1. Running head: THE AMERICAN VULNERABILITY
The American Vulnerability to Mumbai- and Lahore-style Terrorism
Timothy J. Falasca
GOVT 480
Dr. Stephen Parke

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Abstract
The goal of this short research paper is to briefly describe the small-unit-style terror attacks on
Mumbai, India and Lahore, Pakistan during 2008 and 2009, respectively. The research is based
on testimony and analysis from sources such as the RAND Corporation, the FBI, the former
NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly, as well as testimony from Congressional hearings. The
paper will highlight and analyze the primary findings which can be inferred from the sources and
suggest some solutions and proactive measures that could be taken in order to prevent or, more
likely, soften the impact of a small-unit-based terror attack in the United States.
Key Words: terrorism, small unit tactics, Mumbai, India.

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The American Vulnerability to Mumbai- and Lahore-style Terrorism
The future of terrorism has many faces. One of the more terrifying and growing faces,
especially that from radical Islamic terrorism, is the increasing shift toward small unit tactics. At
its base level, small unit terror tactics are no different than the tactical, operational movements of
military and law enforcement. The goal, however, of the terrorists who choose to use this form of
attack, is to strike fear and uncertainty into the hearts of citizens and governments alike. The
world was shocked with the 2008 attack in Mumbai, India and the 2009 attack in Lahore,
Pakistan. These successful attacks were wake-up calls to the world, especially to the United
States. Yet, it is debatable whether or not these attacks were enough of a wake-up call. In many
cities and towns of the United States, security is quite lax, thereby presenting easy, ‘soft’ targets
for small-unit-style terrorism. A case can be made that the terrorist attacks at Mumbai and
Lahore are striking examples of the still-unsuspecting, vulnerable position of key American
socio-economic structures.
First, it is important to briefly detail the Mumbai and Lahore attacks. Mumbai, India, the
most populous city in India, and 5th
most populous city in the world, was a prime target for
terrorism for one primary reason: Mumbai was, and continues to be, a center for Western
commerce and tourism. The elaborately planned, highly-coordinated and simultaneous attacks
began on November 26, 2008. Ten members of the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
[LeT] quite literally ‘stormed the beaches’ and proceeded to pre-planned, pre-surveilled ‘soft’
targets within the populous portions of Mumbai. The targets included a railway station, a café, a
Jewish center, a hospital, and a 5-star hotel. These targets were soft, primarily because there was
no real way to defend them (Faire, 2009), and the terrorists’ pre-surveillance demonstrated their
knowledge of this fact. The terrorists used low-tech weaponry, such as AK-47s and basic

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explosive devices, including grenades, in perfect tandem with mobile, commando-style tactics.
In conducting their simultaneous, highly-mobile, and sustained assaults, the ten terrorists
separated into 2- and 3-man teams, demonstrating and successfully utilizing their advanced
tactical training (House of Representatives[HoR], 2009, Rabasa et al. 2009). By the end of this
60-hour-long attack, 164 people were killed, including the attackers, and over 300 were
wounded.
The Lahore, Pakistan attack in March, 2009 was almost as shocking as the Mumbai
attack, but the attack was much smaller in scale. The attack, targeting the Sri Lankin cricket team
which was on its way to a game, was boldly planned to take place in the middle of the city. A 10-
to-12-man assault team, armed with RPGs, grenades, and small arms, swarm-attacked the cricket
team’s convoy while it was traveling through Liberty Square (BBC News, 2009). The attack was
conducted with an advanced tactical style, employing the use of diversion and systemic targeting
(BBC News). The attack left 8 casualties, 6 of whom were police officers tasked with guarding
the cricket team convoy. A particularly disturbing fact of the Lahore attack that NYPD
Commissioner Ray Kelly noted was that the perpetrators were not immediately apprehended
after the attack concluded (HoR, p.15), and were able to escape unhindered. Research seems to
conclude that the attackers managed to melt into the crowds after conducting the attack.
The Mumbai and Lahore attacks demonstrate important shifts in terrorist mindsets and
battle tactics. First, according to Faire, the mindset of the terrorists as they conducted these
attacks was not to commit suicide. “Rather, they seek to kill as many as possible until they either
succumb to enemy operations or manage to survive, perhaps by decisively eliminating the enemy
in the battle” (Faire, p.8). Second, as Kelly (2009) accurately assesses, the Mumbai and Lahore
attacks demonstrate a strong emphasis on the use of coordinated, commando-style attacks. The

