The Issue Is Not Unification, but Forced Unification.pdf

1. ANALYSIS
THE ISSUE IS NOT
UNIFICATION,
BUT FORCED
UNIFICATION
How History Can Help Us Understand
Taiwan’s 2024 Elections
Da-Wun Sie
Yu-Fen Lai

2. PUBLISHER
Global Innovation Hub
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom
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Taiwan
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AUTHORS
Da-Wun Sie, Yu-Fen Lai
EDITOR
Global Innovation Hub of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for
Freedom
CONTACT
global.innovation@freiheit.org
AS OF
December 2023
NOTES ON USING THIS PUBLICATION
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ernment elections, or European Parliament elections).
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Imprint

3. TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: THE MAN WITH A SMIRK ________________________________
A VOTE FOR THE KMT IS NOT A VOTE FOR UNIFICATION __________________
A VOTE FOR THE DPP IS NOT A VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE ________________
WHAT DOES A VOTE FOR THE TPP MEAN? _________________________________
THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS __________
CONCLUSION: HE WAS THE FUTURE ONCE ________________________________
ABOUT THE AUTHORS _______________________________________________________
© Red-Hawk / Canva.com
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4. 4 INTRODUCTION: THE MAN WITH A SMIRK
Four men, all wearing suits, emerged from behind closed
doors. Three of them appeared to be content, if not fully tri-
umphant. The fourth, however, could barely conceal his dis-
appointment. As they walked out, journalists huddled around
them, cameras and notebooks at the ready. The four men
posed for photos. In front of everybody, the man who seemed
the most elated turned to the only one who looked gloomy. He
then made a snide remark. “I bet you’ve never thought a day
like this would come.” After saying this, he smirked. No one
doubts that he wanted the press to hear him loud and clear.
Apparently, cajoling (or perhaps strong-arming) the other pol-
itician into accepting a hugely disadvantageous deal – a deal
on which that politician reneged three days later – was not
enough for him. He had to humiliate him as well.
The smirking man was Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president from
2008 to 2016. He may revel in the obvious discomfort of the
man who stood next to him, but in his final two years in of-
fice, he would not have been so pleased with himself. Back
then, his authority was left in tatters. In the spring of 2014, a
large-scale protest forced him to abandon his signature trade
deal with Beijing. Protesters argued that his trade deal would
compromise Taiwan’s much-cherished political autonomy.
As it turned out, many voters also agreed. His party, the Kuo-
mintang (KMT), ended up suffering a crushing defeat in 2016,
handing both the presidency and the control of Congress to
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); his party also failed
to recover in 2020.
The man receiving Ma’s snide remark was Ko Wen-je. Ko, a
surgeon-turned-politician, did not play a particularly signifi-
cant role in the 2014 protest. However, his anti-KMT broad-
sides, coupled with his perceived authenticity, allowed him to
ride the wave created by the protest. He was elected mayor
of Taipei City, the capital city of Taiwan and a traditional KMT
stronghold, despite having no prior political experience. Many
saw him as a refreshing maverick who speaks his mind. He
ran as an independent but his bid was supported by the DPP.
From then on, however, a series of public spats with the DPP
ensued. Some unexpected alliances were made and, eventu-
ally, his politics became more aligned with the KMT than it
is with the DPP. In order to further his ambitions, he has also
founded his own political party, Taiwan People’s Party (TPP),
in 2019.
In the upcoming January election, Ko will run for president.
