Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International .docx

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Vol. 24, No.426
C
lose to 1000 drones are already employed by a
number of state police, county sheriff’s offices, and
police departments in the United States.
Their uses are varied. For example, a state highway
patrol may use drones to take photos of vehicle and
train accidents. Other law enforcement agencies
may use their drones in tactical response situations
and other incidents during high-risk callouts
involving SWAT, as well as in searches for missing
persons and fleeing suspects.
US Air Force drone
is being hand launched.
The use of drones, while in
its infancy now, has a strong po-
tential to be a game changer for the
good guys, law enforcement, firefighters,

and our military. Photo by Staff Sgt. Kleinholz.
Law
Enforcement’s
Uses of Drones
In Crime Fighting And As
Deterrent Against Terrorism
By Jim Weiss and Mickey Davis
Is there public opposition
to drones being used
by American law
enforcement? You bet.
People feel they will be
used to spy on American
citizens; however, there
was similar opposition
when police switched
from revolvers to carrying
pistols, when Armored
Rescue Vehicles came

into use, when SWAT
was formed, and when
TASERS® began to be
used.
A sheriff’s office in Florida used a drone
to monitor the actions of a subject in a car
with a gun. In the San Francisco Bay Area,
law enforcement used a drone to help track
and apprehend a carjacking/attempted kid-
napping suspect. In Ohio, the Knox County
Sheriff ’s Office used a drone during a
standoff at an apartment building where the
suspect was barricaded inside. The SWAT
team broke out the residence’s windows
and used the drone to look through upstairs
windows to get a better idea of where the
suspect was located.
Law enforcement’s UASs (unmanned air-
craft systems) are primarily mission- and
incident-driven. Images collected using this
technology are handled and retained within
industry standards, consistent with im-
ages collected by any camera used by law
enforcement. However in some situations
like a search for evidence, a search warrant
might be needed or advisable.
Have drones also been used by bad guys?
Yes. They’ve been used to fly near manned
aircraft such as passenger planes, to fly over
prohibited airspace, and to deliver drugs

within correctional institutions. Drone em-
ployment by terrorists is a potentially deadly
threat – including recon, explosives, etc.
Recently, a drone shut down London’s Gat-
wick Airport for a couple of days causing
travel inconveniences for thousands and the
cancellation of a few hundred flights. Ter-
rorism was a suspected possible cause, but
this was discounted. The following month a
drone flew in the restricted airport
airspace in Newark, New Jersey.
In the USA the most common
violations in the uses of drones are
flying in prohibited air space. In
recent years, one was flown above
the Bryant Denny Football Stadium
prior to a University of Alabama
football game. Another was flown
onto the New York capitol build-
ing, while another landed on the
roof of the AT&T stadium where
the Cowboys play. At other times,
a drone was flown within 50 feet of
an NYPD helicopter, one was flown
near the White House that required
Secret Service counter-activity, and
incidents have been documented in
other countries such as one that was
reportedly flown into a bank.
There have also been concerns over drones
interfering with firefighters – especially
with their helicopters and air tankers while
fighting forest fires.

Is there public opposition to drones being
used by American law enforcement? You
bet. People feel they will be used to spy
on American citizens; however, there was
similar opposition when police switched
from revolvers to carrying pistols, when
Armored Rescue Vehicles came into use,
when SWAT was formed, and when TAS-
ERS® began to be used.
Pinellas County (FL)
Sheriff’s Office
Pinellas County, with an estimated popu-
lation of 970,532, has 846 sworn law
enforcement deputies and 687 in detention
and corrections.
The agency currently has one drone, or what
they refer to as a UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle). This small drone is assigned to
SWAT. It is a DJI™ Mavic Pro intended
for use inside buildings. They have tested
it outside, but the camera has no zoom or
thermal imaging, limiting its use; however
the agency is in the process of purchasing
a larger, more multifunctional UAV.
The Sheriff’s Office drone and all UAVs can
be used to gather intelligence, look for sus-
pects, or conduct search-and-rescue missions.
Camera images are vital to those missions.
A search warrant would be required if
the drone is used to gather evidence.

There are currently six UAV pilots in
the Sheriff’s Office who have their
FAA (Federal Aviation Administra-
tion) Part 107 UAV license. They log
flight hours and work closely with
the agency’s Chief Pilot, who is a
UAV instructor as well as being heli-
copter and fixed-wing certified. The
agency is looking into more training
for the drone pilots to become more
proficient.
Legalities: Pinellas County Sheriff’s
Office’s current UAV is registered
with the FAA. Since it has only had
its drone for a few months, it is work-
ing ascertain the needs of the agency
to get a Certificate of Waiver or
Ultimately, the main use of UASs by the Bexar Coun-
ty Sheriff ’s Office and elsewhere is to reduce the risk
to officers and keep them out of harm’s way. Photo
courtesy of Ricardo Requejo Jr.
Vol. 24, No.428
Authorization (COA). A COA
is an authorization issued by
the Air Traffic Organization-
-the operational arm of the
FAA--to a public operator
for a specific unmanned air-

craft activity. The Air Traffic
Organization is responsible for providing
safe and efficient air navigation services
to 29.4 million square miles of airspace; it
generally reviews a request and responds
within 60 days.
Most COAs are for specific uses such as a
special event, but public safety will apply
for a blanket COA allowing operation in a
certain airspace and other special circum-
stances. The Sheriff’s Office currently has
no COAs for night operation, flying beyond
visual line of sight, flying over people,
flying in controlled airspace, or operation
higher than 400 feet. A violation of this can
result in fines by the FAA.
The agency does have Standard Operating
Procedures for their UAV which lay out the
responsibilities of the flight crew, agency
authorization, and usage.
Costs: In comparing the sheriff’s drone to
their helicopter’s cost, the Sheriff’s Office
says it is difficult to provide an exact esti-
mate since the agency does all maintenance
on the helicopter in house. The sheriff’s
flight section figures that it costs several
hundred dollars per hour to operate the
helicopter since cost factors include the
pilot and pay grade
The initial cost of the UAV includes batter-
ies, lights, prop cages for indoor flights, and

getting all six pilots their FAA licenses. This
was approximately $3,500. Other expenses
can include the time the drone is in flight
and any overtime additions to the drone
pilot’s salary, and additional equipment or
maintenances needed for the UAVs.
However, the helicopter and UAV really
cannot not be compared as neither one could
replace the other.
Bexar County, Texas,
Sheriff’s Office
Bexar County Sheriff’s Office’s drone fleet
is currently made up of two commercial
UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems or drones)
and two compact UAS.
The Commercial drones are DJI Matrice
200s which feature single camera gimbal
or pivoted support that allows for rotation.
The drones have an operational range of
4.3 miles, maximum payload of 4.4 lbs.,
ActiveTrack (the ability to track a moving
target), and obstacle avoidance. The two
compact drones are the DJI Mavic Pro, with
cameras that feature 12 MP stills, 4K video
at 30 fps (frames per second), an operation
range of 4.3 miles, and obstacle avoidance.
Uses: The drones were originally intended
to be used for the reconstruction of major
crash scenes involving criminal charges,
but have evolved to be employed in all
major criminal crime scenes as well as for

tactical support. To do this, the agency uses
its drones with Pix4D photogrammetry
mapping software to produce 2D and 3D
renderings of crime scenes. They can then
create video animations, as well as measure
distances and surfaces with sub-centimeter
accuracy. This produces precise, irrefutable
evidence so that investigators, forensic
experts, and jury members can revisit the
scene at any time and from any location.
In tactical support situations, the drones
are used where SWAT and/or the negotia-
tors have responded; typically these are
stand-off events involving barricaded
suspects. The drones are able to pro-
vide overhead perspectives of dynamic
situations and over-watch for the sheriff’s
SWAT operators in the absence of air sup-
port helicopters.
Another use by SWAT is for building or
room clearance during interior operations.
Many systems are small enough now that
they can be flown indoors and through
windows, hallways, and doorways. This
provides the SWAT operators with an ac-
curate layout of the building as well as
identification of suspects. A UAS can also
be utilized as a distraction device, causing
the suspect to focus on the drone while the
team makes entry from a separate location,
overwhelming the suspect before he real-
izes what is happening.
Ultimately, the main use of UASs in these

situations is to reduce the risk to officers
and keep them out of harm’s way.
The Bexar County Sheriff’s Office adheres
to Texas Government Code, Chapter 423:
Use of Unmanned Aircraft in situations
The drones were
originally intended
to be used for the
reconstruction of
major crash scenes
involving criminal
charges, but have
evolved to be
employed in all major
criminal crime scenes
as well as for tactical
support. To do this,
the agency uses its
drones with Pix4D
photogrammetry

mapping software to
produce 2D and 3D
renderings of crime
scenes. They can
then create video
animations, as well
as measure distances
and surfaces with
sub-centimeter
accuracy.
Vol. 24, No.4
where a search warrant
may be required.
Training: The sheriff’s
UAS drone operators
are considered by the
Federal Aviation Ad-

ministration (FAA) to be a commer-
cial entity; operators must obtain an
FAA Part 107 Remote Pilot Certifica-
tion. To earn this, the drone operator
must pass an aeronautical knowledge
test at an FAA-approved testing
center and undergo a Transportation
Safety Administration (TSA) secu-
rity screening.
To prepare for the test, drone pilots
attend the 100-hour Drone Pilot Inc.
(DPI) Eyes Overhead Small Un-
manned Aerial Flight Team Training
course. This course is a seven-part,
proficiency-based, unmanned aerial
operations training program for first
responder/professional operators. It
focuses on safety first, using pub-
lic safety muscle-memory training
techniques to build a professional
flight team that can respond to the
unique missions of first responders
and professional Unmanned Aircraft
(UA). This is a demanding class
which requires self-paced flight
practice several times a week totaling
20 hours between phases. The skill
learned in Phase 1 is a building block
to Phase 2 and Phase 3.
Legalities: The FAA has set regu-
lations on weight and distances a
UAS can be flown, and the Bexar
County Sheriff’s Office operates in
accordance with the FAA regulations.

