This document discusses the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) in addressing current and future national security threats. It argues that while all intelligence methods have value, HUMINT is uniquely equipped to reveal adversaries' intentions and plans. The document cites examples from the Cold War and War on Terror to show how HUMINT has provided critical information to policymakers. It recommends making HUMINT a central focus of intelligence gathering efforts to confront threats like terrorism and a potential nuclear Iran. However, it acknowledges all intelligence methods should be utilized together to develop a complete picture.

1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Certain events in US history seldom come along that have such
an impact that they fundamentally change the way society
functions. If the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could be
counted as one such event, it launching the US into WWII circa
1941-1945, then the attacks of 9/11 would also fit this criterion,
it ushering in the US-led, Global War on Terror. A difference
between the two, however, and subsequently a characterization
of the latter that makes it arguably even more impactful, is the
fact it has been going on for more than 13 years. And while
some would like the world to believe that the US has turned that
‘terrorist’ page in its history, highlighted by the successful
assassination of Osama Bin Laden, it is becoming all too clear
that the US, and the world, are smackdab in the middle of the
story, with no clear conclusion in sight. The truth has
unwelcomingly shone through with a clear consensus that “…Al
Qaeda [is] stronger than ever.” 1 Adding to the terrorism
problem is the emergence of another, more extreme group
known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Despite
ISIS’s extra-ordinary level of cruelty, its ideology has still
managed to resonate with many around the world, evidenced by
its increasing membership; it having garnered an estimated
“20,000” new recruits from “90 different countries.” 2 Finally,
while on the topic of past and recent, history-shaping events, it
is the goal of the US and its Intelligence Community (IC) to
prevent such events from happening in the future. One possible
scenario that is becoming easier to visualize and closer to
actualization, is Iran’s attainment and subsequent use of nuclear
weapons. On the topic of a nuclear Iran, legal expert and
Harvard Law School Professor, Alan Dershowitz, has said,
“ISIS is nothing compared to [Iran]…[it] is a passing blip…If
[Iran] become[s] a nuclear weapons power, they will become the
most dangerous country in the world today.” 3 What, then, is to
be done? In the face of the growing and current threat of

2. terrorism, to the possible, future threat of a nuclear-armed Iran,
what can be done? Is there a strategy that the IC can implement
to eliminate and prevent these threats? The answers to these
questions can be found by looking to an intelligence gathering
discipline that is nearly as old as mankind itself, and one in
which history provides
1 Ali Soufan, “The Sad Legacy of 9/11: ISIS and Al Qaeda are
Stronger than Ever,” The Guardian, 2014, accessed March 1,
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/11/-
sp-9-11-isis-al-qaida-13-years
2 Joshua Berlinger, “The Names: Who has been recruited to
ISIS from the West,” CNN, 2015, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/world/isis-western-recruits/
3 Courtney Coren, “Alan Dershowitz: ISIS is a ‘Passing Blip’
Compared to Iran,” News Max, 2015, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/Alan-Dershowitz-Iran-
ISIS/2015/02/26/id/627101/
ample examples of its effectiveness; that intelligence discipline
being human intelligence (HUMINT). It is thus recommended,
that in order to gain the advantage and eventually win the war
on terror, as well as unveil the true intentions of Iran and its
nuclear program, that the US and its IC must make HUMINT
central to its intelligence gathering efforts.
From the Cold War to the Global War on Terror,
HUMINT has quietly proven its worth time and time again.
Even in the midst of the technological boom the world has been
experiencing these last 20 years, experts continue see the
unique value that only HUMINT can provide to the intelligence
picture. This is not to say that all intelligence resources should
completely shift to gathering and analyzing HUMINT, but
rather the focal point of intelligence gathering should be
focused on uncovering and unveiling the thoughts, goals,
aspirations, intentions and minds of US enemies, something
only HUMINT can produce. In the case of the terror groups Al