However, the polls have consistently shown that if he and Hou
Yu-ih, KMT’s nominee, both enter into the race, it would most
likely lead to an easy victory for William Ching-te Lai, the sitting
vice president and the DPP’s nominee. Yet, neither Ko nor Hou
are willing to be the vice-presidential candidate. Moreover, as
the leader of his fledging party, Ko also has to rally support for
his downballot candidates. Sharing a platform with the KMT
would severely hinder his ability to do so, especially because
it would undermine his appeal as someone who purports to
be the champion of a “new form of politics.” Running on a joint
ticket with KMT’s nominee could prove damaging. “I hate the
KMT,” he found himself saying, trying to maintain that image,
“it is just that I despise the DPP even more.” 1
In fact, Ko is undoubtedly recalling the painful death suffered
by the People First Party (PFP) two decades ago. The parallel
is striking. The PFP was also founded by a political star with
an independent streak. However, its descent into irrelevance
began when it officially joined forces with the KMT, also in a
bid to unseat the DPP. One by one, PFP politicians started to
defect to the KMT – if the party is no longer independent, why
not join the “real thing”? After all, the KMT remains considera-
bly more resourceful. Soon enough, voters also started to de-
sert the PFP in droves. Incidentally, Ko’s deputy, Vivian Huang,
happens to be a PFP veteran who stuck with the party to the
bitter end. She would have remembered this all too well. Vari-
ous news reports have suggested that she remains adamant-
ly opposed to collaboration. Apparently, Ko is swayed by her.
Here enters Ma Ying-jeou, seemingly out of nowhere. Ma con-
vened a four-way negotiation between Ko, KMT presidential
candidate Hou, KMT Chairman Eric Chu, and himself. What
was discussed behind closed doors that day remains un-
known to the public, at least at the time of writing. All the pub-
lic knows is that Ko acquiesced and agreed to run alongside
Hou. Adding insult to injury, he acquiesced to a deal brokered
by Ma, the man whom he used to rail against.
Intriguing as this story may be, international observers may
be even more curious about the actual meaning of all this –
since it was Ma’s China policy that doomed the KMT to failure
last time around, should we interpret some voters’ support
for KMT/TPP as support for a more pro-China, perhaps more
pro-unification, stance? Could it even be interpreted as sup-
port for a second coming of Ma’s approach towards China?
The short answer is no. A more elaborate answer, however,
would need to be based on a deeper understanding of Tai-
wan’s political history.
Introduction: The Man with A Smirk
1
Hou, Betty. “Taiwan Candidate Says He Still Hates Party He’ll Run With.” Bloomberg.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-16/taiwan-candidate-says-he-still-
hates-the-party-he-ll-run-with#xj4y7vzkg

5. 5
A VOTE FOR THE KMT IS NOT A VOTE FOR UNIFICATION
When it comes to political parties in Taiwan, one of the big-
gest misconceptions is that the KMT is pro-China and there-
fore pro-unification, whereas the DPP is anti-China and there-
fore pro-independence. That is at best an oversimplification
and at worst a complete distortion.
Taiwan’s politics is decidedly not sectarian. Since the dawn of
democracy in Taiwan, there has simply been no support for
an annexation, or what Beijing calls “re-unification.” Even back
in 1996, when Taiwan held its first democratic presidential
election, support for immediate unification was less than 3%.2
Even when combined with those who favored “move toward
unification in the future”, support for unification still did not
exceed one quarter of respondents. Later, support for unifi-
cation dwindled even further. Latest polling shows that sup-
port for immediate unification stands at only 1.6%, whereas
support for moving toward unification in the future also only
amounts to a meager 5.8% (see Fig. 1, courtesy of the Elec-
tion Study Center at NCCU).
This explains why even Ma, arguably the most pro-China
president ever, had reiterated his opposition to unification
during his tenure – “No unification, no independence, no war”,
so went his slogan. Indeed, no politician running for national
office would ever dare to explicitly endorse PRC rule. As re-
cently as in October 2023, the Deputy Chairman of the KMT
publicly proclaimed that his party was “not pro-China and not
pro-unification.” 3
Simply put, there has simply never been any
appetite amongst the electorate for being annexed by Beijing.
To be sure, the KMT did use to call for unification. After the
Allied Powers defeated Japan in World War II, the control of
Taiwan – then a Japanese colony – was transferred to the
Chinese government, which was at that time run by the KMT.
However, the KMT government was soon overthrown by the
Communists in the Chinese Civil War. The KMT government
fled China and then reestablished itself in Taiwan. In order to
justify its authoritarian rule in its new fiefdom, it claimed that
the island had to be on war footing, as the KMT would soon
militarily “reclaim” the “Mainland”. In this sense, the ensuing
38-year-long Martial Law regime was buttressed not just by
brute force and the co-optation of local elites, but also the
propagation of Chinese nationalism4
. Sure enough, the KMT
regime was indeed pro-unification, yet only when under its
own banner. It never intended to submit to PRC rule.