According to the FAA, federal, state,
and local government offices can fly
UAVs to support specific missions
under either the FAA’s Part 107 rule
or by obtaining a Certificate of Au-
thorization (COA). These are issued
for a specific period of time--usually
two years--and include special provi-
sions unique to each proposal, such
as a defined block of airspace and
time of day the UAS can be used.
If an agency wishes to certify, they
can submit for a COA, but it is not
required. The Bexar County Sheriff’s
Office chose to obtain both Remote
Pilot licenses for the pilots in accor-
dance with FAA Part 107 and a COA.
Costs: The cost of utilizing the UAS
(drones) is approximately $70-$100
an hour with consideration of the
UAS pilot’s pay whether on duty or
overtime. On the other hand, it costs
approximately $900-$1000 an hour
for a helicopter, depending on the
size of the aircraft.
The initial cost of a commercial drone
such as a DJI Matrice 200 series,
depending on the model, is approxi-
mately $11,000-$14,000 per package.
The operational expenses for a DJI
Matric 200 series is about $2,900
every other year for a four-battery set
and two propeller set replacements.

The initial cost of a compact drone
such as a DJI Mavic Pro series is ap-
proximately $2,000 per package. The
operational expenses for this type of
drone are about $400 every other year
for four batteries and two propeller
set replacements.
The Bexar County Sheriff’s Office
currently has Standard Operating
Procedures in place, and Policies
and Procedures are actively being
completed.
Aurora, Colorado, Police
Department
There are 725 sworn police officers
on the Aurora Police Department; it
has a population 370,000, and covers
an area of 154 square miles
The Aurora Police Department cur-
rently has two drones, a new DJI
Mavic Pro Platinum and a DJI Mavic
Pro. They have used the Mavic Pro to
search for a missing child, to photo-
graph homicide cases, and to search
building rooftops for evidence related
to a homicide.
Training and Legalities: The agen-
cy’s operators have FAA Part 107
licenses. According to the National
Institute of Justice, flight approval is

required to operate a drone; law en-
forcement agencies are granted flight
approval by the Federal Aviation
Administration. The official document
DronesKnox18: In Ohio, the Knox County Sheriff ’s
Office used a drone during a standoff at an apartment
building where the suspect was barricaded inside.
The SWAT team broke out the residence’s windows
and used the drone to look through upstairs windows
to get a better idea of where the suspect was located.
Bexar County Sheriff ’s Office’s drone fleet is currently
made up of two commercial UAS (Unmanned Aerial
Systems or drones) and two compact UAS. The com-
mercial drones are DJI Matrice 200s which feature
single camera gimbal or pivoted support that allows
for rotation. Photo courtesy of Ricardo Requejo Jr.
In tactical support situations, the Bexar County Sher-
iff’s Office drones are used where SWAT and/or the ne-
gotiators have responded; typically these are stand-off
events involving barricaded suspects. The drones are
able to provide overhead perspectives of dynamic situ-
ations and over-watch for the sheriff’s SWAT operators
in the absence of air support helicopters. Photo cour-
tesy of Ricardo Requejo Jr.
30
is referred to as a Certificate of Authorization/
Waiver (COA). This approval process allows
public agencies and divisions of government
to operate UAS in the national airspace; there

are no current regulations in place for UAS
operations.
In addition, it is recommended that these public
agencies establish Policy and Procedures or
other guidance documents to operate a UAS.
The Part 107 license and agreements with air
traffic control in the Aurora area allow the police
department to fly after notifying the appropriate
control tower.
The agency’s policy and procedures are covered
within a police departmental special order which
is written to provide members of the agency
guidance in deploying and using their UAS
(drone) in operational and emergency situations
in a manner consistent with the regulations and
governance set forth by the FAA. Definitions
include reference to a UAS as an aircraft without
a human pilot but being controlled by an opera-
tor on the ground using a transmitter.
A UAS observer, in brief, is a person who assists
the UAS operator in the duties associated with
collision avoidance; departmental approval to
do so is set forth in the general order. Under
this same general order, a UAS operator is the
individual exercising control over the drone
during flight. Under policy, an operator may
respond to specific incidents to capture images
and/or video that may assist investigators. These
incidents are limited to search and rescue, crime
scene evidence documentation, hazmat scenes,
and tactical situations involving a hostage, bar-
ricaded suspect, or an active shooter. The policy
spells out in detail how a request for such mis-

sions must be obtained. Additional details are
within UAS policy such as what to do in the
case of lost link or loss of communication with
the UAS, etc.
Camera images are the primary use of the police
department’s UAS. It cannot take thermal im-
ages, but it can record HD video. The range of
the camera isn’t an issue as the drone may only
fly line of sight.
The Threat of Drones in use by Bad
Guys and Counter Measures
According to Newsweek’s Tim O’Connor,
FBI Director Christopher Wray has warned
members of the Senate that drones will be
used by ISIS and criminal gangs including
MS-13 to attack the USA. And, yes, the FBI
does make use of drones for surveillance in
the US, but this use is minimal.
Are there counter measures that can be used
against drones? Yes, these include such things
as RF (radio frequency) jamming, disrupting
the drone’s GNSS (Global Navigation Satel-
lite System) or satellite link which acts as
its GPS, taking control or hijacking a drone,
using laser energy to crash the drone, and us-
ing nets and projectiles. However, there can
always be a danger when a targeted drone falls
or crashes into the ground.
There are federal laws giving certain gov-
ernment agencies empowerment to take on
outlaw or misused drones.

As for local law enforcement, it can get con-
fusing because of issues such as like false
arrest under state law. Also, under federal law
18 USC 32, it’s a felony to damage aircraft
(manned or unmanned).
The use of drones, while in its infancy now,
has a strong potential to be a game changer for
the good guys, law enforcement, firefighters,
and our military as well as for bad guys, and
various brands of terrorists.
About the Authors
Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infan-
tryman, school-trained Army combat engineer, a former
school-trained (regular Army) Army military police-
man, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired
police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police De-
partment. He has written and co-written hundreds of ar-
ticles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines,
most notably Law and Order. Tactical World, Knives
Illustrated, Tactical Response, Police Fleet Manager,
Florida Trooper, and Counter Terrorism.
Mickey (Michele) Davis is an award-winning, Califor-
nia-based writer and author. Her young adult novel,
Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the
Swiss Prix Chronos for the German trans-
lation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War
veteran officer and a senior volunteer with
her local fire department.
According to

Newsweek’s Tim
O’Connor, FBI Director
Christopher Wray has
warned members of
the Senate that drones
will be used by ISIS
and criminal gangs
including MS-13 to
attack the USA. And,
yes, the FBI does make
use of drones for
surveillance in the US,
but this use is minimal.
This US Army drone is being hand
launched. The use of drones, while
in its infancy now, has a strong
potential to be a game changer for
the good guys, law enforcement,
firefighters, and our military.
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Terrorism in Pakistan: A Behavioral Sciences
Perspective
Asad Tamizuddin Nizami, M.B.B.S.*, Mowadat Hussain Rana,
M.B.B.S.†,
Tariq Mahmood Hassan, M.B.B.S.‡ and Fareed Aslam Minhas,
M.B.B.S.§
This article reviews the behavioral science perspectives of
terrorism in Pakistan. It can
be argued that Pakistan has gained worldwide attention for
“terrorism” and its role in
the “war against terrorism”. The region is well placed
geopolitically for economic
successes but has been plagued by terrorism in various shapes
and forms. A behavioral
sciences perspective of terrorism is an attempt to explain it in
this part of the world as a
complex interplay of historical, geopolitical, anthropological
and psychosocial factors
and forces. Drawing from theories by Western scholars to
explain the behavioral and
cognitive underpinnings of a terrorist mind, the authors
highlight the peculiarities of

similar operatives at individual and group levels. Thorny issues
related to the ethical
and human right dimensions of the topic are visited from the
unique perspective of a
society challenged by schisms and divergence of opinions at
individual, family, and
community levels. The authors have attempted to minimize the
political descriptions,
although this cannot be avoided entirely, because of the nature
of terrorism. Copyright
# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
It is difficult to define terrorism, but most definitions refer to it
as unlawful, mass violence
directed particularly at civilians, resulting in widespread fear.
Such violence is often
(but not exclusively) motivated by political, religious, or
ideological ideals and intended
to induce societal and national changes. However, the
international community has as
yet not succeeded in developing a consensus on a
comprehensive definition of terrorism:
The United Nations General Assembly defines political
terrorism as : a political violence in an
asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and
psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate)
through the violent victimization and destruction of
noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic
symbols). The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in
order to achieve maximum
attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to
influence the targeted
audience(s) in order to reach short and midterm political goals
and/or desired long-term end
states (Schorn, 2006).

