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Session ID:
Session Classification:
Aaron Turner
President, IntegriCell
MBS-R35A
Intermediate
Mobile Aplications:
TheVulnerabilityTsunami is Coming
Presenter Logo
► Prior to modern Tsunami warning systems, these
a similar problem now
► Tectonic shifts in technologies due to
consumerization mobilification
► What is our warning system?
► Anti-virus? Firewalls? The App Stores?
►
correct precursor events or even at the
technological dependencies necessary;
Time to wake up!
Presenter Logo
Tsunami Root Cause Analysis
► The root cause of a tsunami is an
earthquake, a long ways away from
anyone and very hard to see with the
naked eye
► The result of the earthquake is a massive
wave which can wreak destruction at great
distances
Presenter Logo
►
application threats
► According to firms that sell Anti-Virus, we
need to install A/V on mobile devices to
protect ourselves (except for Apple which tells
should just trust them)
► What other messages are out there for mobile
application security?
► Carriers will protect us?
► Handset manufacturers will protect us?
Mobile ApplicationSecurityAnalysis
Presenter Logo
►
►
► What are the actual application threats how vulnerable are apps?
► Wait, the apps are just isolated executables
of n-tiered application architectures?
► What permissions have we given these apps?
Ooops
Presenter Logo
► Static analysis tools give us some insight into the overall
quality of an executable published to the app stores
► IntegriCell partnered with experts in static analysis to
evaluate iOS and Android applications
►
► Astounding number of security problems in even these very
small apps (average size was ~4 mb) connected to very
simple back-end platforms (mostly JSON)
Presenter Logo
► 55 applications reviewed
► All analysis performed
without permission of
application owner
► Application names withheld
► (We tried asking for
permission but none would
grant it)
► Significant numbers of false
positives in these numbers
due to de-compilers used to
begin analysis
ApplicationVulnerabilities
Vulnerability Type % of Occurrence
SQL Injection (client) 35%
AuthZ Weakness (client) 48%
CRLF Injection (client) 51%
XSite Scripting (client) 28%
Directory Traversal (client) 38%
Unencrypted Data (client) 99%
Crypto Material Errors (client) 14%
Reflected XSS (client) 28%
Clear-text Password (network) 72%
Unreleased Streams (client) 12%
Presenter Logo
► 55 back-ends
evaluated
with
and other tools
► Every application
tested had some sort
of back-end
component (API, ad-
server connection,
etc.)
► Predominantly Linux
back-end servers with
JSON installed
Vulnerabilities % of Occurrence
Unencrypted Data 99%
Unrestricted Passwords 74%
Session Termination Flaw (network) 82%
AuthN Bypass 79%
Default Permissions & ACL’s 99%
Directory Browsing 95%
Web Server Patch & Configuration 100%
Presenter Logo
► One application tested was just really, really bad
► 200+ code flaws (in 3 mb of compiled code!)
► 40+ unique web server vulnerabilities
(excluding 20+ critical updates that were not installed)
►
stores?
► The app stores do not perform any sort of static or dynamic analysis
of the applications; they ONLY assure that permissions are requested
and granted as stated in the application manifest.
TheWall of Shame
Presenter Logo
► Try to attack millions of smartphones and
tablets with unique drivers, unknown
patch levels, etc?
► Attack the back-ends and piggy back on
► Working with Marvin team we
discovered:
Permissions found among 2500+ apps % of Occurrence
READ_CONTACTS 31%
READ_SMS 9%
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 65%
Presenter Logo
► Automated static analysis tools are economical. REQUIRE
YOUR APP PROVIDERS TO GIVE YOU AN ANALYSIS BEFORE
ACCEPT DELIVERY!
►
worth it. Application back-ends will be the point of attack
for large-scale exploitation
► Understand how transitive trust models work on mobile
devices. Best option is to deploy a PIM container for
enterprise data.
The Bottom Line
Thanks for your attention!
