Energy for Transportation (A.J. Alimin, UTHM)

ENERGY FOR
TRANSPORTATION
Ahmad Jais Alimin, PhD

OVERVIEW
-
ENERGY SECURITY: INDIA

References
•  Nicholas Newman, Pipeline & Gas Journal, May 2015
•  Sanjay Kaul, President, University of Petroleum & Energy Studies in India,
Pipeline & Gas Journal, August 2013
•  CAIRN India Limited
•  Mikel González-Eguino, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 47
(2015) 377–385
•  L.D.D. Harvey, Energy Policy 54 (2013) 87–103
•  Yousef S.H. Najjar, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 26 (2013)
480–491

Energy is a fundamental requirement for economic development.
Therefore, energy security is even more important in the developing world
than it is in developed countries.
(CAIRN India Limited)

ENERGY SECURITY - INDIA
• 2nd most populous country in the world; 4th largest energy
consumer (1. China, 2. USA & 3. Russia)
• Has abundant supplies of coal, oil and natural gas
• International Energy Administration: India’s per capita energy
consumption = about 1/3 of the global average; increasingly
dependent on energy imports = average annual economic
growth (~ 8%), population increase and rapid urbanization
• India’s economy set to exceed that of Japan and Germany
combined in 2019 (based on IMF figures)

• Expansion of the domestic gas pipeline network to 18,000
miles by 2017, from 9,200 miles in 2013
• July 2014: plans to construct 15,000 miles of gas pipelines
over the next decade
ospects for India’s Ambitions
ing population is expected to more than
double to 516.97 MMscm/d by 2021-
22. Similarly, domestic gas production is
forecast to increase from 100,000 scm/d
in 2013 to 163,000 scm/d in 2018, reach
ing 230,000 scm/d in 2030, according
to the government-commissioned report
Vision 2030.
India was self-sufficient in gas until
2004 when it began importing LNG from
Qatar. Today, India is the fourth-largest
LNG importer and Qatar remains the main
supplier to India’s four west coast import
regasification terminals. LNG imports are
Figure 1
Furthermore, to help meet India’s Kyoto
obligations, the government is encouraging
a switch from coal to gas in power gen

• Power sector, fertilizer producers and rising population -
demand for gas is expected to more than double to 516.97
million metric standard cubic meters per day (MMscm/d) by
2021-2022
• Similarly, domestic gas production is forecast to increase
from 100,000 scm/d in 2013 to 163,000 scm/d in 2018,
reaching 230,000 scm/d in 2030, according to the
government-commissioned report Vision 2030

• India is the 4th largest LNG importer and Qatar remains the
main supplier to India’s four west coast import regasification
terminals.
• LNG imports are projected to rise from 44.6 MMscm/d in
2012-2013 to 214 MMscm/d in 2030.
• In 10/2014, the government increased natural gas prices by
34% to encourage investment in increasing output, new
pipelines and import terminals for rising LNG imports
• Power generation sector is also being encouraged to switch
from coal to gas

• There was an outline of proposed transnational gas pipelines
which have been held back by a mixture of power politics,
security issues and technological difficulties.
• Proposed in the mid-1950s, the 2,700 km Peace pipeline:
Iran’s super-giant 51 Tcm offshore South Pars Gas field with
India via Pakistan, with the Iran-Pakistan section of the
pipeline possibly completed in 2016 or 2017.

ing new import terminals will also generate
new pipelines in the future. For example,
the newly commissioned LNG regasifi
cation terminal at Kochi will require a
pipeline to Mangalore and other parts of
southern India.
However, while government-regulated
low gas prices, state regulations and
land rights are ever-present obstacles to
new domestic pipeline routes, long-held
dreams of pipeline connections to gas
producers in the Middle East, Central and
Southeast Asia face other difficulties.
Figure 2 and Table 1 provide an outline
of proposed transnational gas pipelines
which have been held back by a mixture
of power politics, security issues and
technological difficulties.
Proposed in the mid-1950s, the 2,700-
km Peace pipeline is planned to link
Iran’s super-giant 51 Tcm offshore South
Pars Gas field with India via Pakistan,
Pipelines of interest to India
Figure 2
rema
Afgh
M
is th
pipel
gas.
cons
line,
India
bypa
Th
India
in 1
the
Mya
Beng
Of
Bang
to ge
from
Po
et to exceed
y combined
figures, the
e its energy
ronic infra
n proposes
pipeline net
from 9,200
India’s new
i announced
of gas pipe
e network is
aphic reach
line network
s originating
he northwest.
e brings gas
vari gas pro
to Mumbai.
f the natural
million met
y (scm/d).
minate long
e northwest.
Ltd operates
ur (HVJ) line
as well as the
e.
3,328 miles,
of the coun
ork. In 2009,
eliance Gas
e (RGTIL)
-West pipe
na-Godavari
to GAIL’s
and centers
rn regions.
astern India
the Assam
tate Petronet
.
ly from the
cers and ris
regasification terminals. LNG imports are
projected to rise from 44.6 MMscm/d in
2012-13 to 214 MMscm/d in 2030.
To help satisfy rising demand for gas,
India’s chronic infrastructure deficit has
attracted government attention. In October
2014, Modi’s new government increased
natural gas prices by 34% to encourage
investment in increasing output, new pipe
lines and additional import terminals for
rising LNG imports.
eration with the use of “Dutch auctions,”
according to Economic Times.
GAIL plans to increase its network and
integrate southern India with its pipeline
network in the northwest. In early 2013,
GAIL commissioned the 600-mile Dabhol
to Bengalur (Bangalore) pipeline, the first
line to connect the southern part of India to
the national grid.
Increasing LNG imports as well as add-
Proposed Project Est. Cost Length Capacity Route Stage of Negotiation
Peace pipeline
$7.5
billion
1,620
miles
30
MMscm/d
Iran’s South
Pars fields via
Pakistan’s
Karachi to
Delhi, India.
Target 2017, depen
dent on end of UN
sanctions on Iran
TAPI pipeline
$10
billion
(ADB,
Febru
ary
2015)
1,814 km
38
MMscm/d
Turkmenistan’s
Galkynysh field
via Afghanistan
and Pakistan to
Punjab India
Final stage discus
sions. Also possible
branch from Russia
Oman-IndiaDeep
Sea
$4-5
billion
1,300
km
1.1 Bcf/d
Middle East
Compression
Station near
Oman with
receiving
terminal near
Gujarat
Awaiting
final approval
Myanmar-Ban-
gladesh-India
$1 billion 900 km 12 Bern
Sittwe in
Burma via
Bangladesh
to Calcutta in
India
Awaiting
final approval
Table 1: Proposed Transnational gas pipeline projects
Source: CNBC, Interfax
May 2015

• First introduced in the 1990s, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is a 1,814km project which
is expected to cost $10 billion, according to the Asian
Development Bank.
• If built it would supply 38 MMscm/d of gas to India.
• More likely than the TAPI project is the plan to construct a
deep-sea gas pipeline giving India access to Iranian gas.
• In negotiations: Oman-India Deep Sea pipeline, crossing the
Arabian Sea and linking India’s gas network with Oman’s.

