Deborah Smith - A Comparative Case Study of Privatized Military Firms and U.S. Military Forces In Iraq

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A Comparative Case Study of
Privatized Military Firms and U.S.
Military Forces In Iraq –
Basrah and Thi-Qar
Debbie Smith

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ABSTRACT
This research paper will be a study of privatized military firms (PMFs) and U.S.
Military Forces in two Iraqi governorates, Basrah and Thi-Qar (Dhi-Qar), from 2004 to 2009 and
how they compared to each other with regard to their ability to prevent insurgent attacks. My
research is an extension of Peter Singer’s study of PMFs in “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the
Privatized Military Industry” (Singer 2002). However, my research will go further by providing
specific cases of PMFs and U.S. Military Forces present within the two Iraqi governorates,
Basrah and Thi-Qar, and a comparison of their ability to prevent insurgent attacks within the two
governorates. I hypothesize that PMFs were more effective than U.S. Military Forces at
preventing insurgent attacks within these two governorates due to three mechanisms:
(i) Ability to recruit for security operations utilizing screening processes
from established databases for specific, valued skill sets
(ii) Ability to utilize corporate financing due to PMFs ties to corporate
holdings and financial markets (e.g. stock shares and intra-firm trade)
(iii) Existence of legal loopholes relative to the privatized military industry
(PMI)
In terms of methodology, a matching process will be utilized to provide two
comparable cases, or geographic regions, to evaluate the effectiveness of PMFs versus U.S.
Military Forces in deterring insurgent attacks throughout a specific time horizon.

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To begin process of finding two comparable cases distinguished by the independent
variable, the presence of either PMFs or U.S. Military Forces, I will classify the Iraq’s eighteen
governorates, or provinces, according to six general characteristics:
(i) Location
(ii) Geographical Landscape
(iii) Population
(iv) Ethnic Makeup
(v) Economy
(vi) Issues (i.e. infrastructure, crime, political, women & public services)
Through this analysis, I aim to find two cases, or Iraqi governorates, that share similar
characteristics of the six factors that are yet distinguished by the independent variable, the
presence of either PMFs or U.S. Military Forces. I will then use the incidences of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED) as a determinant of insurgent attacks. Data regarding the incidences of
IED attacks will come from the Iraq War Logs, a collection of U.S. Army field reports revealed
within the Wikileaks disclosures in October 2010. The incidences of IEDs in the matched case
study will then be analyzed across a time horizon, specifically 2004 to 2009, to see whether a
correlation exists between the presence of PMFs versus U.S. Military Forces in the two Iraqi
governorates and the incidences of IEDs from 2004-2009.

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I. BACKGROUND
P.W. SINGER AND THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (PMI)
P.W. Singer credits the emergence of the privatized military industry (PMI) in the
latter portion of the 20th
country to three major factors (Singer 2002). After the Cold War, global
security was left with a gap as nation-states demilitarized, incidences of intrastate conflicts began
to increase, and non-state conflict groups emerged and grew, such as local warlords, terrorist
networks, and transnational drug cartels (see figures 1 and 2; Singer 2002). Secondly, he
attributes the emergence of PMFs to the transformations in the nature of warfare in terms of
advancements towards more technologically, sophisticated military systems, as well as the
newfound ability of non-state actors to easily acquire massive power within the global
marketplace (Singer 2003). Lastly, he believes post-Cold War nation-states’ movements towards
the privatization of state industries to revigorate their economies led to an opportunity to
outsource military services, traditionally the sole domain of government (Singer 2003).
PMFS AND MERCENARIES
Although some scholars may claim that PMFs are essentially modernized versions of
mercenaries, Singer attempts to redefine mercenaries and PMFs, as well as the descriptions of
the two entities. According to the Geneva Conventions, a mercenary is “a foreign individual
who, despite not being a member of either sides of the conflict, is specially recruited to take a
direct part in the hostilities, and is motivated by the desire for private gain” (Additional Protocol
I 1977). Utilizing the Geneva Conventions’ definition of the mercenary as a basis for his own,