AaronTurner
aaron.turner@integricell.com

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Mbs r35 a

  • 1. Session ID: Session Classification: Aaron Turner President, IntegriCell MBS-R35A Intermediate Mobile Aplications: TheVulnerabilityTsunami is Coming
  • 2. Presenter Logo ► Prior to modern Tsunami warning systems, these a similar problem now ► Tectonic shifts in technologies due to consumerization mobilification ► What is our warning system? ► Anti-virus? Firewalls? The App Stores? ► correct precursor events or even at the technological dependencies necessary; Time to wake up!
  • 3. Presenter Logo Tsunami Root Cause Analysis ► The root cause of a tsunami is an earthquake, a long ways away from anyone and very hard to see with the naked eye ► The result of the earthquake is a massive wave which can wreak destruction at great distances
  • 4. Presenter Logo ► application threats ► According to firms that sell Anti-Virus, we need to install A/V on mobile devices to protect ourselves (except for Apple which tells should just trust them) ► What other messages are out there for mobile application security? ► Carriers will protect us? ► Handset manufacturers will protect us? Mobile ApplicationSecurityAnalysis
  • 5. Presenter Logo ► ► ► What are the actual application threats how vulnerable are apps? ► Wait, the apps are just isolated executables of n-tiered application architectures? ► What permissions have we given these apps? Ooops
  • 6. Presenter Logo ► Static analysis tools give us some insight into the overall quality of an executable published to the app stores ► IntegriCell partnered with experts in static analysis to evaluate iOS and Android applications ► ► Astounding number of security problems in even these very small apps (average size was ~4 mb) connected to very simple back-end platforms (mostly JSON)
  • 7. Presenter Logo ► 55 applications reviewed ► All analysis performed without permission of application owner ► Application names withheld ► (We tried asking for permission but none would grant it) ► Significant numbers of false positives in these numbers due to de-compilers used to begin analysis ApplicationVulnerabilities Vulnerability Type % of Occurrence SQL Injection (client) 35% AuthZ Weakness (client) 48% CRLF Injection (client) 51% XSite Scripting (client) 28% Directory Traversal (client) 38% Unencrypted Data (client) 99% Crypto Material Errors (client) 14% Reflected XSS (client) 28% Clear-text Password (network) 72% Unreleased Streams (client) 12%
  • 8. Presenter Logo ► 55 back-ends evaluated with and other tools ► Every application tested had some sort of back-end component (API, ad- server connection, etc.) ► Predominantly Linux back-end servers with JSON installed Vulnerabilities % of Occurrence Unencrypted Data 99% Unrestricted Passwords 74% Session Termination Flaw (network) 82% AuthN Bypass 79% Default Permissions & ACL’s 99% Directory Browsing 95% Web Server Patch & Configuration 100%
  • 9. Presenter Logo ► One application tested was just really, really bad ► 200+ code flaws (in 3 mb of compiled code!) ► 40+ unique web server vulnerabilities (excluding 20+ critical updates that were not installed) ► stores? ► The app stores do not perform any sort of static or dynamic analysis of the applications; they ONLY assure that permissions are requested and granted as stated in the application manifest. TheWall of Shame
  • 10. Presenter Logo ► Try to attack millions of smartphones and tablets with unique drivers, unknown patch levels, etc? ► Attack the back-ends and piggy back on ► Working with Marvin team we discovered: Permissions found among 2500+ apps % of Occurrence READ_CONTACTS 31% READ_SMS 9% ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 65%
  • 11. Presenter Logo ► Automated static analysis tools are economical. REQUIRE YOUR APP PROVIDERS TO GIVE YOU AN ANALYSIS BEFORE ACCEPT DELIVERY! ► worth it. Application back-ends will be the point of attack for large-scale exploitation ► Understand how transitive trust models work on mobile devices. Best option is to deploy a PIM container for enterprise data. The Bottom Line
  • 12. Thanks for your attention! AaronTurner aaron.turner@integricell.com