• The 900-km Myanmar-Bangladesh- India pipeline project was
first proposed in 1997 to deliver 5 Bcm of gas from the Sittwe
offshore field in southern Myanmar to power plants in Dacca,
West Bengal, via Bangladesh (Figure 3).
• Of these four proposals, the Myanmar- Bangladesh-India
pipeline is the closest to getting the go-ahead and has
support from both Dacca and Delhi.

nnections to gas
East, Central and
er difficulties.
provide an outline
nal gas pipelines
back by a mixture
urity issues and
s.
1950s, the 2,700-
planned to link
m offshore South
ndia via Pakistan,
ection of the pipe
in 2016 or 2017.
the 1990s, the
tan-Pakistan-India
a 1,814-km proj
to cost $10 bil
sian Development
ould supply 38
a. It appears close
om the four par
vertheless, doubts
Pipelines of interest to India
Figure 2
The 900-km Myanma
India pipeline project was
in 1997 to deliver 5 Bern
the Sittwe offshore field
Myanmar to power plants
Bengal, via Bangladesh (F
Of these four proposals,
Bangladesh-India pipeline
to getting the go-ahead an
from both Dacca and Delh
Politics, land rights an
incentives under govern
ed gas prices bedevil ex
development of domest
as well as construction
pipelines. In these circum
seemingly easier, albeit m
to import natural gas by L
regasification plants loc
close to markets than to
many obstacles to build
throughout India. P&GJ

• As of early 2014, the republic imports approximately 80
percent of its oil needs.
• Without new and substantial domestic discoveries, imports
are projected to increase to 90 percent by 2030.
• This represents a significant transfer of wealth from India to
the oil exporting nations.
• “India is spending approximately $140 billion annually
importing oil,” said Sunil Bohra, Cairn’s Deputy CFO

ENERGY
SECURITY - INDIA

Energy
In India's
Back Yard
By Sanjay Kaul, President,
University of Petroleum &
Energy Studies in India
India's crude oil and LPG pipeline infrastructure.
T
he recent visit of Myanmar's pro-democracy leader Aung San
Suu Kyi and Bangladesh's opposition leader Begum Khaleda
Zia almost went unnoticed. Despite the Indian government's
red carpet welcome, the media and analysts seemed to miss
the significance of this move toward a more energy secure future and
geopolitically stable neighborhood.
Myanmar produces about 420 Bcf, exporting more than 300 Bcf.
The missed opportunity reflects India's problems with a multi-
country natural gas pipeline project, not only in this particular case, but
also in its abilify to respond to fierce competition while relying on an
unpredictable transit state, and a lack of state funding.
Another miss was New Delhi's irresolute stand on the military regime
• Geopolitical factors and the
energy demands
• Access to the available
energy
• Power generation sectors;
population and
transportation demands;
ENERGY SECURITY -
INDIA

• Ensuring secure supply of energy: planning for country’s
development, as well as the energy supply for powering the
transportation system
• Understanding this scenario will assist in planning the
transport systems for the future
• Harnessing available energy sources (conventional
petroleum based, coal, gas, biomass, natural gas) or
empowering the use of non-conventional energy sources
(alternative fuels, blended fuels, hybrid, fuel cells,
electrification

• Energy sector will face three major transformations:
•  Concerns with climate change
•  Energy security of supply
•  Energy poverty.
• Less attention is given on ‘energy poverty’
• IEA - the cost of providing universal access to energy by
2030 would require annual investment of $35 billion (much
less than the amount provided annually in subsidies to fossil
fuels.
ENERGY POVERTY

• Table 1 - indicators related to development and energy for nine
representative countries
• Observe: Human development index (HDI), life expectancy at
birth and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are all
closely related to energy consumption.
This paper seeks to provide an overview of the energy-related
aspects of poverty, a concept which has come to be known as
“energy poverty” (see [14]). There are many different views to be
found in the existing literature, but here the problem is approached
in a way that at least enables the most significant elements of it to
be identified. We analyse the current situation as regards energy
poverty, its future prospects and its current impacts. Although
energy poverty affects many different economic sectors and ham-
pers environmental protection efforts, its most relevant (and per-
haps least known) repercussion is its impact on health: according to
the WHO it currently causes more deaths than malaria or tubercu-
losis. The paper ends with an analysis of the possibilities of
providing universal access to energy.
Although it is difficult to separate energy poverty from the
broader, more complex problem of poverty in general, this article
do not seek to examine the underlying causes and consequences of
Table 1
Energy and development indicators, 2010.
Source: World Bank [41].
HDI Life expectancy
(years)
GDP per capita
($, PPC)
Electricity consumption
per capita (kW h)
Energy consumption
per capita (tep)
Passenger cars
(per 1000 people)
CO2 per
capita (t)
United States 0.92 78.2 46.612 13.394 7.1 632 19.7
Germany 0.92 80 37.652 7.215 4.0 510 9.8
Saudí Arabia 0.78 73.9 22.747 7.967 6.1 139 16.5
Russia 0.78 68.8 19.940 6.452 4.9 233 11.3
Brazil 0.73 73.1 11.180 2.384 1.3 178 1.9
China 0.69 73.3 7.553 2.944 1.8 35 4.4
India 0.55 65.1 3.366 616 0.5 12 1.2
Nigeria 0.47 51.4 2.367 137 0.7 31 0.7
Ethiopia 0.39 58.7 1.033 54 0.4 1 0.1
Fig. 1. Electricity consumption, 1960–2010, kW h per capita. .
Source: World Bank [41]
M. González-Eguino / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 47 (2015) 377–385378

• As countries progress their energy consumption increases.
• Fig. 1 shows the trends in electricity consumption from 1970 to
2010 for a number of countries.
• China: 150 kWh/capita in 1970 to 3000 in 2010 (20X more)
• However, in some African countries where there has been little
or no economic progress energy consumption has hardly
increased at all: for instance in Ethiopia consumption is up
from 18 kW h per person in 1970 to 58 in 2010.
• Per capita electricity consumption in Ethiopia is currently 250
times lower than in the United States.

• The link between
energy consumption
and development also
works in the opposite
direction: energy
consumption tends to
decrease at times of
economic recession.
o provide an overview of the energy-related
concept which has come to be known as
[14]). There are many different views to be
iterature, but here the problem is approached
enables the most signiﬁcant elements of it to
lyse the current situation as regards energy
rospects and its current impacts. Although
many different economic sectors and ham-
rotection efforts, its most relevant (and per-
ercussion is its impact on health: according to
causes more deaths than malaria or tubercu-
s with an analysis of the possibilities of
cess to energy.
ﬁcult to separate energy poverty from the
x problem of poverty in general, this article
e the underlying causes and consequences of
per intended to analyse the various techno-
ble for providing access to energy or indeed
jects [40]. The attention is focused rather on
articularly on energy poverty in the sense of
nergy. The particular features displayed by
ealthier countries (“fuel poverty”, see [15])
73.9 22.747 7.967 6.1 139 16.5
68.8 19.940 6.452 4.9 233 11.3
73.1 11.180 2.384 1.3 178 1.9
73.3 7.553 2.944 1.8 35 4.4
65.1 3.366 616 0.5 12 1.2
51.4 2.367 137 0.7 31 0.7
58.7 1.033 54 0.4 1 0.1
Fig. 1. Electricity consumption, 1960–2010, kW h per capita. .
Source: World Bank [41]

