3. DISCLAIMER
“All efforts have been taken to
correctly pronounce names of
the Commanders and Ships of
the battle in this
presentation. Any funny sounds
during the presentation are
purely coincidental and
unintentional”
- Pizey Syndicate
6. BATTLE WITH RELATIVELY MODERN SHIPS
1ST MAJOR NAVAL BATTLE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ERA
AMBITIOUS & AGGRESSIVE FORCES
17 SEP 1894
7. Instrument of imperial challenge post Meiji
era and rise of Nationalists
Mirror of Tsushima Battle (Russo-Japanese
War)
PROLOGUE
8. China mined by corrupted officials
Conciliant International Policy
Fed imperialist appetites including Japan
Large untapped industrial market
Several wars (with Britain, France, USA) saw all-out
easy victories, as the Chinese fleet mostly counted
armed junks & few modern vessels
PROLOGUE
9. Motivated over influence of
Korea
Weakened Qing Empire vs
Successful Meiji Restoration
Result :
China humiliated,
loosing Korea as a
tributary state
Japan left with more
resolve and confidence
PROLOGUE
10. 04 Jun 1894, Korean King Gojong, sought
help from Qing govt in suppressing
Donghak Rebellion
General Yuan Shikai and contingent of
28,000 men
Japanese took it as violation by
Convention of Tientsin and deployed 8000
troops
Any reform of Korean Govt was refused
and Pro-Japanese Govt established
PROLOGUE
11. Qing had no national army
Divided based on ethnicity and region
Local Beiyang Army - well-equipped and trained with
modernised equipment
CHINESE
FORCES
PROLOGUE
12. CHINESE
FORCES
Beiyang Fleet - best amongst whole Empire
Northern (Beiyang), Southern (Nanking), Foochow
and Canton
1880 - Modernisation efforts with British
1884 - Foochow Fleet sunk by French Navy over
Indochina
Lack of ammunitions, funds - corrupt officials
PROLOGUE
13. 1894 – Beiyang Fleet considered first-rate
in Asia, largely supported by Li Hongzhang,
Viceroy of Zhili
Armoured turret ships (TingYuen class)
8000 tons German-built battleships
Armoured cruisers KingYuen
LaiYuen
Protected cruisers ChenYuen, ChingYuen
Torpedo CruisersTsiYuen
Kuang Ping class Chaoyong,Yangwei
Coastal warship Pingyuan
CHINESE
FORCES
PROLOGUE
14. Japanese infantry – initially trained and formed
by French officers
JAPANESE
FORCES
Re-modelled after the Prussian model from 1885
Well equipped with German guns
PROLOGUE
15. Western, high level standard doctrines, military system
and organization
Improved Mobility by enhancing logistics,
transportation and structures
In Year 1894, 120000 men and 04
divisions were mobilized
JAPANESE
FORCES
PROLOGUE
16. JAPANESE
FORCES
Japanese Navy - young underdog in 1894
Officers formed by British Navy, Academy
set up by France
1881 - First expansion bill passed,
ordering 46 vessels (French & British
yards) including 2 cruisers
PROLOGUE
17. JAPANESE
FORCES
1886 - Yokosuka Yard refit by French engineer
Emile Berti
Ironclad Hull Ships
1890 – 1st VTE engines (CruiserOshima) and
1892 – 1st HTE engines
1893 – New naval expansion plan passed
PROLOGUE
18. July 1894 - Japanese mustered all available
warships into one combined force
9 Protected Cruisers
Matsushima (flagship)
Itsukushima
Hashidate
Naniwa
Takachiho
Yaeyama
Akitsushima
Yoshino
Izumi
Cruiser Chiyoda
Armored Corvettes
Hiei
Kongō
Fusō
JAPANESE
FORCES
PROLOGUE
19. Known as Sinking of the Kow-
shing
Small scale engagement,
between the cruiser Naniwa and
the Chinese cruiser Tsi-yuan and
gunboats Kwang-yi and Tsao-
kiang
At sea to reinforce the escort of
the transport Kow-shing
25 JULY 1894
BATTLE OF PUNGDO
PROLOGUE
20. Guns blazed for an hour
Damaged Chinese cruiser fled
Kwang-yi ran aground to avoid
sinking
Kow-shing sank, with nearly all
hands
Naniwa’s captain Tōgō
Heihachirō became a celebrity in
Japan for this feat
25 JULY 1894
BATTLE OF PUNGDO
PROLOGUE
21. 17 SEP 1894
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
OF YALU RIVER
Beiyang fleet - located off the mouth of the Yalu
River
Japanese objective - command of the yellow sea to
allow transport Japanese troops to the mainland
Chinese fleet - tough nut to crack
Two Chinese battleships vs Nil Japanese
PROLOGUE
22. Li Hongzhang recommended the
Beiyang Fleet to be kept safely in
Lüshunkou
Guangxu Emperor insisted that
convoys to pass safely and required
neutralizing Japanese Fleet
Beiyang Fleet intercepted by the
Japanese enroute from the mouth
of the Yalu River, escorting a
convoy
17 SEP 1894
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
OF YALU RIVER
PROLOGUE
25. Belligerents
Qing China &
Imperial Empire of Japan
Commanders and Leaders
China - Adm Ding Ruchang
Adm Liu Buchan
Japan - VAdm Ito Sukeyuki
RAdm Tsuboi Kozo
NARRATIVE
28. Both fleets approached each
other in contrasting formations
Chinese intended to form a line
with the ships side by side;
wedge formation
Imperial fleet was in column
formation with the flying
squadron in front
Japanese flying squadron
attacked Beiyang’s Fleet
right flank
Chinese opened fire at 5500 Yards;
Japanese held their fire
NARRATIVE
30. Japanese ships also received
major damages (Yoshino was
hit, Akagi and Saikyo Maru were
put out of action)
Major Japanese ships fired their heavy
and quick firing guns that swept the
decks of Chinese ships and smashed
their superstructures
When flying squadron turned
South, Beiyand fleet was caught
between 02Japanese squadrons
Japanese flying squadron
successfully hunted down &
destroyed the cruiser
Jingyuam
By sunset the Beiyang fleet was
near the point of total collapse
where in most of the fleet had
fled or sunk
NARRATIVE
31.