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terrorists in both attacks demonstrated that they knew how to work well as a military unit and
accomplish a sustained, violent assault.
This has huge implications for the United States. An important factor which McJunkin
(HoR) points out is that the attacks were of a low-tech, high-impact nature. Just as in Mumbai,
the major American cities, such as New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C, and Los Angeles,
all contain the same soft targets – targets which only require a low-tech attack, and yet have a
high impact yield, whether in casualties, negative economic impact, media hype, or a mixture of
all three. Additionally, high-impact, soft American targets include shopping malls and schools of
all educational levels. What must be realized is that a group of trained terrorists could easily use
timed explosives and small arms in an attack on an America city.
In order to understand viable solutions to a Mumbai/Lahore-style attack, it is important to
point out a key factor that underpins successful terrorist attacks: ‘the dumb ones get caught.’ In
part, this idea is linked to what White says: “the best anti-terrorism efforts will fail at points in
the future” (2014, p.420). The news is riddled with reports of thwarted terrorist plots, from the
1993 New York “Landmarks” Plot to one of the most recent, where a NY man was charged with
helping the terrorist group ISIL in the attempted murder of returning U.S. soldiers (Barber 2014).
However, it is not extremely difficult to plan and successfully execute a terrorist attack. Jenkins
(2013) suggests that the Columbine, Aurora, and Sandy Hook shootings, while not actual Islamic
terror attacks, are representative of the carnage a single person could create. It is important to
note the obvious fact that these attacks were never detected by authorities. By most standards,
these attacks were successful in that the shooter accomplished his goal of killing as many people
as possible before committing suicide. Therefore, a logical conclusion is that if a single,
untrained individual (“lone wolf”) could successfully conduct such attacks, then a trained group

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of terrorists who are careful with their operational security could most definitely plan and
execute an attack with even greater carnage.
This leads to the problem of detectability. For example, radical, Islamic, would-be
terrorists could create plans for attacks in closed-door meetings within their mosque (as long as
no informants are within those meetings). Similarly, would-be terrorists who are working
together to plan an attack could very easily stay undetected if they were to buy the necessary
weapons and explosives on the black-market. If a terror cell was acting smart and secure, they
very well might avoid detection by the authorities if they do not create any form of ‘online’
presence. Avoiding the usual methods of electronic communication, such as cell phones, lan-line
phones, internet forums, and email activity (just to name a few), would make it exceptionally
hard for intelligence collectors who do not have HUMINT sources on the inside of terror-
planning operations. Thwarted, yet nearly successful, terror plots such as the Underwear Bomber
or the Time Square car bomb were only thwarted because there was a technological malfunction
of the explosive devices. The explosives for these plots bypassed security. They were already in
place and simply needed to be detonated. These plots were smartly planned, but poorly executed.
Likewise, would-be terrorists who are American citizens in good legal standing (and not
named on a suspected-terrorist watch list) could exploit their 2nd
Amendment right to buy the
necessary firearms and bulk-ammunition from a licensed firearms vendor (FBI 2013). As is
already done in some rural parts of the U.S., would-be terrorists could freely conduct their own
small unit tactical training. The conclusion drawn from the freedoms and privileges is this:
American citizen terrorists living in the U.S. will spell the likely success of a Mumbai-style
attack on U.S. soil. It is not a matter of “if,” but “when.”

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Assuming that small-unit terrorism will happen at some point in the U.S., the problem
that strikingly presents itself is soft target security. The all-important question that policy makers
and security experts seek to answer is how to prevent a Mumbai- or Lahore-style attack in
America. There are two major security deficiencies which could (and most likely are) being
exploited by terrorists. First, there is the problem of non-secure, open borders with Mexico and
Canada. As it stands currently, the permeable borders with Mexico and Canada allows for a
plethora of undetected drug and human smuggling. It is no secret that the Mexican drug cartels
are in an unholy alliance with overseas terrorist elements (White; Judicial Watch 2014). As a
result, trained terrorists from overseas, as well as the necessary explosives and other weaponry,
could be smuggled across any of the U.S. borders undetected. Jenkins suggests that it would be
“extremely difficult today…even by al-Qaida standards.” Yet his conclusion is debatable. Based
on the findings from Smarick & LaFree (2012), it would not be hard to smuggle trained terrorist
fighters into this country. Second, there is a lack of armed security around the majority of soft
American targets, such as schools, theaters, malls, hotels, and transit stations. However, the
reason that these facilities having little-to-no armed security is that of cost. Most of the
aforementioned facilities simply do not have room in their operating budget to include armed
security. Of course, these are just two out of several serious security problems in the U.S.
Many policy makers have proposed solutions that they believe would help in stopping or
diminishing the impact of a Mumbai-style attack. The NYPD has paid particular interest to the
Mumbai attacks, primarily because of the shocking similarities between Mumbai and New York
City. They have certain plans in place. For example, if there is an indication that a terror attack is
imminent, a countermeasure they plan to employ involves interrupting cell phone and satellite
communications (Kelly). Such a countermeasure only would prohibit terrorists from using cell or