3. Qaeda and ISIS, HUMINT will yield details regarding future,
operational intent and targets in and outside of the US. In the
case of Iran, only Israel seems to be unanimous in its belief that
Iran wants to produce nuclear weapons, while in the case of
other members of the international community, it is still a
matter of debate. HUMINT against Iran will confirm or deny
these accusations made by Israel and others, as well as provide
US policy makers with the intelligence needed to take
preventative action; action to prevent production of nukes,
and/or action to prevent their usage.
HUMINT, OTHER ‘INTs’, & THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE
Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, is the collection and analysis
of information from human sources. This includes, but is not
limited to, information gathered from espionage, witness
statements and interrogations. And while all intelligence
gathering disciplines have the capability, to some degree or
another, of revealing enemy intentions, it is HUMINT that is
most suitably equipped to reveal these things. Imagery
intelligence (IMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), on the other
hand, do not typically involve getting information directly from
a human source, i.e. the president of a country, the leader of a
terror group, etc. In the case of signals intelligence (SIGINT),
and especially its sub-category, communications intelligence
(COMINT) there can be a lingering degree of skepticism that
the information being retrieved is not accurate. Take, for
example, the scenario of a tapped phone conversation where one
or both parties may be fully aware that their conversation is
being recorded, so they start saying things to purposely mislead
intelligence personnel. In the same type of scenario, the tap may
be good; the individuals may be oblivious to it, but they may
also be oblivious to just about everything else. As one observer
put it, “Electronic intercepts are great, but you don’t know if
you’ve got two idiots talking on the phone…” 4 In times past,
most notably during the Cold War, these technologically-based

4. platforms were typically enough to get the job done “because
[the US] already knew the adversary’s intent…[but] in today’s
environment, these capabilities are no longer sufficient.” 5
Gathering intelligence is much like creating a painting where
the goal is to provide policy makers and other US officials with
as much detail, color and depth as possible. Where non-
HUMINT intelligence commonly provides an outline of the
painting by providing data and statistics, it is HUMINT that
provides the color, detail and the small nuances that can make
all the difference between a generic painting and a masterpiece.
In other words, HUMINT makes the painting move; it brings it
to life. In its purest form, HUMINT acts as a psychologist,
revealing the adversary’s heart and mind; revealing plans and
intentions that would otherwise go unnoticed. Such information
is crucial to winning a war against an enemy whose motives and
ideology are largely foreign to the masses. As Secretary of
State, John Kerry, recently stated, “You cannot defeat what you
don’t understand.” 6
HUMINT: PROVING ITS WORTH OVER TIME In spite of the
US’s justified reliance on IMINT and SIGINT during the Cold
War, the climax of the war, The Cuban Missile Crisis, and its
resolution was dependent upon information provided by an
insider; a HUMINT source. Many believe, and they are partially
correct in their belief, that it was simply a U-2
4 Matthew M. Aid & Cees Wiebes, “The Importance of Signals
Intelligence in the Cold War,” APUS, accessed February 27,
2015, https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-
global-studies-
common/INTL%20421/CONTENT/Week%202/Wiebes%20Intro
dcution%20The%20Importance%20of%20Signals
%20Intelligence%20in%20the%20Cold%20War.pdf
5 Luc Pigeon, Clark Beamish, and Michel Zybala, “HUMINT
communication information systems for complex warfare,”
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 2002, accessed

5. February 27, 2015,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=HUMINT+communic
ation+information+systems+for+complex+warfare
&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-
bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA467646&ei=usLwVJDVLcb
9yQTKi4KIBw&usg=AFQjCNFdMVLbHBBScA
tUjVWuF2AcjZiruw&bvm=bv.87269000,d.aWw&cad=rja
6 Patrick Goodenough, “Kerry: You Have to Understand
Terrorists to Defeat Them,” CNSNews, 2015, accessed February
27, 2015, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-
goodenough/kerry-you-have-understand- terrorists-defeat-them
reconnaissance plane that just so happened to be in the right
place at the right time when it captured photographic evidence
of Soviet nukes in Cuba. This is not the complete story,
however, as the U-2 was specifically directed on where to go
and what to look for thanks to the detailed information provided
by GRU Colonel, Oleg Penkovsky: “Penkovsky’s debriefing
sessions produced about 1,200 pages of transcripts,…[were]
immensely valuable,…[and] allowed [President] Kennedy to
pursue a diplomatic option…Penkovsky and HUMINT had
averted a disaster and saved the world from nuclear
destruction.” 7 Thanks to this HUMINT source, clearer heads
prevailed, and as a result, it was not the “last Saturday [Mr.
McNamara] would ever see,” 8 nor, thankfully, anyone else’s.
Another example of HUMINT’s worth is found
by looking at the events that led to the successful assassination
of Osama Bin Laden. The hunt for the most wanted man in the
world lasted over ten years. In spite the US’s technological
tools i.e. satellite imagery, UAV reconnaissance,
communications intercepts, electronic intercepts, etc., Bin
Laden was able to avoid capture by staying relatively low-tech,
and by using simple encryption devices to throw off US
intelligence services. The IC, realizing its difficulties in