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Singer goes further by defining a mercenary force according to six distinct characteristics (Singer
2003):
(i) Foreign - a mercenary is not a citizen or resident of the state in which
he or she is fighting
(ii) Independence – a mercenary is not integrated (for the long term) into
any national force and is bound only by the contractual ties of a
limited employee
(iii) Motivation – a mercenary fights for individual short-term economic
reward, not for political or religious goals
(iv) Recruitment – mercenaries are brought in by oblique and circuitous
ways to avoid legal prosecution
(v) Organization – mercenary units are temporary and ad-hoc groupings
of individual soldiers
(vi) Services – lacking prior organization, mercenaries focus on just
combat service, for single clients
On the other hand, Singer defines PMFs as “corporate bodies that specialize in the
provision of professional services intricately linked to warfare… including combat operations,
strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training, and technical
skills”(Singer 2003).

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Once again, Singer utilizes six components to distinguish PMFs from mercenary
forces (Singer 2002):
(i) Organization – PMFs are organized along pre-existing corporate lines
(ii) Motivation – PMFs are business profit-driven, rather than individual
profit-driven
(iii) Open market – PMFs are legal, public entities that trade and compete
openly in a global market
(iv) Services – PMFs offer a wide variety of services to a wide variety of
clients
(v) Recruitment – PMFs recruit and screen potential employees from
established databases for specific, valued skill sets
(vi) Linkages – PMFs have ties to corporate holdings and financial
markets in addition to the security industry
Singer then delineates PMFs even further according to the various types of military
skills PMFs provide, whether they are military provider firms, consulting firms, or support firms
(Singer 2002). An example of a military provider firm during the Iraq War was Triple Canopy,
which provided security for the Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters in Iraq. A
consulting firm in Iraq was Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), which provided
strategic planning to the Iraqi Defense Ministry. A support firm in Iraq was Kellogg, Brown &
Root, which provided translators to U.S. Military Forces (Young 2007). In terms of the general
services contracted by the U.S. government for Iraq, Singer states that private security

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contractors (PSCs) were hired for three primary tactical purposes (Singer 2004):
(i) Protection of key installations and facilities
(ii) Protection for key leaders and individuals
(iii) Convoy escort
Although Singer concedes that PMFs can be of use in situations such as security
crises, nation-states should also weigh the consequences of the privatized military industry on
international security. He cites three potential negative impacts PMFs may have on international
security (Singer 2003):
(i) Contractual dilemmas between the client and the PMF (i.e. misaligned
incentives, incomplete information/monitoring difficulties, critical
losses of control, and novel incentive measures)
(ii) Marketization of violence and disruptions to the overall global
security environment (i.e. fungibility of power, complexities in the
balance of power, privatization of alliance behavior, empowerment of
non-state actors, and human rights abuses)
(iii) Policy impact of alternative military actors (i.e. alterations in the civil-
military balance, and circumvention of public policy limitations)
However, Singer concedes that these potential negative impacts vary depending on
the type of PMF at hand. Regardless, Singer cautions the international sphere of its growing

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dependence on the privatized military industry without analyzing the potential consequences that
may follow considering the ratio of contractor to public, national army soldier has grown larger
over the past decade. For example within the past decade, from the First Gulf War to the Iraq
War, the ratio of private contractors to US servicemen has grown from 1:100 to 1:10
(Abrahamsen & Williams 2007).
PMFS VERSUS U.S. MILITARY FORCES
As stated earlier, I believe PMFs are more effective at preventing the incidences of
IED attacks according to the three mechanisms outlined earlier.
(i) Ability to recruit for security operations utilizing screening processes
from established databases for specific, valued skill sets
I believe PMFs are more effective than U.S. Military Forces at preventing IED
attacks due to their ability to recruit from a more competitive pool of labor, compared to the U.S.
Military, which has to rotate its soldiers in and out after their two-year tours of duty are over
(CRS 2008). Most PMCs are composed of individuals at the “peak of the military profession, i.e.
recently retired “tier-one” U.S. Special Forces operators as well as ex-British Special Air Service
(SAS) troops” (Singer 2004). In fact, the average age of a private contractor in Iraq was 40 years
old, while the average age of a U.S. soldier was 27 (Pelton). It’s highly probable that private
contractors in Iraq have more life-time experience with war combat than U.S. military
servicemen, considering individuals hired by PSCs were generally at the peak of their career;
therefore, private contractors may be more adept at handling crisis situations than U.S. military

