Presentation at CeDEM Asia 2014

1. Territorial Issues and Support
for the Prime Minister:
A Survey Experiment on Rally-‘Round-the-Flag
Effect in Japan
Tetsuro Kobayashi
(National Institute of Informatics)
Azusa Katagiri
(Stanford University)

2. RQ
• Does perceived threat of China increase
support for PM Abe?
• What are the segments of the JP public that
are most susceptible to this effect?

3. Perceived military threat of China
Dec. 2011 Waseda University
“Polls on foreign affairs”
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012a)

4. Perceived military threat of China
July 2012 Waseda University
“Polls on foreign affairs”
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

5. External threat and domestic public
opinion
• Perceived external threat affects domestic
public opinion
– Lowers political tolerance (Gibler & Hutchison, 2007)
– Strengthens national identity (Gibler et al., 2012)
– Decreases well-being (Miller, 2013)
– Increases support for the restriction of civil
freedom (Berinsky, 2009; Weeks, 2014)
– Increases support for political leaders (Lambert et al.,
2010; Lambert, Schott, & Scherer, 2011)
• Rally-’round-the-flag effect

6. Rally-’round-the-flag effect
• A social psychological phenomenon in which
support for political leaders increase
temporarily and sharply following abrupt and
striking military threats (Mueller, 1970; Baker & O'Neal,
2001)
• President Bush’s approval ratings soared 39
points to 90% after 9/11 attacks

7. Perceived threat
Support for
President
RRF effect

8. Perceived threat
Support for
President
RRF effect
Anger

9. Application to perceived threat of
China
• Contextual differences
– No armed conflict so far
– Not so dramatic as terror
– Not widely known that PM is the commander of SDF
– Unique historical context
• Historical belief on past colonialism
• But if anger is the key mediator, RRF effect
would be replicated to the extent the threat
evokes anger

10. Hypotheses
• H1: Perceived threat of China over territorial
issues increases support for PM Abe
• RRF effect hypothesis
• H2: This RRF effect is mediated by anger toward
China
• Emotion mediation hypothesis
• H3: Historical beliefs of Japanese colonial policy
in China in the past moderates the RRF effect
• Historical belief moderation
• H4: Perceived threat of China has no effects on
conservative shift in political attitudes other
than territorial issues
• Domain specificity

11. Experiment
• February 13-14 2014
• Japanese adults
– N=2,400
– Online panel
– Excluding “professional respondents”
• Random assignment
– Treatment group: N=1200
– Control group: N=1200

12. Procedure
• Pre-treatment measures
– Demographic, Party ID, Ideology, Nationalism,
Political knowledge, Media trust (Asahi, Sankei,
and Nikkei), Historical belief
• Treatment
– Browse a news article of Nikkei newspaper on
popped-up window
• Cannot move on without browsing the article
• Need to stay at the page at least for 30 sec
• Post-treatment measures
– Manipulation check: Perceived threat of China
– DVs: Emotion toward China (Anger/Anxiety),
Support for PM Abe, Policy attitudes

13. Treatment
• Treatment
– “People’s Daily Reports ‘Discussion Needed for
Issues of Attribution of Okinawa’ Suggesting
China’s Territorial Rights: Chief Cabinet Secretary
‘Completely Injudicious’”
– Reports China raising the issues of the attribution
of Okinawa in order to restrain Japan from issues
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
• Placebo
– News article on smartphones
– Completely unrelated to China or territorial issues

14. Valid responses and Compliers
• # of valid responses: N=1562
– NTreatment=775, NControl=787
• # of Compliers：N=939
– NTreatment=531, NControl=408
– Definition
• Answer correctly to quiz re the content of the article
• Browse the article for more than 40 sec

15. Covariate balance and
Manipulation check
• Covariate balance
– Sufficient both in the entire sample and in
compliers
• Manipulation check
– Significant treatment effect on perceived threat of
China
• Both in the entire sample and in compliers
• Whether covariates are included or not
• Cohen’s d = 0.11～0.15