A Vote for the KMT is Not a Vote
for Unification
2
Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 2023. “Taiwan Independence vs.
Unification with the Mainland (1994/12~2023/06).” https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/
Detail?fid=7801&id=6963
3
Chen, Alyssa. 2023. “Beijing ‘concerned’ by KMT official saying party is mislabelled as
‘pro-China’.” South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/
article/3237599/beijing-concerned-kmt-official-saying-party-mislabelled-pro-china
© Andy.LIU / Shutterstock.com

6. 6 A VOTE FOR THE KMT IS NOT A VOTE FOR UNIFICATION
Later on, democratization as well as the growth of the PRC’s
military prowess meant that even this position was no longer
tenable. Nowadays, KMT’s position on this issue has become
more ambiguous – to detractors, it may even seem tortured.
Despite previous calls from within the party to revisit this is-
sue, the KMT is still clinging to the so-called 1992 Consensus.
This term refers to the unwritten understanding upon which
representatives of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) had allegedly agreed in a semiofficial meeting in 1992.5
The undisputed part of this consensus is that there is only
one China in the world and that Taiwan forms part of it. It is
disputed, however, as to whether both parties agreed to disa-
gree over which government represents China. The KMT side
maintains that both sides had agreed to disagree, whereas
the CCP has never acknowledged that any party could ques-
tion the status of the PRC government as the sole represent-
ative of China. Indeed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has equated
the so-called Consensus exclusively with “unification”, which
would most likely involve applying the model of “One Coun-
try, Two Systems” – essentially the Hong Kong model. In this
context, as an analyst at the thinktank RAND Corporation
commented, “it is hard for the KMT to credibly claim ‘different
interpretations’ on the 1992 Consensus.” 6
Legal arguments aside, the KMT often asserts to the public
that it has a consensus with Beijing, and that this consensus
allows Taiwan to hold contentious political issues in abey-
ance – and that, consequently, enough good will from Beijing
would allow Taiwan to foster trade ties with China and main-
tain peace. In this sense, to grossly oversimplify, the main di-
viding line in Taiwanese politics is whether one is convinced
by this argument. KMT supporters tend to believe that the
1992 Consensus forms a good basis for negotiations and,
therefore, peace. Critics of the KMT, however, question wheth-
er accepting Taiwan forms part of China would not actually
undermine Taiwan’s security, as it would entail conceding that
Beijing is right to pursue unification and is right to preclude
other countries from “meddling with China’s internal affairs”
in doing so. In short: One side thinks the “Consensus” brings
peace, the other side thinks it spells peril.
Put another way: What worries certain voters is not the KMT’s
expressed stance on unification; instead, it is its willingness to
accept Beijing’s preconditions, coupled with its presumption
that China would be acting in good faith. Additionally, some
voters are also concerned about how KMT’s policies have in-
creased Taiwan’s dependence on China. They suspect these
policies would give Beijing more levers to pull in order to un-
dermine Taiwan’s autonomy and, eventually, force unification
by strangulation. This is also why the prospect of a KMT vic-
tory often causes real anxiety, even dread, from these voters
who, of course, would tend to support the DPP.
4
Wang, Fu-Chang. 2013. “A Prolonged Exile: National Imagination of the KMT Regime in
Postwar Taiwan.” Oriens Extremus 52: 137-172.
5
For an explainer, see: Maizland, Lindsay. 2023. “ Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So
Tense.“ Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-tai-
wan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden
6
Grossman, Derek and Millan, Brandon Alexander. 2020. “ Taiwan’s KMT May Have a
Serious ‘1992 Consensus’ Problem.“ The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/
taiwans-kmt-may-have-a-serious-1992-consensus-problem/
© Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (NCCU)

7. 7
A VOTE FOR THE DPP IS NOT A VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE
Detractors from the KMT camp, however, often claim that
the DPP’s stance is too agonistic and that it still oversteps
Beijing’s red lines. For Xi Jinping, DPP’s refusal to accept his
precondition for talks – that Taiwan is an inalienable part of
China – has also been unacceptable. Consequently, Beijing
has suspended all dialogues with Taipei since Tsai of the DPP
took office in 2016, despite Tsai’s repeated calls for these dia-
logues to be resumed.
