1. Lessons Learned Crimea 2014
# Lesson Comment Remedial action
1 Psychological conditioning and
Ideology
Ukrainian military were trained to see Russians as
friends and brothers. Russians used it to accomplish
mission of Crimea annexation.
Ideology of fellowship and bureaucratic thinking created
inability to think or act
Education and training system
that teaches people to be open
minded and make their own
decision based upon
democratic values and
situation of the time, not
indoctrination, rules and
dogma
2 Decision making Centralized C2 negatively affected decision making,
losing time waiting for orders instead of delivering a
prompt response
Decentralized decision making,
Delegation of authority to
junior commanders.
Basing training and exercises
on decision making activities
not only upon skills and
rehearsals
3 Passive Command and Control UKR military trained to act after receiving order rather
than reacting when the situation requires. With lack of
strategic leadership it wasn’t possible to react promptly
on operational and tactical level
Training ability to act
independently, changes in HR,
education systems and policies
Strategic (operational)
leadership course needed
urgently for senior leaders
4 Overbearing Working Mentality Overchecking and overcontrol in system of managing
defense and security didn’t work and had damage effect
on the morale and ability of commanders to act.
Excessive Paperwork and hours worked for no reason
create an unhealthy and unproductive environment
Simplify verification system,
delegate authority, and
educate responsibility.
Documents (Laws) must reflect
common sense and may be

2. Officers have no energy to change gear for war. changed if needed.
5 Human resource system UKR military promotion system has been based on the
ability to «follow rules» principle rather than promoting
strong leaders, risk takers and independent thinkers.
There were not commanders who were incapable to
make combat decisions on their own.
Introduce new mentality, HR
policy, operational design
methodology and brain
storming tools
6 Intelligence Our intelligence has been systematically used as a tool of
power rather than tool of operations.
Deliberately withholding access to strategic warning
information to all level of C2 stopped common sense
thinking.
Misinterpretation of obvious information when
intervention started.
Understanding that Intel is an
operational tool, Intel Info
must be accessible to all levels,
minimize items considered as
secrets.
Creation of unit analyzing
combat experience and
situational centres
7 Territorial recruiting and social
policy for military
Military in Crimea were mostly recruited from Crimea
and were not able to fight with the pro-Russian
population. Most of them (up to 80%) didn’t stay loyal to
Ukraine. Lack of trusted and reliable social (particularly
in housing) policy for Ukrainian military also affected
their decision to stay within Crimea rather than to move
to continental Ukraine
Only branch at Navy HQ completely moved out of Crimea
was MILCOOP branch who all spoke English.
Recruiting must be from other
areas (extra-territorial)
principle. Social policy for
military to be totally reviewed:
maximum monetization and
affordable loans for housing.
8 Lack of security of critical
infrastructure (Government
buildings, airports, energy
suppliers, transportation, TV
and communication)
Existing protection plan wasn’t activated because of
Crimean security service and police treason. Military as
supportive agency wasn’t activated and didn’t take a lead
in crisis situation because of a gap in legislation.
Security plan to be reviewed in
order be activated promptly
before danger in place. Leading
authority is not to be strictly
fixed from definite agency.
New clear Law Enforcement

3. ROE for COIN to be designed
and activated.
9 Unsecure location of military
installations
Many military HQs and units located within civilian
infrastructure, neglecting secure perimeter, autonomous
energy and water supply requirements and other
measures of physical security. These resulted that most
of the military installations became insecure and
vulnerable, particularly during hybrid warfare.
Physical and material security
to be primary requirements
during selection of military
units location.
10 Equipment (uniform, aircraft,
warships)
Worn out and old fashioned, not durable, uncomfortable
to use. Lack of modern intelligence collection,
communication, targeting and EW equipment.
Procurement of new and
modern equipment, including
personal equipment.
11 Training Classic Soviet Style warfare training (no hybrid), old
fashioned, insufficient resources (fuel, spare parts)
Allocate sufficient resources,
change methodologies to
include asymmetric warfare
PSYOPS, INFOOPS
12 Using ethnical (Russians and
pro-Russian Ukrainians)
civilians as manpower for
paramilitary forces in Crimea
Psychological and mental unpreparedness of Ukrainian
military to confront (use the force) with (against) formal
civilians.
Special attention of security
services to different non-
friendly paramilitary
organization. Promotion of
patriotic organizations.
13 Active support of annexation
from Russian Orthodox Church
Russian Orthodox Church justified the occupation of
Crimea and called for non-resisting actions.
Promotion of pro-Ukrainian
religious positions. Unity of
Ukrainian churches within the
military structure.