustine inter alia; the grievances of the region have been
numerous.
These have included disinheritance by federal government laws, loss of control over their resources,
marginalization in the oil economy, marginality within the Nigerian federation and militarization and repression
through the military and security agencies. In relation to the Transnational Oil Companies (TNOCs), the region
complains of environmental pollution, mistreatment, poor compensation practices, poor benefits, unfulfilled
promises, failures to implement memoranda of understanding and inadequate employment and representation.
Other grievances are the poverty, deprivation, high youth unemployment and hopelessness, the location of head
offices of TNOCs outside the region and the takeover of oil benefits and oil blocks by non-indigenes of the region
(Ibid).
These grievances true is inexhaustible and real facts. The response of the government and the TNOCs led by Shell
to the crisis is severe repression, suppression, subjugation and inhumane. According to Groves (2009), the
Transnational Oil Companies has struggled to operate in the face of widespread anti-oil protests and civil conflict in
the Niger Delta. Shell, in particular, has faced considerable security challenges since the emergence of an active
civil society in the early 1990s – most notably manifested in the „Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People‟.
Each has a position on the essence of the crisis in the Niger Delta hence what security, peace and development
means to the government and the TNOCs is inconsistent with that of the host communities. For the Nigerian state,
the Niger Delta is security crisis and not underdevelopment and marginal representation.
This explains the reason why the state has often used military confrontation against the poor and innocent people of
the region. It equally offers reason why the state has restricted her attention to issues like; communal activities
against oil companies, militant activities, murder of state security personnel, destruction of oil facilities, hostage
taking and murder of oil workers among others. This further explains why the Nigerian state has christened these
people „vandals‟, „criminals‟, „saboteurs‟, „murderers‟, „miscreants‟, „militants‟ and „skelms‟. The Nigerian state
has at different times unleashed pain and violence on the people, the Umuechem Massacre of 1990 (Suberu, 1996);

the Ogoni Genocide (The News, May 1993; Suberu, 1996); the Odi Massacre of 1999 (Aghalino, 2009) and
Gbaramatu Massacre of 2009 (Adebayo, 2009) which has generally been nicknamed total crackdown. In these
crackdowns, properties and lives were not only lost but many were raped, maimed, deformed, displaced or forced
into exile (cited in Oshionebo, 2009).
Theoretical Discourse
Conflict theories are perspectives in social sciences which emphasize the social, political and material inequality of
a group and critique the broad social-political system. Bearing in mind that no single concept or theory can expect
or capture the Niger Delta crisis and its implication on Nigerian state, two theories would be examined.
Classical Modernity Theory
This theory is associated and propounded by Anthony Giddens, Simmel, Weber, Marx and Durkheim. They were
all engaged at one point or the other in an analysis of modern society. All were working at the point of the
emergence of modernity and dwell more on the critique of the problems posed by the modern world and economy.
Simmel for instance according to Frisby (1992) “was the first theorist of modernity”. He (Simmel) investigated
modernity primarily in two major interrelated sites the city and the money economy. According to Poggi (1993),
Simmel‟s postulation first saw that modernization brings with it a series of advantages to human beings, especially
the fact that they are able to express various potentialities that are unexpressed, concealed and repressed in
pre-modern society.
This captures the whole essence of the Niger-Delta crisis where indigenous owners, community leaders strive to
receive commensurate social provisions for themselves in line with the level of modernization, environmental
development and socio-economic improvement.
Frustration-Aggression Theory
Frustration–aggression theorists argue that collective behaviour is an aggressive response to feelings of frustration.
Central to the theory is the assumption that all aggression has its root cause in the frustration of more actors‟ goal
achievement. In other words, conflict can be the product of the unfulfilled personal or group goals and the
frustration that this brings.
According to a resident argued that they did not deserve be treated as „political and social orphans‟ in their own land
when he said; “The government is interested in the oil. We have been forgotten and we are left to our fate in spite of
our contribution to the wellbeing of Nigerian economy, we are frustrated and tired of being ignored” (Interview,
Warri August 14, 2010). To buttress this argue, Osaghae 1995), noted that the oil companies and the government
have done too little to compensate them for [environmental] devastation and that, overall, they have not enjoyed
much benefit from oil wealth. In Amaraegbu (2011) assessment on “Violence, terrorism and security threat in
Nigeria‟s Niger Delta: An old problem taking a new dimension” respondents were asked whether, if frustration
could be the reason the youths take to armed violence. Responses were obtained from a total of 50 persons of who
42 (84%) answered in the affirmative. While a total of 30 respondents (60%) reported having experienced severe
hardship, 45 (90%) said that the agitation would not have led to armed confrontation if the right people had taken

charge and pursued policies and practices that had „human face‟. A total number of 38 respondents (76%) were of
the opinion that despite the enormous amount of money purportedly spent by the FG, state of public infrastructure
remained deplorable across the region (Ibid).