A Vote for the DPP is Not A Vote for
Independence
7
Wang, Fu-chang. 2013, “Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transition in Taiwan.” Oriental
Institute Journal 22(2): 81-107.
8
Wu, Chyi-In. 2021. “2020 Taiwan Social Change Survey (Round 8, Year 1): Globalization,
Work, Family, Mental Health, Religion, Mass Communication, Political Participation,
Leisure (C00369_1) [data file]”. Available from Survey Research Data Archive, Academia
Sinica. https://doi.org/10.6141/TW-SRDA-C00369_1-1
9
Fee, for instance, the full transcript of Tsai’s interview with the BBC in 2020: https://eng-
lish.president.gov.tw/News/5962
On the issue of nationhood, the DPP had also been on a jour-
ney. In 1986, several dissidents who had long been fighting
against the KMT’s authoritarian rule decided to formally es-
tablish the DPP. It was both a pro-democracy movement and
a movement that challenged the then-hegemonic Chinese
nationalism, since – as mentioned above – Chinese nation-
alism was one of the key forces that sustained the KMT’s dic-
tatorial regime. Therefore, the DPP actively helped to foster a
Taiwanese identity which, in turn, lead people to seek formal
independence – to formally free Taiwan of what many dissi-
dents saw as the Chinese-nationalist yoke.7
But in the face of the PRC’s military threat and the US’s prefer-
ence for the status quo, considerations of peace and stability
eventually prevailed. The DPP-internal debate on independ-
ence gradually subsided. A new constitution, a formal dec-
laration of independence, a referendum on nationhood – all
these proposals have long been consigned to history. Nota-
bly, one survey shows that, in 2020, 60.4% of all Taiwanese
adults preferred independence if peace could be maintained.8
People do desire independence. Yet the prospect of war has
prevented even the once staunchly pro-independ-
ence party from advocating it. Though formal
independence remains the dream of some
people, it also remains precisely that: A dream,
and a very distant one as well.
Instead, the DPP’s official position, reiterated
by the incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen nu-
merous times throughout her tenure and also
reaffirmed by the current candidate
William Lai, is as follows: There is no
need to seek formal independence,
since Taiwan is a self-ruling democ-
racy that, for all intents and purposes,
is already independent.9
Furthermore,
the Constitution of the Republic of Chi-
na, even though it was imposed upon
Taiwan by the KMT regime, will also
remain the constitution of the country
– after all, the constitution had subse-
quently been amended seven times over
the course of democratization. As such, the
DPP claims to be the defender of status quo. According to
DPP leaders such as Tsai and Lai, what is more important
now is to preserve Taiwan’s autonomy and safeguard its
democratic way of life.
©
Red-Hawk
/
Canva.com

8. 8 WHAT DOES A VOTE FOR THE TPP MEAN?
As for the position of the TPP: Its stance remains nebulous. In fact,
the most politically informed citizen might not be able to pinpoint
Ko’s position on this issue – or, for that matter, several other issues.
We know for certain that he is neither pro-unification nor pro-inde-
pendence – which is hardly surprising, given that is also both Lai’s
and Hou’s stance on the issue. However, Ko also has the tendency
to grossly misrepresent both the DPP’s and the KMT’s position. He
is particularly intent on asserting that the DPP is pro-independence
and, therefore, made up of intransigent ideologues that embody
what he refers to as “old politics.” Yet, Ko has occasionally also
claimed that the KMT is pro-unification. In a recent speech, for in-
stance, he reduced the debate between the two main parties to the
following false dichotomy: “At this stage, neither unification nor in-
dependence is possible. But the KMT and the DPP have squabbled
about this for thirty years”10
. According to Ko, these debates only
serve to create strife and discord.