16. H1: Perceived threat of China over
territorial issues increases support for
PM Abe (RRF effect hypothesis)
Cohen’s d = 0.01 ～ 0.04
Dependent variable:
Treatment 0.005 0.006 0.022 0.020
(0: Control 1: Treated) (0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.027)
Constant 0.574** -0.077 0.564** -0.130
(0.018) (0.076) (0.024) (0.095)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1562 1562 939 939
R-squared 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.316
Standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Support for PM Abe
Entire sample Compliers
Coef. (B)

17. H2: This RRF effect is mediated by anger
toward China (Emotion mediation hypothesis)
Entire sample Compliers Entire sample Compliers
Cohen’s d = 0.13 ～ 0.16
Dependent variable:
Treatment 0.030** 0.032** 0.037* 0.034* 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.000
(0: Control 1: Treated) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.660** 0.375** 0.658** 0.352** 0.707** 0.500** 0.719** 0.530**
(0.008) (0.038) (0.011) (0.049) (0.008) (0.038) (0.011) (0.049)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1562 1562 939 939 1562 1562 939 939
R-squared 0.004 0.150 0.006 0.166 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.054
Standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Affect toward China
Anger Angxiety
Coef. (B)

18. Perceived threat
of China
Support for
PM Abe
H1: RRF effect
Anger toward
China
H2: Emotion mediation effect

19. H3:Historical belief moderation hypothesis
Perceived threat
of China
Support for
PM Abe
Historical belief

20. Historical belief
• A scale by Gries et al. (2009)
– China prospered under Japanese colonial rule
– Japanese policies helped China to develop.
– Japanese policies were not good for China
(Reverse)
– The Chinese people suffered under Japanese
rule (Reverse)

21. H3: Historical beliefs of Japanese colonial policy
in China in the past moderates the RRF effect
Dependent variable:
Treatment 0.143* 0.122* 0.180* 0.156*
(0: Control 1: Treated) (0.069) (0.060) (0.085) (0.073)
Historical belief (Conservative) 0.708** 0.186* 0.799** 0.191
(0–1) (0.096) (0.090) (0.125) (0.116)
Treatment X Historical belief -0.274* -0.233* -0.340* -0.277*
(0–1) (0.130) (0.113) (0.161) (0.139)
Constant 0.221** -0.137+ 0.177** -0.208*
(0.051) (0.081) (0.065) (0.103)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,562 1,562 939 939
R-squared 0.048 0.298 0.062 0.319
Standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Support for PM Abe
Entire sample Compliers
Coef. (B)

22. Moderation by historical belief
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Mean - 1SD Mean Mean + 1SD
Historical belief (Conservative)
Control
Treatment
Error bar: 95% CI
ATE=7%
P < .05
Support of PM Abe
Liberal Conservative

23. H4: Perceived threat of China has no
effects on conservative shift in political
attitudes other than territorial issues
• The treatment effect was significant only on
the attitude of Senkaku/Diaoyu issue
– No significant treatment effects on the issues
attitudes of Constitutional revisions, defense
reinforcement, preemptive attacks, and pressure
to North Korea
• The effects of external threat perceptions are
issue-specific

24. Hypotheses
• H1: Perceived threat of China over territorial issues
increases support for PM Abe
– RRF effect hypothesis
• H2: This RRF effect is mediated by anger toward China
– Emotion mediation hypothesis
• H3: Historical beliefs of Japanese colonial policy in
China in the past moderates the RRF effect
– Historical belief moderation
• H4: Perceived threat of China has no effects on
conservative shift in political attitudes other than
territorial issues
– Domain specificity

25. Take-home
• Differences btwn RRF effect studies in the U.S.
• Threat perception increases support for the
PM among those with liberal historical beliefs
• PM Abe can mobilize support from the
opposite side of the ideological spectrum

26. Thank you!

27. Replication
• Prime of military leader
– Treatment: ”It is PM that has the right of supreme
director of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Do you
support PM Abe or not?”
– Control: “It is PM that is the chief of Cabinet which
is Japan’s Administration. Do you support PM Abe
or not?”