6. tracking Bin Laden down, knew it had to shift its intelligence-
gathering focus. This shift eventually led to the capture and
interrogation of the supposed mastermind behind the 9/11
attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. With the aid of enhanced
interrogation techniques, Khalid eventually provided the CIA
with names of others who were involved, and also information
regarding Bin Laden’s personal courier. The information gained
from Khalid, along with the information gained from those he
named provided the IC with a target (the courier) to focus their
efforts on. The result, of course, was the US sending in Navy
Seals to finish the job, but initially, it was the information
received from these human sources that gave the manhunt a
guiding compass to follow.
STRAYING FROM HUMINT & THE NEED FOR ITS RETURN
Too often it seems that the IC tends to lose sight of the vital
role that HUMINT plays. This problem is likely caused by the
constant technological developments made in human society
which naturally bleed over to advancements in the
intelligence/military world. So much has technology
7 Rich Disabatino, “Interview: Rich Disabatino, PBS, 2001,
accessed December 27, 2014,
“http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/terrorism/inter
views/disabatino.html
8 “Cuban Missile Crisis,” History Channel, accessed August 29,
2014, http://www.history.com/topics/cold- war/cuban-missile-
crisis
imbedded itself into everyday life that it would be neigh
impossible for the average person to function without the
internet, social media, cell phones, GPS navigation and so on. It
is not just the IC, military or the average citizen who has
become heavily reliant on technology, but terror groups as well.
In fact, according to lecturer Clive Best, a group like Al Qaeda

7. could not even function today without the internet. 9
Due to this situation, it is the best interest of the IC to
constantly improve its technological capabilities, but at what
cost? Certainly not at the cost of sacrificing the quality and
quantity of HUMINT, for “some of the worst intelligence
failures…can be attributed to an absence of human
intelligence,” 10 including the attacks of 9/11. In an interview,
it was asked of Rich Disabatino, Director of Intelligence
Support Group, Ltd., to give his thoughts on the topic. He said:
“At one point in time, we thought that electronic intelligence
was going to replace human intelligence. I think we're seeing
right now that you can never replace human intelligence.
Electronic intelligence will only augment it.” 11 Others have
made similar statements as to the importance of HUMINT with
the following quote specifically geared towards the recently
emerged threat of ISIS: “the…art of collecting human source
intelligence has in large part become lost thanks
to…intelligence technology…This lack of HUMINT might have
something to do with the lack of warning about ISIS’s summer
blitz through Iraq and Syria.” 12 Lastly, from an official report
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority
Leader, it was concluded that the “CIA did not sufficiently
penetrate the al-Qa’ida organization before September 11th .”
13 This issue needs to be addressed in the cases of Al Qaeda,
ISIS and Iran. The IC cannot afford to make the same type of
mistakes as it has in the past, especially in determining Iran’s
true nuclear intentions, for nuclear war is a possible price of
failure.
9 Clive Best, “Open Source Intelligence,” Video Lectures, 2007,
accessed February 23, 2015,
http://videolectures.net/mmdss07_best_osi/
10 Gabriel Margolis, “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring
Intelligence Problem,” Global Security Studies, 2013, accessed
February 27, 2015,
http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20%

8. 28ag%20edits%29.pdf
11 Rich Disabatino, “Interview: Rich Disabatino, PBS, 2001,
accessed December 27, 2014,
“http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/terrorism/inter
views/disabatino.html
12 Robert Caruso, “Here’s How the US Can Build the
Intelligence Capabilities Needed to Defeat ISIS,” Business
Insider, 2014, accessed February 27, 2015,
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-needs-better-humint-to-
beat-isis-2014-9
13 “Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance
Prior to 9-11,” Federation of American Scientists, 2002,
accessed February 27, 2015,
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html,ac
cessed4Aug.2008.
ALL INTs WORKING TOGETHER – HUMINT AS THE
FOCAL POINT
It is clear that there is a special level of attention
that needs to be given to HUMINT in order to have a successful
strategy to face current and future threats. With that said,
however, it should also be made clear that all intelligence
gathering disciplines are needed to create a complete
intelligence picture. Looking back at the two examples above
that highlighted the track record of HUMINT’s worth, a closer
inspection of those events show that there is a little more to
their stories. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, U-2
reconnaissance missions to capture photographs of soviet
missiles in Cuba were underway well before Oleg Penkovsky
dropped the ‘a-bomb of information,’ so to speak. Likewise,
after Penkovsky informed the CIA and Britain’s MI6 of the
nukes in Cuba, confirmation of Penkovsky’s claims were needed
since he was, after all, a Colonel in Russia’s GRU; not one that
exactly comes from a trustworthy background. This
confirmation was in fact provided by more U-2 reconnaissance
photos, or IMINT.

