1. !1
The Social Responsibility of the International Olympic Committee and Human
Rights Compliance in Host States of the Olympics
William Morrow
January 15, 2016
Awarded the Owen D. Young Prize in International Relations

2. !2
Research Question and Argument
"The decision in 2001 to give the games to China was made in the hope of improvement
in human rights and, indeed, the Chinese themselves said that having the games would
accelerate progress in such matters” —Dick Pound (Vice-President of the International
Olympic Committee, 1996-2000)
With the decision to award the 2008 Summer Olympiad to Beijing, China, the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) affirmed a new guiding principle and purpose—
the protection of human rights. Considering that the IOC operates as the central
governing body of international athletics, this announcement was intended to usher in a
new era of sport, where the Olympics would function as more than just a showcase of
athleticism and entertainment, but rather would also act as a catalyst for social change.
However, the extent to which the IOC has fulfilled this new commitment to human rights
since 2001 remains up for debate. Among international sporting competitions, the IOC
Summer and Winter Olympics and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) Men’s World Cup stand out as exceptional in attracting global media attention and
financial resources. However, this paper will focus its attention solely on the IOC and its
respective relationship with the host states of the Olympics. This paper will therefore
seek to address the following question; to what extent has the IOC actually succeeded in
inducing human rights compliance in the host states of the Olympic competitions.
This paper will analyze the role of the IOC in leveraging human rights
compliance based on two separate models. In the first model, the IOC functions as a
transnational enterprise with international stakeholders that interact with host state
subsidiaries. By contrast, in the second model, it operates as a globally-influential NGO

3. !3
with the capacity to leverage the naming-and-shaming of host states in a complex web of
globalized media and communication. From this modular analysis, this paper will then
analyze the efficacy of the IOC in leveraging human rights compliance in host-states.
This paper will argue that the success of the IOC in influencing host states' human rights
practices has been both narrow in scope and of limited duration. Because the primary
mechanisms though which the IOC exerts pressure on host states are through Western
financial assistance and media attention, host states (1) improve only civil and political
rights (because they are the human rights most predominantly recognized in the West)
and (2) do so only until the games end, when Western financial and media attention
moves elsewhere.
The paper will take a complex, yet traditional format in its examination. First, this
paper will investigate more in-depth the analytical concepts that are being used in the
paper, particularly of transnational enterprises, NGOs, and compliance. Next, this paper
will delve into a review of the existing literature on transnational enterprises, NGOs, and
human rights compliance. Following this, the paper will articulate some of its
methodological drawbacks. Afterwards, this paper will undergo a thorough investigation
of both theoretical models, as they are applied to the specific case studies of the 2008
Beijing Summer Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Penultimately, this
paper will undertake an original analysis of the strengths and weakness of such modeling,
before concluding with a challenge to the IOC to embrace new practices of enforcement
in inducing human rights compliance.
Discussion of Analytical Concepts

4. !4
To explore the role of sporting institutions and human rights compliance in states
hosting the Olympics, this paper will first discuss key analytical concepts that frame the
argument. In particular, this section will focus on the concepts of transnational
enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and compliance.
In his essay, “Emerging International Human Rights Norms for Transnational
Corporations,” Giovanni Mantilla introduces the concept of transnational corporations,
which he terms “the most powerful non-state actors in the world” (Mantilla 280).
Transnational enterprises are characterized by their corporate charge, and their operation
beyond the limitations of territorial jurisdiction through “subsidiaries incorporated in the
state in which they are operating and not incorporated in the state of the
headquarters” (McCorquodale 389). In this paper, the IOC will be categorized as a
transnational enterprise under the first model because of its distinct corporate-subsidiary
structure that emulates transnational enterprises. In other words, the host states of the
Olympics function as subsidiaries of the IOC, which are headquartered in Lausanne,
Switzerland (Morgan 1). Furthermore, another characteristic of transnational enterprises
is that they are financed with capital from international stakeholders and offer services to
international consumers (Muchlinski 163). As will be discussed further later in this paper,
the IOC also is financed by a broad range of corporate stakeholders and provides a
product of entertainment to an international consumer base. While the IOC does not
claim to be a transnational enterprise, the distinctive conceptual characteristics of
transnational enterprises are applicable to it as an institution.