32. OP ANALYSIS
FORCE COMARISION
CHINESE
BEIYANG FLEET
02 Battleships
08 Cruisers
02 Corvette
02Torpedo boats
IMPERIAL
JAPANESE NAVY
09 Cruisers
01 Corvette
01 Gunboat
01Auxiliary Cruiser
33. ADVANTAGES
NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY
SUPERIOR BATTLE SHIPS
IRON CLAD SHIPS
BIGGERCALIBER GUNS
DISADVANTAGES
LOWER SPEED
LOW RATE OF FIRE
VINTAGE FLEET
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF
COMBAT POTENTIAL IN
FORMATION
OP ANALYSIS
FORCE COMARISION
35. OP ANALYSIS
FORCE COMARISION
ADVANTAGES
MVREAND FAST
HIGHER RATE OF FIRE
LATESTAND MODERN SHIPS
DISADVANTAGES
LESSER IN NUMBERS
NO BATTLE SHIPS
LOW RATE OF FIRE
36. STRATEGIC LOCATION
BETWEEN CHINA AND KOREA
CHINESE FLEET ORDERED NOT
TO CROSS SOUTH OF YALU
RIVER
JAPNESE COULD OPERATE
FREELY ON WEST COAST OF
KOREA
OP ANALYSIS
FACTOR OF SPACE
37. DESTROYED ONE CHINESE
SHIP PRIOR TO BATTLE IN SEP
1894
ONE DAY AFTER DECISIVE
VICTORY ON LAND - HIGHER
TEMPO
BATTLE LASTED ONLY FIVE
HOURS
OP ANALYSIS
FACTOR OFTIME
38. OP ANALYSIS
FACTOR OF INFORMATION
JAPANESE FLEET WAS AWARE OF
MOVEMENTOF CHINESE FLEET
EASYTO DETECT
GAP IN INFORMATION FLOW
39. OP ANALYSIS
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT
UNAVAILABILITY OF
AMMUNITION WITH
CHINESE
POOR MATERIAL STATE
OF AMMUNITION HELD
WRONG CALIBER OF
AMMUNITION
LIMITED LIVE
AMMUNITION
40. OP ANALYSIS
MISC FACTORS
ADVANCED WESTERN TRAINING OF JAPANESE
JAPANESE EVOLVED MODERN TACTICS AND
DOCTRINES
POOR DISCIPLNE MORALE AND TRAINING OF CHINESE
TROOPS
FASTER SPEED AND MOBILITY OF JAPANESE SHIPS
41. OP ANALYSIS
MISC FACTORS
CHINESE TACTICS OF PLACING WEAKER SHIPS IN
FLANKS
JAPANESE EXPLOITED WEAKENESS OF CHINESE
TACTICS
WEAK AND CORRUPT NATIONAL AND MILITARY
LEADERSHIP
POOR C2 OF CHINESE FLEET
44. NON UNIFIEDAND REGIONAL NAVIES
Absence of unified and modern national
armed forces
Existence of regional armies and navies
Rivalry between Nanyang Fleet and
Beiyang Fleet
Leadership at apex level
LESSONS LEARNT
45. STRATEGIC & TACTICAL AIM
No comprehensive Chinese plans
Giant pincer movement
Contingency planning
LESSONS LEARNT
46. Chinese indifference
towards Japanese
Ignored growth of
Japanese Navy
LACK OF PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE
LESSONS LEARNT
47. In-effective tactical communication
Hesitation of leadership to acknowledge
orders
Japanese destruction of Dingyuan’s
foremast
Information superiority of Japanese
TACTICAL COMMUNICATION
LESSONS LEARNT
48. Rapid assimilation of western
technology - Japanese
Poor quality of Chinese
ammunition
Slow industrial advancements -
Chinese
MODERN TECHNOLOGY
LESSONS LEARNT
49. Heavier Chinese ships
Speed and mobility of
Japanese ships
LITTORAL WARFARE
LESSONS LEARNT
50. Outdated main guns – Chinese
Poorly skilled Chinese crew
GUN MOUNTING AND SKILLS
LESSONS LEARNT