Ko was supposedly the sole political leader that transcends these
divisions – a “rational” and “pragmatic” figure. Indeed, Ko has made
several statements that, presumably, are aimed at demonstrating
that he is rising above the fray. He is also banking on the fatigue of
certain voters on the issue of sovereignty. This fatigue also has its
historical roots. In the 1990s, the debate on whether Taiwan should
become independent had been highly emotive, primarily because
post-war Chinese immigrants were suspicious that they would be
excluded from the new nation envisioned by the DPP.11
To be sure,
Ko’s predominately young supporters may not be fully aware of this
historical context. However, history is what allows Ko to present this
issue as an old one for ideologues who only serve to stir up hatred.
Other telling examples of his position – to the extent that there
is one – include his response on whether he supports the 1992
Consensus and what underlies it: That Taiwan is part of China. He
remarked that it was not his responsibility to define these terms
and, if elected, he would then ask Beijing to clarify its definition12
– despite the fact that Beijing’s definitions have been quite clear
for decades. When asked how he himself understood the so-called
Consensus, he brushed the question aside by saying “I don’t know,
I must pretend I don’t.”13
On other occasions, he has also remarked
that Taiwan should not be a pawn between the US and China but
should become a bridge instead. Sceptics would, of course, point
to the obvious fact that China’s ambitions towards Taiwan are not
just a product of the US-China rivalry. Finally, speaking to the Brit-
ish newspaper The Telegraph, Ko said that his approach would be
to tell Beijing that Taiwan wants to preserve its way of life and of
building upon the two sides’ shared language and religions.14
The
bottom line is this: Since Ko has consistently refused to be drawn
on the subject, support for the TPP cannot be interpreted as an en-
dorsement of any particular approach.
What Does a Vote for the TPP Mean?
10
Chou, Husan-hui. 2023. “’Ask China What the Definition of the 1992 Consensus Is.’ Ko
says he ‘Doesn’t Know,’ ‘Must Pretend He Doesn’t’” Newtalk News. https://newtalk.tw/
news/view/2023-11-20/897389 [in Mandarin]
11
Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan. 2020. The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and
Identity in Modern Taiwan. Cambridge University Press
12
Ko Wen-je Vows to Question China‘s Definition of 1992 Consensus If Elected President
Central News Agency. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202306070400.aspx[in
Mandarin]
13
See Chou, loc. cit.
14
Smith, Nicola. 2023. “Taiwan’s presidential hopeful wants to restart dialogue with
China after seven years.” The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-
news/2023/11/17/taiwan-election-hopeful-restart-dialogue-china/

9. 9
Ko also has the tendency to
grosslymisrepresentboththe
DPP’sandtheKMT’sposition.
He is particularly intent on
asserting that the DPP is pro-
independence and, therefore,
made up of intransigent
ideologues that embody what
he refers to as “old politics.”
Yet, Ko has occasionally also
claimed that the KMT is pro-
unification.

10. 10
In essence, Taiwanese citizens overwhelmingly do not want
unification. The issue is not decisive because it has never
been divisive. Instead, it is the prospect of a forced unifica-
tion that actually affects elections. To understand how cross-
strait relations matter in any given election, we must first
understand the exact way in which voters perceive the unwel-
come prospect at the time: Is it likely? If so, what is required
to tackle it? This point would be evident if we compare how
cross-strait relations mattered in past elections.
To illustrate, consider the presidential elections of 1996, 2012,
and 2020. In 1996, the PRC conducted a series of missile
tests in the run-up to Taiwan’s first democratic presidential
election.15
Significantly, some of these missiles land-
ed dangerously close to two of Taiwan’s most
important ports. However, these intimidation
tactics backfired. Instead of successfully
blackmailing Taiwanese voters, Beijing’s
tactics allowed the incumbent, Lee Teng-
hui, to demonstrate that he was a calm
and competent commander-in-chief. In
short, during what was later called Third
Taiwan Strait Crisis, voters were looking
for the safe pair of hands most capable of
countering Chinese aggression.16
In contrast, in 2012, Ma Ing-jeou from the KMT
successfully ran for re-election by presenting him-
self as the one who could focus on fostering economic ties
with the PRC.17
A key reason this strategy worked was that
the PRC government and the KMT jointly convinced enough
voters that the threat of annexation was overblown and that
the focus should be on trade instead – despite the fact that
Beijing still did not renounce the use of force and still has
missiles pointed towards Taiwan. Ma assured the public that
political issues could be put on hold, that unification was not
in the cards. After all, Beijing saw Ma as someone it could
work with. It had, therefore, softened its tone and also offered
several trade “concessions” to Ma’s government. Besides,
China’s emergence as a global economic power seemed un-
stoppable at that time. With the benefit of hindsight, we now
know that China was already starting to transform itself into a
much more difficult business environment at that point. How-
ever, that was not obvious to most people at the time.