9. In the case of the hunt for Osama Bin Laden, the
information extracted from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the
other interrogated suspects were undoubtedly critical in finding
the target. Their information, however, was only a portion of
the ingredients that made for the overall success of the mission.
Once CIA personnel operating in Pakistan identified the courier
as Sheikh Abu Ahmed, much of the work was then passed to the
NSA and its COMINT team to “[intercept] telephone calls and
emails between [Ahmed’s] family and anyone inside Pakistan.”
14 The combined efforts of COMINT and HUMINT did not end
there as a monitored satellite phone call would prove to lead the
CIA to the doorstep of Bin Laden’s 3-story hideout. From there,
GEOINT and IMINT played their respective roles as advanced
satellite imagery took “high-res and infrared images of the
compound” in order to map its layout. With the blueprints in
hand, the CIA had a replica of the compound built in North
Carolina and which would be used as a training ground for the
Navy Seals. So accurate was the GEOINT and IMINT-produced
layout, that the Seals were told what floor of the structure they
would likely find Bin Laden on. 15
14 “Timeline: The Intelligence Hunt Leading to Bin Laden,”
BBC, 2011, accessed February 27, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13279283
15 Emily Smith, “How did the CIA Find Bin Laded?...” The
Blaze, 2011, accessed February 27, 2015,
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/05/02/how-did-the-cia-
find-bin-laden-a-phone-call-a-courier-and-years-of- detective-
work/
Thus in both examples it is seen that relying
wholly on one intelligence gathering discipline would largely be
unproductive, but when a combination is used, it is a completely
different story with the results often changing the course of a
conflict or war. What is also evident is HUMINT’s key role,
having played the ‘initiator’ in both scenarios in the sense that

10. HUMINT got the ball rolling; it provided direction and clarity
where before there was little or none whatsoever. It is for these
reasons why it has been said that “…correlating HUMINT data
with that of signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial
intelligence (GEOINT) and measurement and signatures
intelligence (MASINT)…is a key criterion for generating the
right knowledge.” 16
HUMINT NEEDED AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ISIS
“To win this war on terrorism and to find
people, HUMINT is first among equals.” 17 Why, then, has
there been such a reluctance to employ espionage tactics against
the threat of terrorism? As it turns out, there are, indeed, valid
reasons; one being that espionage is extremely risky, where the
result of being caught usually means death. Between the US and
its allies during the Cold War, for example, thousands of agents
were lost to the Soviets and N. Korea. 18 While it is safe to
assume that Soviet Russia was not kind to American spies, it is
not hard to imagine an outcome that is even more brutal if Al
Qaeda or ISIS captured a US spy hiding within its ranks.
What adds to this danger is the fact that there
is the matter of a complete social, cultural, religious, linguistic
and racial disparity between people from the Middle East,
including Muslim extremists, and people from the US, including
HUMINT intelligence operators. This is not to say that it is
impossible for a CIA operator to penetrate a terrorist cell, but
that it would be extremely difficult, and may not be worth the
risk if there are other viable options.
16 Robert Ackerman, “Defense HUMINT Needs Technology,
Too,” AFCEA, 2006, accessed February 27, 2015,
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1202
17 Ibid
18 Matthew M. Aid & Cees Wiebes, “The Importance of Signals
Intelligence in the Cold War,” APUS, accessed February 24,
2015, https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-

11. global-studies-
common/INTL%20421/CONTENT/Week%202/Wiebes%20Intro
dcution%20The%20Importance%20of%20Signals
%20Intelligence%20in%20the%20Cold%20War.pdf
One of these ‘other’ options, is working
directly with allied nations, for “inter-operability with…allied
HUMINT organizations is fundamental to effective HUMINT
operations.” 19 Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of
the US to work with allied nations located in the Middle East;
with a people and in a place where this extreme disparity does
not exist.
Nations such as Jordan and Lebanon each
have their own intelligence agencies, agencies that are manned
by natives of the country and region. These individuals know
the religion, culture, history and all other social aspects that the
terrorists are familiar with, having grown up there as well.
Professor Walid Phares, who was born in Lebanon, expounds on
this idea, and also why he feels he is personally able to
understand the mindset of these terrorists:
It was not difficult for me to read the mind of the
leader of al Qaeda. I had read the same history books he read.
We have looked at the same pictures, heard the same legends
over and over. I listened to the same type of Friday preaching
(khutba), read the same Qu’ran and Hadith, and devoured the
same Salafi accounts that he did; so did millions of others
around the Middle East. 20
This coordination with friendly nations, along
with the familiarity these nations have with Al Qaeda and ISIS
members are the keys to penetrating terrorist cells. The result
will be the attainment of vital HUMINT regarding the intentions
and plans of Al Qaeda and ISIS leaders. In the case of Jordan,
there is much at stake as it “is the next major target for [the
Islamic State], and [Jordanian] King Abdullah knows it.” 21 On
a positive note, “[Jordan’s] intel is very good on some

