14 Social Alternatives Vol. 34 No. 1, 2015Classical .docx

14 Social Alternatives Vol. 34 No. 1, 2015
Classical Stoicism and the Birth of a Global
Ethics: Cosmopolitan Duties in a
World of Local Loyalties
Lisa hiLL
Do I have responsibilities to strangers and, if so, why? Is a
global ethics possible in the absence
of supra-national institutions? The responses of the classical
Stoics to these questions directly
influenced modern conceptions of global citizenship and
contemporary understandings of our
duties to others. This paper explores the Stoic rationale for a
cosmopolitan ethic that makes
significant moral demands on its practitioners. It also uniquely
addresses the objection that a
global ethics is impractical in the absence of supra-national
institutions and law.
themed artiCLe
What do we owe to strangers and why? Is a global ethics
possible in the face of national boundaries?
What should we do when bad governments order us to
mistreat strangers or the weak? These were just some
of the questions to which the ancient Stoics applied
themselves. Their answers, which emphasised the
equal worth and inherent dignity of every human being,
were to reverberate throughout the Western political
tradition and directly influence modern conceptions of

global citizenship. Yet, how the Stoics arrived at their
cosmopolitanism is often imperfectly understood, hence
the first part of the discussion. Objections that their ideas
were too utopian to be practically useful also reflect
misunderstandings about Stoicism, hence the second
part of the paper.
I begin by exploring the Stoic rationale for the cosmopolis,
the world state, after which I address the objection that
a global ethics is impractical in the absence of supra-
national institutions and law. Well aware that local
loyalties and the jealousy of sovereign states towards
their own jurisdictional authority would represent
significant obstacles to the practice of a global ethic, the
Stoics insisted that the cosmopolis could still be brought
into existence by those who unilaterally obeyed the laws
of ‘reason’ even within the confines of national borders
and in the face of hostile local institutions.
Background
Inspired by the teaching of Socrates and Diogenes of
Sinope (Diogenes the Cynic), Stoicism was founded
at Athens by Zeno of Citium in around 300 BCE and
was influential throughout the Greco-Roman world
until around 200 CE.1 Its teachings were transmitted
to later generations largely through the surviving Latin
writings of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, C. Musonius
Rufus and Marcus Aurelius, as well as the Greek
author Diogenes Laertius via his Lives and Opinions of
Eminent Philosophers. The Stoics not only influenced
later generations; they were extremely influential in their
own time. From the outset, Stoicism was a distinctive
voice in intellectual life, from the Early Stoa in the fourth
and third centuries BCE, the Middle Stoa in the second

and first centuries BCE, to Late Stoicism in the first
and second centuries CE (and beyond) when Stoicism,
having spread to Rome and captivated many important
public figures, was at the height of its influence.
Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Global Ethics
The idea that we should condition ourselves to regard
everyone as being of equal value and concern is at
the heart of Stoic cosmopolitanism. The Stoics were
not alone in promoting this ideal: the Cynics were also
cosmopolitan. But it was the Stoics – the dominant
and most influential of the Hellenistic schools – who
systematised and popularised the concept of the
oikoumene, or world state, the human world as a
single, integrated city of natural siblings. Impartiality,
universalism and egalitarianism were at the heart of
this idea.
The Stoic challenge to particularism was extremely
subversive for a time when racism, classism, sexism
and the systematic mistreatment of non-citizens was
a matter of course. It was hardly thought controversial,
for example, that Aristotle (1943: IV. 775a. 5-15) should
declare that ‘in human beings the male is much better
in its nature than the female’ and that ‘we should look
upon the female state as being … a deformity’. Similarly,
ethnic prejudice was the norm rather than the exception
in antiquity. The complacent xenophobia and racism
of Demosthenes’s 341 BCE diatribe against Philip of
Social Alternatives Vol. 34 No 1, 2015 15
Macedon would not have raised a single eyebrow in his

Greek audience:
[H]e is not only no Greek, nor related to the
Greeks, but not even a barbarian from any place
that can be named with honour, but a pestilent
knave from Macedonia, whence it was never yet
possible to buy a decent slave (Demosthenes,
1926: 31).
Reversing these kinds of attitudes (and the behaviour
attendant on them) was the self-appointed task of the
Stoic philosophers.
The Cosmopolitan Ideal, Social Distance and Care
for Strangers
The first step towards promoting a universalistic ethic
entailed changing our whole way of thinking about
social distance. The Stoics were well aware that most
people tend to imagine their primary, secondary and
tertiary duties to others as ranked geographically:
distance regulates the intensity of obligation and people
will normally give priority to themselves, intimates,
conspecifics, and compatriots (in roughly that order),
before strangers, foreigners and members of out-
groups. This view is what is commonly referred to as ‘the
common-sense priority thesis’ or the ‘common-sense’
view of global concerns. Hierocles, the second century
Stoic philosopher, introduces the image of concentric
circles to illustrate how we generally conceive of our
obligations to others:
Each one of us is … entirely encompassed by
many circles, some smaller, others larger, the
latter enclosing the former on the basis of their
different and unequal dispositions relative to each

other. The first and closest circle is the one which
a person has drawn as though around a centre,
his own mind. This circle encloses the body and
anything taken for the sake of the body … Next,
the second one further removed from the centre
but enclosing the first circle; this contains parents,
siblings, wife, and children. The third one has in it
uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces,
and cousins. The next circle includes the other
relatives, and this is followed by the circle of local
residents, then the circle of fellow-tribesmen, next
that of fellow citizens, and then in the same way
the circle of people from neighboring towns, and
the circle of fellow-countrymen. The outermost
and largest circle, which encompasses all the
rest, is that of the whole human race (fragment
reproduced in Long and Sedley 1987: 1349).
But the Stoics wanted to radically change this way of
thinking and feeling about others. As Hierocles suggests,
we must first become aware of our own prejudices in
order to repudiate them and thereafter substitute them
with superior cosmopolitan mental habits:
Once all these [circles] have been surveyed, it
is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper
treatment of each group, to draw the circles
together somehow toward the centre, and to keep
zealously transferring those from the enclosing
circles into the enclosed ones (Hierocles fragment
in Long and Sedley 1987: 1/349).
Humanity must embark on a morally demanding
developmental journey that begins (quite naturally) with a
variable quality of attachment towards others, proceeding

to a state of invariable quality of attachment towards
the world at large. The Stoics did not aim to invert the
priority thesis (which would mean that the intensity of our
feelings would increase the further out we went); rather,
they strove for a sameness of feeling for all, regardless
of social distance. Impartiality was their ideal. To be self-
regarding and partial to intimates was not only contrary
to natural law; it was a sign of moral immaturity.
Why Do I Owe Strangers (and the Less Fortunate)
Anything?
What led the Stoics to this ambitious mission? The
answer originates in Stoic theology, which was devised
as a philosophy of defence in a troubled world and
a rival to the religion of the Olympian pantheon. The
Stoic emotional ideal was a combination of spiritual
calm (ataraxia) and resignation (apatheia) that were
to be cultivated in order to achieve happiness/human
flourishing (eudaimonia). The point of religion was to
bring order and tranquillity; something the official Greek
religion of the Olympian gods was quite obviously
incapable of achieving. This religion, with its capricious,
sex-crazed, ill-tempered and unpredictable gods who
meddled in human affairs from the heights of Mount
Olympus hardly inspired calm, let alone compassion.
Neither did its unending demands for propitiation and
sacrifice promote resignation. So the Stoics devised
a less disconcerting religion that spoke of an orderly
universe with no divine intervention whatsoever and
brought the gods not only closer to us, but into us;
no longer distant, terrifying others but, quite literally,
kindly insiders. ‘Reason’, the ‘mind-fire spirit’ existed as
intelligent matter, residing benignly in all life and impelling
it unconsciously and teleologically towards order and
rightness. Humans are not separate from God (or Gods)

but a part of ‘Him’: ‘the universe [is] one living being,
having one substance and one soul’ (Marcus Aurelius
1916: IV.40).
Because the Gods have given each human a particle of
God-like intellect (‘reason’), we have a natural kinship
both with God and with each other (Marcus Aurelius
1916: 12.26). As related parts of the same entity, and
equally sharing in ‘reason’, we are natural equals on
earth with equal sagacious potential. According to
Cicero, everyone has the spark of reason and ‘there is no
difference in kind between man and man [it] is certainly
common to us all’ (Cicero 1988: I. 30). Seneca says that
the light of educated reason ‘shines for all’ regardless
of social location, which is, after all, merely a matter of
luck and social conditioning. As he quite sensibly points
out, ‘Socrates was no aristocrat. Cleanthes worked at
a well and served as a hired man watering a garden.
Philosophy did not find Plato already a nobleman; it made
him one’ (Seneca 2002: Ep. 44.3). Exclusive pedigrees
‘do not make the nobleman’; only ‘the soul … renders us
noble’ (Seneca 2002: Ep. 44.5). Everyone has the same
capacity for wisdom and virtue and everyone is equally
desirous of these things (Seneca 2002: Ep. 44.6).
True freedom comes from knowledge, from learning to
distinguish ‘between good and bad things’ (Seneca 2002:
Ep. 44.6). Being knowledgeable and therefore ‘good’ is
not just for ‘professional philosophers’. People do not
need to ‘wrap [themselves] up in a worn cloak … nor
grow long hair nor deviate from the ordinary practices

of the average man’ in order to enter the cosmopolis;
rather, admission is open to anyone who insists on using
their own right judgement, in simply ‘thinking out what
is man’s duty and meditating upon it’ (Musonius 1905:
Discourse 16). This is the route to both the moral and the
happy life: when we learn to live according to the natural
law of Zeus, and therefore our natural tendencies, we
are enabled to achieve inner tranquillity (Chrysippus in
Diogenes 1958: ‘Zeno’, VII. 88).2
Duties, Harm and Aid
The Stoics insisted that one of the things that allow
us to live virtuously in accordance with nature is the
correct performance of duties (Sorabji 1993: 134-157).
The virtuous agent is beneficent and just: justice is the
cardinal social virtue (‘the crowning glory of the virtues’)
and beneficence is closely ‘akin’ to it (Chrysippus cited
in Cicero 1990: I. 20). We should always strive to refrain
from harming others since the universal law forbids
it (Cicero 1990: 1. 149.153; Marcus Aurelius 1916:
9.1; Seneca 2002: Ep. 95.51-3). Indeed, ‘according to
[Nature’s] ruling, it is more wretched to commit than to
suffer injury’ (Seneca 2002: Ep. 95.52-3).
But the negative virtue of refraining from harm is not
enough: virtue must also be positive. It is natural for
human beings to aid others (Cicero 1961: III. 62). We
are duty-bound to meet the needs of our divine siblings
(Marcus Aurelius 1916: 11.4) and it is ‘Nature’s will
that we enter into a general interchange of acts of
kindness, by giving and receiving’ (Cicero 1990: I. 20).
The morally mature person knows that she must ‘live for
[her] neighbour’ as she lives for herself (Seneca 2002:
Ep. 48.3).