In 2020, a substantial proportion of voters was shocked by
how brutally the Hong Kong government suppressed the
pro-democracy Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Move-
ment. To be sure, most voters had never been interested in
Beijing’s offer of “One Country, Two Systems”. However, the
events highlighted what would be at stake if Taiwan lost its de
facto independence. Not before long, one particular slogan
gained traction amongst social media users: “Today’s Hong
Kong could be tomorrow’s Taiwan.” It was in this context that
many voters wanted a candidate who has the conviction and
courage to stand up to China and, thus, prevent Taiwan from
becoming the next Hong Kong. This was the main reason
why Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP eventually was re-elected by a
landslide, despite lagging behind in the polls at the outset of
the campaign.18
You could say that cross-strait relations matter
to presidential candidates the way mathemat-
ics matter to high school students: To suc-
ceed, one must take an exam on mathe-
matics. However, specific exam questions
can vary from year to year, with algebra
being crucial in one year, geometry the
next, and calculus in yet another. Like-
wise, cross-strait relations have always
mattered in Taiwan’s elections, but the
specific tests facing the candidates remain
unique to each race.
Moreover, the nature of these tests largely depends
on how the threat of forced unification from China looked
like: Faced with actual missiles in 1996, voters sought a com-
petent commander-in-chief. Believing that annexation was
unlikely and closer trading relations were desirable, the elec-
torate voted for someone who vowed to continue economic
integration in 2012. Reminded of the brutality of the PRC in
2020, a record-breaking majority of people cast their ballots
for the candidate whom they believed could best prevent Tai-
wan’s fall. In none of these elections were people voting on
the issue of unification per se. In each and every one of these
elections, cross-strait relations played a unique role.
The Changing Significance of Cross-
Strait Relations
15
“Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.” Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Taiwan_
Strait_Crisis
16
The Economist. 2020. “Even in death, Lee Teng-hui is helping shape Taiwan’s identity.”
The Economist. https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/08/05/even-in-death-lee-teng-
hui-is-helping-shape-taiwans-identity
17
Wu, Jieh-min and Mei Liao. 2015. “From unification-independence divide to the China
factor: How changing political identity influences voting behavior.” Taiwanese Sociology
29: 89-132. [in Mandarin]
18
Bernstein, Rachel. 2020. “The Impact of the Hong Kong Protests on the Election in
Taiwan.” The National Bureau of Asian Research. https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-
impact-of-the-hong-kong-protests-on-the-election-in-taiwan/
THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

11. 11
19
Lai, Ching-te. 2023. “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait.” The Wall Street
Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-
taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00
20
Garci, Carlos., Berrazeg, Walid., Wu, Sarah. 2023. “Taiwan reveals first domestically made
submarine in defence milestone.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/
taiwan-reveals-first-homegrown-submarine-defence-milestone-2023-09-28
21
Chen, Yun and Jason Pan. 2023. “DPP accuses Ma Wen-chun, KMT of treason.” Taipei
Times. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/10/19/2003807913
22
Lin, Sean. 2023. “TPP‘s Ko kicks off presidential run, says will extend goodwill to China.”
Focus Taiwan. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202305200006
23
Chiang, Chin-yeh and Bernadette Hsiao. 2023. “Under 10% of Taiwanese see China as
trustworthy: Survey.” Focus Taiwan. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202311210009
24
Chang, Wen-hsin. 2023. “Hou mentioned the keywords both the US and China wanted to
hear.” United Daily News. https://udn.com/vote2024/story/123307/7451272?from=udn-
cardnews [in Mandarin]
So what is the current incarnation? Well, many voters are now
wary about actually fighting a war. This is not surprising, given
how Beijing has behaved in 2023: It has conducted several
large-scale live-fire drills, deployed its aircraft carrier, flew as
many as 103 warplanes towards Taiwan in one day, and even
simulated a blockade of the island democracy.