“Terrorism” is a politically and emotionally charged word,
which greatly compounds
the difficulty of providing a precise definition (Gardner, 2008;
Nunberg, 2001).
*Correspondence to: Asad Tamizuddin Nizami, M.B.B.S,
Assistant Professor, Institute of Psychiatry, WHO
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Rawalpindi Medical
College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. E-mail:
[email protected]
†
Director General, Centre for Trauma Research and Psychosocial
Interventions, National University of
Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan
‡
Department of Psychiatry, Division of Forensic Psychiatry,
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario Canada
§
Head Institute of Psychiatry, WHO Collaborating Centre for
Mental Health, Rawalpindi Medical College,
Rawalpindi, Pakistan
Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Behavioral Sciences and the Law
Behav. Sci. Law 32: 335–346 (2014)
Published online 28 April 2014 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bsl.2118
Attempts by the state to protect civilians against terrorism may
also lead to social
oppression, and that in turn may result in further acts of

terrorism (Hoffman, 1998;
Record, 2003).
Pakistan is a classic example of a country caught in an ongoing
war against terrorism,
where the state, its people, its neighbors, allies and friends have
had diverse and often
conflicting views on the subject. Surprisingly, Pakistan is
considered to be both a front-
line nation in the international war against terrorism and at the
same time a sponsor of
international terrorism. More than a decade after its active
involvement in an all-out
war against terrorism, it finds its allies as well as its own
government entering into a
dialogue with the terrorist organizations to find a palatable
solution.
At this important juncture in history, this article aims to look at
terrorism in Pakistan
from the perspective of the behavioral sciences. It takes into
account an interplay of
diverse factors that have contributed to unprecedented suffering
by the nation at the
hands of terrorists. The article also takes into account the
country’s unique and advan-
tageous geopolitical status, which has resulted in a peculiar
anthropological experience
through its use as a corridor used for thousands of year by
Greeks, Arabs, Mongols,
Turks, Afghans, and Iranians to reach India’s capital, Delhi, the
seat of power in the
subcontinent. We also discuss the psychological, social, and
religious vulnerabilities
of the people of Pakistan, which may predispose this country to
both contributing to,

and becoming a victim of, terrorism.
PAKISTAN: GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO
Pakistan is situated in the northwest part of the South Asian
subcontinent and lies
between 24ºN and 37ºN in latitude and 67ºE and 75ºE in
longitude. It is bordered
to the east by India (1,950 km) and to the north and northwest
by Afghanistan
(1,200 km), including the one-km-wide, largely porous
Wahkhan strip. To the
southwest is the oil-rich heart of the Persian Gulf region, Iran
(800 km), and to the south
is the Arabian Sea. Pakistan also has a common border to the
north with China
(600 km).
From a strategic point of view, Pakistan is at the crossroads of
central, south
and southwest Asia and provides the easiest and the quickest
link between the
oil-rich Persian Gulf and China. Its upcoming Gwadar sea port
is a natural harbor
that has the potential to serve the Central Asian states and
Russia through
Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a federation of four provinces (Sindh, Punjab,
Baluchistan, and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa), a capital territory (Islamabad) and a group of
federally administered
tribal areas in the northwest along with the disputed area of
Azad Jammu and Kashmir
(World Health Organization, 2009). Pakistan has a geographical
area of approximately

800,000 sq. km which is spread over a diverse terrain,
comprising some of the highest
peaks of the world, such as K2, deep valleys, the fertile plains
of the world’s oldest
civilization, the Indus Valley, and deserts in Sindh and
Balochistan. Pakistan is the
world’s sixth most populous country with a population of
180,808,000. The average
population density is 229 individuals per sq. km, and the
population is projected to
reach 210 million by 2020 and then to double by 2045.
Pakistan has access to the Indian Ocean, through which most of
the world’s trade
passes, and enjoys 700 km of coastline, with the promise of
offshore oil and gas
336 A. T. Nizami et al.
Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 32:
335–346 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/bsl
reserves. China, which is developing its southern and western
provinces, particularly
the Xinjiang region, shares a border with Pakistan and is merely
2,600 km away from
the sea ports of Karachi and Gwadar. Pakistan offers a unique
opportunity for China
and other Central Asian states that are landlocked to have trade
access to the Indian
Ocean.

The main geopolitical threat to Pakistan is the compromised
strategic position that
was traditionally provided by the friendly Pakhtuns (residents
of the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province) in the northwest of the country, but
which is now challenged
by al-Qaeda and the anti-Pakistan Taliban of Afghanistan. The
terrorist organizations,
sponsoring a separatist movement in Balochistan, are hampering
the realization of the
full potential of the province in terms of its mineral, oil, and
gas resources. These orga-
nizations pose the same threat to the road linking China to the
Gwadar port and to the
gas pipeline project with Iran.
However, despite the geopolitical advantages, factors that
perpetuate terrorism include
the population explosion, rampant poverty, illiteracy, poor
health parameters, severe
power shortages, unexploited natural resources, a fragile
industrial and agricultural
infrastructure, limited financial resources and, in the last
decade, the ongoing war against
terrorism.
EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN
The northwest region of the country bordering Afghanistan is
the part of Pakistan that
has been worst hit by terrorism since September 2001, with its
epicenter in and around
the city of Peshawar, capital of the province of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Histori-
cally, the famous “Khyber Pass” in KPK has served as an
important route for armies

that invaded the subcontinent and India from the northwest.
Throughout history the
inhabitants of this part of Pakistan have been exposed to wars,
battles, armament,
and soldiers. Trading in arms and ammunition is a norm.
Pakhtun men are expected to carry a weapon as an integral part
of their dress. Indeed,
they feel “naked” without it. Many sections of this diverse
society are practitioners of a
concept of religion that discourages modernization and the
participation of women in
educational and occupational pursuits. A behavioral sciences
approach to the evolution
of terrorism in this region must link these influences to the
collective unconscious
(Carl Jung) of the largely Muslim population, particularly the
Pakhtun tribes that have
occupied the northwest of Pakistan for centuries.
The current wave of insurgency shows gross similarities to a
similar movement led
by the clerics Syed Ahmed Barevli (1786–1831) and Shah
Ismail when the region
was under Sikh rule in the 19th century. The two clerics revered
themselves as saints
and great warriors, who were fighting for the implementation of
an Islamic way of life.
Many Pakhtun tribes rallied under them, took up arms under the
leadership of Syed
Ahmed, who declared himself to be the Amir ul Momineen
(Head of the Believers),
and challenged the military might of the Sikhs. They demanded
and implemented a
change in the traditional lifestyles of the inhabitants, strictly
implementing their

concept of Sharia (Islamic lifestyle) and started to collect 10%
of the people’s gross
earnings as Ushr (a form of taxation introduced in the early
years of Islam).
Annexing hundreds of villages in and around Peshawar, they
enhanced their
influence and fought pitched battles against Sikh armies at their
stronghold at Akora
Terrorism in Pakistan: a behavioral sciences perspective 337
335–346 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/bsl
(the current site of one of the largest religious seminaries in
Pakistan, with its alumni
including Mullah Umar, the former Taliban ruler of
Afghanistan) in the 1820s. This
movement took root and gained momentum in the same
geographical and cultural area
where Fazal Ullah (the current commander of Taliban in
Pakistan) and his father-in-law,
Sufi Muhammad, took up arms against the Pakistan government
from 2002 to 2009,
and attempted to establish a very similar Islamic state in the
Swat district of KPK.
The movement was eventually crushed by the forces of Ranjeet
Singh (1780–1839)
when he joined hands with local tribal chieftains, in a battle at
Balakot in the Hindu

Kush mountains. The establishment of the Sikh militias led to
the formation of the Sikh
State in the early 19th century. Both clerics were killed in the
battle of Balakot and
achieved the status of martyrs of Islam. Thus, the
anthropological roots and strategic
inspiration for today’s insurgency and militancy in this region
are hundreds of years
old. At the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, examples
of extortion and extrem-
ism – emanating from acts of aggression, brutality, killings,
arson, looting, rape, and
torture of Muslim migrants by Hindu and Sikh extremists –were
rampant during the
mass migration to Pakistan. The gory details of these acts of
terror are still fresh in
the minds of present-day survivors. An estimated one million
people lost their lives and
14–18 million people were forcefully displaced. In Punjab
alone, the loss of life was
between 500,000 and 800,000, and 10 million people were
forcefully displaced
(Ahmed, 2013). After the Second World War, this was the first
case of ethnic cleansing,
through terrorism, that took place in Pakistan.
The Kashmir conflict is a territorial dispute involving India,
Kashmiri insurgent
groups and Pakistan that has continued since 1947. India and
Pakistan have fought
at least three wars over the Kashmir issue, including the wars of
1947, 1965, and
1999. This issue has continuously sparked violence and acts of
terrorism in the region.
An armed insurgency in Kashmir led to the formation of
militant wings, which were in

fact the beginning of the mujahideen insurgency, and continues
to this day. India con-
tends that the insurgency was largely started by Afghan
mujahideen who entered the
Kashmir valley after the end of the Soviet Afghan war.
The 1960s Mukti Bahni movement in the east wing of Pakistan,
urging that a
separate homeland be established for the Bengalis (local
population of East Pakistan),
was marred by terror and violence. It was a classic example of
the worsening vicious
cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism. As a result, a new
country, Bangla Desh
(Homeland of the Bengalis) came into being in 1971, but it
endorsed the use of similar
terror tactics and foreign support for the separatist elements in
Balochistan and the
North West Frontier province of Pakistan. Using a behavioral
model, the antecedents
and consequences of these events may have led to both operant
and classical condition-
ing for pursuing violent means in the pursuance of political
agendas.
For the two decades after 1971, successive regimes undertook
measures, particularly
in Balochistan and Sindh, to curb what they considered
challenges to the integrity of
the country. Meanwhile, the entry of the Soviet Union into
Afghanistan in 1979
prompted the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China
to support rebels
fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan and to funnel
foreign support to the mujahideen and rebel groups all across

Afghanistan. The war also
attracted Arab volunteers, known as “Afghan Arabs”, including
Osama bin Laden.
The humanist Rogerian concept of “unconditional positive
regard” was stretched
well beyond its wildest possible interpretation when Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia became
the first and probably the only two countries to recognize the
Taliban government in
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Kabul as legitimate. This “regard and recognition” of a terrorist
group that went on a ram-
page and started destroying Buddhist relics, subjugating women,
closing girls’ schools
and swiftly and systematically destroying progressive thought,
was ignored by the civil
society in Afghanistan.
On the home front, the mujahideen, who were being equipped
with the latest
weapons by the U.S. during the Afghan war, included many of
the clerics and students
of madrassas (seminaries, usually attached to a mosque, for
imparting religious
education), and they returned, along with their ammunition,
from the Afghan war to

their respective villages in Punjab and Sindh as battle-hardened
soldiers. The rural
and suburban cultures of regions far away from the Afghan
border, and in the heart
of the Punjab, now had a “new authority” on stage, which until
then had been
dominated by the feudal lords and industrialists. Most of these
clerics received regular
foreign funding to make madrassas that were bigger than ever
and which were to
become the breeding grounds for terrorists of the post-9/11 era
(Ahmad, 2008).
The authors believe that successive governments looked the
other way as the terror-
ist groups made inroads into the society to become a
“subculture”. In the meantime,
the evangelical schools working with young men and women
alike provided a perfect
cover for them to be converted to a militant way of life by
representatives of terrorist
groups. The regular recruitment of young men from across the
country to be used as
suicide bombers and jihadi fighters was not once denounced by
the religious leaders
and leaders of political parties.
The war on terror in Afghanistan was an intervention by the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and allied forces in the Afghan political
struggle, under cover
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to dismantle the
al-Qaeda terrorist orga-
nization and to remove the Taliban government from power,
which at the time con-
trolled 90% of Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies drove the

Taliban from power;
however, most al-Qaeda and Taliban members escaped to
neighboring Pakistan or
retreated to rural or remote mountainous regions. While NATO
forces continued to
battle the Taliban insurgency, the war expanded into
neighboring north-west Pakistan.
Most of the mujahideen groups from the Afghan war were never
disarmed and some
of these groups were later activated in the form of the Lashkar-
e-Taiba, the Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen and others, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP). The same groups
started taking on the state itself, causing the greatest threat to
both the state and the
citizens of Pakistan through the politically motivated killing of
civilians and police
officials.
The annual death toll from terrorist attacks in Pakistan ranged
from 164 in 2003 to
3,318 in 2009 (Bloch, 2006; Musharraf, 2006) with a total of
35,000 Pakistanis killed
between September 11, 2001 and May 2011. According to the
government of
Pakistan, the direct and indirect economic costs of terrorism
totaled 68 billion US
dollars from the years 2000 to 2010 (Bloch, 2006).
From the late 1990s onwards, the callousness and pathological
nature of “la belle
indifference” shown by mainstream society set in, leading to a
partial paralysis of civic
life and the state machinery. While the majority of the
population is still committed to

liberalism, progress, democracy, a pluralistic world view,
tolerance, and peace, there is
an ever-growing, deep intrusion of reactionary, fundamentalist,
and pagan thinking in
some sections of Pakistani society. A deeper understanding of
how these macrosocopic
changes have influenced the psyche and social lives of the
vulnerable population falling
prey to terrorism is in order.
335–346 (2014)
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BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES
Psychological Perspective
From its inception in 1947, the Pakistani nation was challenged
by the trauma of
migration, where millions were killed, looted, murdered, raped,
and burnt alive by
Hindu and Sikh extremists. Stability in the nation was
significantly hampered by the lack
of resources, the burden of hundreds and thousands of homeless
families, and the mass
influx of migrants form East Pakistan to West Pakistan across a
tortuous landscape.
The country lost its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, and
within a year of his

death, through the Objectives Resolution adopted by the
Constituent Assembly of Paki-
stan on March 12, 1949, the democratic, liberal, and secular
spirit gave way to a particular
interpretation of religion, which had little to offer to its non-
Muslim minorities. These
events were followed by wars with India in 1948 and 1965,
which, along with the eventual
separation of East from West Pakistan, were traumatic events
for the entire nation.
These events were bound to be reflected in the psychological
profile of individual
citizens. Mixed with socioeconomic adversity, these political
challenges have affected
the psyche of the average Pakistani. It is against this backdrop
that we need to under-
stand the psychological perspective of terrorism in Pakistan. It
may not be appropriate
to label all terrorists as merely psychopathic personalities or
mad people (Atran, 2003;
Horgan, 2008). It may be equally naïve to consider a suicide
bomber as a depressed or
suicidal individual.
To understand the “psychology” of a terrorist in Pakistan or
otherwise, one must try
to understand how they view their own conduct and why. They
view their own actions
as rational and purposeful, driven in response to their own
perception of social, politi-
cal, religious, and other realities (Horgan, 2008). But
dismissing terrorists as “mad”,
“evil” or “aliens” is perhaps reassuring as it distances us from
them and their motives.

The thinking that “I am good and right” and “You are bad and
wrong” prevails in
the mind of a terrorist in any part of the world. These beliefs
distance them from their
victims, and probably make it easier for them to kill their
opponents with apparently
little or no sense of remorse or guilt (Merari,1990). This
mindset was a common
finding among the majority of terrorists who were captured and
taken into custody from
various parts of Pakistan and interviewed while in confinement.
The concept of
themselves being “good” and their victims “bad” emerges from
a range of religious,
ideological, social, and cultural factors.
Related to this idea is the concept of revenge, renown, and
reaction in the pursuit of
terrorism (Richardson, 2006). Female suicide bombers are
usually more likely to be
motivated by emotional factors, including revenge, whereas
their male counterparts
are driven by political and/or ideological factors (Jacques &
Taylor, 2008). Revenge
may explain why terrorist attacks often take place on the
anniversary of some perceived
injustice. Revenge is one of the principal reasons underlying the
decision to become a
bomber (Berko, 2009), but “machismo” is also reported to be an
important factor.
The example of Osama bin Laden incorporates most of these
concepts. To some, he
is viewed as a charming and gentle figure; to others he is a
demoniacal figure. Was he
fuelled by his own publicity or was he driven by an Islamic

fervor or some more deeply
rooted psychological factors? Moreover, it is difficult to
disentangle his apparent
religious and political aspirations, although he consistently
emphasized his wish to return
to the days of the Caliphate and the law of Sharia.
335–346 (2014)
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Social Perspective
For most of the time of Pakistan’s existence, its social
environment has been challenged
by poverty, illiteracy, disease, insecurity, and injustice. In such
a setting, the terrorist
was often seen by the oppressed populace less as a villain or an
outlaw, and more as
a “rescuer” who could “free” the society from its sufferings.
Violence has emerged as
a societal “norm”, leading to more delinquents, adolescents with
conduct disorders,
and a culture of “guns and drugs.” A paucity of outlets like
sports, music, and gender
interaction only makes matters worse. In certain parts of
Pakistan, violence has strong
cultural and religious endorsement and approval. A study
conducted on 1,031 terrorist
incidents in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
found that 100% of the

perpetrators were unemployed and were motivated by religious
factors, and 80% were
unmarried (Khan, 2009).
Families, too, influence the choice of individuals to commit
themselves to terrorist
events and to sacrifice their lives (Asal, Fair, & Shellman,
2008). A survey of families
of over 100 slain militants showed that those who were
materially better off were less
likely to consent to their children joining a jihad (holy war)
than poorer families (Asal
et al., 2008). In their book, Who are Pakistan’s Militants and
their Families?, Fair
(2008) reported that the role of the family in encouraging or
dissuading members to
pursue militant links is a crucial subject of enquiry.
In Pakistan, the madrassas have certainly been seen through
Western eyes as a male-
volent influence on young Muslims. These institutions, although
under-researched,
have developed a mythology of their own in relation to their
responsibility for the
radicalization of young Pakistanis. A survey of 50,000
households asked why parents
chose to send their children to madrassas (Cockcroft, 2009).
The primary reason
seemed to be because these institutions provided good Islamic
education. The second
most common reason was the low cost of the madrassas and
their provision of food and
clothing (Cockcroft, 2009). In a study of Deobandi (a Muslim
sect) religious schools,
Bano (2007) asserted that only a small proportion of these
institutions promote extremism,

and that their reputation as “breeding grounds for terror” may
not be justified.
Religious Perspective
The 21st century has witnessed a revival of religious
fundamentalism that runs counter to
the previous perception that secularization, although erratic, is
irreversible. The concept
that the rise of modern society and the decay of religion are two
sides of the same coin
has unfortunately proved to be wrong. Even today, multiple
examples exist of soldiers
around the world displaying bravery and valor heading into
battle at times knowing full
well that theirs is a one-way journey. They make a choice, more
likely than not, to go into
battle and sacrifice their lives for a greater good, an ideal they
believe in.
The concept of self-sacrifice in Pakistan was idealized from the
War of 1965 against
India (Nawaz, 1965). During this war, at the Battle of
Chawanda in the Pakistani city of
Sialkot, the Pakistani soldiers tied landmines to their chest and
lay down under the
Indian tanks, thus halting their advance.
The concept of self-sacrifice and martyrdom has been explicitly
used in almost all
religions, and their “conceptual abuse” in terrorism has started
to emerge. Over time,
terrorist organizations have groomed and used “suicide
bombers” to instill fear into a
community, hence furthering their political aims. It is argued
that the overwhelming

335–346 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/bsl
majority of bombers have been motivated by the ideology of
Islamist martyrdom
(Atran, 2003). By contrast, others argue that although suicide
bombers are used by
organizations for political purposes and claim to be
ideologically driven “martyrs,” they
are actually suicidal in the clinical sense and are attempting to
escape personal crises
(Lankford, 2013).
The concept of “Islamist martyrdom” and its abuse were
highlighted at the
conclusion of the Swat operation against terrorism in Pakistan
in 2009. A number of
adolescents who were to be “future suicide bombers” in
Pakistan were taken into
custody and, before their release into the community, were
psychologically profiled.
Their narratives described the recipe for “making a suicide
bomber in six weeks.” All
the adolescents were recruited by the cleric of the madrassa
they attended for their daily
Koranic recitation. In the first week, the adolescents were
closely observed and those
who were more focused on the recitation were invited for more
work at the madrassa