• Energy poverty: the
absence of sufficient
choice in accessing
adequate, affordable,
reliable, high-quality,
safe and
environmentally benign
energy services to
support economic and
human development
not liable to endanger health. The definition also mentions that
technologies should be “environmentally benign”, i.e. that they
should not compromise future generations. It is important for
technological solutions intended to reduce energy poverty to take
into account impacts on climate change and on the environment so
that development can be maintained in the future. Moreover, as
r
1
(
e
i
À E
i
e
o
t
d
w
m
c
s
p
4
t
a
i
4. C
Table 2
Energy poverty by physical threshold.
Source: Adapted from [7].
Thresholds Energy consumption
(cap year)
Energy consumption
(GJ/cap year)
Population (%
total)
Basic human
needs
100 kW h þ150 l
(ffi 5 GJ)
o5 GJ 1800 (27%)
Productive
uses
750 kW h þ220 l
(ffi 10 GJ)
5–10 GJ 1600 (24%)
Modern
Society
2000 kW h þ550 l
(ffi 25 GJ)
10–25 GJ 1500 (22%)
European
Union
Average UE (ffi 75 GJ) 25–75 GJ 1300 (19%)
United States Average USA
(ffi 150 GJ)
475 GJ 600 (7%)
M. González-Eguino / Renewable and Sustainable E380

• Access to energy
Table 3
Number of people without access to “modern” energy access, 2009 (millions).
Source: [16].
Lacking access to
electricity
Relying on the traditional use of
biomass for cooking
Population (% Total) Population (% Total )
Asia 628 18% 1814 51%
Sub-Saharan Africa 590 57% 698 68%
Latin America 29 6% 65 14%
Middle East 18 9% 10 5%
North of Africa 1 1% 2 1%
Total 1267 19% 2588 38%
M. González-Eguino / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 47 (

• Access to
energy
4.2.
T
acce
the p
but i
from
and
(1) a
Sub-Saharan Africa 590 57% 698 68%
Latin America 29 6% 65 14%
North of Africa 1 1% 2 1%
Total 1267 19% 2588 38%
Fig. 3. Population lacking access to electricity, 2009 (millions). .
Source: [16]
Fig. 5
Sourc

• Access to
energy
and Middle Eastern countries such as Iran (100%), Jordan (99%) and
Algeria (98%).
4.2.
T
acce
the p
but
from
and
(1)
(3) a
for p
of en
indi
F
sele
to b
grap
Ame
reso
EDI
How
sub-
F
nam
data
peri
imp
d’Ivo
loca
Fig. 3. Population lacking access to electricity, 2009 (millions). .
Source: [16]
Fig. 4. Relying on the traditional use of biomass for cooking, 2009 (million). .
Source: [16]

• Access to
energy – Energy
Development
Indicator
4.2. Energy development indicator
The energy development indicator (EDI) combines data on
access to and consumption of energy in a single index, covering
le 3
mber of people without access to “modern” energy access, 2009 (millions).
rce: [16].
Lacking access to
electricity
Relying on the traditional use of
biomass for cooking
Population (% Total) Population (% Total )
sia 628 18% 1814 51%
ub-Saharan Africa 590 57% 698 68%
atin America 29 6% 65 14%
orth of Africa 1 1% 2 1%
otal 1267 19% 2588 38%
3. Population lacking access to electricity, 2009 (millions). .
Fig. 5. IDE for 20 selected countries, 2002–2008. .
Source: [16]
M. González-Eguino / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 47 (2015) 377–385 381

price for coal, which almost tripled between 2004 and 2011, from $34/tonne to $10
however, have been falling since May 2011, which has eased the situation slightly.
Meanwhile demand in Malaysia is rising steadily as the economy grows. GDP growth
cent and 5.1 per cent in 2011, following a contraction of 1.6 per cent in 2009. Its est
is forecast to be 4.4 per cent, according to Global Finance, still strong in spite of glob
difficulties. Table 2 shows peak electricity demand between 2005 and 2011 in Penin
these figures demonstrate, demand has risen throughout this period. The peak in 2
represented a 2.7 per cent increase over 2010.
Although margins in Malaysia appear generous - installed capacity in Peninsular Ma
21,794 MW - this depends upon the availability of fuel, as TNB found out early in 20
import power from Singapore when gas supplies were restricted. Meanwhile the co
trend in demand, in spite of the global economic recession, means that additional c
aking 45 per cent of the total generation in 2011 and coal 44 per cent (see Table 1).
oil and distillates, these accounted for more than 94 per cent of all power generation. Only
ith 5.8 per cent of the total in 2011, provided any alternative, with the contribution from
e energy sources less than 1 per cent.
contains these figures, also shows the breakdown for 2010. The main difference between
s the sharp fall in the share of generation taken by natural gas - 54 per cent in 2010, which
age points higher than in 2011 - and a rise in the contribution from other fossil fuels. The
ibution from natural gas was the result of tightening supplies, reinforcing the need for
pand its generating capacity from other sources to avoid power supplies coming under
power generation in Malaysia is provided by the national gas company Petronas.
m the company's fields has been declining since 2006 and recently gas for the power
n curtailed, as a result Petronas says of maintenance and upgrading of offshore facilities.

BRIEF ENERGY OUTLOOK
-
MALAYSIA

Introduction – Energy Outlook
Source:
Energy
Malaysia,
Vol. 1, 2014,
pg36-40
GDP, PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY AND FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION
TRENDS IN KILOTONNES OF OIL EQUIVALENT (KTOE)
GDP at 2005 prices (RM Million)Final Energy Consumption (ktoe)Primary Energy Supply (ktoe)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
-
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
ktoe
1990
RM Million
(at 2005 prices)
OVERVIEW
In spite of the sluggish global economy,
Malaysia’s GDP posted healthy growth
in 2012, largely due to resilient
domestic consumption. This trend
resulted in a 0.5% increase in year-
on-year economic growth, putting the
annual ﬁgure for 2012 at 5.6%. Domestic
expansion for the decade, supported
by investment spending.
Energy supply and demand both
recorded strong growth in 2012, with
total primary energy supply and ﬁnal
consumption achieving increases of
5.9% and 7.5% respectively. The
higher growth rate of the latter indicates
Malaysia’s total production and consumption of energy demonstrated healthy growth
in 2012, as the nation continued its efforts to diversify and secure its energy sources.
The National Energy Balance 2012 Report by the Energy Commission indicates that
while Malaysia’s industries have moved towards more energy-intensive areas – placing
a greater strain on the national grid – the country’s efforts to satisfy this heightened
demand have consequently also progressed.
Source: The Energy Commission of Malaysia
Malaysia’s GDP, Primary Energy Supply
and Final Energy Consumption continued
their positive growth trend in 2012.
were dominated by industries
that consume large quantities of
energy.
PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
In 2012, total primary energy
supply increased by 5.9%
compared to 3.2% in 2011. The

37
at 7,866 ktoe.
Malaysia’s coal and coke production
increased steadily by 1.2% to
settle at 1,860 ktoe, with locally
produced coal and coke, mainly
from the Mukah-Balingian area in
Sarawak, accounting for nearly 78%
of the nation’s total production. For
Peninsular Malaysia, coal and coke
In terms of total share, crude oil
and petroleum products reduced by
1.5% to 32.5% in 2012. Natural
gas increased by 0.9% to 46.0%,
while the shares of coal and coke
and hydroelectric both rose 0.3% to
18.9% and 2.6% respectively.
As of the 1st of January 2012,
Malaysia’s crude oil reserves rose 1.6%
driven by two gas reserve discoveries
in the Kasawari and NC8SW ﬁelds
off the coast of Sarawak.
DEMAND AND CONSUMPTION
In 2012, growth in final energy
consumption increased by 2.7% year-
on-year to reach 7.5%, or 46,711 ktoe,
as compared to the previous year’s
CRUDE
OIL
PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS
&
OTHERS
NATURAL
GAS
(SALES
GAS)
COAL &
COKE
HYDRO
POWER
TOTAL
ANNUAL
GROWTH
RATE (%)
SHARE (%)
43.7 48.2 4.4 3.7
39.9 52.0 4.9 3.2
41.7 49.3 5.7 3.2
41.6 49.1 6.8 2.5
41.6 47.3 9.2 1.8
40.2 46.4 11.3 2.1
36.4 51.2 10.4 2.0
34.7 52.1 10.9 2.3
35.1 50.6 12.2 2.1
32.9 51.7 12.9 2.6
35.5 48.1 14.2 2.2
32.6 46.1 19.2 2.1
34.0 45.1 18.6 2.3
32.5 46.0 18.9 2.6
PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN KTOE
Crude Oil and Petroleum Products & Other Natural Gas (Sales Gas) Coal and Coke Hydropower
Long-term trends reveal that while Malaysia has progressively
reduced its dependence on petroleum products, natural gas
remains relatively unchanged from late-1990s levels and coal and
coke has assumed increased signiﬁcance.
Source:
Energy
Malaysia,
Vol. 1, 2014,
pg36-40

Source:
Energy
Malaysia,
Vol. 1, 2014,
pg36-40
4.8%. Up to 36.8% of the ﬁnal energy
demand came from the transport
sector, while the industrial sector
in the industrial sectors relevant
to the National Key Economic
Areas (NKEAs) for electronics,
by systematically easing reliance on
imported fuels.
FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SECTOR
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
ktoe
Residential & Commercial Transport IndustryNon-Energy UseAgriculture
The industrial and transportation sectors
continued their dominance of ﬁnal
energy consumption in 2012, while
the non-energy use and residential and
commercial sectors also increased their
demand to follow closely.

Source: Energy Malaysia, Vol. 1, 2014, pg36-40

Source: Laporan Tahunan 2013,
Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan Malaysia

• Land transport consumes about 35% of the total liquid fuel in
most countries - passenger cars and light trucks.
• The overall vehicles fuel efficiency of the vehicles has
increased considerably: improvements primarily in
aerodynamics, materials, and electronic controls.
• Optimum fuel economy - responsible usage of the right car,
proper maintenance, practice smart driving habits
• Regular maintenance - lowers repair costs, and extends
engine life and reduces air pollution.
ENERGY & LAND TRANSPORT

• Among the available
options:
ü  Energy efficient vehicles
ü  Hybrid
ü  Fuel cell
ü  Biofuels
ü  Electrifications
ENERGY & LAND TRANSPORT
• Types of vehicles:
ü  2-wheeler
ü  Light duty vehicles
•  compact car
•  mid-size car
•  small SUV
•  mid-size SUV
•  Pickup truck
ü  Heavy duty vehicles

Table 2
Estimated average total per capita travel in 2005 in various world regions and the values assumed to be approached asymptotically as income becomes arbitrarily large;
the initial fractions of total travel in light duty vehicles (LDVs) and by air and by rail; the electric share of rail pkm; the energy intensities for LDVs and rail; average loading
per LDV; and the urban share of LDV travel in each region. Source: computed from or adjusted from WBCSD (2004), except for the urban share of LDV travel, which has
been computed from IEA (2009, Figs. 5.10 and 5.11). ‘Other’ includes motorized modes of travel only.
Region Average per capita travel (km) per year Initial fractions of annual pkm Electric share
of rail pkm
Initial MJ/pkm Persons/LDV Urban share
of LDV travel
2005 Asymptotic
Base Green LDV Air Rail Other LDV Rail
PAO 15,400 15,000 12,000 0.495 0.120 0.084 0.301 0.90 1.97 0.18 1.71 0.40
NAM 23,000 25,000 20,000 0.785 0.162 0.006 0.048 0.80 2.57 0.21 1.47 0.50
WEU 13,850 15,000 12,000 0.635 0.154 0.047 0.164 0.90 1.65 0.18 1.60 0.40
EEU 7700 15,000 12,000 0.570 0.090 0.095 0.245 0.80 1.48 0.21 1.77 0.60
FSU 6250 15,000 12,000 0.450 0.050 0.160 0.340 0.80 1.57 0.21 1.77 0.60
LAM 6000 10,000 8000 0.527 0.160 0.007 0.306 0.78 2.04 0.22 1.77 0.60
SSA 1600 10,000 8000 0.230 0.065 0.014 0.691 0.75 2.35 0.23 1.77 0.60
MEA 3180 10,000 8000 0.220 0.120 0.080 0.580 0.33 2.25 0.36 1.77 0.60
CPA 2334 10,000 8000 0.140 0.075 0.160 0.625 0.34 2.02 0.36 1.85 0.60
SPA 2760 10,000 8000 0.103 0.046 0.108 0.743 0.21 2.01 0.40 1.85 0.75
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2009). Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Toward Sustainability, International Energy Agency, Paris.
WBCSD (World Business Council for Sustainable Development) (2004). Mobility 2030: Meeting the Challenges to Sustainability, World Business Council for Sustainable
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/mobility/mobility-full.pdf and www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/mobility/smp-model-spreadsheet.xls.
Table 3
Truck and rail freight activities and energy intensities in 2005 as estimated from data in WBCSD (2004) with adjustments of freight rail data to match IEA fuel and
electricity totals for passengerþfreight rail.
Region Activity (trillion tkm) Rail tkm as a fraction of truckþrail tkm Electric fraction
of rail tkm
Energy intensity (MJ/tkm)
Initial Asymptotic
Truck Rail Rail Rail Truck Rail
PAO 0.495 0.165 0.250 0.250 0.696 3.203 0.390
NAM 1.799 2.599 0.591 0.500 0.047 3.190 0.195
WEU 1.173 0.244 0.172 0.172 0.752 2.922 0.391
L.D.D. Harvey / Energy Policy 54 (2013) 87–103 91
PAO (Pacific Asia OECD); NAM (North America); WEU (Western Europe); EEU (Eastern
Europe); FSU (Former Soviet Union) LAM (Latin America); SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa); MENA
(Middle East and North Africa); CPA (Centrally planned Asia); SPA (South and Pacific Asia)

Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel
Displacement Potential up to 2045
study by Argonne National Laboratory
Five LDV segments were considered
(compact car, mid-size car, small SUV,
mid-size SUV, and pickup truck), as
well as five drive trains (conventional
internal combustion engine, hybrid
electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in hybrid
electric vehicle (PHEV), fuel cell
vehicle (FC), and battery electric
vehicle (BEV)) and four fuels
(gasoline, diesel, 85% ethanol (E85),
and hydrogen).
ng resistance. Altogether, more than 400 assumptions were
ded to define each vehicle.
ather than using a single forecast value for each parameter
affects fuel consumption, a probability distribution of values
assumed for each parameter. Between 100 and 200 simula-
s were performed for each vehicle segment-drive train-fuel
bination, randomly selecting from the probability distribu-
s for each parameter. The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of
consumption are published in the study (corresponding to
middle, and high energy consumption). The Argonne study
nowledges that ongoing research could lead to significantly
er fuel-efficiency gains than found in their study. For this
on, and because we are interested in scenarios with aggres-
R&D support for fuel efficiency improvements, the low
entile energy consumption results are used here. Both
sted and unadjusted energy intensities are given, the unad-
ed ones corresponding to idealized urban and highway
ing cycles and the adjusted ones having been increased
eflect real-world driving conditions, including aggressive
ing behaviour (see also Plotkin, 2009). Adjusted values are
d here.
he Argonne study assumes that vehicle frontal area increases
2% and 6% by 2045 for the low and high energy use cases,
ectively, so as to accommodate increasing passenger and
o volume. The accessory load (to power air conditioners and
r optional devices) is also assumed to increase over time,
reas there is the potential to reduce air conditioning loads by
o a factor of four and to double the efficiency of automotive
conditioning systems (Farrington and Rugh, 2000). All the 2
4
6
8
10
12
litres/100km
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
MilesperGallon
Urban
Highway
L.D.D. Harvey / Energy Policy 54 (2013) 87–103
ctively, so as to accommodate increasing passenger and
volume. The accessory load (to power air conditioners and
optional devices) is also assumed to increase over time,
eas there is the potential to reduce air conditioning loads by
a factor of four and to double the efficiency of automotive
onditioning systems (Farrington and Rugh, 2000). All the
ated vehicles have a maximum speed in excess of 160 kph,
bility to travel at 105 kph on a 6% grade when fully loaded,
a 0–96 kph acceleration time of 9 s. The batteries for the
30 and PHEV40 vehicles are sized to permit rather aggres-
driving in electric-only mode. Relaxation of these perfor-
e requirements would reduce the vehicle energy use.
g. 3 illustrates the results for conventional and hybrid compact
les. Future HEVs using gasoline are projected to have an energy
sity that is only 31% that of present conventional vehicles in
n driving and 43% that of present conventional vehicles in
way driving. For fuel cell HEVs using hydrogen, these figures
to 27% and 33%, respectively. Fig. 4 compares fuel and/or
icity energy intensities of conventional, hybrid, plug-in hybrid,
battery electric vehicles in urban driving. The simulated fuel
y intensities (per km driven with fuel) of future PHEV20s and
40s are 31% and 37% of present-day vehicles, while the
ated electricity energy intensities (per km driven using stored
icity) are 8.3% and 10.5% that of present-day vehicles using
ne. The energy intensity for BEVs using electricity is 11–14%
of conventional vehicles today using gasoline.3
Fig. 5 illustrates
ifferences in fuel energy intensities among different market
ents for present-day conventional gasoline vehicles, future
ne HEVs, and future hydrogen fuel cell HEVs. The present-
ickup truck, for example, requires 60% more energy than the
n compact car. A hydrogen fuel cell (HFC) pickup truck would
re only 30% as much energy as today’s pickup truck, but would
% more energy intensive than the HFC compact car.
ectronic Annex Table A4 lists the complete set of initial and
energy intensities adopted here. These energy intensities are
med to apply to all socio-economic regions, but the propor-
ethanol-to-gasoline or hydrogen-to-gasoline energy intensities for
future vehicles, computed from the intensities given in Table A4.
Ethanol vehicles are projected to require 4–15% more on-board
energy than otherwise comparable gasoline vehicles to travel a
given distance, whereas hydrogen FCVs are projected to require
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Conventional
today
Conventional
2045
HEV today HEV 2045 Fuel Cell HEV
2045RelativeEnergyIntensity
0
2
4
6
litres/10
Fig. 3. Fuel economy (miles per gallon), fuel consumptions (litres/100 km) and
relative energy intensity for present and future conventional and hybrid compact
vehicles, as given by Moawad et al. (2011) based on detailed computer simula-
tions for urban and highway driving.

and hydrogen).
Fig. 5 illustrates
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Conventional
today
Conventional
2045
0
2
4
6
litres/10
e, and high energy consumption). The Argonne study
ges that ongoing research could lead to significantly
l-efficiency gains than found in their study. For this
d because we are interested in scenarios with aggres-
support for fuel efficiency improvements, the low
energy consumption results are used here. Both
nd unadjusted energy intensities are given, the unad-
es corresponding to idealized urban and highway
cles and the adjusted ones having been increased
real-world driving conditions, including aggressive
haviour (see also Plotkin, 2009). Adjusted values are
onne study assumes that vehicle frontal area increases
6% by 2045 for the low and high energy use cases,
y, so as to accommodate increasing passenger and
me. The accessory load (to power air conditioners and
onal devices) is also assumed to increase over time,
here is the potential to reduce air conditioning loads by
tor of four and to double the efficiency of automotive
oning systems (Farrington and Rugh, 2000). All the
vehicles have a maximum speed in excess of 160 kph,
to travel at 105 kph on a 6% grade when fully loaded,
6 kph acceleration time of 9 s. The batteries for the
nd PHEV40 vehicles are sized to permit rather aggres-
g in electric-only mode. Relaxation of these perfor-
uirements would reduce the vehicle energy use.
ustrates the results for conventional and hybrid compact
ture HEVs using gasoline are projected to have an energy
hat is only 31% that of present conventional vehicles in
ing and 43% that of present conventional vehicles in
riving. For fuel cell HEVs using hydrogen, these figures
7% and 33%, respectively. Fig. 4 compares fuel and/or
energy intensities of conventional, hybrid, plug-in hybrid,
y electric vehicles in urban driving. The simulated fuel
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
RelativeEnergyIntensity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
litres/100km
0
10
20
30
40
Mi

and hydrogen).
Fig. 5 illustrates
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Conventional
today
Conventional
2045
0
2
4
6
litres/10
nal devices) is also assumed to increase over time,
ere is the potential to reduce air conditioning loads by
tor of four and to double the efﬁciency of automotive
oning systems (Farrington and Rugh, 2000). All the
vehicles have a maximum speed in excess of 160 kph,
o travel at 105 kph on a 6% grade when fully loaded,
6 kph acceleration time of 9 s. The batteries for the
d PHEV40 vehicles are sized to permit rather aggres-
g in electric-only mode. Relaxation of these perfor-
uirements would reduce the vehicle energy use.
ustrates the results for conventional and hybrid compact
ture HEVs using gasoline are projected to have an energy
at is only 31% that of present conventional vehicles in
ng and 43% that of present conventional vehicles in
iving. For fuel cell HEVs using hydrogen, these ﬁgures
% and 33%, respectively. Fig. 4 compares fuel and/or
nergy intensities of conventional, hybrid, plug-in hybrid,
electric vehicles in urban driving. The simulated fuel
nsities (per km driven with fuel) of future PHEV20s and
re 31% and 37% of present-day vehicles, while the
lectricity energy intensities (per km driven using stored
are 8.3% and 10.5% that of present-day vehicles using
e energy intensity for BEVs using electricity is 11–14%
entional vehicles today using gasoline.3
Fig. 5 illustrates
ces in fuel energy intensities among different market
or present-day conventional gasoline vehicles, future
EVs, and future hydrogen fuel cell HEVs. The present-
truck, for example, requires 60% more energy than the
pact car. A hydrogen fuel cell (HFC) pickup truck would
y 30% as much energy as today’s pickup truck, but would
e energy intensive than the HFC compact car.
ic Annex Table A4 lists the complete set of initial and
y intensities adopted here. These energy intensities are
apply to all socio-economic regions, but the propor-
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Conventional
today
Conventional
2045
0
2
4
lit

•  The simulated fuel energy
intensities (per km driven with fuel)
of future PHEV20s and PHEV40s
are 31% and 37% of present-day
vehicles
•  The simulated electricity energy
intensities (per km driven using
stored electricity) are 8.3% and
10.5% that of present-day vehicles
using gasoline.
•  The energy intensity for BEVs using
electricity is 11–14% that of
conventional vehicles today using
gasoline.
5
6
m)
Gasoline conventional today
Gasoline HEV future
Hydrogen fuel cell HEV future
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Conventional
Today
HEV 2045 PHEV20 2045 PHEV40 2045 BEV 2045
EnergyIntensity(MJ/km)
Fuel
Electricity
Fig. 4. Fuel and/or electricity energy intensities of conventional vehicles today
and of future hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and battery electric vehicles as simulated by
Moawad et al. (2011) for urban and highway driving.
Tabl
Initi
appr
the f
such
WBC
Re
PA
NA
W
EE
FS
LA
SS
ME
CP
L.D.D. Harvey / Energy Policy 54

•  The present- day pickup truck,
requires 60% more energy than the
chosen compact car.
•  A hydrogen fuel cell (HFC) pickup
truck would require only 30% as
much energy as today’s pickup
truck, but would be 70% more
energy intensive than the HFC
compact car.
cars, other cars, light trucks) in some different markets. However,
the deﬁnitions of ‘‘small’’ cars differ in different markets, and the
characteristics of the vehicles in each market segment in each region
would be different from those assumed in the Argonne study, which
are appropriate for the US. Thus, we will regard the different vehicle
market segments as idealized representations of vehicles having a
for ea
scena
the A
SUV, a
and S
total s
the Ja
21%, 2
2.2.3.
Th
avera
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Compact Mid Size Small SUV Mid Size SUV Pickup truckEnergyIntensity(MJ/km)
Gasoline conventional today
Gasoline HEV future
Hydrogen fuel cell HEV future
Fig. 5. Fuel energy intensities among different market segments for present-day
conventional gasoline vehicles, future gasoline HEVs, and future hydrogen fuel cell
HEVs as simulated by Moawad et al. (2011) for urban and highway driving.
Conventional
Today
HEV 2045 PHEV20 2045 PHEV40 2045 BEV 2045
Fig. 4. Fuel and/or electricity energy intensities of conventional vehicles today
and of future hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and battery electric vehicles as simulated by
Moawad et al. (2011) for urban and highway driving.
EEU
FSU
LAM
SSA
MEA
CPA
SPA
WBCSD
2030:
Sustain
tions/m
smp-m

•  Transportation fossil fuel demand
peaks in 2025 at a level about 50%
above the demand in 2005, then
falls to about 50% of the 2005
demand in 2055 and to nearly zero
demand by 2100.
•  Biofuel use for transportation in the
biomass-intensive scenario rises to
about 30% above the current total
fossil fuel transportation demand by
2080, with little change thereafter.
count larger ship size to some extent. Fuel cells using
ould be used with greater efficiency than diesel
ading to further energy savings comparable to the
m fuel cells in heavy trucks.
n the above, energy intensities are assumed here to
he reduction factors given in (6), using Eq. (5). Also
ble 6 are the constants R and t. As with passenger
on, a further 0.5%/yr reduction in energy use is
ter 2035 or 2045.
ve energy intensity over time
effect of the improvements in energy intensity and
toward trucks on the average energy intensity of all
sport is shown in Fig. 8c. Freight energy intensity
ntil about 2015, then decreases until about 2070 with
e thereafter. The final average energy intensity is
elow the 2005 energy intensity if no further efficiency
ssumed after 2035–2045, and about 50% lower with
rovement thereafter. The truck share of total transport
ed from about 10% to about 20% in the LS scenario
decrease in the share of ship transport).
energy demand results
al demand for fuels and electricity is presented for
ios: the LL and HH population-GDP/P demand sce-
products, so the per cent increases in total oil demand due to the
increases in transportation demand would be about half the
values given above (i.e., 12–25%). The lowest peak H2 demand
in the H2-intensive scenarios and lowest peak biofuel demand in
the biomass-intensive scenarios are about 70% and 80%, respec-
tively, of total current transportation fuel use, and occur around
2070–2080.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
EnergyDemand(EJ/yr)
Fossil fuels
Biofuel in biomass-intensive scenario
Biofuels in H2-intensive scenario
Hydrogen in H2-intensive scenario
Electricity in biomass-intensive scenario
Fig. 9. Global transportation energy demand for the HS scenario.
L.D.D. Harvey / Energy Policy 54 (2013) 87–103

Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Displacement Potential up to 2045 study by Argonne National
Laboratory
3. Costs
Cost has not been considered here. However, there are grounds
for believing that the cost premium for advanced conventional
vehicles, HEVs and PHEVs, and possibly for fuel cell vehicles, will
drop to the point where the extra cost can be justified based on
fuel cost savings even without large increases in the price of fuel
(as seems likely to occur). Moawad et al. (2011) estimate addi-
tional manufacturing costs for compact cars, relative to current
conventional gasoline vehicles, of
$600–1200 for advanced conventional gasoline vehicles;
$1000–4100 for advanced gasoline HEVs;
$2200–8400 for advanced gasoline PHEV40s; and
$700–6000 for advanced hydrogen FCVs.
Greene et al. (2011, pp. 14, 17) cite studies indicating an extra
cost of less than $1000 to achieve a 38% reduction in the weight of
a cross-over SUV, an extra cost of $2500–5000 for a midsize HEV
that increases fuel economy by 40–80%, and an extra cost of
$2000 for an advanced conventional drive train that boost fuel
economy by 62%. These and the costs estimated by Moawad et al.
(2011) would be well justified by fuel cost savings.
NRC (2010c), however, estimate much higher costs for PHEVs:
an additional retail cost (including a retail markup factor of 1.4) of
$13,500 (optimistic) to $17,000 (probable) in 2020 for a mid-size
PHEV-40 car relative to a mid-size non-hybrid car, and extra retail
0
20
40
60
80
100
LDVOn-SiteFossilFuelUse(EJ/yr)
Improvement in fuel economy
Change in vehicle drive train
Change in vehicle fuels
Change in segment shares
Reduction in pkm travelled
Modal shift away from LDVs
Increase in passenger loading
Less aggressive driving
Final result
40
60
80
100
iteBio-FuelUse(EJ/yr)
Extra final result
Fixed fuel share
greater prevalence of PHEVs here and in smaller future fuel
energy intensities here.12,13
2.9. Decomposition of energy savings
3. Costs
Cost has not been considered here. However, there are grounds
for believing that the cost premium for advanced conventional
vehicles, HEVs and PHEVs, and possibly for fuel cell vehicles, will
drop to the point where the extra cost can be justified based on
fuel cost savings even without large increases in the price of fuel
(as seems likely to occur). Moawad et al. (2011) estimate addi-
tional manufacturing costs for compact cars, relative to current
conventional gasoline vehicles, of
$600–1200 for advanced conventional gasoline vehicles;
$1000–4100 for advanced gasoline HEVs;
$2200–8400 for advanced gasoline PHEV40s; and
$700–6000 for advanced hydrogen FCVs.
Greene et al. (2011, pp. 14, 17) cite studies indicating an extra
cost of less than $1000 to achieve a 38% reduction in the weight of
a cross-over SUV, an extra cost of $2500–5000 for a midsize HEV
that increases fuel economy by 40–80%, and an extra cost of
$2000 for an advanced conventional drive train that boost fuel
economy by 62%. These and the costs estimated by Moawad et al.
(2011) would be well justified by fuel cost savings.
NRC (2010c), however, estimate much higher costs for PHEVs:
an additional retail cost (including a retail markup factor of 1.4) of
$13,500 (optimistic) to $17,000 (probable) in 2020 for a mid-size
PHEV-40 car relative to a mid-size non-hybrid car, and extra retail
costs of $12,300–15,500 in 2030. These are substantially greater
than the US DOE goal of only $7600 greater retail cost in 2020
(most other estimates are also more optimistic than NRC (2010c)).
At the other extreme, Weiss et al. (2012) see the possibility that
BEVs could achieve cost parity with HEVs by about 2026 and with
conventional vehicles by 2032. In spite of the high PHEV costs
assumed by NRC (2010b), the PHEV-40 would represent a lower
lifecycle cost (including operating cost) than a conventional non-
hybrid vehicle by 2025, assuming oil at $160/barrel and current
low gasoline taxes in the US. NRC (2010c) sees a maximum
possible fleet of 40 million PHEVs in an overall US LDV fleet of
300 million by 2030 (and a most likely PHEV fleet of 13 million by
2030), increasing to 250 million PHEVs by 2050.
The projected cost of fuel cells for transportation, based on
production of 500,000 units/year, has fallen from $275/kW in
2002 to $49/kW in 2011 (US DOE, 2011). The target is $30/kW by
2017, at which point fuel cell vehicles could be competitive
(depending on the relative prices of hydrogen and conventional
fuels). NRC (2010a) projects that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles could
0
20
40
60
80
100
Final result
0
20
40
60
80
100
2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095
Year
LDVOn-SiteBio-FuelUse(EJ/yr)
Extra final result
Fixed fuel share
Fig. 12. Contribution of various technical and behavioural measures to the
reduction of (a) fossil fuel use and (b) biofuel use by LDVs in the LFG scenario.
vehicles,
drop to t
fuel cost
(as seem
tional m
conventi
$600–
$1000
$2200
$700–
Green
cost of le
a cross-o
that incr
$2000 fo
economy
(2011) w
NRC (
an additi
$13,500
PHEV-40
costs of
than the
(most oth
At the ot
BEVs cou
conventi
assumed
lifecycle
hybrid v
low gaso
possible
300 milli
2030), in
The p
producti
2002 to $
2017, at
0
20
40
60
80
LDVOn-SiteFossilFuelUse(E
Final result
0
20
40
60
80
100
2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095
Year
Extra final result
Fixed fuel share
2.9. Decomposition of energy savings
3. Costs
Cost has
for believin
vehicles, HE
drop to the
fuel cost sav
(as seems li
tional manu
conventiona
$600–12
$1000–4
$2200–8
$700–60
Greene e
cost of less t
a cross-over
that increas
$2000 for a
economy by
(2011) wou
NRC (201
an additiona
$13,500 (op
PHEV-40 ca
costs of $12
than the US
(most other
At the other
BEVs could
conventiona
assumed by
lifecycle cos
hybrid vehi
low gasolin
possible flee
300 million
2030), incre
The proj
production
2002 to $49
2017, at w
(depending
fuels). NRC (
0
20
40
60
80
100
Final result
0
20
40
60
80
100
2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095
Year
Extra final result
Fixed fuel share
L.D.D. Harvey / Energy Policy 54 (2013) 87

The first Malaysian electric bus designed by 30 young engineers from local universities. — Bernama photo
KUALA LUMPUR: The electric bus will start operation in this capital city by the middle of 2017.
What makes the electric bus special is that it is the first of its kind in Malaysia and an ingenious product of
30 young engineers from local universities.
The idea to create this green technology came as a result of its high demand in the market and low
maintenance as compared to conventional buses.
Sync RD Sdn Bhd chief operating officer, Nurulhanom Laham said the success is impressive as they are
still new to technological development and engineering technology owned by China.
“There has actually been a high demand from bus operators, but its supply and electric vehicle facilities
such as a charging stations are limited, she told Bernama recently.
This project that began in 2011, had been patented as EBIM (Elektrik Bas Inovasi Malaysia).
Nurulhanom said the electrical bus is capable of saving the bus operator’s cost operation up to 60 per cent,
Hafiz Belu
Keputusan
Perkahwin
Terpaksa B
Peribadi
Dari Seks
Bloom
Disindir G
Mineral
saving more than RM300 million a year compared to the use of diesel energy.
The electric bus was made in accordance with the specification and standard set by the Road Transport
Department and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe which enabled its safe operation on
roads.
“Currently, it is in its final stage of testing and certification to ensure that the vehicle components are at its
best state, safe and fulfils the required standard before it is marketed,” she said.
The technology of its battery is capable of moving a bus for a distance of 200km, making it on par with the
average trips made by buses in a daily operation.
The design process at an estimated cost of RM30 million, will be fully completed this August and expected
to be in full operation by the middle of 2017.
Meanwhile, one of the engineers involved, Mohd Elyas Ariff Shaibudin, 28, a Universiti Malaya mechanical
engineering graduate, said although they had no experience in the design of electrical buses, it did not
prevent them from using the best of skills acquired from their universities.
However, without proper guidance from experts, it would have been harder for them to produce the
innovation, but the opportunity had also motivated young engineers like him to think critically and creatively.
Meanwhile, Nizamuddin Daud, 28, said among the challenges faced include the lack of references since
electrical bus engineering is still new.
“Although we conducted many trial runs that failed, but as a team we successfully overcame the
obstacles,” he said.
— Bernama
She Managed To Convince Many Men To Give Her
Money
She acted like a lover to get men to send her money