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servicemen. Moreover, as casualty rates in 2004 show, “private military contractors suffered an
estimated 150 in Iraq” while the “U.S. Military suffered 849 fatalities” (Singer, icasualties.org).
Though it might be a stretch, we could assume that because PSC employees were trained
specifically for war combat, they suffered fewer casualties.
In terms of the time required to train those about to go to war, as a 2008
Congressional Research Service highlights, “contractors can be recruited, vetted, hired, trained,
and deployed in 90 to 120 days, while State Department agents take two years to recruit, hire,
and train” (CRS 2008). For example, Executive Outcomes can “deploy a fully supported
battalion of 650 men within 15 days” (Stinnett 2). Moreover, most of these PSCs have their own
training camps, meaning they can tailor individuals and hone their employees’ skills towards
specific types of functions the government contracts them for. In fact, “Blackwater has the
largest private training center in the United States. The center consists of various training ranges
including those that simulate urban combat; the country’s largest, multi-surface, multi-level
tactical driving track; and an artificial lake built for conducting simulations of boarding a hostile
ship” (Blackwater website).
Unlike military servicemen who need to be aware of all facets of war making, such as
maintaining the diplomatic relations with the local population, PSCs only have to be concerned
with the specific duties they’re contracted for. Therefore, I believe PMFs are much more suited
towards preventing the incidences of IED attacks in Iraq because PSCs select specific individuals
who have had prior combat experience, and because PSCs train their employees, prior to
deployment, specifically for the operations they’re contracted for.

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(ii) Ability to utilize corporate financing due to PMFs ties to corporate
holdings and financial markets (i.e. stock shares and intra-firm trade)
Secondly, I believe PMFs are more efficient at preventing insurgent attacks because
they have access to multiple financial resources unlike U.S. Military Forces. For example, MPRI,
one of the PSCs contracted by the U.S. government, “was acquired in 2000 and is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of L-3 Communications, a supplier of Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) products, secure communications systems and products, and training
products, thereby putting MPRI into the New York Stock Exchange under L-3’s ticker” (L-3
Communications website). L-3 Communications, “which is owned partly by the Lehman
Brothers investment firm, grossed over $4.0 billion in sales in 2002” (sourcewatch.org). In
essence, MPRI has access to L-3 Communications’ equipment if needed, can utilize intra-firm
trade amongst L-3’s other subsidiaries, and has access to funds collected from its stock shares.
Most PSCs are comprised of corporate structures similar to MPRI. Therefore, PMFs
are advantaged in that they have access to multiple financial resources and can use them to
develop and or purchase high-tech military equipment and tools for their operations if needed.
For example, Blackwater has “extensive technology design and manufacturing capabilities that
have produced remotely piloted airships and IED-safe armored personnel carriers” (Blackwater
website). In fact, “when Blackwater was contracted to protect Ambassador Paul Bremer, head of
the CPA, Blackwater used its own armed helicopters” (Singer 2004). It’s interesting to note that
“several of the MD-530 helicopters used by Blackwater in Iraq were operated through Aviation
Worldwide Services (AWS)”; unsurprisingly, Blackwater “acquired Aviation Worldwide

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Services and its subsidiaries, STI Aviation, Inc., Air Quest, Inc., and Presidential Airways, Inc.
in 2003” (Washington Times).
Conversely, U.S. Military Forces have to rely on the defense budget set by the
President and Congress with regards to the financial resources they can utilize. If the U.S.
government decides to cut the defense budget, the military’s capacity to fight a war will be
negatively affected. As Admiral Greenert mentioned before the House Armed Services
Committee, “the 2013 defense budget cuts will dramatically reduce our overseas presence, our
ability to respond to crises, our efforts to counter terrorism and illicit trafficking, and may
irreversibly damage the military industrial base” (Greenert). Therefore, the U.S. Military’s
capabilities to fight war are largely dependent on the annual decisions of its government
bureaucracy, as well as potential changes to the party in power after elections. Unlike PSCs,
which can shift its financial resources from one subsidiary to another, the U.S. Military Forces
do not have a pool of readily available funds for use during war.
(iii) Existence of legal loopholes in the privatized military industry (PMI)
Lastly, although this is a radical view to espouse with regards to war making, I
believe the existence of legal loopholes in the PMI is an advantage PSCs have over U.S. Military
Forces. Unlike U.S. military servicemen, a comprehensive body of domestic and international
laws do not govern the activities of private contractors. This includes pieces of U.S. legislation
such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a “body of rules applicable to U.S.
military servicemen that parallels American civilian law, with its own court-marital system for
enforcement” (Keefe 2004).