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satellite phones. It would not prevent them from using two-way radio communications. During
his Congressional testimony, Kelly pointed out that the Mumbai terrorists utilized two-way radio
communications in addition to cell phone communications during their attacks (HoR). Therefore,
while the NYPD’s plan would cut off at least one method of possible terrorist communications, it
would not effectively prevent terrorist communications during an attack. What it would do is
effectively take away citizens’ rights to use their cell phones to call for help in an emergency.
Therefore, the NYPD plan to shut down cell service would be more of a social harm than it
would a security benefit.
Another solution is, as White mentions, the growing relationship between the community
and police as a means for citizens to call in suspicious or unusual persons and/or packages.
While this is a proactive observe-and-report strategy, it has the greater potential not to work
effectively in major cities such as NYC and Philadelphia. The principal reason is that commerce
constantly involves unfamiliar people, vehicles, and packages being transported into cities. It
would not be difficult for would-be terrorists to disguise themselves accordingly and conceal all
the necessary tools to carry out a terror attack.
There are several viable, common-sense solutions that could be initiated to bolster the
weak security of many soft targets within the U.S. To prepare for an attack, a city or town could
see fit to have an ever-present security force. This can be accomplished by a) increasing the
number of officers in the department, or b) increasing the number of armed security guards at
soft target locations. The NYPD has done the former, rapidly growing its number of officers and
increasing the proficiency of its officers in weapons training as well as response protocols in case
of a Mumbai-style attack (Kelly; NYPD Intel. Div., 2008). In a city with over 35, 500 uniformed
officers (NYPD, 2014), it is quite possible to have a nearly instantaneous police response to a

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Mumbai-style attack. However, New York City is a huge, wealthy city. In many other less-
fortunate cities with much smaller police forces, a police response would be minutes, not seconds
away. The Sandy Hook and Virginia Tech mass shooting exemplify the saying that ‘when
seconds count, the police are only minutes away’ (unknown author). Therefore, for practical and
financial reasons, larger police forces in smaller locales are not necessarily the answer; but
armed security could provide a solution. Unfortunately, many local, state, and federal policy
makers are averse to armed security, primarily because of the costs involved. However, during
the first critical minutes of a terror attack, many lives can and will be taken. Therefore, if lives
will be saved in the future, armed security is a necessity. The government-funded solution to the
soft target security gap would be to provide armed security for soft target facilities. For example,
these would include (but not be limited to) all levels of government-funded schools and colleges,
malls, and transit hubs. The benefits of such increases in armed security would serve to thwart
any possible Mumbai- or Lahore-style attack. The state of Israel, a constant target for terrorism,
has mandated that armed security be placed at soft targets, such as theaters, malls, schools, and
transportation hubs (Tepper). But again, the major downside to government-funded security is
cost. To fund, hire and train armed security for soft target locations throughout the U.S. would
most like be more than the federal, state, and local budgets could afford.
Therefore, the most cost-effective security option is to make provisions for teachers,
managers, and citizens at various soft targets to be trained and armed. The armed citizen is a
proven method of virtually cost-free security and deterrence. Burton and Stewart (2009) point
out that armed citizens and off-duty cops can make a life-saving difference during an armed
attack, killing or (at minimum) thwarting the attackers until police backup arrives. Many states,
primarily southern and western states, have provisions for citizens to legally carry open or

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concealed handguns while they go about their daily tasks and travels. However, primary
terrorist-target cities, such as Washington D.C. or Philadelphia, have laws banning typical
citizens from being armed while in public. Such laws create egregious security vulnerabilities.
Citizens are almost always the first to make contact with attackers. Oren Shemtov, CEO of
Israel’s Academy of Security and Investigation, commenting on the Sandy Hook shooting, said
that just two armed teachers would have deterred the shooter for 45 seconds each (Tepper, 2012)
– long enough for many of the children to have escaped death. If firearms carry-laws in all states
and cities were instituted, a noticeable part of the security gap would be filled. It would be one of
the single most cost-effective, nearly cost-free methods of providing an immediate threat-
response to any armed terrorist attack on a soft target.
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that the American homeland is still quite
vulnerable to a Mumbai- or Lahore-style attack. The use of small-unit tactics is the trending face
of terrorism and is happening in higher frequency. With access to virtually open U.S. borders and
powerful criminal elements as allies, terrorists have an opportunity to successfully plan and
execute an attack. Certain states provide for the ability of citizens to be armed. Others do not.
This presents a serious security gap. If government cannot provide for armed security, then
citizens should be permitted to be armed in public, especially at the places that are of highest
vulnerability. In an age where terrorism is changing forms, the bold determination of the armed
citizen will significantly deter and delay terrorists when they attack American targets.

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References
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BBC News. (2009, March 3). Gunmen shoot Sri Lanka cricketers. Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7920260.stm
Burton, F., & Stewart, S. (2009, January 14). Mitigating Mumbai. Retrieved from
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