5. !5
Additionally, the IOC may also be thought of according to a counterposing model,
which is that of it being a non-governmental organization, or NGO. The United Nations
Rule of Law defines an NGO as “a not-for-profit group, principally independent from
government, which is organized on a local, national or international level to address
issues in support of the public good” (United Nations 1). In terms of international legal
status, the IOC is a registered not-for-profit NGO (Ettinger 97). Conceptually, Matthews
argues that NGOs have significance for their extraterritorial reach beyond state borders to
influence public opinion both domestically and internationally (Matthews 198). The IOC
operates with these characteristic traits as an independent entity with cross-border
influence, and this paper will seek to explore how it functions as an NGO within a
transnational human rights network.
Finally, the concept of compliance is critical for understanding this examination.
For this paper, compliance will be defined as the adherence by a state to a previously-
agreed upon commitment. The Human Rights scholar Beth Simmons argues that
compliance or non-compliance with human rights agreements stems from the sincerity by
which a state agrees to ratify a particular agreement (Simmons 112). Further discussion
of Simmons’ compliance theories will be considered during the ensuing literature review.
The IOC considers human rights compliance in its selection criteria for hosting the
Olympics, but the extent to which human rights weigh in the final consideration is
unknown (Jackson and Haigh 356). As such, this paper will explore whether or not the
IOC asserts the requisite amount of pressure to ensure that host states sincerely comply
with their human rights commitments.

6. !6
Literature Review
To contextualize the argument this paper sets forth, it is important to examine the
current literature in the Human Rights field that relates to this discussion. The literature
review will follow a similar order to the discussion of analytical concepts and will first
discuss literature on transnational enterprises, followed by an examination of literature on
NGOs, and will conclude with a discussion of theories of compliance.
The traditional framework for analyzing the interplay between transnational
corporations and human rights protection comes from the 2008 Report of UN Special
Representative John Ruggie. The framework, called “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”,
elucidates that “the state’s duty [is] to protect against human rights abuses [... and] the
corporate responsibility [is] to respect human rights” (McCorquodale 386). Therefore,
according to this logic, if the IOC functions as a transnational enterprise, it has a
responsibility to respect human rights and oblige to standard business practice; but
ultimately compliance is the duty of the state, which is why the IOC ought to consider
human rights compliance in deciding on host states. Furthermore, another logic on
transnational enterprises is that of corporate governance theory, which essentially says
that subsidiaries have “a moral imperative to protect the interests of shareholders as a
result of their fiduciary duties towards them” (Muchlinski 163). Applying this theory to
this investigation, the host states have an expectation to follow the interests of their
“corporate" shareholders, which in the case of the IOC are the associated sporting
federations from every participating state and their predominantly Western corporate
partners.

7. !7
For nongovernmental organizations, the scholarly literature on NGOs and human
rights compliance is found in the writings of both Matthews and Keck and Sikkink. For
Matthews, “NGOs are able to push around even the largest governments” by spreading
information among people and groups through media and communication channels that
influence international public opinion (Matthews 53, 64). From this theoretical logic, the
IOC channels so much international attention and media coverage to host states, that host
states are influenced to change their human rights practices by an informed international
public opinion that names-and-shames them. Building on that, Keck and Sikkink
introduce the idea of international issue-networks, comprised of “a set of organizations,
bound by shared values and by dense exchanges of information and services, working
internationally on an issue” (Sikkink 415). Following from this reasoning, the IOC
functions as a large and resource-rich NGO within issue-networks with the capacity to
empower other local, regional, and international NGOs working on human rights in the
host state.
The primary literature on compliance comes from Simmons, who introduces the
idea of sincere versus strategic ratification. Sincere ratification assumes states agree to
human rights protocols with a genuine intention to abide by them, while strategic
ratification assumes states sign on to agreements without any intention to fully comply
with them (Simmons 58). From this logic, host states that make agreements with the IOC
to uphold human rights standards sincerely would comply with protecting the right
regardless of hosting the competition. While, in contrast, insincere states would need an
impetus beyond simply hosting the Olympics to comply with human rights standards.