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This advantage is also due to the existing, vague definitions of whether private
contractors qualify as mercenaries or not, as well as the grey area between combat situations and
noncombat situations, “the Geneva Conventions and other laws of war do not appear to forbid
the use of civilian contractors in a civil police role in occupied territory, in which case
contractors might be authorized to use force when absolutely necessary to defend persons or
property” (CRS 2008). Therefore, PMFs can take actions they believe appropriate for handling
insurgents and implement the most effective strategies to decreasing the incidences of IED
attacks without fear of punishment.
A comparison to the drone strikes used by the U.S. Military in Pakistan to eliminate
the heads of terrorist organizations can be used as a justification for this radical, yet also, what I
believe, is an effective mechanism of PMFs. Although the drone attacks were largely criticized
by the domestic public for reasons including the lack of government accountability, the lack of
due process for the targeted individuals, and the incidences of civilian casualties, we cannot deny
that the drone strikes achieved its goal; they were effective at eliminating al-Qaeda militants who
planned to initiate terrorism and/or had the power to lead potential terrorist attacks. One such
example is the drone strike that killed Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi; Al-Libi was
known as a “virtual ambassador for global jihad, who negotiated with the ethnic Pashtun militant
groups that had sheltered Al Qaeda for over a decade, and had a $1 million bounty on his head”
(NY Times). al-Libi was killed by a drone strike in 2012 and is known to have lead to “a blow to
the group in a lawless area that had long been considered the global headquarters of international
terrorism, whose importance was now potentially slipping” (NY Times). Therefore, I believe that
this freedom PMFs have, due to the lack of comprehensive legislation, allows PMFs to act in

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ways they believe would be best for achieving success in their operations, relative to decreasing
the incidences of IED attacks.
It is apparent that the lack of legislation regarding PMF activity has the potential to
elicit negative consequences, such as collateral damage. However, I believe these potential
consequences are overshadowed by the increased effectiveness of PMFs over U.S. Military
Forces at preventing insurgent attacks. By having this freedom, PMFs have a wider set of options
for strategic and/or successful solutions to decreasing the incidences of insurgent attacks than
U.S. Military Forces.
II. METHODOLOGY
COMPARISON OF THE IRAQI GOVERNORATES OF BASRAH AND THI-QARP
For the purposes of a matched study, I needed to find two cases, specifically two Iraqi
governorates, that were comparable to each other. Therefore, I chose to examine Iraq’s eighteen
governorates according to the following six factors:
(i) Location
(ii) Geographical Landscape
(iii) Population
(iv) Ethnic Makeup
(v) Economy
(vi) Issues (i.e. infrastructure, crime, political, women & public services)

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By categorizing the governorates according to the six factors, I found that Basrah and
Thi-Qar shared similar characteristics when it came to the six factors. Moreover, the two
governorates did differentiate from each other with regards to my independent variable, the
presence of PMFs or U.S. Military Forces. Basrah had a primarily PMF presence, including the
U.S. based PMFs: DynCorp, Triple Canopy, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) and Custer Battles,
as well as U.K. based PMFs: Armor-Group, Hart Security, and Control Risks Group.
It should be pointed out that the British Military Forces were also primarily stationed
in Basrah (Telegraph 2009). For the sake of the matching process, I chose not to incorporate into
my analysis the existence of varying international PMFs, such as U.S. versus U.K. based PMFs,
and the presence of national military forces, such as the British Military Forces, in a primarily
PMF region. As to avoid disregarding these aspects completely, I highlighted these details as
potential confounding variables in the later criticism of my study.
Conversely, Thi-Qar had a primarily U.S. Military Forces presence, with regards to
the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Specifically, Thi-Qar was presided primarily by
the U.S. Marines, although the U.S. Air Force was also present at Tallil Air Force Base, located
near Nasiriyah, the capital (see figure 4). Thi-Qar was also the governorate in which the
infamous Battle of Nasiriyah, a battle between the U.S. Marines from Task Force Tarawa and the
Iraqi army and paramilitaries, took place (Andrew 2004).