12. things…and they work…Humint hard. They likely have al
Qaeda penetrated at some level.” 22 The US
19 Luc Pigeon, Clark Beamish, and Michel Zybala, “HUMINT
communication information systems for complex warfare,”
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 2002, accessed
February 27, 2015,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=HUMINT+communic
ation+information+systems+for+complex+warfare
&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-
bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA467646&ei=usLwVJDVLcb
9yQTKi4KIBw&usg=AFQjCNFdMVLbHBBScA
tUjVWuF2AcjZiruw&bvm=bv.87269000,d.aWw&cad=rja
20 Walid Phares, “Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against
America,” APUS, 2005, accessed February 28, 2015,
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/apus/reader.action?docID=10135448
21 Rowan Scarborough, “NSA intercepts key to locating…”
Washington Times, 2014, accessed February 28, 2015,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/23/nsa-scores-
victory-in-foiling-khorasan-groups-us- t/?page=all
22 Ibid
needs to reach out to Jordan, a long standing US-ally, and begin
a bilateral, HUMINT intelligence effort to gain the intelligence
Jordan has and continues to obtain. Once the US becomes privy
to the existing Jordanian intelligence on the terrorist groups, the
US can begin augmenting Jordan’s HUMINT effort with funds,
equipment, and the backing of the CIA and NSA which includes
GEOINT, MASINT, IMINT, and SIGINT capabilities.
Another opportunity for HUMINT arises from
the relationship between Lebanon and the Shi’ite, terrorist
community, Hezbollah. Hezbollah primarily resides in Lebanon
and even holds seats in Lebanon’s Parliament. 23 Currently, the
US has a good standing relationship with Lebanon as it acts as a

13. huge financial support of Lebanon’s. On the other hand,
however, the US has officially categorized Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization. Hezbollah’s feelings towards the US are
largely mutual as Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, recently
suggested that the CIA is a direct supporter of ISIS. 24 The
glimmer of hope for coordination arises from other comments
made by Nasrallah, namely that he has “call[ed] on the people
and governments of the region in order to work together to
confront the [infidel/ISIS] threat.” 25 Adding to this hope is the
fact that ISIS has recently declared war on Lebanon,
Hezbollah’s resident state. Taking all these factors into
consideration, Hezbollah may see the benefits of working with
the US, especially if Lebanon used some of its political leverage
to persuade Hezbollah to move towards the US’s direction.
There are a few primary reasons as to why
such a complex and comprehensive effort should be made to
create an alliance with Hezbollah, even if it is a temporary one.
For one, Hezbollah is “probably the world’s largest, most
sophisticated, wealthiest and most militarily capable terror
organization” in the world. 26 Along these lines, it also has
formidable HUMINT capabilities, so much so, that as recently
as 2006, it successfully infiltrated the state of Israel,
“manag[ing] to recruit valuable information” which led to
23 Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah,” Council
on Foreign Relations, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-
hizbullah/p9155
24 Edwin Mora, “Hezbollah Chief…,” Breitbart, 2015, accessed
February 28, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/national-
security/2015/02/17/hezbollah-chief-urges-middle-east-unity-in-
anti-isis-fight- accuses-cia-and-israels-mossad-of-backing-isis/
25 Ibid
26 Shai Oseran, and Stephane Cohen, “Don’t be fooled.
Hezbollah is bigger and badder than ever,” The Tower, 2014,

14. accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.thetower.org/article/dont-
be-fooled-hezbollah-is-bigger-and- badder-than-ever/
successful attacks against Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 27
Potentially having HUMINT assets inside Al Qaeda and ISIS
that already have extremist Islamic/terrorist roots could be
extremely beneficial, and likely lead to bigger intelligence
opportunities. Their familiarity with terrorist operations could,
in the long run, lead to promotions, quickly moving up the
ranks, and even leading missions. This would undoubtedly lead
to them attending meetings with Al Qaeda/ISIS leaders and, in
turn, being privy to information regarding major operations. As
much of a long shot as an alliance with Hezbollah may be, a
genuine effort needs to be made, for the potential information
that could be obtained would possibly have as great of effect as
Penkovsky’s submissions to the CIA had in his day.
Another suggestion on how to gather HUMINT
on these Middle Eastern terrorists would be to look south –
south to the notoriously insecure US-Mexico border, and the
Central/South American nations that fall below it. It is well
known that Al Qaeda and ISIS have turned to the drug trade as a
method to fund their operations, and because of the countries
they are in, business with natives naturally and commonly
occur. Drug deals around the US-Mexico border is where the
focus should be, as there is a higher potential for the buyers to
be American. Herein lies opportunities: looking to Bosnia as an
example, it was shown that “[Bosnian] intelligence services
entities…involve[ed] themselves in crime as a profitable
sideline.” 28 It is probably unrealistic expect the CIA to get
involved in organized crime, especially as a ‘profitable
sideline,’ but it would not be unrealistic for it to place an
insider in a criminal organization, or insiders in multiple
organizations that do business with Al Qaeda and/or ISIS drug
cartels. These HUMINT assets will likely have the opportunity
to place tracers and/or listening devices on the terrorists or their

15. vehicles. These devices will lead the CIA to their bases of
operations where communications regarding future operations
between them and their leadership in the Middle East will likely
happen. SIGINT/COMINT equipment can be used to trace phone
calls and intercept email traffic, all the while revealing names,
dates, locations and other pertinent information. Though in the
end this
27 David Eshel, “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War,” Defense
Update, 2007, accessed March 1, 2015, http://defense-
update.com/analysis/lebanon_war_1.htm
28 Luc Pigeon, Clark Beamish, and Michel Zybala, “HUMINT
communication information systems for complex warfare,”
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 2002, accessed
February 27, 2015,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=HUMINT+communic
ation+information+systems+for+complex+warfare
&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-
bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA467646&ei=usLwVJDVLcb
9yQTKi4KIBw&usg=AFQjCNFdMVLbHBBScA
tUjVWuF2AcjZiruw&bvm=bv.87269000,d.aWw&cad=rja
would end up primarily as a SIGINT operation, the original key
to success would be due to HUMINT efforts.
The final suggestion for HUMINT operations
against Al Qaeda and ISIS would also be based in the Central
and South American regions. Not only do these terror groups
have their own drug cartels, but they also attempt to recruit
like-minded and impressionable individuals in these areas.
Often enough, however, some of these recruits do not share the
same level of enthusiasm or commitment. In other words, one
could ‘count them out’ for going on ‘one-way-ticket’ missions.
It is these individuals that the US can target for recruitment, for
many of them may be involved just for the money they make
from assisting in drug deals. As such, the US can financially

16. reward and bribe these individuals for information: locations of
terrorist camps, bases of operation, names, email addresses,
phone numbers, etc. These contacts can be made through similar
means as described above i.e. tracers, listening devices, bugs.
The information gained from these HUMINT
contacts, as well as from the communications between terrorist
drug dealers and their leadership in the Middle East will garner
invaluable intelligence. Such intelligence should be of
particular value considering the many security issues that
plague the US- Mexico border. In other words, the US-Mexico
border is as good a place as any for a terrorist attack to occur,
and therefore one that should be guarded with the utmost effort.
HUMINT NEEDED AGAINST IRAN
For decades, Iran has had its heart set on
establishing a fully operational nuclear program. It has
repeatedly stated that its desire for having such is strictly for
peaceful, economic purposes. It is the justified suspicion of
many, however, that a nuclear-powered Iran would by
synonymous as a nuclear- armed Iran. Iran does not help its
case, either, as its leaders have frequently made threats against
US ally, Israel. It is because of these threats, at least in part,
that the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been
the most vocal opponent of a nuclear Iran. In fact, he has
recently said that “a nuclear threshold [Iran]…is a threat to the
entire world…and it is much worse than the threat of Islamic
State.” 29 Another matter that fuels suspicions regarding Iran’s
true intentions is the fact that it has illegally built nuclear
reactors in the past. At least one of these facilities was believed
to be a nuclear reactor specifically designed to construct nuclear
weapons, so much so that Israel sent in jet fighters, destroying
the facility in 2007. 30
If the threats against Israel and the illegal
building of nuclear facilities was not enough, Iran also has