28. Experiment
• March 6-7 2014
• Japanese adults
– N=1540
– Online panel
– Excluding “professional respondents”
– Excluding those who participated in the original experiment
• Random assignment
– Threat perception * Prime of military leader = 4 groups
– Complete random assignment (N=385 for each group)

29. Moderation by historical belief
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Historial
belief:
Mean - 1SD
Historical
belief:
Mean
Historical
belief:
Mean +
1SD
Historial
belief:
Mean - 1SD
Historical
belief:
Mean
Historical
belief:
Mean +
1SD
Prime: No Prime: Yes
Control
Treated
Error bar: 95% CI

30. Discussion
• Threat perception increases support for the
Prime Minister among those with liberal
historical beliefs when military leader is NOT
primed
• The effect of threat perception disappears
when military leader is primed

31. Discussion
• The effect of priming military leader
– Works as a cue of conservativeness/hawkishness of
Abe pulls people back to their baseline level of
support
– No evidence of anger/retaliation-based RRF effect
• Threat perception is effective among those with
liberal historical belief
– Anger and retrospective evaluation cannot explain
– What’s the mechanism?

32. Thank you!!

33. Social Psychological explanations
• Explanations that does NOT integrate emotions
– Opinion leadership hypothesis
– Patriotism hypothesis
• Explanations that integrate emotions
– Anxiety-based
• Terror-management theory
• Uncertainty-management theory
– Anger-based

34. • Ideology: We measured with one item below.
• Terms such as “right” and “left” are used to
express one’s political standpoint. Suppose 0
being the most left and 10 being the most
right, where would you stand? Please choose
from the numbers 0 to 10.

35. • Nationalism: We measured the following 13 items by a 5-point scale ranging from
“agree” to “disagree” and summed them up (α= 0.80). The order of presentation of
the items was randomized.
• 1．I want to stay a Japanese citizen than a citizen of any other country
• 2．I am proud to be Japanese
• 3．I want to feel proud of Japan but sometimes I can’t (Reverse)
• 4．There are a few things about the current Japan that I feel embarrassed about
(Reverse)
• 5．Generally speaking, Japan is a good country compared to other countries
• 6．The world would be a better place if people in other countries would be like
Japanese people
• 7．Even if one’s own country is wrong, citizens should support their country
• 8．I feel proud of Japan when Japanese athletes excel in international sporting events
• 9．It is a matter of course to teach about the national flag and anthem in education
• 10. We need to reconsider post-war educational system to educate children more
about patriotism and responsibilities of citizens
• 11．I feel proud of Japanese democracy
• 12．All people in Japan are fairly and equally treated
• 13．Foreigners who are legally residing in Japan should have the same rights as
Japanese

36. • Political knowledge: We used the following six items from the
questionnaire of “Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy” conducted by
Waseda University and measured by a five-choice method that included
“Don’t know.” We unobtrusively measured the answering time and
classified the answers that took 20 seconds or more as incorrect (Iyengar
et al., 2010). The order of presentation of the choices except “Don’t know”
was randomized.
•
• 1．Which country is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations
from?
• 2．Which one of the following is the international organization called
NATO?
• 3．Which one of the following is the international organization called IMF?
• 4．Which one of the following is the international agreement that
adjusted exchange rates for depreciation of the U.S. dollar and
appreciation of the Japanese yen between five developed countries
including the United States and Japan etc.?
• 5．Which one of the following is the international organization that has a
Japanese secretary-general?
• 6．Which one of the following countries has the largest number of
Muslims.
• http://www.cjs-waseda.jp/surveys/surveys.html

37. • Media trust: Using News Credibility Scale (Gaziano & McGrath,
1986), we measured trust for each of the three newspapers
including Asahi Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun, and Nikkei Shimbun by
the following five items (a five-point scale ranging from “agree” to
“disagree”). The order of presentation of the items was randomized.
•
• 1. Reports by [Asahi/Sankei/Nikkei] Shimbun are mostly fair
• 2. Reports by [Asahi/Sankei/Nikkei] Shimbun are mostly accurate
• 3. Reports by [Asahi/Sankei/Nikkei] Shimbun are mostly unbiased
• 4. Reports by [Asahi/Sankei/Nikkei] Shimbun mostly provide the
whole story
• 5. [Asahi/Sankei/Nikkei] Shimbun can mostly be trusted