DESIGN LIVING SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY TRANSPORTATION BUSINESS ENERGY SLIDESHOWS
Derek Markham (@derekmarkham)
Transportation / Cars
July 8, 2016
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It's not directly related to greener living, but it is a major feather in the cap of
electric car engineering, which could help inform the future of clean transport.
The latest iteration of an electric race car from Academic Motorsports Club Zurich (AMZ),
which is made up of some 30 university students from ETH Zurich and Lucerne
University of Applied Sciences and Arts, broke the world record for electric car
acceleration on June 22nd, with the team's grimsel vehicle reaching 100 kmh (62 mph) in
a blistering 1.513 seconds, taking less than 30 meters to hit that speed.
According to Wikipedia's listing of fastest production cars by acceleration, the grimsel
is actually more than half a second faster than the Porsche 918 Spyder at the top of the
list, in part due to its ridiculously light weight and powerful electric drive system. The
grimsel incorporates carbon fiber materials and weighs just 168 kg (370 lb), and is
equipped with four wheel hub motors capable of generating 200 hp and 1700 Nm of
Student-built electric race car goes from 0-62
mph in 1.513 seconds
© ETH Zurich / Alessandro Della Bella
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It's not directly related to greener living, but it is a major feather in the cap of
electric car engineering, which could help inform the future of clean transport.
The latest iteration of an electric race car from Academic Motorsports Club Zurich (AMZ),
which is made up of some 30 university students from ETH Zurich and Lucerne
University of Applied Sciences and Arts, broke the world record for electric car
acceleration on June 22nd, with the team's grimsel vehicle reaching 100 kmh (62 mph) in
a blistering 1.513 seconds, taking less than 30 meters to hit that speed.
According to Wikipedia's listing of fastest production cars by acceleration, the grimsel
is actually more than half a second faster than the Porsche 918 Spyder at the top of the
list, in part due to its ridiculously light weight and powerful electric drive system. The
grimsel incorporates carbon fiber materials and weighs just 168 kg (370 lb), and is
equipped with four wheel hub motors capable of generating 200 hp and 1700 Nm of
torque, along with an advanced traction control system to individually regulate each
wheel's performance.
© ETH Zurich / Alessandro Della Bella
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Four major cities move to ban diesel vehicles by 2025
By Matt McGrath
Environment correspondent
2 December 2016 Science Environment
Air quality in Paris has forced political leaders to take a hard stance on the use of diesel
The leaders of four major global cities say they will stop the use of all diesel-powered
cars and trucks by the middle of the next decade.
The mayors of Paris, Mexico City, Madrid and Athens say they are implementing the ban to
improve air quality.
They say they will give incentives for alternative vehicle use and promote walking and cycling.
The commitments were made in Mexico at a biennial meeting of city leaders.
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around three million deaths every year are linked to exposure to outdoor air pollution.
Europe pollution 'kills 467,000 a year'
Diesel cars: What's all the fuss about?
London air quality alerts announced
Diesel engines contribute to the problem in two key ways - through the production of particulate
matter (PM) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Very ﬁne soot PM can penetrate the lungs and can
contribute to cardiovascular illness and death.
Nitrogen oxides can help form ground level ozone and this can exacerbate breathing difﬁculties,
even for people without a history of respiratory problems.
As the evidence has mounted, environmental groups have used the courts to try and enforce
clear air standards and regulations. In the UK, campaigners have recently had success in
forcing the government to act more quickly.
Now, mayors from a number of major cities with well known air quality problems have decided to
use their authority to clamp down on the use of diesel.
In the UK, campaigners are calling for London's mayor to commit to phase out diesel vehicles
from London by 2025.
Sadiq Khan has proposed an expansion to the planned Ultra-Low Emission Zone in central
London.
ClientEarth lawyer Alan Andrews said: In the UK, London's mayor is considering bolder action
than his predecessor, proposing an expansion to the planned Ultra-Low Emission Zone. This is
welcome but we want him to go further and faster.
And it's not just London that has this problem, we need a national network of clean air zones so
that the problem is not simply pushed elsewhere.
Analysis

Madrid will ban diesel-powered vehicles from 2025
By Roger Harrabin, BBC environment analyst
The diesel ban is hugely significant. Carmakers will look at this decision and know it's just a
matter of time before other city mayors follow suit.
The history of vehicle manufacture shows that firms that do not keep up with environmental
improvements will fail in a global market. The biggest shapers of automobile design are not
carmakers, but rulemakers.
There is already a rush to improve electric and hydrogen cars and hybrids. That will now
become a stampede.
There is an ironic twist to this. Governments originally promoted diesel vehicles because they
produce fewer of the CO2 emissions that are increasing climate change.
But manufacturers misled governments about their ability to clean up the local pollution effects,
so now diesel vehicles are being banned to clean up local air.
In their place will come electric and hydrogen vehicles, which are perfect for climate policy, if the
power comes from renewables. Strange world.
Follow Roger on Twitter @rharrabin
At the C40 meeting of urban leaders in Mexico, the four mayors declared that they would ban all
diesel vehicles by 2025 and commit to doing everything in their power to incentivise the use of
electric, hydrogen and hybrid vehicles.
GETTY IMAGES
But manufacturers misled governments about their ability to clean up the local pollution effects,
so now diesel vehicles are being banned to clean up local air.
In their place will come electric and hydrogen vehicles, which are perfect for climate policy, if the
power comes from renewables. Strange world.
Follow Roger on Twitter @rharrabin
At the C40 meeting of urban leaders in Mexico, the four mayors declared that they would ban all
diesel vehicles by 2025 and commit to doing everything in their power to incentivise the use of
electric, hydrogen and hybrid vehicles.
It is no secret that in Mexico City, we grapple with the twin problems of air pollution and traffic,
said the city's mayor, Miguel Ángel Mancera.
By expanding alternative transportation options like our Bus Rapid Transport and subway
systems, while also investing in cycling infrastructure, we are working to ease congestion in our
roadways and our lungs.
Paris has already taken a series of steps to cut the impact of diesel cars and trucks. Vehicles
registered before 1997 have already been banned from entering the city, with restrictions
increasing each year until 2020.
Once every month, the Champs-Élysées is closed to traffic, while very recently a 3km (1.8m)
section of the right bank of the Seine river that was once a two-lane motorway, has been
pedestrianised.
Our city is implementing a bold plan - we will progressively ban the most polluting vehicles from
the roads, helping Paris citizens with concrete accompanying measures, said Anne Hidalgo,
the city's mayor.
Our ambition is clear and we have started to roll it out: we want to ban diesel from our city,
following the model of Tokyo, which has already done the same.
Many of the measures being proposed to cut air pollution have a knock-on benefit of curbing the
emissions that exacerbate global warming as well.
The quality of the air that we breathe in our cities is directly linked to tackling climate change,
said the mayor of Madrid, Manuela Carmena.
As we reduce the greenhouse gas emissions generated in our cities, our air will become
cleaner and our children, our grandparents and our neighbours will be healthier.
Many of the plans outlined by the mayors meeting in Mexico are already having a positive
impact.
In Barcelona, extra journeys by publicly available bicycles have reduced the CO2 emissions by
over 9,000 tonnes - the equivalent of more than 21 million miles driven by an average vehicle.
Follow Matt on Twitter and on Facebook
Share this story About sharing

This page is for personal, non-commercial use. You may order presentation ready copies to distribute to your colleagues, customers, or
clients, by visiting http://www.autobloglicensing.com
(/) / Green (http://www.autoblog.com/green/)
GREEN (http://www.autoblog.com/green/) Dec 6th 2016 at 2:31PM (/archive/2016/12/06/)
Toyota announces new, more efficient powertrains for 60 percent of its
vehicles by 2021
This means traditional, hybrid, and electric propulsion.
Reese Counts (http://www.autoblog.com/bloggers/reese-counts/)
!
(http://www.autoblog.com/bloggers/reese-counts/rss.xml)
In the face of increasingly strict standards
on fuel economy, Toyota announced a new
hybrid system (2.5-liter direct-injection
inline 4-cylinder engine)
Toyota New Global Architecture (TNGA)
focuses on more than just a clean or
efficient engine.
With TNGA, Toyota focused on improving
handling, ride, and braking performance.
The new powertrains are meant to
compliment this new platform by being
both engaging to drive and fuel efficient.

This page is for personal, non-commercial use. You may order presentation ready copies to distribute to your colleagues, customers, or
clients, by visiting http://www.autobloglicensing.com
(/) / Green (http://www.autoblog.com/green/)
GREEN (http://www.autoblog.com/green/) Dec 6th 2016 at 2:31PM (/archive/2016/12/06/)
Toyota announces new, more efficient powertrains for 60 percent of its
vehicles by 2021
This means traditional, hybrid, and electric propulsion.
Reese Counts (http://www.autoblog.com/bloggers/reese-counts/)
!
(http://www.autoblog.com/bloggers/reese-counts/rss.xml)
In the next five years, Toyota plans to
release 17 versions of nine engines,
including the new 2.5- liter four-cylinder.
Since TNGA is an adaptable platform, the
roll out will be eased through the use of
shared components.
By 2021, Toyota plans to have new
powertrains in 60% percent of the vehicles
shared components, including those sold in
Japan, the United States, Europe, and
China. In addition, the company seems to
be backing down from fuel cell
development in order to shift focus to
battery electric

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Energy for Transportation (A.J. Alimin, UTHM)

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