17. significant ties to the terror groups Hezbollah and Hamas. One
particular point of concern here is that it is common knowledge
that state actors, such as Iran, use non-state actors, like
Hezbollah and Hamas, to push their political and militaristic
agendas against their enemies. In this case, it is quite possible
that Iran may be reluctant to deploy a nuclear weapon against
Israel in fear of a nuclear- retaliation from Israel, or even the
US. This being the case, Iran could manufacture a nuclear
device and secretly hand it over to Hamas or Hezbollah, and
allowing one of them to use it on Israel.
Despite all of these indicators – indicators that
point to Iran’s nuclear intentions being hostile in nature – many
in and out of the US do not see any real danger in granting
Iran’s wish for a fully operational nuclear program. Thus,
official negotiations have begun and progressed, as of late, in
which the US, Iran and other nations around the world have
come together to see if an agreement can be made to allow Iran
to proceed with its desired nuclear program. The conflict is
clear, and so, too, is the path to resolve it. Unveiling and
verifying Iran’s true nuclear intentions is the only way to truly
settle this issue, and it must be settled; the stakes are too high
to let this situation ‘play out’ without intervention. And though
intelligence on and against Iran has improved lately, “there are
still…critical gaps in what [the US] know[s] about what is
going on inside the country, especially in the realm of the CIA’s
HUMINT operations in Iran.” 31
When a nation knows it is the primary target
of a sworn enemy, it is going to fight back more vigorously than
any secondary target. Seeing the example of this in Jordan’s
response to ISIS, namely
29 Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu warns world powers: A nuclear
threshold Iran is a bigger threat than ISIS,” Jerusalem Post,
2014, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-
News/Netanyahu-warns-world-powers- A-nuclear-threshold-

18. Iran-is-a-bigger-threat-than-ISIS-379211
30 Noah Klieger, “A Strike in the Desert,” YNet News, 2012,
accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3799227,00.html
31 Matthew Aid, “Spying on Iran,” MatthewAid.com, 2012,
accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.matthewaid.com/post/20716455365/spying-on-iran
its aggressive HUMINT campaign against the terrorists, the US
can fully anticipate Israel having the same level of fervor in its
espionage campaign against Iran. The information and
intelligence gained by Israel’s Mossad agents needs to be shared
with US officials to fill-in these ‘critical gaps.’ In return, the
US IC needs to fully support Israeli-HUMINT operations
against Iran as if the operations were their own. This includes
any cyber-espionage support, such as a Flame-style virus which
has been useful against Iran’s nuclear facilities in the past, 32
nuclear-MASINT support to read and monitor any significant
changes or abnormalities emanating from existing Iranian
nuclear facilities, and any other technologically-based
intelligence platform that can augment, support and help verify
the intelligence garnered from Israeli, HUMINT sources. The
information the Mossad will uncover, and subsequently shared
with the US, will likely play a key role in the determining the
outcome of current nuclear negotiations had between the US and
Iran. In other words, if Israeli intelligence uncovers that Iran is,
indeed, attempting to make a nuclear bomb, then negotiations
would be terminated, drastically reducing the fear of a nuclear
equipped Iran and a possible nuclear war.
Another way HUMINT can be collected on Iran
is by looking to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The IAEA is an agency that acts as the world’s nuclear
police, in a sense, in that it monitors nuclear usage, verifies that
nuclear power is being used for peaceful purposes, and develops
standards that all nations using nuclear power must abide by.

19. The IAEA is intimately involved in the Iranian situation, often
having personnel in Iran to inspect its nuclear facilities. Having
a CIA officer, who is studied in uranium enrichment and nuclear
weapons production, covertly be a part of the IAEA team tasked
to inspect Iran would essentially put the US inside Iran’s
nuclear facilities that are commonly in question. This would
give intelligence analysts the type of firsthand data and
information that viruses and monitoring devices simply cannot
supply, and hopefully help form some indication as to the true
intentions surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. If there are
strong suspicions and indicators that Iran may be producing
nuclear weapons, additional HUMINT may be necessary for
verification. This can be done by the CIA’s, IAEA insider by
providing names, addresses and places frequently visited by the
lead scientists working in these facilities.
32 “Flame Virus Explained: how it works and who’s behind it,”
Russia Today, 2012, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://rt.com/news/flame-virus-cyber-war-536/
These bits of information will be used in the
overarching effort to set up a time and place where one of these
Iranian scientists can be securely kidnapped and interrogated
for information regarding possible nuclear weapons production.
A near identical operation was conducted by
the CIA in 2009 when “Shahram Amiri, [an] Iranian nuclear
scientist…was kidnapped by secret agents” in Saudi Arabia. 33
Keeping in step with the 2009 kidnapping, CIA operatives will
look for every effort to initiate this kidnapping outside of Iran
and in a friendly nation to reduce any unnecessary risk. Also,
the CIA team involved must utilize extreme caution in
protecting their identities and national origins. This is so
because the Iranian scientist, upon his eventual return to Iran,
will undoubtedly be debriefed. As such, the CIA will only want
its name mentioned as ‘suspected’ kidnappers, nothing more.
Additionally, this will give the US plausible deniability when