– it was a gesture of respect to them, as working for the
madrassa was considered a
pious act. In the second week, the selected adolescents were
given a task to note and
list vehicles passing through a certain gateway. This was used
as a “screening test” of
their “obedience” and ability to focus on an “assignment”.
Those adolescents who
were more focused and vigilant in noting down the vehicles
were taken to the next level.
In the third week, selected adolescents were sent to a distant
seminary where they were
instructed in religious scriptures, more of those related to the
concept of jihad. The
families of these selected adolescents were informed that their
siblings had been chosen
for a “special religious act” and most parents were unable to
exercise their right to
grant or withhold permission. Daily sessions were conducted
and an extreme
emotional environment was experienced by the recruited
adolescents, which
revolved around the army and law enforcement agency
personnel as infidels,
thereby justifying their elimination. In the fourth week, they
were given emotionally
charged sermons, revolving around dreams, the clerics reporting
having experi-
enced visions. The visions were supplemented by Koranic
scriptures; however,
the original meaning was distorted into narratives that involved
asking for revenge
against the army and the security forces. As the adolescents had
been reciting the
same verses in Arabic from the Koran, it was “authenticated”
that whatever the

cleric was reciting was true; however, the adolescents were
unaware of the “meaning”
of the Koranic scriptures in their local language and were
therefore misled by the
meanings provided by the cleric.
The fifth week would start with a congregation in which the
recruits sat with twice
the number of other adolescents, who were planted there by the
cleric. A sacred “draw”
was conducted by the cleric to select those for the “special
mission” of God. The draw
did not include the names of the planted adolescents, only those
of the recruits. As their
names were drawn, the recruits were congratulated by everyone.
During the sixth week,
these recruits remained in isolation and spent all of their time
praying and focusing on
the suicide bombing mission. They were finally guided to their
destination under close
supervision by the terrorists. If the terrorists sensed
apprehension by any adolescent in
blowing himself up, the bomb would be detonated by remote
control. The family
members of the deceased were informed of the success of their
family member in a
sacred cause and provided with financial assistance.
The Pakistan earthquake of October 2005 affected over three
million people of low
income and from the poverty-stricken sections of the population
residing in the KPK
and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir regions of Pakistan. This
provided an opportunity

335–346 (2014)
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for the militant and terrorist organizations to reach out to the
vulnerable sections of
society, offering them food, shelter, clothing, and spiritual
support. Many were
convinced to opt for training and were recruited in the years
that followed. Hundreds
and thousands of females were also inducted into madrassas, the
largest collection
being at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, a stone’s
throw from the
headquarters of both the Inter Services Intelligence (the primary
intelligence agency
of Pakistan) and the Navy.
The Lal Masjid Incident Judicial Commission reported that, in
April 2007, author-
ities of the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa (LMJH) organized an
“Enforcement of Sharia
and Azmat-e-Jihad” conference at Lal Masjid, and decided that
a “Sharia court”
(Islamic court) comprised of 10 clerics would be set up to make
decisions against those
found to be involved in running brothels and following illegal
practices, despite the
presence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan only a walking
distance away from the
Lal Masjid.

The commission reported that the leading cleric at the mosque
warned the govern-
ment there would be “suicide attacks” if hurdles were placed in
their way. The cleric
announced that suicide attacks would be their choice, and that
from that day every de-
cision in the area under their control would be made according
to Sharia. After that
meeting, the activities of LMJH expanded. The students of
LMJH rehearsed for com-
bat in a compound next to the mosque and later the surrounding
areas were declared
“no go” areas for security forces. The lead cleric warned the
government that he had
a sufficient number of suicide bombers inside the mosque and
publicly announced that
suicide bombers of Lal Masjid were permitted to find targets
and strike wherever they
chose to. An operation, headed by the army’s special services
group, was eventually
conducted to cleanse the mosque and the seminary of the
militant elements. There
were heavy causalities on both sides, including many homeless
adolescents from the
2005 earthquake who died in cross-fire, while being forced to
provide cover to the
militants.
Some clerics in Pakistan have made attempts to separate Islam
from terrorism. The
Darul Uloom Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in the
world, hosted an anti-
terrorist conference in 2008. This was attended by 6,000
Deobandi Imams. The
conference declared that the synonymity of terrorism and Islam
was inaccurate and

unhelpful. Nonetheless, there still remain to be found better
answers to the question
as to why some individuals favor only the jihad version of Islam
when there are alterna-
tive ways of pursuing and interpreting the Islamic faith (Berko,
2009).
Terrorist Management Theory Perspective
Terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan alter and
misinterpret the sacred text of
the Koran to motivate potential suicide bombers. They do so by
exploiting the theme
of shahadat (martyrdom) in Islam. Koranic scriptures state that
a person whose death
is classed as shahadat never dies and remains alive like
everybody else, and receives
his due from God, except that the mortals cannot see him, and
he is promised the
highest status in heaven. In the Muslim faith, the world in
which a Muslim lives is a
transient state, and is an opportunity for the believer to achieve
a higher status in the
life hereafter. The worldly pursuits and interest in material
realities of this world are
seen as distractions created by Satan to obstruct and distract the
Muslim while he walks
the “straight path” (sirat e mustaqeem) that leads him to eternal
happiness in heaven.
335–346 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/bsl

Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon (1989),
their article “Evidence
for terror management theory”, proposed that
…natural selection bestowed humans and most other animals
with a diverse set of adaptations
oriented towards self preservation and continued life, with
humans alone having the aware-
ness that they will die some day. It is this awareness that
creates a state of terror in them.
They highlight the role of self-esteem, world views, and
adherence to the norms and
values of society in wanting to attain its recognition even after
death, in an attempt to
transcend death and thus immortalize oneself, as well as to
attain eternal paradise. This
theory explains the successful, albeit exploitative, use of the
concept of shahadat by the
trainers of suicide bombers and other terrorist operatives.
CONTROVERSIES
Psychosocial Support for the Survivors
Although human resilience can be regarded as the norm in
relation to terrorist inci-
dents and other traumatic events, there is no doubt that certain
terrorist acts can cause
serious psychopathology. The risk of psychiatric morbidity is
highest when traumatic
events are characterized by perceived threat to life, lack of
predictability, low controlla-

bility, high loss and injury, the risk of recurrence, and exposure
to death and mutilation
(Ursano, Fullerton, Weisaeth, & Raphael, 2007). In Pakistan,
there is a gross scarcity of
professional and organized psychosocial support for those
affected by such psychopa-
thology. Most mental health professionals lack understanding
and the requisite skills
to treat conditions like post-traumatic stress disorder,
dissociative disorder, anxiety
and depression secondary to terrorist acts. The care provided by
rescue workers, health
authorities, and disaster management authorities is treatment of
the physical wounds
and provision of financial compensation. Attempts are still
under way in Pakistan to
organize psychosocial interventions and provide evidence-based
treatment options to
individuals and families affected by acts of terrorism.
The Family of the Terrorist and the “Missing Persons”
Once identified, pictured, or discovered to be a terrorist, how
are (and how should) the
rest of the family be dealt with? Most terrorists, suicide
bombers, and their accomplices
know when they enter the terrorists’ network that their bond and
relationship with their
family is over, that they will never be able to return to them
again. Yet there are others
whose families are aware of the “pursuits” of the individual.
Some even receive shares,
compensation or monthly “income” from terrorist organizations,
occasionally in for-
eign currency. The question, in this case, is what should be the
attitude of neighbors,

relatives, law enforcement agencies, and society at large? In
Pakistan, the picture is
confusing. Often the families of known terrorists spend the rest
of their lives at the
mercy of police and security agencies.
In a highly religious society where burial rituals are given much
importance, a valid,
socially cohesive response to the death of a known terrorist or
suicide bomber lurks in
the darkness. It can range from a highly respectable burial of a
“martyr” to a hurried
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burial at night with little or no knowledge or participation from
the family, neighbors,
and relatives.
The normal behavioral and psychological processes of shock,
disbelief, denial, guilt,
anger, blame, depression and eventual acceptance of the loss
may therefore never take
place. The social support of the various post-burial rituals
(Soyem, Khatam, Jumaiarat,
Daswan, and the concluding congregation of Chehlum, held on
the fortieth day after the
burial) never take place. These rituals, which are known to play
a protective role for the

mental health of the widow, the offspring, and all others who
survive the dead person,
are thus denied to them. It is not difficult to assess the long-
term risk of abnormal grief,
clinical depression, and various other clinical complications
that afflict the family mem-
bers and loved ones of the terrorist.
An equally difficult task for mental health professionals is to
deal with the family
members who suffer from these grief reactions. Left in a
quandary, to date the clini-
cians have no clear guidelines on how to deal with this clinical
eventuality. The authors
have taken it upon themselves to try to convince the law
enforcement agencies and
other stakeholders of the right of the family of the deceased to
receive mental health
and social support, albeit with scant success. It becomes even
more difficult in situa-
tions where a suicide bomber is considered by the family to be a
martyr; in this case,
the suicide bomber often leaves a death note in which he lists
names of several family
members who he demands from God to join him in the heavens.
Humanistic and pro-
fessional handling calls for an approach whereby the family
members of the terrorists
are respected and not automatically considered terrorists too. A
behavioral sciences-
oriented approach would demand provision of all psychosocial
support to such fami-
lies. The ethos of the medical profession would also endorse
this. Law enforcement
agencies are accused by human rights activists and, at times, by
high offices of the judi-

ciary of being responsible for additional discomfort to the
terrorist’s family by repeat-
edly interrogating them even after the death of the terrorist. The
families of the
“missing persons” in Pakistan are indeed emotionally
challenged and suffer from psy-
chological trauma of another kind. Living in a state of
heightened anxiety and expecta-
tion, they may develop “learned helplessness.” The families
(particularly the children)
of law enforcement personnel abducted or taken hostage by
terrorists live under similar
conditions.
The authors have treated several of these families, who have
spent up to five years
waiting to receive access to appropriate mental health services.
Barraged by an array
of possibilities regarding their loved one’s fate, they spend their
days and nights praying
or visiting faith healers and shrines of saints, living an
emotionally numb or even para-
lyzed life that seems suspended from the day on which they last
saw their loved one.
Challenged and marred by serious mental health challenges,
these families find it
stigmatizing when they are asked to seek psychological help.
The mental health profes-
sionals who try to provide such help are equally lost with regard
to counseling and
selecting the most appropriate psychotherapeutic interventions.
The magnitude of mental health, economic, and psychosocial
challenges faced by
the wives, children and parents of all the missing persons is
immense. The complexity

deepens when questions are posed with regard to their pensions
or benefits, housing,
and eligibility for compensation. Usually, most of these families
agree to take compen-
sation meant for the deceased, yet legally they are not entitled
to the service benefits
after a certain amount of time. No legislation exists to provide
guidance in deciding
the matter. Such eventualities simply add to the social woes of
these unfortunate
335–346 (2014)
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individuals. There can be religious sanctions in certain sects of
Islam prohibiting the
wives of such persons from marrying or being announced as
widows.
Given the fact that neither the end of terrorism nor the end of
the war on terror is in
sight in Pakistan, such complex and impossible scenarios can
only become more
common and even more complex.
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Ahmed, I. (2013). Who began the violence? The how and why
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Asal, V., Fair, C. C., & Shellman, S. (2008). Consenting to a
child’s decision to join a Jihad: insights from a
survey of militant families in Pakistan. Studies in Conflict and
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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Law enforcement intelligence: implications for self-radicalized
terrorism
Jeremy G. Cartera* and David L. Carterb
aDepartment of Criminology & Criminal Justice, University of
North Florida, Jacksonville, FL,
USA; bSchool of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University,
East Lasing, MI, USA
A series of tragic events over the last three years has further
strengthened the emerg-
ing preventative and proactive philosophies adopted by US law
enforcement post-Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Law enforcement and the American public
now have a heightened
awareness of homegrown terrorism. While these terrorist actors
operate independent of
traditional terrorist networks and groups, they are often
influenced by such groups
through a process where they enter as a non-violent individual
and exit as a violent
‘true believer’. Efforts by law enforcement to mitigate or
prevent such threats rely on
the implementation of intelligence-led policing practices.
Central to these practices is
the input of raw information into the intelligence cycle. This
paper will discuss the
importance and application of suspicious activity reporting as it
impacts law enforce-
ment intelligence practices to prevent threats from self-
radicalized terrorism.
Keywords: self-radicalized terrorism; suspicious activity
reporting; law enforcement
intelligence; intelligence-led policing; law enforcement

partnerships
Since the profile of a would-be terrorist is becoming less and
less obvious . . . In that kind of
fog, small behaviors necessarily loom large. (Amanda Ripley,
Time Magazine, 2007)
Introduction
The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 demonstrated an
evolution1 of tactics utilized by
violent criminal extremists to kill, cause damage, and instill
fear. Consistent with this evo-
lution of tactics are changes in the practices and policies
guiding the prevention of such
attacks. The USA is now facing another incarnation2 of terrorist
behavior – the increased
prevalence of the ‘self-radicalized’ terrorist who is
‘homegrown’ and may be a ‘lone wolf’.
Because of these changes in the threat environment, the
practices and policies neces-
sary for prevention must change to reflect the threats. The
Nationwide Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative (NSI) emphasizes the input of raw
information in the form of obser-
vable human behavior into the law enforcement intelligence
cycle as critical to law
enforcement’s counter-terrorism efforts. This raw information is
known as ‘Suspicious
Activity Reports’ (SARs) and the vehicle by which SARs reach
the intelligence cycle is
law enforcement’s partnerships with the community. This paper
will briefly discuss law
enforcement intelligence practices, SARs, and community
partnerships and how they

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
Police Practice and Research
Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2012, 138–154
ISSN 1561-4263 print/ISSN 1477-271X online
� 2011 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2011.596685
http://www.tandfonline.com
relate to the prevention of homegrown terrorism. The discussion
will be supplemented
with case studies of the Fort Dix, New Jersey plot and the Fort
Hood, Texas attack.
Self-radicalization of terrorists and criminal extremists
The National Strategy for Information Sharing posits that ‘. . .
there is increasing concern
regarding the potential threat posed by homegrown terrorists.
While lacking formal ties to
al-Qaeda, these disaffected, radicalized, violent extremists often
draw inspiration from al-
Qaeda and other global terrorist organizations’ (White House
[WH], 2007, p. 17). The
significance of lone-wolf terrorism was felt by the USA prior to
9/11. Timothy
McVeigh’s 1995 attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma; Eric Rudolph’s bombing at the 1996 Olympic Games
in Atlanta, Georgia;
and Theodore ‘Ted’ Kaczynski’s – the ‘Unabomber’ – attacks
on airlines, universities,
and other targets across the country from the late 1970s to the

mid-1990s serve as promi-
nent examples. Post 9/11, the presence of lone-wolf terrorism
has come in various forms.
However, in a one-year period in 2009–2010, the pace of lone-
wolf actions, representing
a diverse array of extremist beliefs, increased significantly with
several lone-wolf attacks
or attempts. This significant trend includes:
� 31 May 2009: right-to-life extremist Scott Roeder, who had a
record of right-wing
extremist activity and threats against abortion clinics, killed Dr
George Tiller, a
Wichita, Kansas physician who performed controversial late-
term abortions, for the
stated purpose of stopping the physician from performing more
abortions.
� 3 June 2009: self-radicalized Muslim convert Abdulhakim
Mujahid Muhammad
killed a 23-year-old Army private outside of a Little Rock,
Arkansas Army recruiting
office, telling investigators he wanted to kill as many members
of the US military as
he could because he was mad at the military for past actions
against Muslims.
� 9 June 2009: avowed white supremacist and Holocaust-denier
James Von Brunn
opened fire inside the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in
Washington, killing a
security guard who stopped him in the entrance.
� 5 November 2009: Major Nidal Hasan, an Army psychiatrist
who had become a
self-radicalized Muslim extremist and who had communicated

with known terrorist
Anwar al-Awlaki, killed 12 people in a shooting attack at Fort
Hood, Texas.
� 25 December 2009: Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab attempted
to detonate a bomb
on Northwest Airlines flight 253 from Amsterdam, Netherlands
as it prepared to
land in Detroit, Michigan.
� 4 March 2010: John Patrick Bedell, an anti-government
extremist, committed a
shooting attack at the Pentagon where he wounded two security
guards before
being killed.
� 1 May 2010: Faisal Shahzad’s attempt to kill hundreds in
New York City by leav-
ing a large homemade bomb that included large amounts of
shrapnel, in the back
of an SUV parked in the middle of Times Square.3
� 20 May 2010: two West Memphis, Arkansas police officers
were killed and two
Crittenden County, Arkansas Sheriff’s Department deputies
were wounded by Jerry
Kane and his 16-year-old son Joseph, both of whom had been
involved in anti-
government activity.
This list of incidents suggests that self-radicalized lone-wolf
attacks are the criminal
extremists’ methodology of choice.
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 139

Radicalization is the socialization process of developing
political, religious, environ-
mental, economic, or other ideological attitudes, values, and
beliefs leading to a narrow
vision of the ideology that is represented by only a small
number of believers who may
be characterized as being revolutionary or militant. Hence, the
radicalization process
develops an individual as an extremist. As an individual is
exposed to more of the
extremist ideological literature, the process reinforces the
beliefs, much like circular logic.
It is fundamentally a resocialization process where the
individual’s attitudes, values, and
beliefs are eventually transformed to be consistent with the
ideology, often leading to vio-
lence and/or actions that are traitorous to the individual’s
previous life. In an ideological
context, the person becomes a ‘true believer’. The steps in the
radicalization process can
vary. Many experts (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009; Silber
& Bhatt, 2007) believe
it involves four primary stages:
(1) Pre-radicalization: an individual’s lifestyle prior to
radicalization (relationships,
environment, jobs, social life, etc.).
(2) Self-identification: an individual is influenced by internal
and external factors
attributing to the exploration of extreme philosophies,
ideologies, and values.
(3) Indoctrination: an individual intensifies their beliefs and

adopts extreme philoso-
phies, ideologies, and values with no exceptions.
(4) Soldier: an individual accepts their duty to participate in the
struggle as a warrior
fighting those who oppose the ideology in an attempt for the
ideology to achieve
realization.
Others believe the radicalization process involves ‘mentorship’
as a key motivator to
influence beliefs and actions (Sageman, 2004; Whitelaw, 2009).
Under this theory, the
individual proactively researches and consumes information that
shapes the radicalization
process, however, the person’s ideological direction is
influenced by a mentor who rein-
forces the belief system. The mentor only provides ideological
support, not financial or
logistical support. Because the self-radicalized individual
typically has no support net-
work, any criminal actions they commit which are intended to
support or further the
extremist ideology are typically planned and executed solely by
that individual – this is
characterized as a lone-wolf act.
Regardless of the process by which an individual transforms
from a non-risk to a vio-
lent risk, opportunities exist that lend themselves to law
enforcement collecting information
that supports intelligence processes. The progression from stage
to stage of self-radicaliza-
tion requires active exposure to extreme ideologies that are
often identifiable in public
places – ranging from public statements to extremists’ blogs. It

is these outward behavioral
signs of self-radicalization that become important for suspicious
activity reporting.
Law enforcement intelligence practices
A brief foundation
The emerging law enforcement philosophy for preventing or
mitigating transjurisdictional
criminal and terrorist risks is intelligence-led policing (ILP).
Fundamentally, the intelli-
gence process is designed to identify criminal threats and
develop operational responses
to eliminate the threats. ILP integrates these processes with
other police responsibilities
such as handling calls for service and criminal investigations.
While there are many
dimensions of ILP, due to space considerations only a
contextual discussion of the con-
cept will be provided here.4 ILP can be defined as:
140 J.G. Carter and D.L. Carter
The collection and analysis of information related to crime and
conditions that contribute to
crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended
to aid law enforcement in
developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic
planning related to emerging or
changing threats. (Carter & Carter, 2009, p. 317)
In short, ILP is the business model of policing that relies upon
the analysis of raw infor-

mation to guide decision-making that will ultimately influence
the actions taken by law
enforcement agencies (Ratcliffe, 2008). The process of how ILP
is applied varies across
law enforcement agencies depending upon geographic
responsibility, population, agency
size, resources, and other jurisdictional variables. Regardless of
the specific model, at the
heart of ILP is an information management process that
embodies the ‘intelligence
cycle’.
This cycle is comprised of six steps: (1) Planning and Direction,
(2) Collection, (3)
Processing and Collation, (4) Analysis, (5) Dissemination, and
lastly (6) Re-evaluation
(Global Intelligence Working Group [GIWG], 2003). These six
components depict the
methodology by which law enforcement assesses and analyzes
raw information that is
developed into analytic products. These products inform police
leaders on variables
related to threats which, in turn, aid them in developing
prevention strategies. Interwoven
within these steps are a variety of informal and formal
partnerships for two-way commu-
nication between law enforcement and citizens; policies guiding
ethical police behavior
and the protection of civil liberties; channels for raw
information to be routed to the intel-
ligence cycle; and methods of critical thinking to provide the
analysis of raw information.
Figure 1 provides a comprehensive diagram of the intelligence
cycle illustrating these
processes.

Inherent in the intelligence cycle is giving clarity to suspected
threats and the discov-
ery of previously unknown threats. Threats may well exist in a
community about which
law enforcement has no information. Therefore, a method must
be in place to solicit, col-
lect, assess, integrate, and analyze these diverse data. Having a
broad-based, threat-driven
information collection protocol is the only way law enforcement
may be able to identify
and understand threats within a community. The need for this
diverse information from
citizens is why suspicious activity reporting has become a
critical component for threat
management.
Suspicious activity reporting
Law enforcement’s utilization of non-traditional sources of
information to combat terror-
ism has been documented as a key resource for successful threat
prevention (Riley,
Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005). Suspicious activity
reporting is a formalized process
to document and share observed behaviors which are indicative
of criminal activity.
Information – including ‘tips and leads’ – may come from law
enforcement personnel,
private sector partners, or citizens. This information is placed in
written form and pro-
cessed through the law enforcement agency, including verifying
facts and confirming if
the suspicious behavior has a criminal nexus, in order to have
the SAR integrated into
the analytic process of the intelligence cycle.

There are three types of Suspicious Activity Reports. The first
is the financial SAR. This
was mandated by the Bank Secrecy Act (1970) wherein financial
institutions must report
certain types of transactions to the Treasury Department. The
suspicious activity most com-
monly associated with financial SARs is money laundering or
trafficking in unlawful com-
modities.5 The second is the all crimes SAR. This is simply the
documentation and
reporting of suspicious activity related to any crime. The
activity may be observed by a
law enforcement officer or reported to an officer. This is similar
to what many law enforce-
ment agencies have used traditionally known by various names
such as a Field Intelligence
Report, Field Interview Report, or Miscellaneous Investigation
Report.
The third type is the Information Sharing Environment –
Suspicious Activity Report
(ISE-SAR). This is the documentation of suspicious behavior
specifically related to terror-
ism or crimes that support or facilitate terrorist planning and
acts. The reason for having
a distinct SAR for terrorism is based on statutory provisions
emanating from the Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. At a law
enforcement agency, the
form and processes for line officers are typically the same for
both the ‘all crimes’ SARs

and ISE-SARs. However, when the SAR is processed through
the intelligence unit or
fusion center,6 the ISE-SAR is processed differently and shared
much more widely. The
reason for the different processing is based on the responsibility
of the ISE to deal only
with terrorism and crimes supporting terrorism. It is this type of
SAR that holds the most
important promise for identifying self-radicalized terrorists.
An important caveat for the fundamental implementation of
SAR processes is the
commitment to protect citizen’s privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties. The Program
Manager’s Office for the Information Sharing Environment
(PM-ISE) and its federal part-
ners examined potential privacy and civil liberties risks
associated with SARs and con-
sulted privacy and civil liberties advocacy groups to identify
effective mitigation
strategies. As a result, explicit types of suspicious activities
have been identified which
Figure 1. Detailed law enforcement intelligence cycle.
Source: Taken from Carter (2009), with permission.
are based on past cases that reasonably indicate the planning of
a terrorism incident.
These actions are documented in the ISE-SAR Functional
Standard for Suspicious Activity
Reporting (Program Manager’s Information Sharing
Environment [ISE], 2008). By focus-

ing on observed behavior, this standard mitigates the risk of
profiling based on race, eth-
nicity, national origin, or religion. It also improves mission
effectiveness by enabling
agencies to focus on and address potential threats in a more
efficient and standardized
manner (ISE, 2008).
Partnerships for law enforcement intelligence
While important knowledge that may forewarn of a future attack
may be derived from
information reported by patrol officers in the course of routine
law enforcement and other
activities (WH, 2007), the current discussion focuses on the
importance of developing
community and private sector partnerships to increase the
awareness of suspicious behav-
ior within communities. Moreover, based on lessons learned
from community policing,
that agencies engaged in a SAR program must educate their
partners and community
members on the purpose of the program, the type of information
that is needed, and why
they should participate in the program (ISE, 2010a). Simply
stated, law enforcement seeks
the assistance of community members and the private sector to
report suspicious behavior
because this significantly increases the probability of criminally
related suspicious actively
being observed. To be effective, however, community members
and private partners must
be informed about identifying suspicious behavior that has a
criminal nexus.
The promise ILP has demonstrated, especially the heavily

emphasized analytic com-
ponent (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007), to combat
terrorism is not complete
without access to raw information to be input into the
intelligence cycle. Partnerships
forged between law enforcement agencies and their communities
serve as the vehicle by
which critical raw information enters this cycle. The value of
developing partnerships for
two-way information flow has been reaffirmed continuously
within federal reports and
recommendations (GIWG, 2005, 2008; International Association
of Chiefs of Police
[IACP], 2004; ISE, 2010b). This approach has been recognized
by both the Department
of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security as an
effective counter-terrorism
strategy. In response to the 2005 London bombings, the UK
developed an initiative
referred to as ‘neighborhood policing’ where police officers
gained the trust of commu-
nity members in order to establish an information exchange
dialogue (Innes, 2006). Fur-
thermore, in efforts to combat terrorism, Australia has adopted
this partnership approach
with private sector entities at airports (Wheeler, 2005) and
within community businesses
– referred to as ‘networked policing’ (Palmer & Whelan, 2006).
Similarly, both the Israeli
Police and the Turkish National Police have developed
‘community partnership’ programs
to gain information from community members about terrorism-
related suspicious activity
(Carter, 2009). Despite the diverse environments of those
initiatives, they have all been
met with demonstrable successes.

In a February 2010 Homeland Security Advisory Council
(HSAC) meeting, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano
tasked the HSAC to
‘. . . work with state and local law enforcement as well as
relevant community groups to
develop . . . and provide recommendations regarding how the
Department can better sup-
port community-based efforts to combat violent extremism
domestically’ (Homeland
Security Advisory Council [HSAC], 2010, p. 2). In response,
the HSAC identified multi-
ple such partnerships where law enforcement and the
community were successfully
engaging in counter-terrorism/extremist information:
� Los Angeles, California. Law enforcement joins communities
and government
agencies to improve quality of life issues and reduce violent
crime.
� Austin, Texas. Law enforcement works with community on
rapid response teams to
mitigate tough issues and work in partnership to reduce violent
crime.
� Las Vegas, Nevada. Grassroots community effort led by
faith-based organizations
that assist in reducing violent crimes and gangs.
� Dearborn, Michigan. Collaborative effort to engage the

community in the identifi-
cation and resolution of community issues to include combating
violent crime.
� State of Maryland. Established an executive level
coordinating office within the
Governor’s Office to work with community groups, ethnic
groups, and faith-based
organizations to address quality of life and other issues of
concern.
� State of Ohio. Established a community engagement office,
which built a collabora-
tive and cooperative relationship with the communities based on
trust and mutual
respect.
� Minneapolis, Minnesota. Designated crime professional
specialists who are liaisons
between the community and local law enforcement and have
safety centers that are
funded by the neighborhoods (HSAC, 2010, p. 7).
Moreover, in July 2010 DHS Secretary Napolitano announced
the launch of the ‘See
Something, Say Something’ program to anchor a new national
information-sharing part-
nership with Amtrak as part of the Nationwide Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative.
This national program utilizes public education materials,
advertisements, and other out-
reach tools to engage and educate travelers, businesses,
community organizations, and
public and private sector employees to identify suspicious
behavior on railway systems
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2010). These

examples of partnerships forged
with the community serve as illustrations of the unique
approach law enforcement is tak-
ing with community members and organizations in efforts to
promote two-way communi-
cation flow. As mentioned, these partnerships are the essential
foundation needed to
channel raw information related to suspicious behavior to law
enforcement agencies.
Figure 2. Operational assumptions for risk prevention.
Source: Taken from Ratcliffe (2010), with permission.
Law enforcement intelligence: determination and prevention
The mission of law enforcement intelligence is to prevent or
mitigate crimes/threats/
attacks from reaching fruition. This mission requires, or
assumes, certain knowledge to
be available to law enforcement – such as information on the
criminal actors along with
their motives, methods, and targets. Without this information,
the probability of law
enforcement successfully preventing crimes and terrorism
diminishes. This is the impor-
tance of gaining raw information in the form of SARs to serve
as the ‘bridge’ between
intelligence gaps.7 These vital pieces of information, that may
seem irrelevant at the time
of the report, may be the missing piece necessary to ‘complete
the puzzle’ about the pres-
ence and nature of a terrorism threat.

Fundamental to this discussion is that the prevention of crime
and terrorism is a pro-
cess based upon a set of operational assumptions. This process
requires a commitment to
a philosophy of practice that emphasizes proactive operations
even though most law
enforcement activities are reactive in nature. Ratcliffe (2010)
sums up the operational
assumptions – illustrated in Figure 2 – which law enforcement
must recognize when
determining threats and identifying ways to mitigate or prevent
threats from reaching fru-
ition. Simply put, in order to prevent crime or terrorism it is
operationally assumed that
law enforcement must be proactive – such as training
community members on the types
of suspicious activity to look for and report. Moreover, in order
for law enforcement to
be proactive they must rely on a certain degree of predictability
of criminal and terrorist
actions. In the case of SARs, we rely on the predictability of
known criminal ‘indicators’
that law enforcement, in turn, informs community members to
be aware of. Lastly, for
actions to be predictable, a pattern of these actions must be
identifiable (Ratcliffe, 2010).
In the SARs example, law enforcement looks for the series of
indicators representing a
pattern of behavior that can be compared with other reported
suspicious activity not only
within the jurisdiction but also regionally and nationally.
Coupled with these operational assumptions is a scale of
opportunity and time that
has implications for risk identification and thus prevention.

Opportunity and time play
different roles in street crimes than in complex (or enterprise8)
crimes and pertain differ-
ently to terrorism as well. Street crimes, such as robbery and
sexual assault, rely upon lit-
tle planning and time to carry out the criminal act. Offenders of
street crimes rely more
heavily on an opportunistic target, hence there is little
preparation time and few criminal
instruments needed to commit the crime. Complex criminality,
such as terrorism or
white-collar crime, requires more planning before the criminal
act occurs. For example,
identifying channels through which money can be laundered and
the processes of laun-
dering the money through these channels is time consuming.
Moreover, the targets avail-
able for complex criminality are far more limited than those of
street crimes – it is more
difficult to skim money from a brokerage house than to rob a
liquor store.
Terrorism, both acts by lone wolfs and networks alike, require
significant planning
prior to an attack. Examples abound, such as the sophistication
and logistics of the 9/11
attacks on the USA, the complexity of four significant and
deadly attacks in Istanbul,
Turkey in November 2003 by the Turkish al-Qaeda, and the
detailed planning of the 7
July 2005 coordinated bombings in London, England. All three
of these incidents had
multiple coordinated attacks, which required significant
logistics, preparation, and people
to make the attacks a reality. The time and planning required for
these attacks was

significant because ‘suitable’ targets had to be identified and
reconnoitered in consider-
ation of the targets’ accessibility, security, and physical and
emotional impact. Just as ter-
rorism requires preparation time and logistical planning, street
crimes are just the
opposite – often little planning and the victim is frequently only
a target of opportunity.
In consideration of these factors, when balanced against the
ability of law enforcement to
intervene and stop the incident, considerations for crime and
terrorism threat control have
two intervening factors: as the time and complexity required to
plan a criminal act
increases, (1) there will be more information (and indicators)
that will likely be observed
and reported to law enforcement and (2) the greater the
likelihood that law enforcement
will be able to intervene in the incident’s planning and
execution. Figure 3 illustrates the
prevention relationship between terrorism/crime opportunity
and time.
Perspective
The discussion thus far has identified both an emerging threat
paradigm – self-radicalized,
homegrown criminal extremists – and a process to manage the
threat. The process is
intelligence-led policing that relies on the use of suspicious
activity reporting from the

community and private sector to provide law enforcement with
raw information about
behaviors that likely have a criminal nexus. The application of
these factors will be illus-
trated in two brief case studies: the attempted attack on Fort
Dix, New Jersey and the
Fort Hood, Texas attack.
Case study: Fort Dix, New Jersey
On the evening of 7 May 2007, six men described as
homegrown ‘Islamic militants’
(DHS, 2007; New York Police Department [NYPD], 2007) with
no apparent connection
to international terrorist networks were arrested for conspiring
to attack US armed forces
Figure 3. Planning and opportunity for crime and terrorism.
personnel at Fort Dix, NJ. These men had planned to attack the
base armed with a vari-
ety of firearms in an attempt to kill as many soldiers as possible
(NYPD, 2007). Of the
six individuals involved in the Fort Dix terrorist plot, three
were brothers. Dritan
‘Anthony’ or ‘Tony’ Duka, Shain Duka, and Eljvir ‘Elvis’
Duka, undocumented aliens
from the former Yugoslavia, had been living illegally in the
USA for more than 23 years
and were accepted as Americans by neighbors and friends who
had no idea they would
scheme to attack a military base (Anastasia, 2007). The Duka

brothers entered the USA
near Brownsville, Texas, in 1984 when they crossed the border
from Mexico (FOX
News, 2009). The brothers had no criminal record, however,
reports indicate the three
accumulated 19 traffic citations, but because they operated in
‘sanctuary cities,’ where
law enforcement does not routinely report undocumented
immigrants to homeland secu-
rity, none of the tickets raised red flags (DHS, 2007). The three
brothers operated a roof-
ing business together.
The brothers conspired with three other suspects in the plot –
Mohamad Ibrahim
Shnewer from Jordan; Serdar Tatar from Turkey; and Agron
Abdullahu from the former
Yugoslavia. Shnewer was a legal US citizen and worked as a
taxi cab driver, a construc-
tion laborer, and also at his family’s supermarket. Tatar was in
the USA legally with a
green card and worked as an assistant manager at a 7–11 store
in Philadelphia and deliv-
ered pizzas for his family’s pizzeria (Stansbury, 2007).
Abdullahu was also in the USA
legally with a green card and worked as a baker in a
supermarket (USA Today, 2008).
Five were charged with conspiracy to kill US military personnel
while Abdullahu was
charged with aiding and abetting illegal immigrants in obtaining
weapons. The weapons
were reportedly Abdullahu’s personnel weapons and included a
SKS semi-automatic rifle,
a Beretta Storm semi-automatic rifle, a Mossberg 12-gauge
pump shotgun, and a Beretta
9 millimeter handgun (Stansbury, 2007).

During November 2006, the six suspects began planning the
attack in more detail.
Tatar’s parents owned a pizzeria near Fort Dix where Tatar
stated he had made deliveries
to the base multiple times. Beyond the normal deliveries, Tatar
mentioned that he noticed
an increase in business during times when large numbers of
troops were stationed on the
base on temporary duty or prior to going overseas. Due to the
number of deliveries
Tatar’s family pizzeria made to Fort Dix, the pizzeria possessed
a detailed map of Fort
Dix labeled ‘Cantonment Area Fort Dix, NJ’ – a map that Tatar
took from the pizzeria
and provided to the group for planning.
The plot to attack Fort Dix was prevented through a citizen tip.
Specifically, in Janu-
ary 2006 the Duka brothers went to a local Circuit City store in
Cherry Hill, NJ to get an
8-mm video converted into a DVD (Stansbury, 2007). They
were greeted by store clerk
Brian Morgenstern who later called the police after becoming
troubled by what he saw
on the video – 10 long-bearded men of Middle Eastern descent
shooting weapons at a fir-
ing range and calling for jihad (Inskeep, 2008). The police
arrived at Circuit City,
watched the video with Morgenstern and determined the video
was suspicious enough to
call the County Counter Terrorism Coordinator who then
contacted the local FBI field
office. That same afternoon the Duka brothers returned to pick
up their copied video
without incident – the FBI received their copy of the video a

week later. Despite this
video, authorities maintain there was no direct evidence
connecting the men to any inter-
national terror organizations such as al-Qaeda (Russakoff &
Eggen, 2007).
The tip from Morgenstern led to an investigation that included
infiltration by a coop-
erating witness – Mahmoud Omar, a legal immigrant from
Egypt. Omar’s history
included a 2001 conviction for bank fraud and a 2004 arrest for
a fight with a neighbor.
In 2006, the FBI recruited him to infiltrate this group. The
group often watched terror
training videos, clips featuring Osama bin Laden, a tape
containing the last will and testa-
ment of some of the September 11 hijackers, and tapes of armed
attacks on US military
personnel (DHS, 2007). The men trained by playing paintball in
the woods in New Jer-
sey and taking target practice at a firing range in Pennsylvania’s
Pocono Mountains
where they had rented a house (Mulvihill, 2008).
In addition to plotting the attack on Fort Dix, the defendants
spoke of assaulting a
Navy installation in Philadelphia during the annual Army–Navy
football game and con-
ducted surveillance at other military installations in the region.
The group also considered
targeting Dover Air Base in Delaware, Fort Monmouth in New

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