As a result, each candidate and main party in this election is
striving to present themselves as the one most capable of
preventing a war. The main dividing line, in policy terms, is
how the different candidates propose to attain that goal. Lai
of the governing DPP argues that deterrence is the best way
forward. He maintains that the best way to prevent war from
happening is to increase the price China would have to pay
should Beijing choose to invade. Thus, he runs on a platform
that calls for further investment in defense, as well as foster-
ing partnerships with the US and other democracies.19
In this
context, Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) pro-
gram – implemented with the full support of President Tsai –
is now a major talking point, as DPP politicians use it to sym-
bolize their commitment and their accomplishment.20
They
have also pointed to KMT legislators who have threatened to
freeze several elements of the budget for the program. They
sought to portray those opposition politicians as untrustwor-
thy on matters pertaining to national security. Moreover, the
fact that one KMT legislator has been accused of divulging
state secrets pertaining to this program had also emerged as
a particularly important issue.21
In contrast, both Hou and Ko prefer to emphasize how they
would work to resume talks with the PRC. On paper, they both
also support the notion of deterrence; however, on the cam-
paign trail, both tend to downplay the issue of military pre-
paredness. According to them, the DPP’s constant emphasis
on the need to counter the PRC is actually provocative and
would, consequently, render Taiwan less safe.22
It should be
noted that no serious politician in Taiwan is against engag-
ing with China. However, two problems remain contentious.
First, sceptics often question whether Beijing will honor its
promises, especially given the historical precedence of both
Hong Kong and Tibet. This could be a tough sell, as a recent
survey shows that only 9.3% of the general public find the PRC
“credible”23
. Second, as discussed above, there are also con-
cerns about the preconditions under which engagement can
happen. It was in this context that the DC correspondent of
the staunchly pro-KMT United Daily News subtly but acutely
remarked, “how dialogues and engagements with Beijing may
be resumed is the ‘hole card’ Hou has yet to reveal– and this
is also what the US and the PRC are most eager to know.”24
On
this issue, details remain scarce.
As election day draws near, we can expect the candidates to
double down on these strategies. Lai is likely to press Hou and
Ko for concrete proposals and, crucially, to ask whether they
would accept Beijing’s preconditions. For their part, Hou and
Ko would probably stay the course and continue to brand the
DPP as dangerous provocateurs or uninspired ideologues –
possibly both.
Either way, this election is being fought on a terrain that is
drastically different from that of 2012. Voters have become
much more worried about the prospect of war and are no
longer so rosy-eyed about trading with China. The KMT can no
longer win by claiming that increasing trade with China would
bring prosperity. It can only win by persuading voters that its
position – one that includes accepting the controversial 1992
Consensus – would make a war of forced unification less, not
more, likely. Sure, Ma Ying-jeou can smirk all he wants, but on
cross-strait relations, the center of gravity has actually shifted
further away from him. He was the future once, but a resur-
rection of his approach towards China remains unlikely. One
could bet that, prior to his fall from grace a decade ago, he had
also never thought a day like this would come.
Conclusion: He Was the Future Once
CONCLUSION: HE WAS THE FUTURE ONCE

12. 12
Da-Wun Sie is a freelance journalist. He is also a PhD candidate in sociol-
ogy at National Taiwan University. His works cover a wide range of topics
including politics (mainly Taiwanese and British), culture, history, technology,
gender, films, etc. The articles he has published range from features and
interviews to news analyses and commentaries. Data journalism is also one
of his specialties. Click here to see full list of his published articles. You can
contact him at dawunsie@gmail.com
About the Authors
Yu-Fen Lai is the Program Officer of Digital Transformation at Friedrich
Naumann Foundation Global Innovation Hub. Before joining FNF, Yu-Fen Lai
worked as a research and communication consultant at Freedom House.
She also completed her internship at the Mercator Institute for China Stud-
ies (MERICS). Her research focuses on Taiwan, Hong Kong, and cross-strait
relations. Yu-Fen Lai holds a MA degree from the Free University of Berlin
and a BA degree from National Tsing Hua University, both in Sociology.
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