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRISIS
Scholars have focused on oil production, the poor state of development in the Niger delta and the resultant
militancy in vogue for some time now. The literature blame this on federalism and the politics of revenue sharing in
Nigeria (Ibaba, 2008); environmental injustices and human rights violation (Ojakorotu, 2010), the failure of
corporate social responsibility on the part of Multinational Oil Companies (Akinola,2005); accountability and
transparency failures in governance and the obnoxious laws that govern the oil industry (Ibaba, 2005).
It is this prevailing reality in the Niger Delta that has given birth to an environment of perpetual agitations, youth‟s
restiveness, insurgency and general insecurity. Different reasons have been given as the raison d‟être of the Niger
Delta crisis; it is germane at this juncture, to examine the underpinnings of the growing insurgency.
The discovery of oil
The discovery of oil in Oloibiri, and subsequent production since the 1970s, has being causing severe
environmental damage in the Niger Delta. “Nigeria is considered as one of the biggest gas flarers in the world”.
Expectedly, this gas flaring “harms wildlife, farmland, and human beings through air pollution, acid rain, noise, and
increase in temperature” (UNDP in Bagaji et al, 2011). In 1978, about 120 children died within a week as a result of
gas flaring from refineries. As a result of environmental damage, reports of birth deformities and complications
during child birth were a common experience that Awoye community had to be shifted about seven times.
Revenue Allocation
The unfavourable revenue allocation is another important factor that escalated the violence in the Niger Delta. The
Delta states are angered that they are deprived by the central government that is dominated by a segment of the
Nigerian ethnic group from benefiting a substantial income that are generated in their immediate environment.
Prior to 1999, the allocation to the Niger delta from the federation account of revenues from oil, decreased
progressively as Nigeria became more dependent on oil. In 1960, the allocation was 50%, then down to 45% in
1970, declining to 20% in 1982, down to 3% in 1992. It was raised to 13% following persistent agitations from the
Niger Deltans (Nwogwugwu et al, 2012).
Environmental Regulations
It is ironical that environmental regulations which are common practice in developed nations are often not
followed due to the lack of power, wealth and equity of the affected communities. As a result, oil
companies often evacuate inhabitants from their homelands, further marginalizing them. As a result, the
Amnesty International is blaming two oil giants for more than 500 oil spills in Nigeria's Niger Delta in 2014. The
companies have been conducting large-scale oil extraction in the Niger Delta for many years. Amnesty
International has leveled heavy criticism: A recent analysis has come to the conclusion that the companies are
responsible for more than 550 oil spills within just one year. "Last year Shell reported 204 separate oil spills, while

ENI - which operates in a smaller area - reported 394 spills," says Mark Dummett, a researcher on the business and
human rights team of Amnesty International. "The number of oil spills occurring in the Niger Delta is really
disturbing."
Violations of the Human Rights
Violations of the human rights of the local populace can be cited as one of the factors responsible for the
crisis in the Niger Delta region. For instance, In January 1993, the crisis over environmental pollution and
economic marginalization from the oil industry reached its peak when 300,000 Ogoni protested against Shell Oil.
This organized protest was followed by repeated harassment, arrests, and killing of Ogonis by the Federal
government troops.
In the same vein, a recent report by Ben Amunwa (2011) from the Platform, the report implicates Shell in cases of
serious violence in Nigeria‟s oil-rich Niger Delta region from 2000 to 2010. It uncovers how Shell‟s routine
payments to armed militants exacerbated conflicts, in one case leading to the destruction of Rumuekpe town where
it is estimated that at least 60 people were killed.
Key findings include:
Platform has heard testimony and seen contracts that implicate Shell in regularly assisting armed militants
with lucrative payments. In one case in 2010, Shell is alleged to have transferred over $159,000 to a group
credibly linked to militia violence.