8. !8
Simmons hypothesizes that for strategic ratifiers, “the real politics of change” is likely to
occur from either executive agenda-setting, litigation, or social mobilization (Simmons
126). The logic of this literature is that in order for host states to comply with human
rights standards, the IOC, acting as either a transnational enterprise or a NGO, would
need to spark executive agenda-setting, litigation, or social mobilization in host states.
This understanding of the literature on transnational enterprises, NGOs, and compliance
will inform the underlying logic of the paper moving forward.
Methodological Drawbacks
While this paper introduces conclusions from two separate case studies, there
remains methodological limitations. The first drawback is a consequence simply of the
type of measurement used. This investigation relies on primarily qualitative data, and
when quantitative analysis is introduced in this study, it is limited to only within the
particular case studies, and is not cross-sectional. The data used for this paper was limited
because of the paper’s scope as a short, undergraduate investigation, which lacked the
requisite resources and time to coordinate a broad, cross-sectional, empirical analysis.
The lack of consistent, quantitative, cross-sectional data is potentially problematic
because what is reported qualitatively often suffers from measurement biases of over- and
under-reporting, especially on controversial matters like human rights.
Additionally, the methodology of this paper may be limited by the case studies
chosen for this particular sample. Both case studies involve countries that are “non-
Western” authoritarian states. As such, a concern of this paper is whether or not its
conclusions are actually answering the stated research question. The conclusions being

9. !9
observed may instead be answering the question of to what extent do non-Western
authoritarian host states of the Olympics actually comply with human rights promises.
Therefore, this paper is limited because the data may be spurious due to this potentially
confounding variable. Further research on the subject matter should look into case studies
of democratic Western host states such as the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics and the
2012 London Summer Olympics to address this potentially confounding relationship.
Because of these methodological drawbacks, the conclusions introduced by this paper
should not be taken as final, and should instead only serve as a starting point for further
investigation that ought to use a broader sample size and more empirically-precise cross-
sectional data.
Transnational Enterprise Model of the IOC
As previously stated in the literature review, the IOC may be analyzed through the
lens of a transnational enterprise because of its corporate-subsidiary governance
structure, international stakeholders, and the market good it provides of athletic
entertainment to a global consumer base. According to Professor Donald Marchand of the
International Institute for Management Development, the IOC has functioned since 2004
based on a corporate development plan that has “worked to secure and increase revenues;
to make the Games more manageable; and to bring many sponsorship and revenue-
related functions back” (Marchand 2). This structure is distinctly corporate by nature, and
resembles similar structures of transnational enterprises. The business scholar Terri Byers
argues that this corporatization of sport, “prompted by global television media and
multinational corporations, has radically transformed the nature of modern sport, turning

10. !10
it from an amateur-based playful activity into a serious multi-billion dollar global
business and established industry” (Byers 5.2).
Therefore, while the IOC is not inherently corporate, per se, it clearly shares the
characteristic principles of transnational enterprises. As will now be explored using case
studies, the IOC has been able to hold states accountable to some human rights
compliance through upholding its corporate responsibility to respect rights and by
leveraging the market influence over its host state subsidiaries. However, the compliance
of host states in these case studies is minimal and limited to what is demanded of the
market by consumers and stakeholders. Human Rights Watch Director for Global
Initiatives, Minky Worden, argues this is because “sports fans, corporate sponsors, and
the general public are increasingly turned off by reports of human rights violations when
sporting extravaganzas are staged” (Worden 12).
Case Study: 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics
In the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Beijing Olympic Planning
Committee drafted a budget for the IOC valued at over $1.6 Billion with 43.6% of
revenue generation tied to television rights and 20.3% of revenue coming from
sponsorship and licensure (Brunet 6). These finances for the Beijing Olympiad were
independent from the costs to the State, and so were international by nature. As scholars
would predict, many of the actions of the Beijing Olympic Planning team were then done
with the intention of satisfying international market and shareholder demand. Some
Chinese scholars like Luo Qing have viewed this through a critical lens that “the Chinese
government wanted only to change the world's image of China” (Associated 1). Be that

11. !11
as it may, the Chinese government still did respond to international market and
shareholder demand for increased political human rights compliance.
A notable example of Chinese acquiescence to shareholder demands was The
Boycott China Campaign that began in 2007 behind the leadership of Hollywood actress
Mia Farrow (Tkacik 2). The Campaign attempted to expose Chinese human rights
negligence in supporting the Sudanese genocidal regime by asking Olympic corporate
sponsors like Coca-Cola, GE, and McDonalds to revoke their sponsorship for the games
(Hong 157). In response to this, and because of pressure from IOC leadership, the
Chinese abandoned their noninterference policy and began exerting diplomatic pressure
on the Sudanese for their human rights malpractice (Kleine-Ahlbrandt 10). The Chinese
response to financial pressure from the Boycott China movement is just one example of
how the Chinese improved their human rights record in some cases, but only after issues
brought attention from Western investors and consumers to the IOC. Furthermore, this
specific case study demonstrates the Ruggie Prinicple that the IOC has a responsibility to
respect human rights, but ultimately the protection of them is the duty of the state.
Case Study: 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics
If the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics were considered to be expensive, the 2014
Winter Games in Sochi, Russia were exorbitantly pricier. The estimated total cost for
hosting the Olympics was approximately $55 Billion with over 96.5% of funding coming
from public financing (Müller 628). However, the games did also attract significant
foreign commercial revenue, and international media consumption, bringing in a record
$1.26 billion in broadcasting rights (Müller 628). Because of the large corporate

12. !12
sponsorship to the games and buy-in from international media groups, the IOC had a
vested interest in ensuring that international stakeholders would not to retract funding due
to corporate liability concerns (Strasser 3).
One particularly notable instance of Russian human rights reform in response to
pressure from Western financial stakeholders was the pardoning of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky just two months before the Sochi games (Fisher 1). Khodorkovsky, a
globally known oil magnate and investor, had been arrested on dubious charges of tax
evasion, and to many investors “the case against Khodorkovsky [had come] to represent
investor concern about the rule of law in Russia” (Meyer 5). As such, it logically follows
that Putin’s pardoning of Khodorkovsky immediately prior to the Olympic Games may be
seen as an example of corporate governance theory, where the “subsidiary” of the
Russian state responded to concerns of the corporate stakeholders about political human
rights. Again, it is important to note, that the pardoning of Khodorkovsky, represents a
response to a distinctly Western concern of political rights that Western corporate
stakeholders could relate to; while other rights violations, particularly those related to
labor, did not garner the same attention, nor response from the IOC and Russia.
NGO Within Transnational Network Model of the IOC
As introduced in the literature review, the IOC has distinct qualities of a NGO in
its ability to channel international attention and media coverage, as well as its placement
within broader transnational issue-networks. Edwards and Skinner argue in their book,
The Sport Empire, that the membership processes, inter-organizational links, and media
relationships of the IOC make it a NGO “capable of instigating and maintaining

13. !13
transnational relations” (Edwards 39). This functionality is crucial to the IOC’s role
within the broader transnational networks as a large and resource-rich NGO with global
influence that most NGOs simply do not have.
Moreover, while the IOC is an institution, whose primary purposes for organizing
sport are apolitical by nature, it contains foundational commitments to social good. In the
Olympic Charter, sport is stated as a means “to promote peaceful society concerned with
the preservation of human dignity” (Olympic 13). As such, it is clear that the IOC even
recognizes itself as an institution beyond simply sport, with a role to play within
humanitarian issue-networks. By modeling the IOC as a well-connected, resource-rich,
and influential NGO within transnational issue-networks, this paper will show how the
IOC has leveraged some minor instances of human rights compliance in host states in the
following case studies.
Case Study: 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics
The Beijing Olympics were widely viewed as a rallying opportunity for NGOs
within human rights issue-networks to press China on its human rights record. Although
the IOC rarely took an advocacy stance itself, when it did, it had lasting implications.
NGO groups, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters
Without Borders, consistently used the lead-up to the Olympics as an opportunity to
question Chinese human rights policies (Einhorn 1). However, in most instances, the IOC
maintained a diplomatic silence on these issues, which was widely criticized by other
NGOs in these issue-networks (Branigan 3). Yet, in a few instances, when faced with
enough pressure from other NGOs, the IOC did respond with statements criticizing

14. !14
China, which incited quick reactions from the government (Tibet 5). Therefore, the IOC
did in some cases play a role in leveraging compliance akin to that which Keck and
Sikkink would expect of an influential NGO within an issue-network.
One particularly significant public advocacy statement from the IOC that did
result in human rights improvement from the Chinese state, was in regards to Internet
freedom. Under the original agreement for the Beijing Olympics, China stated they would
guarantee “complete media freedom” (Branigan 3). However, in the lead-up to the games,
censorship of international media sites such as the BBC Chinese language site and
Amnesty International’s online website continued (Spencer 1). In wake of an outcry over
this continued censorship from numerous NGOs within the issue-network, the IOC
released a statement calling for “the Beijing 2008 organizers to provide media with the
fullest access possible to report on the Olympic Games, including access to the
Internet” (Bristow 2). Almost immediately after this, China took actions to restore access
to many international media sites (Bristow 3). This situation clearly exhibits the naming-
and-shaming influence the IOC can have as a large and powerful NGO to induce human
rights compliance. Though it should also be noted that this only happened following
mounting global criticism from the issue-network on a decidedly Western concern of
Internet freedom.
Case Study: 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics
Transnational issue-networks used the lead-up to the Sochi Games as an
opportunity to draw attention to Russian violations of LGBT, environmental, and political
human rights. Tantamount to Matthews’ expectations, the Olympics provided a brief

15. !15
window of unprecedented international media coverage for NGOs in Russia doing human
rights advocacy (Fact 2). Notable high-profile demonstrations occurred prior to the
games, including a Greenpeace occupation of a Russian oil rig (Greenpeace 2), a protest
against state corruption done by the globally-renowned band Pussy Riot (Richters 3), and
a “kissing rally” to protest anti-LGBT legislation (Grove 1). These demonstrations were
only able to receive attention for their causes because of the media coverage brought in
by the IOC’s hosting of the Olympics in Sochi.
More notable though than the demonstrations themselves, were the pardons issued
by the Kremlin for these activists who had drawn international scrutiny. In a sweeping
amnesty, Putin pardoned the Greenpeace activists, the Pussy Riot members, and hundreds
of other protestors arrested in demonstrations (Meyer 2). The imprisonment of these
activists had garnered significant international media attention and condemnation,
including from athletes and officials associated with the IOC (Fisher 3). Putin’s pardons
can thus be seen as a direct consequence of the activism by these issue-networks that
were empowered by the attention and access granted to them because of the Olympics.
However, equally important to note is that, by pardoning these activists, Putin was able to
quell Western condemnation by only addressing the particular human rights violation of
wrongful incarceration. In doing this, Putin was able to avoid having to make the
substantive changes to environmental, LGBT, and religious human rights practices that
the activists were actually protesting for (Fisher 3).
Analysis of the IOC as a Mechanism for Inducing Compliance: Strengths

16. !16
Though its expressed purpose is to the facilitation of sport, the IOC may also be
seen as both a transnational enterprise and a NGO. In these institutional capacities, the
IOC has succeeded in leveraging some human rights compliance in the host states of its
major sporting competitions. However, as this paper has shown, the IOC induces
compliance only when a particular human rights issue captures the attention of
international stakeholders, consumers or issue-networks. Additionally, to fully understand
how the IOC works in leveraging human rights compliance, an important assumption
must be made about states hosting the Olympics, which is that they are strategic ratifiers
of human rights commitments. This assumption implies that host states only make
changes to their human rights compliance when there are sufficient costs to not doing so,
because the status quo is preferable for states. However, because of the prestige
associated with hosting the Olympics, and the perceived risk of international
embarrassment if not done well, host states still are receptive to compliance, when it is
strategic to do so. Therefore, this paper argues that through its institutional capacity as a
transnational enterprise, the IOC induces compliance by creating situations that pressure
states into executive agenda-setting. By contrast, when it acts as a NGO, the IOC
catalyzes political pressure for compliance through social mobilization.
When the IOC is modeled as a transnational enterprise, the strength of it as a
compliance mechanism is in its capacity to commodify human rights as a market good.
This is then something that Western corporate stakeholders and international consumers
are presumed to contemplate in their respective investment or consumption of the
Olympics. By making the respect of human rights a market good that host state

17. !17
“subsidiaries” ought to consider, the IOC makes protecting human rights a thought for
revenue-maximizing host states. Or more cynically, the IOC forces host states to consider
complying at least with human rights (usually political rights) that generate attention
among primarily Western corporate investors and consumers. This principle can be seen
in the Chinese reversal on noninterference in Sudan and in Putin’s decision to pardon
Khodorkovsky just prior to the Olympics. Additionally, because of the market demand it
gives to human rights, the IOC also responds like enterprises to shifts in demand. In
Simmons’ compliance theory, when the IOC acts as a transnational enterprise, it gives
value to the protection of human rights. This makes compliance a market demand to the
state, and thus can induce states to executive agenda-setting of compliance in order to
account for that market demand. Furthermore, this structure fits within the Ruggie
Framework, with the responsibility of the transnational enterprise being to respect human
rights, but the duty to protect them falling to the authority of the state.
However, when the IOC instead acts as a NGO, its strength as a compliance
mechanism comes from its capacity to catalyze global attention to particular human
rights. This stems from the international coverage the Olympics attract in the media, as
for example, 4.6 Billion viewers tuned in to watch the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Nielsen
1), which does not even account for the large social media and journalistic coverage of
these sporting competitions as well. Consequently, the host states of the Olympics have
their actions on human rights magnified for the world (and also their domestic citizens) to
see. This unprecedented media attention empowers human rights groups to share their
stories. The global media coverage of the demonstrations in the lead-up to the Sochi

18. !18
Olympics that led Putin to pardon hundreds of activists shows this theoretical
underpinning in practice. Also, the globalized nature of the Olympics, and the
international attention given to them, can attract transnational issue-networks to advocate
for human rights issues in the host states. These issue-networks can strengthen social
movements by organizing domestic, bottom-up movements, and exerting top-down
pressure on states to comply with human rights protocol. Also, the IOC can be an
influential NGO within these networks in providing legitimacy and resources. This can
be seen in China’s succumbing to transnational pressure to relax Internet censorship. In
Simmons’ compliance language, the IOC, acting as a NGO, can influence host states to
actually comply with human rights standards by orchestrating political pressure on state
governments through social mobilization.
Analysis of the IOC as a Mechanism for Inducing Compliance: Weaknesses
While the IOC clearly can function as an effective mechanism for inducing host
state human rights compliance, its actual capacity to do so effectively is limited. This is
because of its lack of impact on economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as its lack of
sustained influence after the Olympics end in the host states.
In both China and Russia, the changes made in compliance were for only civil and
political human rights. By contrast, in both states, not only were economic, social, and
cultural rights ignored, but often times they actually got worse. In China, maltreatment of
migrant workers and forced evictions of millions were rampant during the Olympics
(University of Iowa 1). While in Russia, Putin continued to violate cultural rights
throughout the Olympics of ethnic Chechens near the Sochi region (Kozlowska 2). Yet,

19. !19
despite widespread noncompliance with economic, social, and cultural rights in both of
these instances, the IOC consistently failed to induce compliance with any of these rights.
This paper hypothesizes that this is because in both models of the IOC as a transnational
enterprises and as a NGO, it is primarily responsive to the Western concerns of corporate
stakeholders, major consumer markets, and the major NGOs in issue-networks. Mutua
argues Western concerns undervalue economic, social, and cultural rights (Mutua 58).
Therefore, while these mechanisms can uphold compliance on political human rights,
they are weak compliance mechanisms for economic, social, and cultural human rights.
Finally, future investigations of this subject should also consider the potential that not
only does the IOC fail to induce compliance by host states with these rights, but that the
institution itself, may be the violator of these economic, social, and cultural rights.
The other major weakness of the IOC as a mechanism for inducing compliance is
that its influence as either a transnational enterprise or a NGO in host states effectively
diminishes as soon as the Olympics end. As such, any improvements in rights compliance
from states often is only temporary. Viewing this investigation pessimistically, the
specific examples named of improvements in human rights compliance have since been
almost completely reversed. China recently re-strengthened its Internet censorship (Chin
1). Meanwhile, Russia has incarcerated Pussy Riot member Nadezhda Tolokonnikova
once again for peacefully demonstrating this year (Ryzik 1). This paper hypothesizes that
because the international spotlight is requisite for the IOC to function as a compliance
mechanism (regardless of if it is acting as a transnational enterprise or NGO), the IOC is

20. !20
limited as a mechanism in that it cannot induce sustainable long-term compliance beyond
the scope of the games themselves.
Conclusion
Beijing has recently been named as the host city for the 2022 Winter Olympics
and Russia will be hosting the 2018 World Cup. If the IOC (and other international
sporting institutions like FIFA) are truly committed to making the protection of human
rights in host states a priority, they should look to the past major sporting competitions
hosted in these states for guidance on what worked and did not work in holding them
accountable to human rights. While the IOC has successfully leveraged some minimal
host state human rights compliance in the case studies researched, through its capacities
as a transnational enterprise and as a NGO, this compliance has been limited to primarily
political rights that attract the attention of Western corporate stakeholders, consumers,
and NGOs within issue-networks. In order for the IOC to more effectively wield its
influence on compliance in the future, it should use its contractual authority as a
transnational enterprise more effectively to make states agree to concrete human rights
reforms to be institutionalized in law before granting them the honor of hosting the
Olympics. Additionally, the IOC should use its advocacy role as a NGO more powerfully
to revoke games if states fail to comply with certain human rights standards. The IOC is
an exceptionally unique global institution, and if they sincerely commit to making human
rights a core aim, they truly can use sport to “preserve human dignity.”

21. !21
Bibliography
Branigan, Tania. "China Relaxes Internet Censorship for Olympics." The Guardian. N.p.,
1 Aug. 2008. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Brunet, Ferran, and Zuo Xinwen. "The Economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An
Analysis of First Impacts and Prospects." Centre D’Estudis Olímpics (2009):
1-27. Web. 14 Dec.
Bristow, Michael. "China Lifts More Internet Curbs." British Broadcasting Corporation 1
Aug. 2008, News sec.: n. pag. Print.
Byers, Terri. Contemporary Issues in Sport Management: An Introduction. Vol. 1. Los
Angeles: SAGE, 2015. Print.
Chin, Josh. "China Internet Regulators Announce More Explicit Rules on Web
Censorship." Wall Street Journal [New York City] 28 Apr. 2015, World ed., Asia
sec.: Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Edwards, Allan, and James Skinner. The Sport Empire. Aachen: Meyer & Meyer Sport,
2005.
Einhorn, Bruce. "NGOs: China Is Breaking Olympics Promises." Bloomberg Business.
N.p., 31 July 2008. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Ettinger, David J. "The Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee." Pace
International Law Review 4th ser. 4.1 (1992): 97-121. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Fisher, Max. "Why Is Putin Pardoning so Many High-Profile Political Prisoners? (Hint:
Sochi)." The Washington Post 19 Dec. 2013, Online ed., Worldviews sec.: Web.
14 Dec. 2015.

22. !22
Greenpeace International. Updates from the Arctic Sunrise Activists. Greenpeace News.
N.p., 1 Aug. 2014. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Grove, Thomas. "Russian Gay Rights Activists Detained After 'Kissing Protest'" Reuters.
Thomson Reuters, 11 June 2013. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Hong, Fan, and Zhouxiang Lu. The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists
and Champions. 1st ed. Vol. 29. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013. Print.
Jackson, Steven J., and Stephen Haigh. "Between and Beyond Politics: Sport and Foreign
Policy in a Globalizing World." Sport in Society 11.4 (2008): 349-58. Web. 14
Dec. 2015.
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie, and Andrew Small. "China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy:
Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?" Foreign Affairs January/February (2008): n. pag.
Web. 14
Kozlowska, Hanna. "An Appalling List of Human Rights Abuses Last Year in Putin’s
Russia." Quartz. N.p., 30 Jan. 2015. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
International Olympic Committee. Fact Sheet: Sochi 2014 Facts & Figures. Feb. 2015.
Raw data.
International Olympic Committee. Olympic Charter. 2 Aug. 2015. Lausanne,
Switzerland.
Mantilla, Giovanni. “Emerging International Human Rights Norms for Transnational
Corporations,” Global Governance, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April-June 2009).
Matthews, Jessica. “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1997)

23. !23
Marchand, Donald A. "An Inside Look at the International Olympic Committee:
Transforming the Organization Behind the Olympic Games." International
Institute for Management Development (2010): n. pag. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
McCorquodale, Robert. “Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human
Rights Law,” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 87, Supp. 2 (2009)
Meyer, Henry, Ilya Arkhipov, and Jake Rudnitsky. "Putin’s Pardon of Tycoon Buoys
Russia Before Sochi Games." Bloomberg Business. N.p., 20 Dec. 2013. Web. 14
Dec. 2015.
Morgan, Liam. "First Stone Laid at New Multi-Million Dollar International Olympic
Committee Headquarters." Inside the Games. Dunsar Media Company, 8 Dec.
2015. Web. 14 Dec.
Muchlinski, “Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework:
Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation,” Business Ethics
Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1
Müller, Martin. "After Sochi 2014: Costs and Impacts of Russia’s Olympic Games."
Eurasian Geography and Economics 55.6 (2014): 628-55. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Mutua, Makau. “The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights,” in Sajó (ed.),
Human Rights with Modesty: The Problem of Universalism (Leiden/Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff,
Nielsen. Newswire. Beijing Olympics Draw Largest Ever Global TV Audience. The
Nielsen Company, 5 Sept. 2008. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.

24. !24
Poast, Paul D. "Winning the Bid: Analyzing the International Olympic Committee's Host
City Selections." International Interactions 33 (2007): 75-95. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Richters, Katja. Pussy Riot, the Media and Church-State Relations in Russia Today. Diss.
U of Chicago Divinity School, 2014. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Ryzik, Melena. "Founding Member of Pussy Riot Detained in Moscow." The New York
Times Online. N.p., 12 June 2015. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Sikkink, Kathryn, and Margaret Keck. “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and
Sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3
(Summer,
Simmons, Beth A. Mobilizing for Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2009),
Chaps.
Spencer, Richard. "Beijing Olympics: China Lifts Internet Restrictions but Warns Foreign
Media." The Telegraph [London] 1 August 2008, Online ed., World News sec.:
Web. 14
Strasser, Max. "Corporate Sponsors Faulted for Sochi Participation." Al Jazeera America.
Al Jazeera, 31 Jan. 2014. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
The University of Iowa Center for Human Rights (UICHR). Human Rights Index: China
and the 2008 Olympic Games. Rep. no. 21. N.p.: 2008. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Tibet Network. Losing the Bet on Human Rights: Beijing, Tibet and the Olympic Games.
Rep. 2015. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Tkacik, John J., Jr. "Beijing Olympics Boycott: A Wake-Up Call." The Heritage
Foundation (2007): n. pag. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.

25. !25
United Nations Department of Public Information. "Non-Governmental Organizations."
United Nations Rule of Law. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.
Worden, Minky. Raising the Bar Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights. Rep. New
York City: Human Rights Watch, 2015. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.