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FIGURE 1. VARIABLE COMPARISON OF BASRAH AND THI-QAR.
Smith, Debbie. (2013). Variable Comparison of Basrah and Thi-Qar [Table]. From United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governorate Assessment Reports of
Basrah and Thi-Qar: 2006. UNHCR: 2006. Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, 2006.

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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDS)
For the purposes of examining the effectiveness of PMFs versus U.S. Military Forces
to prevent insurgent attacks, I used the incidences of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) over a
time horizon, specifically 2004 to 2009, as a measure for insurgent attacks. IEDs are essentially
homemade bombs and are most commonly roadside bombs and/or car bombs. The data for the
incidences of IED attacks was derived from the Iraq War Logs, a collection of approximately
400,000 U.S. Army Field reports (The Guardian 2010). WikiLeaks, a not-for-profit media
organization dedicated to global transparency and the freedom of information for the public
audience, disclosed the reports in October 2010. Each log provides information regarding the
region, latitude and longitude, date, affiliation, and casualties (i.e. enemy, friend, civilian, and
host nation) related to IED attacks.
By plotting the GPS coordinates of the IED attacks into Arc Map, I was able to have
an overall understanding of the location and density of these IED attacks in Iraq, specifically
Basrah and Thi-Qar (see figures 5 and 6). The IED attacks were then tracked using a time
horizon from 2004 to 2009 (see figure 7). On a side note, the incidences of IED attacks did vary
for the two regions; Basrah experienced 149 IED attacks while Thi-Qar experienced 38 IED
attacks. Unfortunately, although the Iraq invasion lasted from 2003 to 2011, this was the only
source of comprehensive data available regarding the incidences of IED attacks in Iraq, which is
another criticism detailed later on in this paper.

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FIGURE 2. PRESENCE OF IED ATTACKS ACROSS IRAQ’S 18 GOVERNORATES.
FIGURE 3. PRESENCE OF IED ATTACKS IN BASRAH AND THI-QAR.

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FIGURE 4. TIME HORIZON - INCIDENCES OF IED ATTACKS IN BASRAH AND
THI-QAR FROM 2004 – 2009.
Note: Asterisks for Basrah, December 2007, and Thi-Qar, September 2006, indicate when
security responsibility was shifted over to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). However, with regards
to Thi-Qar, U.S. Military Forces did not fully withdraw until 2011.
III. CONCLUSION
FINDINGS
Upon analysis of my results, I found a negative, surface level correlation between the
presence of PMFs and lesser incidences of insurgent attacks, and conversely, a positive, surface
level correlation between the presence of U.S. Military Forces and lesser incidences of insurgent
attacks. Therefore, my hypothesis that we should see lesser incidences of insurgent attacks over
time if PMFs are present was disproved. However, it must be understood that without statistical
analysis, the surface level correlations I rely upon are not empirically supported. Statistical
analysis could be done to find the level of significance of the correlations as well as the margin
of error.