Shell admits that from 2006 onwards, the company paid thousands of dollars every month to armed
militants in the town of Rumuekpe, in the full knowledge that the money was used to sustain three years of
conflict.
A company manager exposes structural problems with Shell‟s „community development‟ programme,
claiming that “the money is not going into the rightful hands,” and that poor community engagement
caused Shell to shut down a third of its oil production in August 2011 after 12 oil spills in the Adibawa
area.
Bad Governance and Corruption
The Niger Delta region is riddled with bad governance/corruption on the parts of government officials, both
at the state and local government levels. The gross financial misappropriation of money meant for redressing the
problems created by the exploration has not helped the matter despite agencies and commissions established for the
area (Akinola, 2005).
It has been argued that if government officials in the region have utilized judiciously their monthly allocations,
to better the lots of the ordinary people, through the creation of jobs, and embark on infrastructural
development of the region, the situation would have been better than this current sorry state.
Rather, the jumbo monthly allocations are spent on frivolous things that have no corresponding bearings
on the life of the people.

Alleged insincerity of the Federal Government
Alleged insincerity of the Federal Government is another factor that has been attributed to be one of the reasons
responsible for the crisis, is the alleged insincerity of the Federal Government of Nigeria to fully develop the
region in partnership with the state governments. Commissions like Oil Minerals Producing Area Development
Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC).
For instance, Buhari‟s silence on the report showed he was only playing to the gallery on the Delta issue, and
subsequent developments have done nothing to dispel those misgivings. The disclosure by a special adviser to the
vice president two months after the report was submitted that yet another committee had been established to study
the recommendations, coupled with the lack of any further response since then, are deepening doubts over the
government‟s sincerity. The longer these doubts grow, the more difficult it will become to engage all stakeholders
in an effective peace process.
Unemployment
Unemployment is very high among the people of the Niger delta. The youth from the Niger delta do not benefit
from the presence of the transnational corporations especially the oil companies operating in their communities.
Less than 5% of the people from the Niger delta work in the companies, while women from the region working with
the oil companies are less than 1%. Those who benefit through employment by the oil companies are from the
non-oil producing parts of Nigeria (Bagaji, 2013).
EFFECTS OF CRISIS IN THE NIGER DELTA ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Niger Delta conflict has worsened with increased pipeline vandalism, kidnappings and militant
takeovers of oil facilities since 2005. The consequential instability has caused a significant amount of short
fall in production due to the crisis (Cited in Akinbobola, 2006).
Unemployment
Unemployment Rate in Nigeria increased to 23.10 percent in the third quarter of 2018 from 22.70 percent in the
second quarter of 2018. Unemployment Rate in Nigeria averaged 12.31 percent from 2006 until 2018, reaching an
all-time high of 23.10 percent in the third quarter of 2018 and a record low of 5.10 percent in the fourth quarter of
2010 has significant effect to the region in particular. Although the region is well endowed with intelligent
human resources, it has the highest illiteracy and unemployment rates in Nigeria. Statistics show that while
76% of Nigerian children attend primary school, this level drops to 30-40% in some parts of the Niger Delta.
Unemployment rate in the region is reported to be 30% (Uyigue and Agho, 2007).
Poverty
The region that produces this amount of wealth has nothing but poverty to show for this huge contribution to the
economy. The cost of goods and services in the Niger Delta are quite high compared to other parts of the
country because of the presence of oil business activities thereby birthing a high cost of living in the region. This is

at the detriment of the local peoples because the more costly the prices of goods and services, the more the local
people are impoverished.
Insecurity and Emigration
Insecurity itself breeds divestment as nobody will be prepared to risk his life-saving in ventures which he is not sure
to be alive to reap the fruits of his labor. With divestment also comes emigration. Most European governments have
declared Niger Delta a high-risk area and evacuated its citizens living there. Due to the continuing and festering
crisis situation in the Niger Delta, numerous foreign companies are pulling out daily from the region and foreign
workers are retreating to their native countries.
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME
With the amnesty programme initiated by the Federal Government, designated centers were allocated in six Niger
Delta states namely; Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers state respectively (Watt, 2011).
Importantly, as soon as their weapons were laid down by militia groups the use of data capturing (biometrics) was
carried out and ex-militants were registered and documented at various zones in each state accordingly. At the
beginning, many had doubt about the whole amnesty deal despite assurance from some notable stakeholders,
traditional and community leaders came out and convinced the ex-militants that the government was sincere in
implementing the amnesty. To show it commitment, the late President in 2009 freed Henry Okah, a suspected
leader of Movement of Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) Okah accepted the amnesty offer after treason
and gun running charges against him were dropped (Aghedo, 2013).
Similarly, at the expiration of 60 day period 20,192 ex-militants disarmed and accepted the amnesty deal. In fact, as
a result of the agitations by other militant youths 6,166 were added making it 26,358 recipients proclaimed by the
president (The Nation Newspaper, 2013). It is necessary to know that sustainable peace and security will only
thrive in the troubled region if there is the immediate stoppage and disruption of oil facilities which will lead to, and
create an enabling environment in the area of infrastructural development.
More so, the former agitators who keyed into the amnesty programme were accommodated and initially camped at
designated centres temporarily at Aluu in Rivers State, Agbarho and Egbokodo all in Delta State before they were
finally sent in batches to Obrubra (hub of the programme) to undergo transformational and
rehabilitation/reintegration phase of the programme in order to re-orient and train them to acquire various skills in
their different areas, (Ibude, 2011). Similarly, the Federal Government earmarked for each ex-militants who have
surrendered their arms and key into the post-amnesty programme with the payment of N65, 000 monthly stipend
for food and cash allowances during the post-amnesty rehabilitation period which is to last for three months as they
would be deployed to designated training centres for rehabilitation programmes (Oluwaniyi, 2011).
With Nigeria‟s oil exports close to being crippled in 2008 by militant attacks, the then government of President
Umaru Yar‟adua cut a deal: stop the raids in return for amnesty and a rehabilitation plan for fighters, and a
commitment to address the region‟s demands for more local control of oil. More than 20,000 former fighters signed

on, receiving skills training and monthly stipends, while several former militant commanders received
pipeline-protection contracts.
Relatively, after the amnesty proclamation in the region, it is clear that violence has reduced to an extent but not
totally as crude oil production has risen to about 2.1 million barrels per day. What is responsible for this situation as
the amnesty draws attention in the region is that there is no war and there is no peace and also, there is no winner
and there is no loser in the conflict. Although, there is relative peace as oil production has increased the Nigeria
foreign earning. Despite this the Niger Delta area still faces a lot of challenges.
In the same vein, Mbachu and Bala-Gbogbo (2019) buttress that relative peace returned and oil output increased,
reaching 2.2 million barrels a day by the time Buhari was elected in 2015. When Buhari started to cancel the deals,
attacks resumed and oil production plunged. Part of their ridiculous demands include the release of corrupt
politicians like Col. Sambo Dasuki who is on trial for the alleged arms scandal and the unconditional release of a
secession campaigner like leader of the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) Nnamdi Kanu and
the de-freezing of the accounts of ex-militant leader, Government Ekpemupolo among others.
According to Searce (2016) beyond low prices for the nation‟s oil, the source of more than 70 percent of the
government‟s revenue, Nigerian officials have been tormented by a new band of militants claiming to be on a quest
to free the oil-producing south from oppression. They call themselves the Niger Delta Avengers. Despite their
name, which sounds as if it might be out of a comic book, the militants have roamed the waters of the south for six
months, blowing up crude oil and gas pipelines and shattering years of relative peace in the region.
Consequently, Nigeria‟s oil production in the second quarter this year dropped 25 percent from the same period a
year earlier enough to contribute to a slight increase in global oil prices, according to an analysis by Facts Global
Energy, a consulting firm in London (Searce, 2016). Partly because of the Avengers and their sabotage, Nigeria has
fallen behind Angola as Africa‟s top oil producer. The Avengers have sent oil, power and gas workers fleeing,
torturing the multinational companies that burrow for oil underneath the waters. Fuel deliveries around the country
have stalled because almost everything that has to do with oil in Nigeria right now has been tangled up by the
militants. The attacks have been so costly that Mr. Buhari sent troops that had been fighting in the north against
Boko Haram the extremist group that has killed thousands and forced more than two million people to flee their
homes to battle the Avengers in the south instead (Ibid).
So, the struggle is no longer about the emancipation of the Niger Delta or restoring its dignity as the militants
delight in postulating. It is about vested personal interests of their sponsored leaders, who identify with government
in the day time, but romance the militants at nights. Based on the mounting pressure on the FGN and with the silent
voice of America which is pushing for dialogue, President Buhari seems to be bending backwards by announcing
its readiness to dialogue with the NDA militants but future will tell.
While he (Buhari) eventually resumed the payments, nothing has been done to address a 16-point set of demands
for more local control of oil resources and investment in infrastructure to achieve peace presented to Buhari by the
Pan-Niger Delta Elders Forum in December 2016. More than two years later, the discussions haven‟t advanced,
according to Edwin Clark, the leader of the forum. Buhari now faces the choice of resolving the delta problem or

kicking the can down the road as most of his predecessors did, according to Mitee, the rights activist who led the
government panel that initiated the amnesty plan in 2008. Mbachu and Bala-Gbogbo (2019) maintained that “If the
government wants to just play along and do some appeasement during the four years and carry over the
fundamental problems, then it will just be business as usual”. In this case, we are transferring the doomsday to the
future even though no substantial attacks have been carried out by any groups in the Delta region since January
2019 but the region still lingering with lack of infrastructure and national development.
THE WAY FORWARD
The Niger Delta crisis has degenerated to a level where its permanent resolution is problematic, the amnesty deal
notwithstanding. While this paper entertains the pessimism that lasting resolution of the Niger Delta crisis is
far-fetched, it nonetheless believes that something can be done to solve the crisis. To this end, this paper makes a
case for the institution of an alternative development strategy for the Niger Delta region.
This strategy should emphasize extensive grass-root participation. Under it, the States of the Niger Delta should be
divided into special development areas, with each development area coinciding with a major oil producing
community. The management of the development areas should be drawn from relevant community-based groups
including the youths, the traditional rulers, religious groups as well as village or town associations. The
management would be led by a credible philanthropist or community leader appointed by the Federal Government
from within the jurisdiction of own development area.
As enunciated by Clark, J.P. (1999) the solutions to the Niger Delta problem lies in the following:
A special police unit should be established in the region to protect oil and gas installations, turbines and distribution
lines to guard frequent interruptions in the oil and gas industry. Perhaps, indigenes of the Niger Delta can be put to
work to guard such installations. We can thus monitor their performance as productive citizens. The use of the
military in the name of task force can only heighten tension.
The criminalization of militancy and hostage taking cannot be overemphasized since these acts are at variance with
the vision and aspiration of genuine struggles for de-pollution, resource control and an acceptable revenue
allocation formula.
Recommendations
Therefore, the development areas should be funded by the Federal Government through direct budgetary
allocations.
The development areas would have the mandate to ensure urgent infrastructural and socio- economic
transformation of the Niger Delta.
They should be domiciled in the oil producing communities, and should carry the locals along in the execution of
their mandate.
Activities of the development areas should be subjected to periodic review through a feed- back mechanism put in
place by the Federal Government to ensure optimal performance.

There is need for democratic governance to strive with underlying emphases in the activation of the citizenry to
realize the common good to be taken root in the popular consciousness of Nigerians for national development
(Ogbuleke, 2019).
It must state, however, that any strategy designed to address the Niger Delta crisis must start with a comprehensive
environmental clean-up and restoration of the spatial ambience of the region which has been desolated over the
years by the activities of oil production. This will require the incorporation of the Niger Delta peace and
development plans into the wider national development strategy.
The extant statutory bodies dedicated to the transformation of the Niger Delta, such as the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDNC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, should synergize in an attempt to
work out credible modalities for delivering development dividends to the people of the Niger Delta. In doing this,
care must be taken to ensure that local initiatives and inputs are sought for and elicited in such a manner that process
is participatory and reflective of the aspirations of the people.
CONCLUSION
The Niger Delta represents one of the worst degraded and worst impoverished environments in the contemporary
world. For over five decades, the Nigerian State has connived with the oil multinational in ruining the Niger Delta
in the name of oil exploration and production. The people of the region have been exposed to sundry
socio-economic, political and ecological malaises for which there has been no proper recompense. The apparent
insoluble instability in the Niger Delta, even in its post-amnesty phase, is a sort of retribution for decades of abuse
of the land and people of the Niger Delta. It is on this note that this paper submits that the crisis will prevail, and
may even degenerate the more, until and unless the organic context which precipitates and sustains it is
comprehensively and adequately addressed. This is without any prejudice to the prospects of the amnesty
programme enacted under President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua regime. Unless militant agitations are curbed
successfully and Niger Delta development elevated to the fore of national development, the economy will suffer in
the long run.
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