38. • Perceptions for Japanese colonial policy in China:
Using a scale by Gries et al. (2009), we measured with
four items (a five-point scale ranging from “agree” to
“disagree”). The order of presentation of the items was
randomized.
•
• 1. China prospered under Japanese colonial rule
• 2. Japanese policies helped China to develop.
• 3. Japanese policies were not good for China (Reverse)
• 4. The Chinese people suffered under Japanese rule
(Reverse)

39. • Questions regarding contact article for the definition of Compliers:
We measured the following two items by a five-choice method that
included “Don’t know.”
• ・Treatment group
• 1. Which country is this article about? (Correct answer: China)
• 2. Which prefecture of the following was the issue in the article?
(Correct answer: Okinawa prefecture)
• ・Control group
• 1. For the company featured in this article, which prefecture was
the company located in? (Correct answer: Kanagawa prefecture)
• 2. Which of the following cities was featured in this article that
developed a tourist guide Smartphone app? (Correct answer:
Kamakura city)

40. • Threat perceptions from China: Using a scale by Gries et al.
(2009), we measured with five items (a five-point scale
ranging from “agree” to “disagree”) (α = 0.73). The order of
presentation of the items was randomized.
•
• 1. The world would be a safer place if the China was weaker
• 2. China is a threat to Japan
• 3. Japan should be suspicious of China’s intentions
• 4. The recent increase in China’s defense spending
undermines Japan’s security
• 5. China seeks to avoid military conflict with Japan
(Reverse)

41. • Emotions toward China: Based on Huddy,
Feldman, & Cassese (2007), we presented a lead
sentence “How are you feeling toward China (the
People's Republic of China)?” followed by a
seven-point scale that ranged from “feel very
strongly” to “not at all. ” The order of
presentation of the emotions was randomized.
• ・Anxiety toward China: “anxiety”, “fear”, and
“concern” (α= 0.85)
• ・Anger toward China: “anger”, “hostility”, and
“hatred” (α= 0.87)

42. • Support for Prime Minister Abe: We
measured one item “Do you support Prime
Minister Abe or not?” with two choices of
“yes” and “no.” The order of presentation of
the choices was randomized.

43. • Political attitude: We measured the following 12 items from the UTokyo-
Asahi Survey (UTAS) conducted by Masaki Taniguchi of the Graduate
Schools for Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo and the Asahi
Shimbun. We measured with a five-point scale that ranged from “agree”
to “disagree.” The order of presentation of the items was randomized.
•
• 1. We should amend the Constitution
• 2. We should strengthen Japan's defense capabilities
• 3. Even if it means to increase tensions with China, we should actively
protect the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands
• 4. In the cases that foreign attacks are anticipated, we should not hesitate
to have preemptive attacks
• 5. We should prioritize pressure than talks when dealing with North Korea
• 6. We should allow the use of the right of collective self-defense by
amending the constitution or revising the interpretation
• 7. It is a matter of course that privacy and individual rights are restricted
to protect public safety
• 8. We should approve local suffrage for permanent foreign residents
• 9. We should promote acceptance of foreign workers
• 10. We should improve moral education
• 11. Resumption of operation at nuclear power plants, which are currently
offline for regular inspection, is inevitable
• 12. Municipalities except the affected areas should actively accept debris
of the Great East Japan Earthquake

44. 各国に対する脅威認識の構造
早稲田大学「外交に関する調査」2012年7月
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

45. 文化や価値観の共有と脅威認識
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

46. 文化や価値観の共有と脅威認識
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

47. 文化や価値観の共有と脅威認識
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

48. 文化や価値観の共有と脅威認識
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

49. 文化や価値観の共有と脅威認識
Source: Iida & Ueki-Kawakatsu (2012b)

50. 社会心理学的説明
• 感情をモデルに組み込まないもの
– オピニオンリーダー仮説
• 大統領に対するオープンな批判の抑制とメディアの
Indexingによってオピニオンリーダー間で大統領支持
の合意が形成されていると認知される
– 愛国心仮説
• 社会的アイデンティティ理論
• 内集団のポジティブなイメージを保持するためにリー
ダーに対する支持が高まる

