The Extent and Effectiveness of Subsidizing Fisheries Management Worldwide

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This presentation provides an overview the state of subsidies to fisheries worldwide and introduces new research that explores the efficacy of subsidies provided in support of fisheries management by governments around the world. Economic theory suggests that many forms of subsidies to the fisheries sector can negatively influence the sustainability of fish stocks by reducing the costs of fishing and/or artificially increasing the revenues from fishing (the so-called ‘bad’ subsidies). Conversely, several forms of subsidies can positively enhance fish stock sustainability (‘good’ subsidies). Currently, subsidies to the fisheries sector are estimated at more than US$ 30 billion annually, which is roughly 35 percent of the value of annual landings. Of this amount, roughly US$ 7 billion is categorised as ‘good’, US$ 21 billion as ‘bad’, and US$ 4 billion are defined as ‘ugly’ subsides, where the net of positive or negative impacts may be ambiguous. Using collected data concerning ‘good’ subsidies as an indicator of management expenditure, Mr Dyck tests its explanatory power over cross-country differences in the sustainability of ocean fish populations, for which maritime countries are responsible under the United Nations Law of the Sea (1982). The presentation also explores the role of management expenditure in altering IUU incentives using economic theory and offers some preliminary work showing a relationship exists between governance and illegal fishing.

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The Extent and Effectiveness of Subsidizing Fisheries Management Worldwide

  1. 1. The extent and effectiveness of subsidizing fisheries management worldwide Andrew J. Dyck October 2009
  2. 2. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Global fisheries subsidies Under UNCLOS, countries must manage their resources sustainably for the benefit of current and future generations. Subsidies can be counter-productive in fulfilling this responsibility.
  3. 3. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Estimation of fisheries subsidies $54 billion, FAO (1992) $14-20 billion, Milazzo (1998) Bottom-up re-estimation (2006) Collection of data sources Estimation of missing data
  4. 4. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Categorization of subsidies Beneficial Programs that are likely to enhance stocks and/or reduce capacity Capacity-enhancing Programs that are likely to increase capacity and cause over-fishing Ambiguous Programs may increase or decrease capacity depending on how well they are designed
  5. 5. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Results of subsidy estimation 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 World Bank This study FAO Subsidies($USbillions)
  6. 6. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Results: Fisheries subsidies by category Capacity-enhancing subsidies, $21 billion, 66% Beneficial subsidies, $7 billion, 22% Ambiguous subsidies, $4 billion, 13%
  7. 7. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Beneficial subsidies - management Management Monitoring & control Stock assessment Stock enhancement Other beneficial subsidies Research & development Marine protected areas
  8. 8. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Testing management effectiveness Do management subsidies reduce the level of over-fishing? Some preliminary results of cross-country regression model
  9. 9. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Management effectiveness results
  10. 10. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Management effectiveness results
  11. 11. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Management effectiveness results
  12. 12. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Illegal fishing profit equation Subsidies enter the Illegal equation several times: Increases Illegal fishing Reduces costs (C(e)) ie. vessel modernization / vessel buyback programs Decreases Illegal fishing Increase the probability of detection ie. Monitoring & control programs FeeeCeqpIUU *)]()(*[ θ−−=∏
  13. 13. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Governance and illegal fishing
  14. 14. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Summary Subsidies to global fishing fleets is more than $30 billion per year
  15. 15. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Summary Subsidies to global fishing fleets is more than $30 billion per year The effect of management spending can differ greatly in developed and developing nations
  16. 16. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Summary Subsidies to global fishing fleets is more than $30 billion per year The effect of management spending can differ greatly in developed and developing nations Illegal fishing is lower where fisheries are well managed Reducing fuel subsidies could be a source of management funding
  17. 17. October 2009 Global Fisheries Subsidies and Illegal Fishing Special thanks to: Ahmed S. Khan, U. Rashid Sumaila, Reg Watson, Gordon Munro and Daniel Pauly a.dyck@fisheries.ubc.ca http://www.feru.org Thank You!

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