20. Iran starts to point fingers, allowing future negotiations to still
take place. In other words, the last thing the US wants is for
Iran to know the CIA was directly involved, giving Iran an
excuse to retreat into the shadows, and thereby cutting off all
communicative efforts with the US, leaving the US with even
more ‘critical gaps’ than before.
CONCLUSION
The threats and attacks faced today from ISIS and Al
Qaeda are growing in number, in frequency and in their level of
barbarity. Additionally, if what is said by Prime Minister
Netanyahu and Professor Alan Dershowitz is true, namely that
the threats posed by ISIS and Al Qaeda pale in comparison to
the threat of a nuclear Iran, then there is no time to delay.
Increased HUMINT operations against these threats need to
commence and not cease until the world is secure.
Foundationally speaking, these present and future
threats are not new, for similar enemies were faced during
WWII with Nazi Germany, and through the Cold War where the
world looked down the barrel of nuclear war with Soviet Russia.
And similar to the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was
defused by the words of a Soviet Colonel, so too can the threat
of terrorism and threat of Iranian nukes be defused by human
intelligence. Time and time again, HUMINT has stood the test
of time as a unique and
33 Richard Spencer, “Iranian Nuclear Scientist Recounts CIA
Abduction,” The Telegraph, 2010, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/78
90697/Iranian-nuclear-scientist- recounts-CIA-abduction.html
undeniably effective intelligence gathering platform. It is able
to penetrate the minds and thoughts of its targets, revealing the
true intentions and operational plans against the US’s greatest
enemies. For these reasons, HUMINT needs to be the central,

21. intelligence gathering figure in the fight against today and
tomorrow’s threats.
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90697/Iranian-nuclear- scientist-recounts-CIA-abduction.html
Financial Decisions
In both your professional and personal life, you will make a
variety of decisions. You should consider the financial and

25. nonfinancial aspects while making decisions. To evaluate
scenarios, you will also use some tools such as net present value
(NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), modified internal rate of
return (MIRR), payback, discounted payback, and return on
investment (ROI) that you have discussed so far.
In this assignment, you will evaluate the financial aspects of
making decisions.
Tasks:
Investigate any two of the following four financial decisions:
1) Using net present value calculations, determine which has a
higher ROI. Assume the average mileage under both options is
15,000 miles. The car will be sold for its Kelly Blue Book value
at the end of ownership or it will be returned to the leasing
dealership for no additional lease/return/mileage cost. The
automobile being considered is a 4-cyl, 2.5 liter, two-wheel
drive, Nissan Rogue sport utility. At the end of the 6 years, the
automobile is in very good condition. Tax, title, or license fees
are not considered under either option.
· Buying a Nissan Rogue today for $32,000, putting $10,000
down and taking a six-year loan for the rest at 4%
or
· Leasing the Rogue for 6 years at $360 a month with a down
payment of $3,500 due at delivery. The car must be returned at
the end of the lease. 15,000 miles per year are allowed under
this lease plan.
Show your work and explain your rationale.
2) Commit to buy a vacation home in the climate of your
choice, rent the home out when you are not using it, or sign a
five-year lease for the home for the two months a year you plan
on using it. You will need to make up the numbers for your
home for this exercise.
3) A different buy-or-lease alternative—you could buy a home
for $300,000, putting 20% down and renting it out at $1,700 a
month. Which would make more financial sense? Buying or

26. leasing the home? Explain your rationale.
4)Lease your home for the next three years or sell it with the
intent to return to the same geographic area after you complete
a three-year expatriate assignment in the country of your
choice. Given the facts above, should you lease the house or sell
it? The current market value is approximately $320,000. Explain
your rationale, and show your work.
For the two options that you selected (and using the figures
given above for those options), investigate the realistic
assumptions for your location and include the information you
found in the analysis. Create a paper in about 1,000–1,200
words, including the following:
· Initial information/approach: purchase price, rebate, down
payment, amount to finance, etc.
· Payments formulas and calculations
· Explanation of the financial factors that you are employing in
the selected decisions
· Conclusion containing the "best answer" for your personal life
on the basis of these financial factors
· Probability of following the recommended "best answer"
(assuming that these are the only decision options)
Grading Criteria
Maximum Points
Communicates understanding of financial factors employed in
the selected decisions.
Communicates the ability to analyze the situation and provide
optimal conclusions on the basis of financial factors.
Communicates the ability to assess the probability of following
the recommended solutions
Conveys through written word understanding and application of
the essential assignment components

27. Total: