La presentación se basa en los dos primeros artículos de la tesis doctoral de Emiliano Tealde. En ellos se estudia los efectos de un programa de seguridad a gran escala en los niveles de criminalidad en la ciudad de Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. Se demuestra que el programa no logra bajar los niveles de criminalidad, sino desplazar el crimen hacia las áreas de la ciudad que el programa no cubre.

1. Do Police Displace Crime?
The Effect of the Favela Pacification
Program in Rio de Janeiro
Emiliano Tealde
Universidad ORT Uruguay
University of Siena
XXXI Jornadas Anuales de Econom´ıa del BCU
18 y 19 de agosto de 2016
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2. The Favela Pacification Program
Consists in the expulsion of criminals from some Favelas
Recovers to the State territories under gang control
Triggering factors
• 17 August 2007: Rio de Janeiro announced as a host city of the
2014 FIFA World Cup
• 2 October 2009: elected to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games
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3. Do Police Displace Crime?
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4. Table 1. The Favela Pacification Program
Territory Gang until the Pacification
Pacification Date Date
Batan Militia 1 June 2008
Cidade de Deus Comando Vermelho 11 November 2008
Santa Marta Comando Vermelho 20 November 2008
Babilonia Comando Vermelho 15 May 2009
Pavao Comando Vermelho 30 November 2009
Tabajaras Comando Vermelho 26 December 2009
Providencia Comando Vermelho 22 March 2010
Borel Comando Vermelho 28 April 2010
Formiga Comando Vermelho 28 April 2010
Andarai Comando Vermelho 11 June 2010
Salgueiro Comando Vermelho 30 July 2010
Turano Comando Vermelho 10 August 2010
Macacos Amigos dos Amigos 14 October 2010
Adeus Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Alemao Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Chatuba Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Fazendinha Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Fe e Sereno Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Nova Bras´ılia Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
(Continued)
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5. Table 1. The Favela Pacification Program
Territory Gang until the Pacification
Pacification Date Date
Parque Proletario Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Vila Cruzeiro Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Sao Joao Comando Vermelho 1 June 2011
Coroa Comando Vermelho 2 June 2011
Escondidinho Comando Vermelho 2 June 2011
Sao Carlos Amigos dos Amigos 2 June 2011
Mangueira Comando Vermelho 19 June 2011
Rocinha Amigos dos Amigos 12 November 2011
Vidigal Amigos dos Amigos 12 November 2011
Jacarezinho Comando Vermelho 13 October 2012
Manguinhos Comando Vermelho 13 October 2012
Arara Comando Vermelho 17 January 2013
Barreira Comando Vermelho 3 March 2013
Caju Amigos dos Amigos 3 March 2013
Cerro-Cora Comando Vermelho 29 April 2013
Mangueirinha Comando Vermelho 2 August 2013
Camarista Meier Comando Vermelho 6 October 2013
Lins Comando Vermelho 6 October 2013
Vila Kennedy Comando Vermelho 13 March 2014
Note: Pacification operations are vastly reported by the Brazilian media; dates and gangs controlling
the territory are obtained from numerous media reports.
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6. The Favela Pacification Program
Number of Policemen
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
06/2008
03/2014
06/2009
06/2010
06/2011
06/2012
06/2013
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7. The Favela Pacification Program
Population Covered
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
06/2008
03/2014
06/2009
06/2010
06/2011
06/2012
06/2013
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8. The Favela Pacification Program
Area Covered (square kilometers)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
06/2008
03/2014
06/2011
06/2009
06/2010
06/2012
06/2013
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9. The Favela Pacification Program
Police per square kilometer0.511.522.5
06/2008
03/2014
06/2009
06/2010
06/2011
06/2013
06/2012
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10. Research Questions
Do police reduce crime there where it is deployed?
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11. Research Questions
Do police reduce crime there where it is deployed?
Do police displace crime to other areas?
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12. Do police reduce crime there where it is deployed?
The Research Design
Treatment: police deployment.
Treatment group: pacified territories.
Control group: non-pacified territories.
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13. Do police reduce crime there where it is deployed?
Measures
Homicide rate: best measure.