We have duties of justice, fairness and mutual aid to one
another and the needs of others imply a duty to meet
them: ‘Through [Nature’s] orders, let our hands be ready
for all that needs to be helped’ (Seneca 2002: Ep. 95.52-
3). Moral failure is epitomised by an ‘incapacity to extend
help’ (Epictetus 1989: Fragment 7, 4: 447). It is not only
neutral strangers who are entitled to our assistance, but
also our supposed enemies. Contrary to the ‘common
notion’ that ‘the despicable man is recognised by his
inability to harm his enemies … actually he is much more
easily recognised by his inability to help them’ (Musonius
1905: Fragment XLI). Clearly, the moral demands of the
cosmopolitan ethic are extremely high, requiring that we
treat impartially even the feared and hated. The need for
a high level of moral maturity is one of the reasons why
the Stoics placed so much emphasis on the desirability
of emotional self-control.
Universal Versus Positive, Local Law
The extirpation of passionate attachment and the
moderation of intense loyalties to conspecifics are basic
preconditions for a global ethics. Impartiality is the key
to Stoic egalitarianism: the wise person knows that the
laws governing her behaviour are the same for everyone
regardless of ethnicity, class, blood ties (Clark 1987:
65, 70), and gender (Hill 2001). Judgements about the
welfare of others are always unbiased: ‘persons’ are of
equal value and ends in themselves regardless of their
social location or proximity to us. Reason is common
and so too is law; hence ‘the whole race of mankind’
are ‘fellow-members of the world state’ (Marcus Aurelius
1916: 4.4; see also Epictetus 1989: I.9. 1-3; Cicero 1988:
I.23-31).
Cicero (1961: III.63) says that ‘the mere fact’ of our

‘common humanity’ not only inclines us, but also
‘requires’ that we feel ‘akin’ to one another. The
siblinghood of all rational creatures overrides any local
or emotional attachments because the ‘wise man’
knows that ‘every place is his country’ (Seneca 1970:
II, IX.7; see also Epictetus 1989: IV, 155-165). In order
to ‘guar[d]’ our own welfare we will subject ourselves
to God’s laws, ‘not the laws of Masurius and Cassius’.
When family members rule over others we ‘demolis[h] the
whole structure of civil society’ while putting compatriots
before ‘foreigners’ destroys ‘the universal brotherhood
of mankind’. If we refuse to recognise that foreigners
have the same ‘rights’3 as compatriots we utterly destroy
all ‘kindness, generosity, goodness and justice’ (Cicero
1990: 3. 27-8).
The rational agent will put the laws of Zeus before those
of ‘men’ whenever a conflict between them arises, even
when this imperils the wellbeing of the agent concerned,
as it so often did in the case of Stoic disciples. For
example, when in 60 CE Nero sent Rubellius into exile
to Asia Minor, Musonius went with him in a gesture of
solidarity, thereby casting suspicion on himself in the
Social Alternatives Vol. 34 No 1, 2015 17
eyes of the lethally dangerous Nero. Upon the death
of Rubellius, Musonius returned to Rome, where his
Stoic proselytising drew the further ire of Nero who
subsequently banished him to the remote island of
Gyaros. After Nero’s reign ended, Musonius returned
to Rome but was banished yet again by Vespasian on
account of his political activism.

Musonius thus practised what he preached. He taught
that it is virtuous to exercise nonviolent disobedience
in cases where an authority orders us to violate the
universal law. It is right to disobey an unlawful command
from any superior, be it father, magistrate, or master
because our allegiance – first and always – is to Zeus
and to ‘his’ commandment to do right. In fact, an act
is only disobedient when one has refused ‘to carry out
good and honourable and useful orders’ (Musonius 1905:
Discourse 16). Where the laws of God conflict with the
laws of ‘men’, natural law trumps positive law (Cicero
1988: II.11). As Epictetus (1989: 3.4-7) says: ‘if the good
is something different from the noble and the just, then
father and brother and country and all relationships
simply disappear’. All the Stoics agree on this point
and they directly influenced Kant’s views on the same
subject, namely, that the universal law ‘condemns any
violation that, should it be general, would undermine
human fellowship’ (Nussbaum 2000: 12).
Realist Objections
It is often suggested that cosmopolitanism in general –
and the idea of the world state in particular – is hard to
take seriously because it is practically impossible due
to the persistence of sovereign states and the localised
loyalties that accompany them. On this view, Stoic
cosmopolitanism necessarily involves the commitment
to a world state capable of enacting and enforcing
Stoic principles. However, the cosmopolis is not, strictly
speaking, a legal or constitutional entity (although, of
course, it can be): rather, it is, first and foremost, an
imaginary city, a state of mind, open to anyone capable
of recognising the inherent sanctity of others and who
evinces the Stoic virtues of sympatheia (social solidarity),
philanthropia or humanitas (benevolence), and clementia

(compassion). We become cosmopolites when we work
hard to look beyond surface appearances (Seneca 2002:
Ep. 44.6) and live in obedience to the laws of reason
and of nature, rather than the variable laws of a single
locality. These are the qualities that secure a person’s
membership of the cosmopolis and which also conjure
it into reality.
We are all capable of being cosmopolites. As Musonius
says, the mind is ‘free from all compulsion’ and is ‘in
its own power’; no one can ‘prevent you from using it
nor from thinking … nor from liking the good’ nor from
‘choosing’ the latter, for ‘in the very act of doing this’, you
become a cosmopolite (1905: Discourse 16). Sovereign
states and the citizens within them do not need formal,
supranational structures and legal frameworks to operate
as world citizens; they only need to begin acting as
though the world were a single city which, although
composed predominantly of strangers, is nevertheless
and inescapably one family of natural siblings. Everyone
can and should be a cosmopolite, even if this means
challenging the institutional authority of those who rule.
The fact that the cosmopolis is an imagined community
(albeit constituted by real moral agents committing real
acts of ‘reason’) does not mean that its laws are not more
secure once they have been enshrined in positive law. In
fact, the Stoics preferred to see the laws of Zeus codified
(Bauman 2000: 70, 80). The Roman Stoics, in particular,
sought to bring the cosmopolis into practical existence
through the exercise of power. This is why many threw
themselves into the Sturm und Drang of politics. The true
sage spurns the life of solitary contemplation to devote
him/herself to civic life. There is a fundamental human
desire to ‘safeguard and protect’ our fellow human beings

and because it is natural to ‘desire to benefit as many
people as [one] can’ (Cicero 1961: III.65); it follows that
‘the Wise Man’ will ‘engage in politics and government’
(Cicero 1961: III.68; Diogenes 1958: ‘Zeno’ VII. 21).
Many Stoics sought to influence politics either directly or
indirectly. The Stoic philosopher-king, Marcus Aurelius,
was the most powerful person on earth during his reign
(Noyen 1955), while the Gracchi brothers pushed for
many Stoic-inspired reforms such as admission of all
Italians to citizenship. Those without formal power sought
to influence those who did hold it: Panaetius advised
Scipio Aemilianus, Seneca advised Nero while Blossius
of Cumae advised Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (see
Hill 2005).
But in the absence of formal institutionalisation the laws
of the cosmos are still held to be real; we remain bound
by them because, as Cicero points out, ‘true law’ is
not ‘any enactment of peoples’ [statute] but something
eternal which rules the whole universe by its wisdom
in command and prohibition’. After all, ‘there was no
written law against rape at Rome in the reign of Lucius
Tarquinius’ yet ‘we cannot say on that account that
Sextus Tarquinius did not break that eternal Law by
violating Lucretia’. The eternal law ‘urging men to right
conduct and diverting them from wrongdoing ... did not
first become Law when it was written down, but when it
first came into existence’, which occurred ‘simultaneously
with the divine mind’ (1988: II. 11).
Even if they never managed to constitutionally entrench
the cosmopolis, the Stoics believe it is realised the
moment an agent internalises its moral precepts and
begins to act upon them unilaterally. On this view,
technically, the world state can be brought into existence
by the actions of a single right-thinking person. Therefore

it is unclear that a global ethics is meaningless without
a world state and without political anchoring practices,
and positive laws to guarantee them. At its inception, the
Stoic cosmopolis was conceived as a moral mindset: no
Stoic ever advocated a legally constituted world-state.
One enters the cosmopolis in and with one’s mind, a
mind that is disciplined to absolute impartiality, capable of
seeing past social conventions and intent on universally
extending benevolence and compassion.
Concluding Remarks
For the Stoics, we are siblings with a common ancestry
who share equally in a capacity for reason. Accordingly,
we are all entitled to full recognition. The global state,
the cosmopolis, is brought into being by this recognition:
it is a function of the capacity to be impartial and to
appreciate that there is an inescapable duty to aid
anyone in need, regardless of their social location or
social proximity. The Stoics knew that this was a hard
task requiring not only a high degree of emotional
control and moral maturity but also a willingness to resist
social convention and local practice. Their injunctions
to reasonable behaviour were made in full knowledge
of the fact that the desired anchoring practices would
most likely be absent; nevertheless, they expected their
disciples to adhere to them, not only in the absence of
such practices but even in the face of hostile anchoring
practices, whether in the form of laws or norms.
References

Aristotle 1943 Generation of Animals, trans. A.L. Peck,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bauman, R. 2000 Human Rights in Ancient Rome,
Routledge, London and New York.
Brown, E. 2006 ‘The Stoic invention of cosmopolitan
politics’, Proceedings of the Conference Cosmopolitan
Politics: On the history and future of a controversial
ideal, Frankfurt am Main, December, http://www.artsci.
wustl.edu/~eabrown/pdfs/Invention.pdf (accessed
03/08/2013).
Cicero 1961 De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H.
Rackham, William Heinemann Ltd, London.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 1988 De Republica; De Legibus,
trans. C.W. Keyes, William Heinemann Ltd, London.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 1990 De Officiis, trans. W. Miller,
Harvard University Press, London.
Clark, S. 1987 ‘The City of the Wise’, Apeiron, XX,1:
63-80.
Demosthenes 1926 ‘Philippic III’, in Demosthenes, trans.
C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Diogenes, L. 1958 Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans.
R.D. Hicks, William Heinemann Ltd, London.
Epictetus 1989 The Discourses as Reported by Arrian,
the Manual and Fragments, in two vols, trans. W.A.
Oldfather, Harvard University Press, London.