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A potential reason as to why we saw more incidences of insurgent attacks when
PMFs were present may be the lack of control generally associated with PMFs, which Singer
mentions in his research. Because the majority of PMF activities are not held accountable to
domestic or international legislation, there’s a greater potential for the misuse of power by
private contractors. Moreover, because the U.S. government does not follow the activities of
PSCs in Iraq closely, there’s also the issue of lack of transparency, and therefore, lack of control.
If the government does not know the PSCs’ means of preventing insurgent attacks, it could miss
out on potential abuses carried out by the PSCs. Therefore, although I originally believed the
freedom to act within legal loopholes was one of the advantages PMFs had over U.S. Military
Forces in deterring insurgent attacks, it may have turned out to actually be the opposite.
Although this may be a stretch, I utilized the isolated incident of the Nisour Square
Massacre and its aftermath as a potential example of why the presence of PMFs may lead to
increased incidences of IED attacks. On September 16, 2007, “Blackwater employees opened
fire onto a crowd of Iraqis, killing 17 Iraqi civilians and wounding 20, claiming self-defense”
(Guardian). However, investigations found that the Blackwater employees used “deadly force
without justification, and were never in any danger,” (Guardian). If we examine the incidences
of IED attacks in Baghdad three months before and after the Nisour Square Massacre, we find
that from 06/2007 to 09/2007, the incidences of IED attacks were actually decreasing. However,
after the incident, from 10/2007 to 12/2007, the incidences of IED attacks started to increase
(Figure 5).

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FIGURE 5. INCIDENCES OF IED ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD FROM 06/2007 TO
12/2007.
Dates Incidences of IED Attacks
6/2007 114
7/2007 104
8/2007 66
9/2007 62
10/2007 49
11/2007 53
12/2007 60
Smith, Debbie. (2013). Incidences of IED Attacks in Baghdad from 06/2007 to 12/2007
[Table]. From U.S. Army Field Reports, Iraq War Logs.
As the CRS report points out, “PSCs’ use of deadly force, the killing of allegedly
innocent Iraqi civilians by Blackwater employees, and the State Department’s alleged lack of
concern about accountability have undermined U.S. foreign policy and specifically U.S. standing
in Iraq. Many in the military reported expressed concerns that Blackwater’s actions that day and
over time could alter and degrade relationships that the military is seeking to build with Iraqis”
(CRS 2008). Moreover, “the incident [Nisour Square Massacre] is also being used by those
seeking to exploit accumulated resentments and draw attacks on private contractors,” (CRS
2008).
Unlike U.S. Military Forces, which are bound to numerous pieces of legislation
regarding their conduct in war, the majority of PMF activities exist within a legal loophole,
leading to increased freedom to act as they see fit, including unprovoked shootings of innocent
civilians. This may be one explanation as to why the presence of PMFs leads to more incidences
of IED attacks than the presence of U.S. Military Forces.

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FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Upon examination of PMFs and U.S. Military Forces, it’s evident that legal loopholes
need to be addressed within the U.S. and other nations to increase the level of accountability.
This could be achieved by passing international legislation, decided upon by a governing body
such as the United Nations, that addresses the activities of operating PSCs’. As with the passage
of most international legislation, it can be assumed that this would involve a long and difficult
decision-making process. Even if such legislation were passed with international consensus, I
believe the implementation and execution of the regulations would prove to be a challenging
issue.
Regardless, it is necessary for the international community to finally address and
prepare for the existence of this new and rapidly expanding facet of war making. First and
foremost, the international community must explicitly outline the distinctions between PMFs and
mercenaries as well as combat and noncombat situations. The international community should
also decide upon the status of private contractors, the extent of private contractors roles’ in
combat zones, and legal ramifications, similar to the ones established for insurgents in combat
situations. Although the privatized military industry is a relatively modern concept in the field of
war making, this does not mean the industry should continue to remain unregulated. Security
contractors that act beyond the scope of self-defense and their company’s contracts need to fear
the possibility of prosecution as a means of curtailing potential misuses of power.
I believe recommendations such as the ones listed above would help to improve in the
long run the diplomatic and military relations amongst nations relative to the use of PSCs.
Hopefully, the adoption of such recommendations would also lead to a decrease in the incidences
of attacks in PMF occupied regions.