Property crime rate: changes in reporting rates.
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14. Do police reduce crime there where it is deployed?
Homicide rate
Treatment and control groups: balanced.
Pacification of a CV territory may affect homicide rate in an AA
territory due to crime displacement.
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15. Do police reduce crime there where it is deployed?
Homicide rate
Treatment group: Pacified territories (former CV territories)
Control group: CV territories
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16. Do Police Displace Crime?
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17. Do Police Displace Crime?
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18. Vila Kennedy
Cidade de Deus
Santa Marta
Babilonia
Pavao
Tabajaras
Providencia
Borel
Formiga
Andarai
Salgueiro
Turano
Adeus
Alemao
Chatuba
Fazendinha
Fe
Nova Brasilia
Parque Proletario
Vila Cruzeiro
Sao Joao
Coroa
Escondidinho
Mangueira
Jacarezinho
Manguinhos
Arara
Barreira
Cerro-Cora
Mangueirinha
Camarista Meier
Lins
09/2007
11/2008
05/2009
11/2009
12/2009
03/2010
04/2010
06/2010
07/2010
08/2010
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19. The Favela Pacification Program
Territory Gang until the Pacification
Pacification Date Date
Batan Militia 1 June 2008
Cidade de Deus Comando Vermelho 11 November 2008
Santa Marta Comando Vermelho 20 November 2008
Babilonia Comando Vermelho 15 May 2009
Pavao Comando Vermelho 30 November 2009
Tabajaras Comando Vermelho 26 December 2009
Providencia Comando Vermelho 22 March 2010
Borel Comando Vermelho 28 April 2010
Formiga Comando Vermelho 28 April 2010
Andarai Comando Vermelho 11 June 2010
Salgueiro Comando Vermelho 30 July 2010
Turano Comando Vermelho 10 August 2010
Macacos Amigos dos Amigos 14 October 2010
Adeus Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Alemao Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Chatuba Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Fazendinha Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Fe e Sereno Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
Nova Bras´ılia Comando Vermelho 28 November 2010
(Continued)
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20. Descriptive Statistics.
Comando Vermelho Amigos dos Amigos
Panel A. Crime
Homicides
Total 6.477 2.943
Civilians 2.534 .809
Police Officer 3.943 2.133
Sexual Assaults 1.060 1.140
Panel B. Police Activity
Cuaght in the Act 7.668 2.627
Drug Arrest 12.881 4.854
Gun Arrest 13.015 7.472
Car Recovery 13.093 5.710
Observations 448 70
Note: data provided by the Public Security Institute.
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21. The Econometric Specification
Yit = α + β ∗ Treatment + Ii + Mt + it (1)
• Yit is homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per month(t) at the territory (i) level
• Treatment takes the value 1 for pacified territories, 0 otherwise.
• Ii stands for fixed effects at the territory level
• Mt stands for monthly effects and
• it is the error term
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22. The Econometric Specification
Yit = α + β ∗ Treatment + Ii + Mt + it (2)
Parameter of interest: β
β: causal effect of the treatment on Y
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23. The Econometric Specification
Yit = α + β ∗ Treatment + Ii + Mt + it (2)
Parameter of interest: β
β: causal effect of the treatment on Y
Cov(Treatment, it ) = 0 (3)
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24. The Econometric Specification
Yit = α + β ∗ Treatment + Ii + Mt + it (2)
Parameter of interest: β
β: causal effect of the treatment on Y
Cov(Treatment, it ) = 0 (3)
Cov(Treatment, it |Ii ) = 0 (4)
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25. Dif-in-Dif validity
Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants0105
09/2007
10/2008
Pacified Non-pacified
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26. Results
The effect of pacification in pacified territories.
Total Civilians Police officers
Pacified -4.905** -0.859 -4.046**
(1.914) (1.082) (1.950)
Pacified*Elevation -2.804*** -0.734 -2.070**
(0.929) (0.440) (0.863)
Terrifory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,184
R2
0.116 0.150 0.152 0.116 0.138 0.135
Note: in the columns under the header Total the dependent variable is total monthly
homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per territory. In the columns under the header
Civilians the dependent variable is monthly homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per
territory, for homicides that both the murderer and the murdered are civilians. In the
columns under the header Police Officers the dependent variable is monthly homicide rate
per 100,000 inhabitants per territory, for homicides that murderer is a Police Officer and the
murdered is a civilian. *** Significant at the 1-percent level.** Significant at the 5-percent
level. * Significant at the 10-percent level.
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27. Police-homicides elasticity
Elasticity: -0.23.
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28. Police Activiy in pacified territories.
Caught in the Act Drug Arrest Gun Arrest Car recovery
Pacified 13.229*** 19.951** -14.441* -1.779
(3.934) (8.953) (8.017) (3.584)
Terrifory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,184
R2
0.368 0.472 0.159 0.377
Note: Dependent variable is monthly number of offenses caught in the act per 100,000
inhabitants per territory for the model presented in the second column. Dependent variable
is monthly number of drug arrests per 100,000 inhabitants per territory for the model
presented in the third column. Dependent variable is monthly number of gun arrests per
100,000 inhabitants per territory for the model presented in the fourth column. Dependent
variable is monthly number of car recoveries per 100,000 inhabitants per territory for the
model presented in the fifth column. Standard errors clustered at the territory level in
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1-percent level.** Significant at the 5-percent level. *
Significant at the 10-percent level.
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29. Evolution of the Effect in Pacified Territories.
Total Civilians Police Officers
Placebo Pacification -2.731 -0.232 -2.498
(1.740) (0.780) (1.574)
1st Pacification -2.849 -2.497*** -0.353
(2.583) (0.808) (2.106)
2nd Pacification -6.157*** -1.331 -4.826***
(2.119) (0.974) (1.427)
3rd Pacification 1.828 -0.182 2.010
(5.584) (1.305) (5.293)
4th Pacification -7.080* -1.789* -5.291
(3.843) (0.988) (3.301)
5th Pacification -11.224** -2.774 -8.450***
(4.343) (2.267) (2.963)
6th Pacification -1.633 4.094 -5.727***
(2.768) (3.783) (2.090)
7th Pacification -8.635*** -2.324 -6.311**
(2.863) (1.595) (2.382)
8th Pacification -7.886*** -3.203** -4.683**
(2.387) (1.445) (1.911)
9th Pacification -5.223* -1.110 -4.113*
(3.085) (1.312) (2.163)
R2
0.157 0.125 0.144
Note: Dependent variable is monthly number of offenses caught in the act per 100,000
inhabitants per territory for the model presented in the second column. Dependent variable
is monthly number of drug arrests per 100,000 inhabitants per territory for the model
presented in the third column. Dependent variable is monthly number of gun arrests per
100,000 inhabitants per territory for the model presented in the fourth column. Dependent
variable is monthly number of car recoveries per 100,000 inhabitants per territory for the
model presented in the fifth column. Standard errors clustered at the territory level in
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1-percent level.** Significant at the 5-percent level. *
Significant at the 10-percent level.
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30. Do police displace crime?
Research Design
Treatment: incentive, due to the Favela Pacification Program,
to displace criminal activities to Amigos dos Amigos territories.
Treatment group: Amigos dos Amigos territories.
Control group: Comando Vermelho territories.
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31. The Research Design
Timeline
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32. Do Police Displace Crime?
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33. Do Police Displace Crime?
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34. Do Police Displace Crime?
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35. Do Police Displace Crime?
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36. Crime Displacement Measure
Homicides
Homicides indicate that CV is trying to relocate in AA
territories.
CV and AA are heavily-armed criminal organizations.
To displace criminal activities to AA territories CV must engage in
disputes with AA.
Control group.
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37. The Econometric Specification
Yit = α + β ∗ AA + Ii + Mt + it (5)
• Yit is homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per month(t) at the
territory (i) level
• AA is the interaction of the treatment period, November 2008 to
September 2010, and the treatment group, Amigos dos Amigos
territories.
• Ii stands for fixed effects at the territory level
• Mt stands for monthly effects and
• it is the error term
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38. Do Police Displace Crime?
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39. The Effect of Pacification in AA Territories.
Total Civilians Police Officers
AA 2.116* 1.440** 0.676
(1.125) (0.565) (1.018)
AA*Elevation 0.039** 0.019 0.020
(0.017) (0.012) (0.013)
AA*Distance 7.330 5.856** 1.473
(6.237) (2.863) (5.793)
Territory FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369
R2
0.144 0.144 0.143 0.115 0.114 0.113 0.127 0.128 0.127
Note:in the columns under the header Total the dependent variable is total monthly
homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per territory. In the columns under the header
Civilians the dependent variable is monthly homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per
territory, for homicides that both the murderer and the murdered are civilians. In the
columns under the header Police Officers the dependent variable is monthly homicide rate
per 100,000 inhabitants per territory, for homicides that murderer is a Police Officer and the
murdered is a civilian. Standard errors clustered at the territory level in parentheses. ***
Significant at the 1-percent level.** Significant at the 5-percent level. * Significant at the
10-percent level.
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40. Police-homicides elasticity
Elasticity: 0.48.
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41. Police Activity and Placebo test
Panel A. Police Activity
Caught in the Act Drug Arrest Gun Arrest Car recovery
AA -2.251 -3.107 1.892 0.680
(1.766) (3.362) (2.123) (2.737)
Terrifory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369
R2
0.349 0.455 0.148 0.380
Panel B. Placebo
Sexual Assaults
AA -0.661
(0.673)
Terrifory fixed effects Yes
Month effects Yes
Observations 1,369
R2
0.073
Note: Dependent variable is monthly homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per territory.
Standard errors clustered at the territory level in parentheses. *** Significant at the
1-percent level.** Significant at the 5-percent level. * Significant at the 10-percent level.
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42. Evolution of the Effect in AA Territories.
Total Civilians Police Officers
Placebo Pacification 0.755 0.538 0.217
(1.470) (0.483) (1.172)
1st Pacification 1.185 2.158** -0.973
(1.742) (0.909) (1.396)
2nd Pacification 3.691** 2.030* 1.662
(1.750) (1.013) (1.412)
3rd Pacification 2.065 1.866 0.199
(1.953) (1.468) (1.533)
4th Pacification 2.093 1.276 0.817
(1.939) (1.248) (1.311)
5th Pacification 1.973 1.306 0.667
(3.893) (2.079) (2.811)
6th Pacification 1.659 0.449 1.211
(2.111) (1.687) (1.354)
7th Pacification 3.439* 2.667* 0.773
(1.881) (1.326) (1.614)
8th Pacification 4.124 0.141 3.983*
(2.517) (1.155) (2.322)
9th Pacification 2.205 0.854 1.351
(2.070) (0.972) (1.388)
R2
0.144 0.116 0.129
Note: in the columns under the header Total the dependent variable is total monthly homicide rate
per 100,000 inhabitants per territory. In the columns under the header Civilians the dependent
variable is monthly homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per territory, for homicides that both the
murderer and the murdered are civilians. In the columns under the header Police Officers the
dependent variable is monthly homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants per territory, for homicides that
murderer is a Police Officer and the murdered is a civilian. Standard errors clustered at the territory
level in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1-percent level.** Significant at the 5-percent level. *
Significant at the 10-percent level.
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43. INTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS
Control group reliability
Displacement from pacified to CV territories and AA retaliation
β = (AA1 − AA0) − (CV1 − CV0) (6)
β = (AA1 − AA0) − (CV 1 − CV0) (7)
CV 1 > CV 1 ⇒ β < β (8)
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44. INTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS
Conclusions
No effect on sexual assaults.
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45. INTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS
Conclusions
No effect on sexual assaults.
No spurious correlation.
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46. INTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS
Conclusions
No effect on sexual assaults.
No spurious correlation.
Downward bias of the estimates.
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47. INTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS
Conclusions
No effect on sexual assaults.
No spurious correlation.
Downward bias of the estimates.
No anticipation of the treatment.
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48. Reduction and Displacement
-20-10010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Pacification
Pacified AA
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