Hill, L. 2001 ‘The first wave of feminism: were the Stoics
feminists?’ History of Political Thought, 22, 1: 12-40.
Hill, L. 2005 ‘Classical Stoicism and a difference of
opinion?’ in T. Battin (ed.) A Passion for Politics:
Essays in Honour of Graham Maddox, Pearson
Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, NSW.
Long, A. and Sedley, D. 1987 The Hellenistic Philosophers,
in two vols, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Marcus Aurelius 1916 The Meditations, trans. C.R.
Haines, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Musonius R. 1905 Musonius Rufus, Reliquiae, O. Hense
(ed.), Teubner, Chicago.
Noyen, P. 1955 ‘Marcus Aurelius: the greatest practitioner
of Stoicism’, Antiquité Classique, 24: 372-383.
Nussbaum, M. 2000 Ethics and Political Philosophy,
Transaction Publications, New Brunswick.
Seneca, Lucius Annaues 1970 ‘Ad Helvium’, in Seneca,
Moral Essays, trans. J.W. Basore, William Heinemann
Ltd, London.
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus 2002 Epistles, in three vols,
intro. R. M. Gummere, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Sorabji, R. 1993 Animal Minds and Human Morals,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Author

Lisa Hill PhD is Professor of Politics at the University of
Adelaide. Before that she was an Australian Research
Council Fellow and a Fellow in Political Science at the
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University. Her interests are in political theory, history of
political thought and electoral ethics. She is co-author
of: An Intellectual History of Political Corruption, and
Compulsory Voting: For and Against. She has published
her work in Political Studies, Federal Law Review,
The British Journal of Political Science and Journal of
Theoretical Politics.
End Notes
1. Although the school wasn’t officially closed until 529 CE.
2. Happiness is synonymous with wisdom and virtue in
Stoicism.
3. Habendam, or what is held or is due to one.
Every Breath
It's interesting to consider that
every breath I take
has already been breathed
been part of another breath.
Perhaps that dog over there,
smelly and hairy, licking its own arse.
lynne White,
GWynedd, WaleS

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Virtue Ethics and Modern Society–A Response to the Thesis of
the Modern Predicament
of Virtue Ethics
Author(s): Qun GONG and Lin ZHANG
Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June
2010), pp. 255-265
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27823328
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Front. Philos. China 2010, 5(2): 255-265
DOI 10.1007/sl 1466-010-0014-5
RESEARCH ARTICLE
GONG Qun
Virtue Ethics and Modern Society^-A Response to
the Thesis of the Modern Predicament of Virtue
Ethics
? Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2010
Abstract The revival of modern Western virtue ethics presents
the question of
whether or not virtue ethics is appropriate for modern society.
Ethicists believe
that virtue ethics came from traditional society, to which it
conforms so well. The
appearance of the market economy and a utilitarian spirit,
together with society's
diversification, is a sign that modern society has arrived. This
also indicates a

transformation in the moral spirit. But modern society has not
made virtues less
important, and even as modern life has become more
diversified, rule-following
ethics have taken on even greater importance. Modern ethical
life is still the
ethical life of individuals whose self-identity contains the
identity of moral spirit,
and virtues have a very important influence on the self-
identical moral characters.
Furthermore, modern society, which is centered around
utilitarianism, makes it
apparent that rules themselves are far from being adequate and
virtues are
important. Virtues are a moral resource for modern people to
resist modern evils.
Keywords virtue, ethics, modern society
1
In the history of ethics, both Confucian ethic thoughts in the
Chinese tradition
and ancient Greek ethic thoughts with Aristotle as the
representative are virtue
ethics. In modern times, utilitarianism, represented by Bentham
and Mill, and
deontology, represented by Kant, have come into being in the
West, and over a
considerable amount of time, the tradition of virtue ethics has
been in decline. In
Translated by ZHANG Lin from Zhexue Dongtai ^ $]& (Trends
of Philosophy), 2009, (5):
40-45_

GONG Qun (El)
School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing
100872, China
E-mail: [email protected]
2019 00:28:51 UTC
256 GONG Qun
the 1950s, in an epoch-making article "Modem Ethical
Philosophy, " G. E. M.
Anscombe, a British ethicist, challenged utilitarianism and
deontology from the
perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. This was regarded as a
sign of the
revival of virtue ethics. Afterwards, notably in the 1980s, many
ethicists
developed virtue ethics from theoretical as well as historical
aspects, igniting its
momentous resurrection. Nonetheless, people have cast a
suspicious eye on the
resurrection, that is to say, they doubt whether or not theorists
could revive the
virtue ethics that has already degenerated. They believe that the
transformation of
virtue ethics to utilitarianism and the normative ethics of
deontology indicates
that virtue ethics are not appropriate for modern society, and it
faces the dilemma
of modern society's changing social structure.
It is not a new view that virtue ethics face a dilemma in modern
society. This

Wew comes from Maclntyre. I will hereby discuss his theory
and compare it to
levant arguments by Chinese scholars. Unlike other ethicists,
Maclntyre is not
only an ethical theorist but also an expert in the history of
ethics. Analyzing the
social history of virtues, Maclntyre proposes that we are in an
after virtue age.
The title of the book, After Virtue, according to the author's
explanation, has
meanings on two levels: First, modern society is in an after
virtue age, ancient,
traditional Aristotelian virtues or traditional virtues
represented by Aristotle,
inevitably disappeared; second, this title indicates the search
for the history of
virtues. That is to say, the author must search for virtues in a
society that has lost
traditional virtues.
According to Maclntyre, virtue ethics was born in traditional
society, which
does not share a similar social structure with modern society.
Traditional society
is one characterized by hierarchy and status, wherein everyone
has their status
and mission. For instance, a noble is as he is at birth, and the
same holds true to a
chieftain, a king, a shepherd, etc. As a result, the established
status of a person
determines his duty, responsibility, and mission, which then
shapes his character
and virtue. At the same time, in traditional society, an
individual not only spends

his entire life engaging in one type of work, but so, too, are
successive
generations. These are the social conditions which are used to
evaluate a person.
The appearance of modern society dissolved these conditions,
as a result of
which the certainty of self disappeared. Maclntyre maintains,
"the democratized
self which has no necessary social content and no necessary
social identity can
then be anything, can assume any role or take any point of
view, because it is in
and for self nothing...the self is no more than 'a peg' on which
the clothes of the
role are hung" (Maclntyre 1984, p. 32).
Maclntyre points out that in traditional society, people
identified themselves
by their membership in different social groups. One can be a
member of a family,
someone's brother, a member of a village, and the like. He
stresses that these are
by no means tentative characteristics, nor do they require
removing "the
2019 00:28:51 UTC
Virtue Ethics and Modern Society 257
discovering of authentic self," but "part of my substance,
defining partially at
least and sometimes wholly my obligation and my duties"

(Ibid.). Modern
society is a contract society identified by contracts, or a society
of equality
whence people have status of freedom. Meanwhile, social
members are not born
with fixed careers; rather, their professions vary at any given
time. Consequently,
in such a modern society, the normative demands from their
profession rather
than those on individual virtue become the focus of ethical
studies. It is in this
sense that duty or responsibility becomes the key concept of
modern ethics.
Therefore, to resurrect virtue ethics, i.e., expanding the mode
of normative
ethics1 appropriate for traditional society to modern society
will encounter
difficulties or become out-dated.
Virtue ethics focuses on what kind of person one may become
or one should
become, putting the subject rather than his acts at the center of
its theory. Modern
normative ethics, on the other hand, mainly concerns acts,
namely, what acts are
good. While utilitarianism stresses the moral value of actions
from their
consequences, deontology evaluates the value of actions based
on the principles
or rules they should follow. According to ethicists like
Maclntyre, traditional
virtue ethics cares about human character and virtue is not

unrelated to
determinate status and circumstances in traditional society. At
the same time, the
traditional self is a concept that integrates birth, life, and death
on the whole, and
in human life it is the search for good in the whole of life
wherein virtue plays a
key role. In modern society, individual life is no longer
considered as part of a
whole, as in traditional society. On the contrary, it has been
taken apart and self
has degenerated into separate fields with different fragments
exerting different
demands on character. Virtue through life has lost its living
space. Such a
degeneration of the holistic self in modern society has rendered
the concept of
Aristotelian virtue in inactive.
Maclntyre also recalls the process in which traditional Western
virtue theories
represented by Aristotle declined. Since modern times, along
with the
establishment of the relationship between capitalism and the
market economy,
utility has become central to modern society. The market
economy seeks the
1 "Normative ethics" was put forward by meta-ethicists in the
tradition of analytic philosophy.
Ethicists or ethic theorists, before the appearance of meta-
ethics who, when studying or
writing about ethics, circled around the making of value
judgments in morality and advocated

some moral values. According to them, this was the ethical
study or work on a practical level.
Meta-ethicists, on the other hand, carry out their investigation
on a philosophical level
concerned only with the analysis of ethical concepts and
judgments, with the logical analysis
of ethical sentences without involving value judgments. In
other words, the concept of
normative ethics is used to differentiate between meta-ethics
and the work of previous ethicists.
It is in this sense that virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and ethics of
deontology are placed in the
category of normative ethics. This article makes use of the
concept of "normative ethics" in
this sense.
2019 00:28:51 UTC
258 GONG Qun
biggest profits, hence the pursuit of utility or material profits,
and financial
profits are of overwhelming significance. In market economies,
all relationships,
even old and tender familial relationships, have been inscribed
with money. It is
in such a social setting that utilitarianism has become rampant,
squeezing virtue
out from the center to the periphery. Maclntyre points out that
the concept of
"utility" was born in contemporary times. Profound changes in

contemporary
productive relationships and the appearance of the commodity
and market
economies made it possible for the pursuit of utility to
dominate. When people
treat utility as a supreme principle for action and the canon for
judgment between
good and evil, virtue degenerates into whether or not it can has
utility. Franklin's
view of virtue is a paragon.
Modern deontology is represented by Kant. It is a normative
deontology with
formal universality, concerned with form, not content. It is
Maclntyre's belief
that this kind of deontology is indicative of the decline of
virtue. To understand
"What you should do" merely as formal categorical
imperatives, we must
consider moral rules or norms in previous social structures
which, however, have
disappeared along with changes in modern society. The original
moral setting
does not exist anymore, but the virtuous imperatives have
survived, which,
consequently, seem empty.2
2
When virtue and virtue ethics only have significance in
traditional society, efforts
by ethicists to resurrect virtue ethics in modern society are
simply a theoretical
game without any practical meaning. When it is only the empty

wish of ethicists,
theorists are engaged in a battle like Don Quixote's windmill.
As a matter of fact,
even Maclntyre himself holds a pessimistic attitude toward the
resurrection of
virtue ethics in modern society, contesting that it can only be
realized in
communities like the cleric educational center set up by
Benedict. A
communitarianist as he is, Maclntyre is also a virtue ethicist
who, as a result, is
thought to be advocating a kind of virtue ethics relevant to
ancient communities
which will surely fail. Does such failure however reveal the
general trouble
2 In effect, it is a misunderstanding by thinkers including
Hegel that Kantian ethics includes
only formal categorical imperatives. Kantian ethics involves
not only formal categorical
imperatives, but also substantial categorical imperatives, that
are human beings are not only
means but ends. When people take two categorical imperatives
apart and concentrate only on
the former, it is natural to find it empty. What must be seen is
that the categorical imperative
that takes human beings to be ends does not appear as the result
of the disappearance of social
construction, wherein ancient virtue was born. On the contrary,
it is the embodiment of social
construction in modern society. Therefore, we cannot
completely attribute Kant's categorical
imperatives to the disappearance of the ancient environment.

2019 00:28:51 UTC
plaguing virtue ethics, or simply indicate the modern trouble
that ancient virtue
ethics is suffering?
The degeneration of ancient communities and the rise of
normative ethics as
utilitarianism and deontology can be taken as the most
important alteration in
social and ethical thought in the process of the transformation
from the
traditional society to the modern one. Along with the
degeneration of ancient
communities and the coming force of modern society, the
characteristics of self
have changed significantly, that is the fragmentation of the
modern self. Such a
transition makes Maclntyre think that the basis for virtue ethics
has vanished.
Hence, the first question is whether or not people still retain
virtues if traditional
communities or the system of status and hierarchy no longer
exists. It is our
contention that traditional communities are no longer around
does not mean
people lack virtues. Since virtues are related to a certain social
community or
social culture, on which it depends to exist and survive, as long
as people still

live in a certain social structure, virtues will, whether in a
traditional community
or not, be the link for maintaining interpersonal relationships.
In other words,
since virtues are socially and culturally relative, modern
society should, like its
ancient counterpart, have corresponding virtue ethics
appropriate for the modern
social structure. The assertion that only ancient society (in the
eyes of some
communitarians, the idea of community has another
significance, that is, society)
has corresponding virtues does not conform to general logical
reasoning.
A more important question concerning whether or not virtue
ethics agrees with
modern society is about the modern self, viz., the
fragmentation of self. We must
accept the fact that the characteristics of the modern self have
changed. Have
such changes nevertheless deprived self of its identity? Or,
does the fragmented
self still contain self-identity? Even so, is there an internal
relationship between
identity and virtue? Without this internal relationship, we
cannot reveal the
meaning and value that traditional virtue has for the self. To
put it in other words,
when the modern self is really ghostlike and without ethical
value, virtues loses
the ontological precondition for its existence in modern

society.
It should be noted that Maclntyre's fragmented self refers to
division in social
life. The most important division that occurs for the individual
from modern life
is the separation of the public sphere from that of the private.
In traditional
society, due to the relatively narrow social sphere,
inconvenient transportation,
and underdeveloped forms of communication, people in a
geographical
community lived in a society consisting of acquaintances, in
which there was
virtually no private space. Even in the city-states of ancient
Greece, people lived
among acquaintances as such. Industrialization and
urbanization in modern
society has changed people's living state and life space. What
has appeared along
with urbanization is a society of strangers. The biggest
difference between
strangers and acquaintances lies in the fact that as far as a
stranger is concerned,
2019 00:28:51 UTC
260 GONG Qun
he has no right to interfere in anything of mine. In this way, the
modem city and

modem industry have allowed strangers to emerge. Meanwhile,
all the fields
related to the public have developed, e.g. different professional
groups and their
life. Public spheres such as political activities, space for public
opinion,
networking, and public spaces etc., developed, wherein
everyone must follow
relevant social norms or moral standards. Such a separation of
spheres has
highlighted differences in social circumstances between modem
virtue and its
ancient counterpart, and make the professional morals in the
professional sphere
and the public morals in the public sphere as contrasted with
the private morals
in the private sphere emerge. Nonetheless, even though this has
led to differences
between ancient people and modem people on moral life, it
does not mean that
virtues have dissolved because of the division that has occurred
in modem life
and only universal ethical principles are permitted. As far as
modem individuals
are concerned, whether in the public life or private one, virtues
are required. In
modem society's market economy, due to the fragmentation of
interpersonal
interests, the possibility of conflict is far greater than that
within a family or even
a clan, and hence the virtue of righteousness is of greater
importance than in
ancient society. In other words, we need, all the more,
righteous people, those

with lofty ideas who hold good and justice in society higher
than anything else.
In the same vein, in different professional fields, duty and
responsibility or
rule-following ethics are found in the center. Be that as it may,
as far as an
individual is concerned, when he does not change these duties
and mies into his
internal demands, but treats them as the external demands of
professional duties,
there is no virtue whatsoever. The difference between virtues
and external mies
lies in that the former is the manifestation of an individual's
character whereas
the latter is no more than an instrument to reach a goal. Such is
the case wherein
both professional moral demands and professional techniques
are needed to
fulfill a professional task for which the former two are means.
But, for an
individual, can we regard duty and responsibility as necessary
means for him to
fulfill a duty? If so, people would not be able to follow the
bondage of these
duties and responsibilities or mies where profits from
professional life can be
made without their stipulation; instead, they may seek these
interests through
more convenient and lucrative means. Such means however
would damage
people's professional lives, negatively affecting or even mining
their careers. The
Sanlu Hj? (a trade mark in China) powdered-milk case is one

such instance for
people to ponder. Virtue means to treat duty and responsibility
as internal
requirements, making them key factors in one's moral character
so that one
cannot help doing so, and it is not a means to profit from
external interests. In
this sense, any modem profession, as such, cannot be without
virtue. Additionally,
unlike those virtues (e.g., courage, generosity, etc.) conceived
of by Aristotle
from the perspective of individual life, virtues in modem
society have a closer
2019 00:28:51 UTC
bearing on duty and are more diverse. This is to say that
professions appeal to
professional virtues. As a result, it is not in a general sense that
virtue ethics has
suffered in modern society. The so-called trouble is only
meaningful in the sense
of traditional virtues. People should not believe that
Aristotelian virtue ethics
hold no significance for modern life (this is an issue deserving
of more detailed
discussion, which cannot be done here).
What is more, the separation of spheres in modern society
refers to neither the

fragmentation of the self's personality nor the degeneration of
the identity of the
self. Seen from the segmentation of the external life, the
modern self seems to
have degenerated. The individual has no self, his essence is not
defined by
himself, and the self becomes a hanger for a role. The case,
seemingly, is not so
however when we see from the point of view of the individual
mental and
psychic identities such as mental identity, moral identity, and
identity of tendency
to act. As is demonstrated by developmental psychology, the
identity of an
individual's mental self comes from one's childhood
experience, and throughout
the development of the behavioral subject, his ability to speak
and act takes form
and develops, building some consistency. Self qua subject
keeps its own identity
during separation from and interaction with other objects. As
Harbermas puts it,
self may keep his identity when interconnecting with others
and, in all the games
relevant to roles, express that kind of relationship akin to
others yet absolutely
different hence ambivalent. What's more, as such a person?he
incorporates the
inner interaction into some unquestioned complex mood of life
history?he
makes himself appear (Harbermas 1989, p. 113). We do not
mean to say, of
course, that a person will never change his mentality or moral

tendency to act etc.,
but we mean that there will be changes, and there is
consistency which, as it were,
enables us to recognize from mental and moral identity as well
as physical
identity the same person from several years ago, decades ago,
or even earlier.
The mentality and moral tendency to act is an important facet
of one's identity.
We cannot deny that a person, from his youth into middle age
and to old age, has
personal identity. Indeed, most people have relatively steady
personalities, albeit
some have alternating personalities. Nevertheless, even this
alternation does not
come from large everyday changes and, even if it were a great
change, is the
result of gradual and quantitative changes, or a significant
change occurs after
some juncture has been reached. In other words, it is the
change, in lieu of the
fragmentation, of personality.
The main aspect of mental identity is individual moral identity,
the root of
which is virtue or the moral character of a person. Character is
the moral life of a
person, a layer above his natural one. As is pointed out by
Aristotle, virtue is
cultivated from a person's habit to act or gradually formed in
his life experiences,
and consequently, becomes a person's second life. Mencius
contends that there is
a slight difference between human and animals, and it is moral
character. Human

2019 00:28:51 UTC
262 GONG Qun
essence is not one's nature, but his social attributes, of which
morality is the most
essential. To put it in another way, human identity in moral
character embodies
our particularity as human beings. Nonetheless, while this
particularity leads to
generic identification between others and us, it differentiates us
from others
qua a moral self. As Harbermas puts it, in self identity, some
paradoxical
relationship is revealed: As a common one, and self is the same
as all the
others; as an individual however, he is by no means identical
with any other
individual (Ibid., pp. 93-94). Because of different
psychological processes and
life experiences, an individual's moral characteristics which are
formed by his
long-term habits may differ. As far as the self is concerned,
self identity
maintains consistent individual tendencies to act so that we can
expect
consistency from an individual due to his life experiences. In
other words,
when someone acts a certain way under some circumstance, it
stands to reason

that he would still do the same under similar circumstances.
Take, for example,
a brave man. It is more than that his life experiences have
demonstrated his
bravery. We can also expect his behavior to be the same in the
future. This is
to say that a righteous man would behave righteously, a brave
man bravely, a
moderate man moderately, a benevolent man kindly, and so on.
Aristotle
repeatedly mentions what a brave man would do and what a
righteous man
would do, referring to virtuous agents in the sense of self-
identity. When a
person is not worthy of expectation with regard to virtue, it
means that people
do not know how to communicate, cooperate, or co-exist with
him. Individual
self-identity is related to the maintenance of interpersonal
relationships and the
plan and expectations of human life.3
Will a man of virtue disappear as the result of the
fragmentation of life in
modern society? Whether in ancient society or modern society,
there is always
the virtuous self or the self lacking of virtue, and this will not
change as
modern living conditions vary. Self-identity and moral identity
are cultivated
from mental experiences and moral tendencies to act. Both in
ancient times and
in modern times, individuals exist and develop in
communication with the
external social circumstances and others. Based on this, if the

fragmentation of
modern life leads to the fragmentation of self, it only means
that there is no
standard for individuating individual self in society. In effect,
none can be
found to have been totally lost his moral self in any society.
Self-identity is a
unique psychological, moral and spiritual basis of individuals
qua individuals.
In self-identity, moral identity or the identity of moral
character is of much
Of course, we by no means deny that Aristotelian virtue ethics
includes the idea that slaves
are not men, but this also does not conform to Aristotle's view
that treating virtue as coming
from the inner construction of humanity and human praxis.
Pointing to this, we do not deny
that virtue ethics discuss virtue in a general sense of humanity.
2019 00:28:51 UTC
importance.
3
The second important issue presented by Maclntyre is: Modern
society is utility
centered whereas traditional society is virtue centered. Virtue
has been

marginalized in modern society. According to Maclntyre, we
are now in an after
virtue "dark age." What this view holds is not that there is no
virtue in modern
society, but that virtue is no longer important in modern
society. In Aristotelian
ethics, happiness centers around virtue; in utilitarianist ethics,
on the other hand,
happiness takes utility as its core or treats the utilitarian
consequence of action as
the standard for judgment. Maclntyre is correct in this sense
when judging the
place of virtue in modern society. Others also contend, on the
basis of
rule-following ethics represented by deontology, that modern
society puts rules
in the center and hence virtue at the periphery of moral life.
The following two
views deserve our notice: The first is judging the
marginalization of virtue as a
fact; the second is taking it as value identification. It is
Maclntyre's position to
make a judgment on the fact, ignoring value identification. His
opinion with
respect to the circumstances of virtue in modern society fails to
lead him to the
conclusion that virtue is not important in modern society. Just
the opposite, he
argues that we need to seek virtue because we have lost ancient
Aristotelian
virtue. As has been stated before, the pun, i.e., "after virtue"
used by Maclntyre
which contains the dual meaning of after virtue and searching
for virtue
demonstrates this. Where, nevertheless, should we cultivate or

find virtue?
Maybe the too much element of ancient Aristotelian complex in
Maclntyre has
inscribed in him the idea that authentic virtue can by no means
be cultivated in
modern society. A considerable number of modern Western
ethicists however do
not agree with him. For instance, Max L. Stackhouse, the
famous ethicist once
told me, even though we do not have Aristotelian ancient
virtue, we still have
virtue!
Of course, adherents to the ethical doctrine based on rules who
affirm virtues
from value considerations do not deny that virtue is needed in
modern society.
They simply believe that virtue is less important. What cannot
be denied is that
there is a great difference between ancient or traditional social
life and modern
one regarding the significance of virtue. The development of
modern material
civilization and the abundance of material life have changed
the appearance of
material life in traditional society. The upsurge in material
wealth is the origin as
well as product of the utilitarian pursuit. The conversion of
human spiritual value
has greatly improved the living conditions of modern man and
should be
commended for this. Nonetheless, the loss of the central status
of virtues has also

2019 00:28:51 UTC
264 GONG Qun
brought about problems such as the alienation and money-
orientation of
interpersonal relationships, damage brought to human beings
camouflaged by the
neutrality of technological value, the massacre of Jews in
World War II, to name
just a few. On this issue, I agree with Maclntyre's words,
namely that history has
its merits and faults, so we should not stop thinking about what
we have lost
when celebrating what has been given to us by progress.
Needless to say,
historical changes have led to a great change in status of virtue
in human life, but
we cannot claim that virtue has become less important because
it has no place in
modern society. It is just the opposite. The evils that have
happened in modern
society are unprecedented and unanticipated for our ancestors,
demonstrating
how necessary virtue is for modern society. Maybe utilitarian
pursuit in modern
society has produced many morally indifferent individuals or
even evil ones, and
has greatly degraded moral standards in modern society. It does
not mean

however that we no longer need virtue or virtue is no longer
appropriate for
modern society. If this is the plight, we should admit that it is
the plight of
modern man in lieu of virtue.
Virtues are necessarily important to the continuing existence of
mankind and
to the continuing development of human civilization. Can we
say that it is
enough for modern society to merely have rules? Is it worthy of
our concern that
virtue is in the periphery? Undoubtedly, virtues in modern
society are very
different from that in ancient society. We thus cannot return to
the age of
Confucius or Aristotle. Being unable to renew the exact
Confucian or Aristotelian
virtue notwithstanding, we cannot claim that it is dispensable.
The emergence of
professional life, urban life and technological life has
considerably changed the
human environment, further reinforcing the need for rules.
Rules nevertheless
cannot replace virtues in people's social and moral lives.
Rather than a kind of
elusive mental state, virtue is the inner character of a moral
self. What is more,
utilitarian pursuit in modern society has changed the direction
of human pursuit
for value and people's attitude toward material interests. The
change of the
human environment and values has led to changes in virtue and
its enrichment. In

addition, modern life centered on utility presents a greater
demand for the
practice of modern virtue. Modern man is confronted with
stronger temptations
from greed and selfish desires than his ancestors, and a society
of strangers has
enlarged the possibility of committing evil. The virtual cyber
world has presented
far greater demand for human virtue than the shendu (self-
discipline)
stressed in traditional Chinese society. On this account, we
hold that virtue,
especially modern virtue, is needed in modern society; rules
alone are not
enough.
The last problem is: There are ethics, to wit. utilitarian ethics
and ethics of
deontology, that fit in with modern life, do we still need virtue
ethics? The point
is, can utilitarianism and deontology alone respond to the need
for virtues? We do
2019 00:28:51 UTC
not think so. Issues pertaining to virtue should not be
categorized into that of
consequence of acts or rules of acts. Utilitarian ethics
interprets the moral
significance of utilitarian consequence from that of acts, and

deontology stresses
the moral significance of rules to acts from the significance of
rules.
Nevertheless, they fail to answer modern society's moral
demands. Virtue ethics
reaffirms the importance of virtue from the significance of
individual virtue,
which is precisely what the aforementioned two theories lack.
Seen from the
perspective of ethics, morality is concerned with voluntary
acts. It appeals to the
voluntariness, autonomy and self-consciousness of the subject,
so that it focuses
on individual character and virtue rather than external rules.
Acts originate from
the subject or the actor, which indicates that it is insufficient to
do ethical studies
merely from the significance of acts. Virtue ethics embodies
this particularity of
virtue by taking individual virtue as the focus. Hence, on the
whole, albeit the
declination of traditional virtues has its origin in the
transformation of social
structure and social history, this is, as a matter of fact, a
serious theoretical
deviation to ignore virtue ethics due to the development of
utilitarianism and
deontology. As a matter of course, an in-depth study of virtue
ethics is needed to
answer this question. Only in this way can the particular value
of virtue ethics be
made evident, which I will examine in another article.
References

Maclntyre, A. (1984). After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press
Harbermas, J. (1989). Communication and the Evolution of
Society (in Chinese, Zhang Boshu
tr.). Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe
2019 00:28:51 UTC
Contentsp. [255]p. 256p. 257p. 258p. 259p. 260p. 261p. 262p.
263p. 264p. 265Issue Table of ContentsFrontiers of Philosophy
in China, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2010) pp. 155-311Front
MatterMencius' Refutation of Yang Zhu and Mozi and the
Theoretical Implication of Confucian Benevolence and Love
[pp. 155-178]On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the
Confucian and Daoist Perspectives [pp. 179-195]The
Advantages, Shortcomings, and Existential Issues of Zhuangzi's
Use of Images [pp. 196-211]Political Thought in Early
Confucianism [pp. 212-236]The Renaissance of Traditional
Chinese Learning [pp. 237-
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��2��6��5��]Kant's Virtue Theory [pp. 266-
279]Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action
[pp. 280-293]Toward Model-Theoretic Modal Logics [pp. 294-
311]Back Matter
[63]
A Global Ethics for a
Globalized World
Anis Ahmad
Abstract
[Islamic ethics recognizes the role of intuitions, reason, customs
and traditions, so
long as all these draw their legitimacy from the Divine
principles. First and
foremost is the principle of coherence and unity in life. The
second foundational
ethical principle is the practice of justice or equity, fairness,
moderation, beauty
and balance in life. Then come respect, protection and
promotion of life. The role
of reason and rational judgment in human decision-making is
also important.
Protection of linage and dignity of genealogy, too, has
relevance to people of the
entire world. These divinely inspired ethical principles of Islam
– transcending
finitude of human mind and experience – are not local, regional

or national on
their origin. Their universality makes them globally applicable,
absolute and
pertinent in changed circumstances and environment. They are
human friendly
and offer appreciable solutions to human problem in this age of
globalization. –
Eds.]
A phobia generally stands for an obsession or an intense fear of
an object or a situation, like dog phobia, school phobia,
blushing
phobia. Phobias are associated with almost any psychiatric
condition
but are most often related with anxiety or obsessional states
leading to
queer compulsive behavior.
1
Islamophobia, a pegurative terminology,
used more frequently in post 9/11 era, refers to a reactionary
understanding of Islam and Muslims as dogmatic,
fundamentalist, less
civilized, anti-rational, backward, destructive and terrorist.
Islam is
perceived through the prism of news and media as a faith which
prescribes all those things which conflict and negate the western

value
system and pose a threat to the western civilization and
rationality.
2
This conceptual and psychological problem of the western
statesmen,
media experts, think tanks and researchers is not recent. Islam
and
Muslims have been for centuries regarded rivals, enemies and
opponents of the west. For the past two centuries, at the least, a
political, intellectual and cultural encounter, between the west
and the
Muslim world, has taken place. In this encounter the west was
has been
on an offensive and the Muslim world took mostly a defensive
approach. With the rise capitalist economy, secular political
system and
liberal intellectual tradition in the west, the western imperialism
penetrated its political, economic and cultural colonialism deep
in the
Muslim world. One symbol of it was that the official and
commercial

language of the colonizer replaced the native languages.
Consequently
in some Muslim lands (Algerian, Tunis, Morroco) French
because
Prof. Dr. Anis Ahmad is a meritorious Professor and Vice
Chancellor, Riphah
International University, Islamabad. He is also Editor of
Quarterly Journal Maghrab
awr Islam (West & Islam), published by Institute of Policy
Studies, Islamabad.
1 Ley, “Phobia,” 7.
2 Said, Covering Islam, 7.
Policy Perspectives
64
practically their first language and Arabic become secondary; In
the
Pakistan sub-continent, Sudan, Malaysia, South Africa and
Nigeria
whenever the British colonialism ruled, English because official
language. Similarly Italian and Dutch languages were
popularized
among in Libya and Indonesia. Adoption of a foreign language

had its
socio-cultural implication on the Muslim people. At the same
time their
relationship of the colonizer and the colonized also persuaded
the
colonizer to understand the mind of the colonized and take
necessary
measures to keep the colonizer subjugated. In order to
understand and
control the colonized, imperialists tried to learn about the native
languages and cultures. This persuaded the British, French,
Italian and
Dutch, to create centers for study of the Orient with focuses on
study of
language and culture of the natives. They also trained a
generation of
native scholars who subscribed to the western mind-set,
research
methodology and its basic assumptions.
All known civilizations have their distinct concepts of good and
bad. Even those considered as “uncivilized” and heathens
believe in

certain norms and values. They generally respect their elders
and love
children, they value honesty and disapprove cheating.
Traditionally,
local customs and traditions, after continuous practice, evolve
into
norms and laws. These norms and laws define for them what is
good or
bad behavior. When ethical behavior is considered an obligation
and
duty, it is called deontological ethics. Furthermore while
determining
right or wrong, one may take up an objective or subjective
approach.
Those who think good and right can be known like natural
objects, or
that right and wrong can be empirically verified are called
ethical
naturalists. While those who think right or wrong are a matter
of
emotions, or attitude of a group, are termed emotivists. Those
who
hold to non-cognitivism and think that attitudes of a group
determine

ethicality or non-ethicality of a judgment are called ethical
relativists.
The word ethics [ethickos in Greek, from ethos meaning custom
or usage] as a technical term also refers to morals and character.
Moralis was used by Cicero, who considered it the equivalent of
the
ethikos of Aristotle with both referring to practical activity
3
. Ethical
behavior in general means good conduct, acting with a sense of
right
and wrong, good and bad, and virtue and evil. Philosophers
classify
ethics in various categories, for example Normative ethics deals
with
“building systems designed to provide guidance in making
decisions
concerning good and evil, right and wrong…”
4
.
With these preliminary observations on the meaning of the
term, we may look briefly on the axiological and teleological
aspects of

ethical behavior. The axiological or value aspect subsumes that
ethical
behavior is to be considered good. The latter simply means that
the
3 Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy, 156.
4 Ibid, 156.
A Global Ethics for a Globalized World
65
ultimate objective and purpose of an action should be
achievement of
good. In either case western and eastern ethical thought
consider social
consensus, at a given time, as the source of legitimacy of an
ethical
act. Though certain ethical values apparently carry universality
e.g.
truth, the question, what is truth as such, whether truth is
practiced for
the sake of truth, or to avoid a personal harm, or for the
collective

benefit of a society, can be approached from different
perspectives.
In Western thought Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752 C.E.) held
that a person‟s conscience, when neither polluted nor subverted
or
deranged intuitively, makes ethical judgments. Immanuel Kant
(1724-
1804 C.E.) is known for his taking law as the basis of ethics;
therefore
here ethical behavior, for him, is a matter of a categorical
imperative.
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832 C.E.) considered the greatest good
of the
greatest number of the people as the goal of ethics. Herbert
Spencer
(1820-1903 C.E.) evolved the concept of evolutionary
utilitarianism.
Edward A. Westermarck (1862-1939 C.E.) pleaded the view of
ethical
relativism thus considering ethical systems as a reflection of
social
conditions. While William of Ockham (1290-1349 C.E.)
regarded ethics

as having religious origin in the will of God where the Divine
command
declares what is right or wrong.
Except for a handful of religious thinkers and philosophers,
those in the East or the West
consider intuition, collective
good or social conditions
responsible for considering an
act good and ethical or bad
and immoral. Nevertheless
certain concepts such as
justice, beneficence and non-
malfeasance are commonly
agreed as basic ethical
principles in the West. Islamic
ethics on the contrary draws
its legitimacy from Divine
revelation or Wah}ī. The Qur‟ān and the Prophetic Sunnah
provide

universal ethical principles with specific instructions on what is
good,
therefore permissible and allowed (h}alāl), what is desirable
(mubāh})
and what is bad and impermissible (h}arām) as well as what is
disliked
(makrūh).
These two comprehensive terms, h}alal and h}aram cover all
possible areas of human activity wherein one exercises ethical
judgment, and thus acts morally or immorally. Ethical
boundaries
(h}udūd) are drawn to indicate areas to be avoided. A vast area
of
mubāh} also exists where under general universal Divine
principles,
Maqās}id al-Sharī‘ah or objectives of the Divine law, individual
and
collective rational, logical and syllogistic reasoning (ijtihād)
leads to
judgments and positions on emerging bio-medical and ethical
issues.
All known civilizations have their
distinct concepts of good and bad.

Even those considered as
“uncivilized” also believe in
certain norms and values.
Policy Perspectives
66
The basic difference between the Eastern and Western ethical
philosophy, and the Islamic ethical paradigm can be illustrated
with the
help of a simple diagram.
Evolution of Ethical Values in the East
and the West
Ethical Norms
and values
Social Habits
and Behavior
Local Customs
and Traditions

Sociologist, anthropologists and historians of culture trace
origin of
ethical values of a people in their physical environment. With
the
change in space and time, values and norms are also expected to
change. The norms and values of a pre-industrial society and a
post-
modernist society are not expected to be similar. Social,
economic and
political evolution is supposed to cause basic changes in the
value
system of a people who go through this process. Values and
norms,
therefore, are considered relative to socio-economic change.
Truth,
beauty and justice are, therefore not absolute but subject to
environmental change and evolution. Man is supposed to adjust
his
behavior and conduct accordingly.
Islamic ethics recognizes the role of intuitions, reason, customs

and traditions, so long as all these draw their legitimacy from
the
67
Divine principles of Sharī‘ah. No customs or traditions contrary
to the
principles of Sharī‘ah can serve as the basis of social,
economic,
political, legal and cultural policies and practices. Social
development
and progress is subservient to Sharī‘ah. Divine legislation
(Sharī‘ah, in
the strict sense of the word) is neither a product of social
evolution nor
particular to a place, people, society or historical context. Its
principles
are operational in all seasons and in a variety of human
conditions.
Islamic ethics is founded on divine principles of sharī‘ah (the
maqās}id) which can be summarized as follows: First and
foremost is

the principle of coherence and unity in life (tawh}īd). It simply
means
that human behavior has to be coherent, unified and not
contradictory
and incoherent. If it is ethical to respect human life, the same
principle
should be observed when a person deals with his friends or
adversaries.
Justice, truth and thankfulness should not be selective. If a
person
declares that Allah is the Ultimate Authority in the universe,
then His
directions and orders should be followed not only in the month
of
Ramadan and in the masjid or within the boundaries of the
Ka‘bah, but
even when a person is in the farthest corner of the world one
should
observe Allah‟s directions in one‟s personal life, in economic
activities,
social transactions, as well as in political decision making.
Unity in life
or tawh}īd in practice, therefore, is a value and norm not
particular to a
place, time or people.

If a comparison is made with Confucianism for example, one
finds that in Confucianism (founded by Confucius: 551-479
B.C.E.),
there is great emphasis on the noble person (chuntzu). The
noble
person is expected to observe
certain values like humanity,
benevolence and compassion
(jen); righteousness (yi), filial
piety (xiao) and acting
according to “rules of
propriety” in the most
appropriate manner, or
observing ritual and ceremony
(li).
Jin or human
heartedness and yi or
righteousness together build a person of high moral quality

5
.
Righteousness and human heartedness in Confucianism are not
for the
sake of any utilitarian end. Righteousness has to be for the sake
of
righteousness. This reminds us of the Kantian categorical
imperative, or
following ethics as a legal obligation. Confucianism does not
accept
ethical relativism. In other words, ethical behavior and a
righteous
person stand for “principled morality”.
5 Yu-Lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, 10-12.
Islamic ethics recognizes the role
of intuition, reason, customs and
traditions, so long as all these
draw their legitimacy from the
Divine principles.

Policy Perspectives
68
The Confucian term li is often translated as “ritual” or
“sacrifice”. The fact of the matter is that it stands for more than
doing a
ritual in the prescribed manner. Confucius, in response to one of
his
students, is reported to have said: “in funerals and ceremonies
of
mourning, it is better that the mourners feel true grief, than that
they
be meticulously correct in every ceremonial detail.”
6
Ethics in practice
appears a major concern of Confucianism. It also indicates that
ethical
consciousness and a desire for ethical and moral conduct and
behavior
is a universal phenomenon.
Thus according to the Islamic worldview, ethical and moral
behavior (taqwa, ‘amal-s}āleh), observing what is essentially
good

(ma‘rūf) and virtue (birr) is an obligation. Reasoned ethical
judgment is
the basis of man‟s relation with his Creator as well as the basis
of
serving and interacting with His Creation .Every human action
is to be
based on ma‘rūf and taqwa, which are the measurable
manifestations
of tawhid or unity in life. Man is neither an economic entity
nor a social
animal, but an ethical being. Allah informed the angels before
the
creation of the first human couple that He was going to create
His
khalīfah, vicegerent or deputy, on earth. Allah did not say a
“social
animal” or an “economic man” or a “shadow of god/monarch”
or one
“obsessed with libido” was going to be created. khalīfah
conceptually
means a person who acts ethically and responsibly. Therefore
Man in
the light of the Qur‟ān is essentially an ethical being.

This realization of the unity in life, is the first condition for
being
a believer in Islam and this principle has global application.
Hence not
only for a Muslim but also equally for a Buddhist, Confucian, a
Christian, or a Hindu it is important to liberate oneself from
contradictions in conduct and
behavior. Specifically for a
Muslim observance of one and
the same ethical standards is
a pre-requisite for Īmān or
faith. An authentic Prophetic
h}adīth states:
“It is reported on the
authority of Anas b. Malik that
the Prophet (May peace and
blessings be upon him)
observed: one amongst you
believes (truly) till one likes

for his brother or for his neighbor that which he loves for
himself.”
7
The Qur‟ān in several places underscores unity in action or
unity
in behavior and profession as the key to ethical and moral
conduct.
6 Creel, Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung, 33.
7 Saheeh Muslim. Book 1. Hadīth no. 72.
The principle of coherence and
unity in life is the first and
foremost. It simply means that
human behavior has to be
coherent, unified and not
contradictory and incoherent.
69

“O Believers! Why do you say something which you
do not do? It is very hateful in the sight of Allah that
you say something which you do not do.”
8
Unity in life as the first core teaching of Islam also happens to
be the basis of what have been called objectives of the Sharī‘ah
(maqās}id al-Sharī‘ah). Since unity in life means elimination of
dual
standards of ethics and morality and development of a holistic
personality, its applicability and relevance is not particular to
be
Muslims. Needless to say the objective of sharī‘ah are
essentially
objectives of humanity as such truly global. The Qur‟an invites
the
whole of humanity to critically
examine human conduct and
behavior, and through the
application of tawh}īd, create
harmony, balance, coherence
and unity in human conduct and

social policy. This principle was
not a tribal, Arabian or Makkan
practice. It was revealed to the
Prophet that the Rabb or
Naurisher of the whole of
human community is Allah
alone, therefore He alone to be
taken as Transcendent creator
and sustainer of the whole universe and mankind. The Qur‟anic
terminology Allah is not an evolved form of ilah but proper and
personal
name of Transcendent creator of mankind. Islamic law similarly
was not
a matter of Arabian customs traditions assigned normativeness
by
Islam. Islam cause to Islamize the Arabs and non-Arabs. It
never
wanted to Arabize the non-Arabic speaking world community.
The second foundational ethical principle, and an important

objective of the Sharī‘ah is the practice of „adl (justice) or
equity,
fairness, moderation, beauty and balance in life. ‘Adl (justice)
is one of
the major attributes of Allah, for He is Most Just, Fair and
Compassionate to His creation. At the same time, it is the
principle
operating in the cosmos, in the world of vegetation, in the
animal
world, sea world as well as in humanity at large. The Qur‟ān
refers to
the constitution of man regarding this principle:
“O man! What had lured you away from your
Gracious Rabb, Who created you, fashioned you,
proportioned you.”
9
8 As-Saff:61:2-3.
9 Al-Infitaar: 82:6-7.
Second foundational ethical
principle, is the practice of

justice or equity, fairness,
moderation, beauty and balance
in life.
Policy Perspectives
70
In Islam ethical conduct and virtuous behavior (taqwa) is
directly linked with ‘adl:
“O Believers! Be steadfast for the sake of Allah, and
bear true witness, and let not the enmity of a people
incite you to do injustice; do justice; that is nearer to
piety….”
10
‘Adl is a comprehensive term. It also includes the meaning
of
excelling and transcending in ethical and moral conduct:
“Allah commands doing justice, doing good to others,

and giving to near relatives, and He forbids
indecency, wickedness, and rebellion: He admonishes
you so that you may take heed.
”11
Though generally taken to mean legal right of a person, „adl
has
much wider implications. At a personal level it means doing
justice to
one‟s own self by being moderate and balanced in behavior.
Therefore
if a person over sleeps or does not sleep at all, starves in order
to
increase spirituality or to lose weight, or on the contrary,
overeats and
keeps on gaining weight, in both cases, he commits z}ulm or
injustice
to his own self. „Adl is to be realized at the level of family. The
h}adīth
of the Prophet specifies that one‟s body has a right on person
similarly
his wife has a right on a person.
One who is kind, loving, caring and

compassionate toward family is
regarded by the Prophet a true
Muslim. „Adl has to be the basis of
society. A human society may
survive despite less food but no
society can survive without „adl or
fairness and justice. „Adl in
economic matters means an
economic order with oppressions,
monopoly and unfair distribution of
wealth. It also demands political
freedom and right to association, difference of opinions,
criticism and
right to elect most suitable person for public position. If a
political
system does not provide freedom of speech, respect for
difference of
opinion and practice of human rights it cannot be called a just
political
order. The capitalist world order, because of its oppressive

nature
cannot be called an „adil order. It remains a z}alim order so
long it does
not provide the due share of the laborer.
10 Al-Ma’idah: 5:8.
11 An-Nah}l: 16:90.
A human society may
survive despite less food
but no society can survive
without fairness and
justice.
71
‘Adl in a medical context means professional excellence in
one‟s
area of competence and specialization, for the simple reason
that ‘adl
means doing a thing at its best. It implies devoting full attention

to the
patient in order to fully understand the problem and coming up
with the
best possible remedy. It also means prescribing a quality
medicine with
least financial burden on the patient, and avoiding unnecessary
financial burden on a patient by prescribing irrelevant
laboratory tests
or high cost medicine when a less costly medicine can do the
same.
Thus if in one single area proper attention is not paid, it is
deviation
from the path of ‘adl.
The third vital global ethical principle and one of the objective
of
the Sharī‘ah is respect, protection and promotion of life. It too
has
wider and vital implications for the whole of mankind. This
principle is
drawn directly from the Qur‟ānic injunction that saving one
human life
is like saving the whole of mankind, and destroying one single
life,

unjustly, is like killing the whole of mankind.
12
This Qur‟ānic injunction
makes it obligatory on every believing Muslim to avoid harming
life or
killing, except when it is in return for committing manslaughter
or
causing lawlessness in society.
13
Since the word used in the Qur‟ān is nafs which means, self,
soul, individual human being, it is not particular to the Muslims
or
people of a particular faith, creed or ethnicity. No individual or
group of
human beings can be killed, or their life harmed without an
ethical,
objective and legal justification. It also means that life when
even in its
developmental stage is equally honorable and valuable. A fetus
hence
has the same sanctity as a full-grown human being. Therefore
any

things that can harm the fetus is also to be avoided in order to
ensure
quality of life is not marginalized. For example if a female
during
pregnancy uses alcoholic beverages, or drugs or even smokes,
medically all these are going to harm the fetus, and thus effect
the
quality of life in future of a child yet to harm.
Not only this, but the principle has further serious implications
even for environmental policies. It is also directly relevant to
the
manufacturing and production of pharmaceuticals. If the quality
of
pharmaceuticals is not controlled, their use is bound to harm
life.
This principle is also related to public policy on population. It
does not allow state to interfere in the bedroom of a person and
impose
an embargo on childbirth, or allow abortion. These are only a
few
serious ethical issue directly related to the principle of value of

life.
12 “That whoever kills a person, except as a punishment for
murder or mischief in the
land, it will be written in his book of deeds as if he had killed
all the human beings,
and whoever will save a life shall be regarded as if he gave life
to all the human
beings…” Al-Ma’idah:5:32.
13 Ibid.
Policy Perspectives
72
Obviously these are universal applications of this principle and
not
confined to the followers of Islam.
The fourth major ethical principle relates to the role of reason
and rational judgment in human decision-making. The fact that
human
beings should have reasoned judgments, and rise above
emotional
behavior, blind desires and drives is a major concern of the
Sharī‘ah.

Consequently Islam does not permit suspension of freedom of
judgment. An obvious example is, if a person gets addicted to
drugs or
hooked to intoxicants, their use influences his personal and
social
relations, freedom of will, as
well as personal integrity. In
Islam independence of reason
and rational judgment is a pre-
condition for all legal
transactions. The Qur‟ān
considers the use of intoxicants
immoral (fah}āsh). It is not only
sinful but also legally prohibited.
Modern medical research also
confirms the harmful effects of
drugs and intoxicants on the
mental health of people
irrespective of their race, color

or religion. However Islam‟s concern for reasoned and rational
behavior
in personal and social life is not peculiar to Muslims. It‟s
universal
values have global relevance to the conduct and behavior of all
human
beings at a global level.
The fifth principle, protection of linage and dignity of
genealogy,
too, has relevance to people of the entire world, irrespective of
their
religion, race, color or language. It makes protection of genetic
identity
and protection of lineage an ethical and legal obligation. The
Islamic
social and legal system considers free mixing of sexes and pre-
marital
conjugal relations immoral as well as unlawful. This has serious
implications for health sciences, social policy and legal system.
This
global ethical principle deters a person from commercialization
of the
human gene and also from the mixing of genes (such as in the

case of
a surrogacy). This principle helps in preserving high standard of
morality in human society. It also discourages anonymity of the
gene
and helps in preserving tradition of genetic tree.
This limit review of the objectives of Islamic shari‘ah indicates
that every principle has global relevance to ethical and moral
conduct of
persons in a civilized society. The purpose of this brief resume
of
universal and foundational Islamic ethical and moral principles,
has
been first to dispel the impression that Islamic ethics is
particular to the
Muslims; second to understand the objectives and origin of
these
values in the Divine guidance and third, to find out how viable
they are
in the contemporary world.
Islamic ethical principles
clearly differentiate between a

reasoned and rational judgment
and a judgment based on the
so-called blind drives.
73
The principles and the objectives of the Sharī‘ah, as mentioned
above, are practically the objectives of humanity. Many of the
biological, emotional or intellectual and social needs of man
have been
interpreted in western social sciences as blind drives, instincts
and
animal desires; Islamic ethical principles clearly differentiate
between a
reasoned and rational judgment and a judgment based on the so-
called
blind drives. For instance, some human actions may have
apparent
similarity but they may be poles apart. A person may take a loan
from

a bank on a mutually agreed interest rate to establish an
industry.
Another person may also borrow money from a bank on the
Islamic
ethical principles of profit sharing, and with no interest at all.
Both
appear industrial loans yet essentially one supports the
capitalistic
exploitative system, while the other encourages commercial and
industrial growth without indulging in interest or usury, totally
prohibited by Islam.
Legitimacy of Ethical Values
Before concluding, it may also be appropriate to add a few
words on
the legitimacy of Islamic ethical principles. It may be asked,
“do these
principles draw their legitimacy from their customary practice,
or draw
their power and authority from somewhere else?
Ethical behavior in all walks of life is a major concern of Islam.

However it does not leave ethical judgment to the personal like
or
dislike, or to the greatest good of the largest number of people,
though
one of the maxims of the Sharī‘ah directly refers to public good
or
maslaha ‘amah. The origin and legitimacy of values in the
Islamic world
view resides in Divine revelation (wah}ī). Revelation or
kalaam/speech
of Allah should not be confused with inspiration or intuition,
which is a
subjective phenomenon. Revelation, wah}ī or kalaam of Allah is
knowledge which comes from beyond and therefore, it is not
subjective
but objective. Being the spoken word of Allah, makes it
transcend the
finitude of space and time. Though revealed in the Arabic
language, it
addresses the whole of humanity (an-Naas). It uses Arabic
language
only incidentally, for clarity in communication. The purpose of
revelation in Arabic was to Islamize the Arabs and not to
arabize those
who enter in to the fold of Islam.

Islamic values by their very nature are universal and globally
applicable. None of the ethical norms have their roots in local
or
Arabian customs and traditions. These are not particularistic,
temporal
values that normally change with the passage of time. These are
universal values having their roots in the Divine, universalistic
revelation. The principle of ‘adl discussed above, is not
particular to a
race, color, groups or a specific region, or period of history.
Respect
and promotion of life is also a universal value. Similarly
honesty,
fairness, truth are neither Eastern nor Western, these are
universally
recognized applied values.
Policy Perspectives
74

The purpose of these universal Islamic values is to help human
beings develop a responsible vision of life. It is a gross
underestimation
to consider life a sport, a moment of pleasure. Life has
meaning, an
ethics by which it has to be lived, fashioned and organized.
The Islamic world view, as pointed out earlier looks on human
life holistically. It advocates integration and cohesion in life,
and avoids
compartmentalization and fragmentation. Tawh}īd or unity in
life is
created when one single standard is observed in private and
public life
and all human actions are motivated only by one single concern
i.e how
to gain Allah‟s pleasure by observing an ethical and responsible
life.
Islamic ethics can be summarized in only two points. First and
foremost, is observance of the rights of the Creator; living an
ethical
life with full awareness of accountability on the day of
Judgment as well

as in this world. Secondly, to fulfill obligations towards other
human
beings not for any reward, recognition or compensation, but
simply
because it pleases Allah. Serving humanity for the sake of
humanity
may be a good cause but what makes serving humanity an
‘ibadah or
worship is serving Allah‟s servants for His sake, and not for
any worldly
recognition by winning an excellent reward.
Islamic ethics in practice helps in binding the balanced,
responsible, receptive and proactive personality of a
professional. The
primary Islamic ethical values briefly discussed above allow
anyone
who follows these in their letter and spirit to reflect as a global
citizen,
who transcends above discriminations of color, race, language
or
religion. The Qur‟ān invites the entire humanity to adopt the
path of
ethical living and practice, in order to make society peaceful,

orderly
and responsive to needs of
the community. The Muslim
community is defined in the
Qur‟ān as the community of
ethically motivated persons
(khayra-ummah) or the
community of the middle
path (ummatan-wast}ān)
that does not go out of
balance and proportion and
implements good or ma‘ruf.
Ethically responsible
behavior means a behavior that follows universal ethical norms
and
laws and resists all immediate temptations. The strength of
character
simply means strict observance of principles a person claims to
subscribe to. Thus Islamic professional ethics guides a
professional in

all situations where an ethical judgment is to be made, in
medical
treatment as well as in business transactions, and administrative
issues.
It is a gross underestimation to
consider life a sport, a moment of
pleasure. Life has meaning, an
ethics by which it has to be lived,
fashioned and organized.
75
Islamic ethics in practice encompasses not only formally known
social work but practically every action a human takes in
society.
Islamic professional or work ethics is not confined to customer
satisfaction. A believer has to act ethically in personal as well
as social,

financial, political and cultural matters. Change in space and
time does
not lead to any change in ethical and moral standards and
behavior.
Quality assurance as an ethical obligation is one of the major
concerns
of the Qur‟ān. The general
principles of quality
assurance are mentioned at
several places in a variety
of context.
“Weigh with even
scales, and do not
cheat your fellow
men of what is
rightfully theirs...”
14
It is further
elaborated when the Qur‟ān directs, that while delivering goods

or
products one should not observe dual standards:
“Woe to those who defraud, who when, they take by
measure from men, take the full measure, but when
they give by measure or by weight to others, they
give less than due.”
15
A medical practitioner for example, when he gets his
compensation in terms of consultation fee, it is his or her
ethical
obligation to advice a patient with full responsibility, care and
sense of
accountability to Allah. The same applies to a teacher, who
must deliver
knowledge with full honesty, responsibility and fairness without
hiding
the truth, or manipulation of facts. It equally applies to students
and
researchers who do their utmost in seeking knowledge and truth,
and

produce knowledge while avoiding plagiarism and other unfair
means in
research.
14 Ash-Shū’ara:26:182-183.
15 Al-Mut}affifīn:83:1-3.
Islamic ethics in practice
encompasses not only formally
known social work but practically
every action a human takes in
society.
Policy Perspectives
76
The divinely inspired ethical principles transcend finitude of
humans mind and
experience. These are not
local, regional or national
on their origin, they are

not for a people with a
specific denomination
either. Their universality
makes them globally
applicable, absolute and
applicable in changed
circumstances and
environment. They are
human friendly but not a
result of human intellectual
intervention and offer
appreciable solutions to
human problem in this age
of globalization.
Wamā tawfīqī illa, bi Allah, wa Allahu A’lamu bi als}awāb.
The divinely inspired ethical
principles of Islam – transcending

finitude of human mind and
experience – are not local, regional
or national in their origin. Their
universality makes them globally
applicable, absolute and pertinent in
changed circumstances.
77
References:
Creel, H.G. Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung.
Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953.
Ley, P. “Phobia.” in Encyclopedia of Psychology. edited by H.J.
Eysenck,
et al, Vol III. New York, The Seabury Press, 1972.
Reese, William. Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion Eastern
and

Western Thought. New Jersey: Huamanties Press, 1980.
Said, Edward W. Covering Islam, How Media and the Experts
Determine
How We See the Rest of the World. New York: Panthoos Book,
1981.
Yu-Lan, Fung. The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy. Boston:
Beacon Press,
1947.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without
permission.
1
1
Introduction to
Global Issues
VINAY BHARGAVA

More than at any other time in history, the future of humankind
isbeing shaped by issues that are beyond any one nation’s
ability
to solve. Climate change, avian flu, financial instability,
terrorism, waves of
migrants and refugees, water scarcities, disappearing fisheries,
stark and
seemingly intractable poverty—all of these are examples of
global issues whose
solution requires cooperation among nations. Each issue seems
at first to be
little connected to the next; the problems appear to come in all
shapes and
from all directions. But if one reflects a moment on these
examples, some
common features soon become apparent:
■ Each issue affects a large number of people on different sides
of
national boundaries.
■ Each issue is one of significant concern, directly or
indirectly, to all or
most of the countries of the world, often as evidenced by a
major
United Nations (UN) declaration or the holding of a global
conference
on the issue.
■ Each issue has implications that require a global regulatory
approach;
no one government has the power or the authority to impose a
solu-
tion, and market forces alone will not solve the problem.

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