51. 社会心理学的説明
• 感情をモデルに組み込むもの
– 不安ベースのモデル
• 存在脅威管理理論：死の顕現性や不確実性が高まっ
た時に旗下集結効果が生じる
• 脅威認知が保守的な態度やリーダーに対する支持を
高める(Janoff-Bulman & Usoof-Thowfeek, 2009)
• 問題点
– 旗下集結効果は軍事的・敵対的な文脈でのみ生じている

52. 社会心理学的説明
• 感情をモデルに組み込むもの
– 怒りベースのモデル
• 感情喚起モデル(Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001)
• 認知が感情に先行する
• 脅威認知は不安と怒りを高めるが、両者は大統領支
持に対して異なる効果(Lambert et al., 2010; Huddy, Feldman,
& Cassese, 2007)

53. 固有の歴史的文脈
• 過去の植民地政策に関する歴史認識
– 日本の大学生は、過去の中国における日本の植
民地政策をポジティブに評価する保守的な人ほ
ど、現在の中国の脅威認知とタカ派的な外交政
策に対する支持度が高く、尖閣諸島をめぐる問題
についても強硬的な態度を表明する傾向が強い
(Gries et al., 2009)

54. 国際政治学的位置づけ
• 国際危機・軍事紛争発生後の旗下結集効果を研究した先行研究
に対して、本研究は、本格的な国際危機に突入する前段階におい
て、世論の対外脅威認知が政権支持率に及ぼす影響を対象とす
る。
• このような危機の前段階における対外政策と世論を扱った研究は
比較的乏しく、本件は両者の関係を考察する上で格好の事例であ
る。とりわけ、対外脅威認知を経ることで、世論の政権支持率への
インパクトを推定し、指導者の国内政治上のインセンティブの有無
を探る（例えば、Audience cost; Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 2001;
Smith 1998; Tomz 2007)。
• 日中関係の緊張が、国内世論の安倍首相支持に対してプラスの
効果を持っている可能性？

55. 仮説1：領土問題に関する中国の脅威
認知は、安倍首相に対する支持を高
める（旗下集結効果仮説）
Dependent variable:
Treatment 0.037 0.040 0.051 0.057+
(0: Control 1: Treated) (0.030) (0.026) (0.038) (0.033)
Constant 0.489** -0.306** 0.495** -0.431**
(0.021) (0.096) (0.029) (0.122)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,111 1,111 695 695
R-squared 0.001 0.259 0.003 0.292
Standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Support for PM Abe
Entire sample Compliers
Coef. (B)
不支持Cohen’s d = ～

56. 仮説2：旗下集結効果は中国に対する怒
りによって媒介される（感情媒介仮説）
Dependent variable:
Entire sample Compliers Entire sample Compliers
Treatment 0.019 0.024+ 0.030+ 0.032* 0.011 0.012 0.004 0.004
(0: Control 1: Treated) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 0.669** 0.264** 0.673** 0.250** 0.710** 0.428** 0.733** 0.472**
(0.009) (0.045) (0.012) (0.058) (0.009) (0.043) (0.011) (0.056)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,111 1,111 695 695 1,111 1,111 695 695
R-squared 0.002 0.159 0.005 0.164 0.001 0.069 0.000 0.058
Standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Affect toward China
Anger Angxiety
Coef. (B)
不支持Cohen’s d = 0.13 ～ 0.16

57. 過去の歴史認識による調整効果
（安倍首相の外交政策評価）
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Historial
belief:
Mean - 1SD
Historical
belief:
Mean
Historical
belief:
Mean +
1SD
Historial
belief:
Mean - 1SD
Historical
belief:
Mean
Historical
belief:
Mean +
1SD
Prime: No Prime: Yes
Control
Treated

58. 過去の歴史認識による調整効果
（安倍首相支持）
• 安倍内閣の支持率は本実験から追試にかけ
て低下傾向
– 時事世論調査
• 2014年2月8～11日：53.7％
• 2014年3月7～19日：48.1％
• リベラルな歴史認識層では脅威認知によって
支持率が6割近くまで上昇