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CRITICISMS
As Singer points out in his own studies of PMFs in Iraq, the limited data available on
this modern dimension of war making is a problematic feature for current analyses of PMFs
effectiveness. Singer writes, “the topic of privatized military firms remains largely unexplored
for a variety of reasons: the relative newness of the phenomenon, its failure to fall neatly into
existing theoretic frameworks, and, most important, the character of the business itself. Because
these firms’ operations are almost always controversial and secrecy is often the norm, research is
difficult…Likewise, although government activities are open to examination under laws such as
the Freedom of Information Act, the company contracts are protected under proprietary law,
often making their activities completely deniable” (Singer 2003).
Considering the privatized military industry developed only two decades ago and
most PMFs operations are covert and unpublicized, it was difficult to have a thorough analysis of
PMFs in Iraq. Ergo, this study is highly specific and constrained by the public data that was
available due to the lack of comprehensive and legitimated reports. Although the Iraq invasion
lasted from 2003 to 2011, unfortunately, I could only rely on the Iraq War Logs, which span
solely from 2004 to 2009, in combination with news articles, books, and anecdotes from those
individuals who participated in or witnessed such operations. Due to the lack of legitimate and
comprehensive material readily available on this subject, this study required utilizing various
types of sources in an effort to pinpoint the presence and duration of each entity’s stay within
Iraq’s various governorates. Ergo, some degree of error is inevitable within this study.
An additional criticism this research must address is the existence of potential,
confounding variables, specifically the existence of varying international PMFs and the presence
of national military forces in a primarily PMF region. However, because the initial study was

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created to examine solely the correlation between the presence of PMFs or U.S. Military Forces
and incidences of insurgent attacks, the distinctions between the U.S. and U.K. based PMFs, as
well as the presence of other national military forces, were disregarded. Had the study been
reformed to address such aspects, the matching process would have resulted in no similar cases,
or Iraqi governorates, for this study.
Note: Regarding the presence of the British Military Forces in the primarily PMF region of
Basrah, “relations between the British Forces and the local government soured after January
2006. After a series of corrupt police officials and following the release of a video appearing to
show UK troops beating Iraqi civilians in Southern Iraq, the Provincial Council suspended
relations with British Forces in February 2006. It was not until early May that local authorities
agreed to formally resume co-operation” (UNHCR 2006). As displayed in figure 6, Basrah
experienced a slight spike in the incidences of IED attacks from January to February 2006.
However, it was not large enough to compare to the other larger spikes in IED attacks (see figure
4). Regardless, the presence of national military forces could be mediated by examining their
effects in future avenues of research.
FUTURE RESEARCH
In terms of future avenues of research, one suggestion is comparing the varying types
of PMF contractors during the Iraq invasion, whether it’s domestic (i.e. U.S. based) PMFs or
international (i.e. U.K. based) PMFs. As noted earlier, both domestic and international PMFs
operated within Basrah therefore it would be interesting to study which type of PMF led to lesser
incidences of IED attacks. Although I noted that distinguishing PMFs by where they are based
could affect the matching process to yield no cases, this issue could be mediated by manipulating

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the independent variable, the presence of PMFs versus U.S. Military Forces, to the presence of
U.S. versus U.K. based PMFs. The same process could be applied to study the presence and
effectiveness of various national military forces in Iraq.
To create a more comprehensive analysis regarding the use of PMFs and national
military forces, one could combine multiple variables to determine whether PMFs or national
military forces are more efficient and/or effective than the other, including incidences of human
rights abuses, level of economic development, presence of coalition forces, public opinion of
domestic citizens (i.e. U.S.) as well as host nation citizens (i.e. Iraq) throughout the duration of
the Iraq invasion.
One last suggestion for future research is a cost-efficiency analysis of U.S. based
PMFs versus U.S. Military Forces. This type of research could use current cost analysis studies
done of U.S. Military Forces and PMFs, such as those submitted by the Congressional Budget
Office. These economic studies could be analyzed in combination with the effectiveness of each
entity on a myriad of variables, such as deterring IED attacks or decreasing the incidences of
human rights abuses, to create a comprehensive cost-efficiency analysis of U.S. based PMFs
versus U.S. Military Forces.
However, as noted from the beginning of this study, a crucial obstacle to further
avenues of research in this field will be the lack of available, comprehensive data. This is due to
the fact that data collection during a time of war in a region that lacks the necessary
infrastructure or is governed by a politically repressive regime. Even if data collection methods
were made possible during wartime in such regions, such war making operations tend to be overt
and remain unpublicized.

Smith 25
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09-defense-contractor_x.htm>.

Smith 26
Pelton, Robert Young. Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror. New York:
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Smith 27
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