1. Amsal Wajihuddin
POLI 150
Professor Carlson
2/25/14
Essay # 1: Honor As a Means Conducive to the Scientific Study of War
The effectiveness of national, personal or other forms of honor as variables conducive to the
scientific study of war is questionable since the variables themselves constitute as qualitative and
non-empirical measures in a method that relies predominantly on practical and observable
variables for findings. However, the method employed in the scientific study of war itself may be
inadequate in accurately ascertaining the true cause(s) that nations go to war between or amongst
themselves. The reason being that the scientific method to study war assumes that all actors
involved in war are rational and that they all respond to advantageous or adverse stimuli in the
same or similar fashions and to the same or similar degrees. Ironically, objective variables that
are often listed as plausible candidates of causing and sustaining warfare, such as zealous
conviction in one‟s cause, a sense of national duty driven by strong patriotism, the active and
often vicious preservation of personal and national interests and the all too familiar inherent
human desire to rule,remain overwhelming yet under-measured components contributing to war.
As is demonstrated by the events mentioned in the Melian dialogue, might indeed makes
right and the weaker side‟s moral appeals to justice become as irrelevant to the likely outcome of
the scenario as the lack of justice in the war itself. The Athenians‟ harsh reply to the Melians‟
suggestion of being “neutrals, friends instead of enemies” (Thucydides, 70) condenses the
Athenian‟s perception of honor in warfare and its application thereof. The Athenians favor
fighting that benefits them over peace that benefits both parties since the Melians‟ “hostility
cannot hurt us [the Athenians] as your [the Melians‟] friendship will be an argument to our
subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.” (Thucydides, 70) The Athenians and

2. Melians share their acceptance and appreciation of honor as an indispensable virtue as it relates
to interstate relations but differ in their understandings of the ends that upholding honor brings
about. The Athenians are convinced that an „honorable alliance‟ is a myth since true honor can
only be harnessed when one engages in a fight for a cause that one reckons worthy of his life and
if the fighter is fortunate enough, he achieves martyrdom, or better yet, sovereignty over a
conquered people, two of the grandest honors of all.
However, the Athenians, hooked on their conquest for honor, engage in a preliminary round
ofself-interested negotiations, which they disguise as a benevolent show of mercy prior to
resorting to full-pledged warfare. Their rationale for doing so revolves around their ultimate goal
of achieving absolute rule over as vast an area of land, at the lowest amount of Athenian
causalities and over as many subjects as possible. Therefore, killing potential subjects to achieve
sovereignty over them would only be preferred if the subjects did not voluntarily consent to be
subjected to Athenian rule.This consequently inspired their ultimatum-esque negotiation.
Nevertheless, the Melians, dwarfed in their military capabilities but towering in their dogmatic
adherence to honorable existences, preferred retaliating and ultimately dying honorably than
upholding compliant docility and living in the shame of submission to slavery (Steele, 95). The
duality of honor is also observable in this scenario on both sides. The Athenians, albeity being a
rather war-mongering bunch, were nevertheless rather honorable in the unrelenting dedication
they harbored as individuals to subduing the enemy and how this dedication mutated into a
shared identity amongst the Athenian army. Similarly, the Melians, who were not naively
optimistic about how they would fare defending themselves against the invading Athenians,
nevertheless chose dedication to defense even if it came at the expense of the imminent and
inevitable destruction.

3. The conclusion of the piece illustrates how inextricable, albeit difficult to quantify, a
component honor is of war. After being completely besieged, the Melians returned to rightfully
reclaim Athenian lines, only to be subdued for a second time by the Athenians; only this time the
Athenians realized that making an example of the Melians was necessary to forestall any such
retaliation by any other of the Athenians‟ subjects. The punishment of killing all grown Melian
men and selling all Melian women and children into slavery violates thejus in belloclause of the
„Just War Theory‟ (Fotion, 25). While it is fair to say that the perceptions and applications of
justice can differ from periods of time, geographical locations and amongst individuals, an
unwarranted transgression beyond the scope of just warfare is almost universally recognized, if
not rebuked. Since there is no mention of the number of fatalities or of the scope of time the war
lasted in Thucydides piece, we are unable to ascertain whether the Athenian-Melian conflict
constitute as a war under the scientific study of war. However, it would be safe to assume that
there was a significant amount of deaths since the battles were recurring until the Melians were
too devastated to retaliate. The other two categories of combatants and militaries were definitely
present, albeit in unmatched proportions.
In conclusion, honor and the tenacity with which individuals and states hold steadfast to it is
commendable if not enviable. However, this unshakable adherence to honor can prove quite
dangerous for the parties that uphold it since dogma without rationale only makes one vulnerable
to pragmatic exploitation by parties who recognize and exploit it to their advantage accordingly.
Much like religious fanatics, who compensate for a lack of sturdy morale by hastily and
irrationally accepting religious doctrines, individuals whose adherence to honor mists their
judgment, actually hampers their ability to sustain themselves and their respective societies. This

4. is because such individuals consider pursuing conflict to be the supreme, and often the only
effective method to alleviate tensions between states and individuals.

5. Works Cited
Thucydides. "The Melian Dialogue." Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes
of War and Peace. 4th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008. 70. Print.
Fotion, Nicholas. War and Ethics. Vol. 3. London: Continnuum International Group,
2007. 25-26. Print.
Steele, Brent J. "Death Before Dishonor." Ontological Security in International
Relations: Self-identity and the IR State. London: Routledge, 2008. 95. Print.