ISLAMIC JIHAD IN INDIA.pptx

ISLAMIC JIHAD IN INDIA
&
Threat to critical
infrastructure
and protection strategies
THE RESURGENT THREAT NEAR BENGAL AND ADJECENT
REGIONS FROM BANGLADESH BASED TERRORIST YBRID
ORGANISATIONS LIKE JMB, HUJI, ANSARULLAH

• Transnational security challenges are threats to the security of
nations characterized by an event or phenomenon of cross-border
scope, the dynamics of which are significantly (but not necessarily
exclusively) driven by non-state actors (e.g., terrorists), activities (e.g.,
global economic behavior).
• international terrorism, transnational organized crime, climate change
and climate-related migration, as well as the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and small arms and light weapons
(SALW), are among the most salient transnational security challenges
on a global scale.
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREAT
• Transnational security issues have been of concern to policy makers
for quite some time now.
• Global terrorism, human trafficking, small arms proliferation and
other forms of transnational security threats have raised concern
among policy makers for several reasons.
• the negative impacts of such transnational issues do not remain
confined to the territorial boundary of a state; rather these spill over
and affect other countries.
• in recent times, transnational security threats have caused serious
damage to the economic, social and political development at the
systemic level.

Bangladesh terror link
• Intelligence sources reveal that the militant groups active in Bangladesh have established links with
international and regional terror groups and receive support, assistance, training and funds to carry
out activities within and beyond the national boundary.
• It is alleged, for instance, that the HuJI-B was formed in Bangladesh drawing inspiration from Al
Qaeda and the group continues to maintain active links with the Al Qaeda network and remnants of
the Taliban militia.
• The HuJI-B, for its part, is believed to have links with terrorist groups based in Pakistan. According to
sources, HuJI-B also has connections with insurgent groups operating in Northeast India.
• According to reports, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives of Indian and Pakistani nationalities are
active in Bangladesh, and are working to build a strong militant network.
• the intelligence agencies have gathered information that the Pakistan-based militant group is
recruiting cadres from Rohingya refugees in Chittagong.
• Indian security analysts report that the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), an ethnic insurgent
group from North East India, maintains linkages with terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh.
• It is also reported that ULFA established its camps in the territory of Bangladesh and that ULFA
operatives received training at various camps of the HUJI-B

Recent incidents related to JMB
• The arrested terrorist of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Mohammad
Jahid-ul Islam alias Bomber Miyan alias Kausar has revealed their group’s plans of
launching jihad in Indian states like West Bengal and Assam. According to a report in
India Today, the terrorist has admitted during interrogation that they were planning to
use exploit the Rohingya issue to further their cause of launching Jihad against India.
• He has reportedly revealed that they had planned the blasts at the Mahabodhi Temple
in Bodhgaya to be the ‘announcement’ of their arrival and a display of their capabilities.
As the Dalai Lama was visiting at the time and a great number of Buddhist pilgrims were
to visit the temple, the blasts were planned to have the maximum impact. On
January 19, 3 powerful IEDs were found in the temple after one of the devices
malfunctioned and caught fire. Kausar is reportedly an explosives expert.
• Two other arrested terrorists in the case had revealed that the IED was placed near
cooking cylinders to cause maximum damage, as the blast would have exploded the LPG
cylinders too. Another IED was reportedly planted near the gate to kill escaping people.
The media coverage and severity of attack was the intended ‘announcement’ the JMB
planned for. Two West Bengal residents, Abdul Karim and Mustafizur Rehman, who were
arrested in Kerala on August 5 were believed to have been recruited by Kausar. Kausar’s
another associate Adil alias Asadullah was also arrested by NIA in Bangalore.

• Kausar Ali alias Mohammad Jahid-Ul Islam is reportedly JMB’s deputy chief who had
escaped from the Bangladeshi authorities in 2014 during the prison transport and had
infiltrated into India.
• He had immediately started recruiting people. He had married a local girl in Birbhum and
even taught in a Madarsa in Beldanga. However, his immediate plans in 2014 were foiled
after an accidental blast in Khagragarh, Burdwan killed two operatives and alerted the
Indian authorities of a large existing JMB network already operational in India. The
Khagragarh unit was reportedly making explosives to be smuggled into Bangladesh.
• Kausar then reportedly went underground and is believed to have travelled across south
India as a workman or plumber. He is believed to have recruited many people over the
years and has even been involved in the radicalisation of Muslim youth in several areas.
He was arrested from Ramnagara near Bangalore.
• The India Today report states that the NIA believes the JMB has many operational
modules in India and many top JMB operatives have met Kausar on several occasions. On
8th August another JMB operative was arrested from Pakur, Jharkhand. Earlier in July,
two JMB operatives were arrested in Delhi while they were trying to activate a module
consisting of Rohingya Muslims.

• Recently another JMB operative named Mohammad Musiruddin alias Musa was
arrested by the West Bengal CID on suspected links to the Khagragarh blast case.
NIA was also probing on his suspected terror links and the US FBI has also
interrogated Musa over his ISIS links. Musa had admittedly in contact with several
top ISIS leaders.
• It is notable here that when Kausar alias Bomber Miyan was being interrogated in
Bangladesh after his arrest, he had revealed that JMB has close ties with the
Rohingya terrorist group Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and JMB
operatives have received training in firearms from RSO in exchange for lessons on
explosives. It was well-known that the JMB was targeting Buddhist pilgrimage
sites as a ‘revenge’ for the Rohingya crisis.
• Security agencies in India have long since warned the potential danger the
Rohingya refugees possess to India and have alerted of their links to terror
organisations. Rohingya refugee camps are suspected to be the breeding ground
for radicalisation and terror activities. Now, with the revelation of JMB’s deep-
rooted network in India and their plans for jihad on Indian soil, the need for strict
action on Rohingya refugees is the ever more important. It also exposes the treat
that the porous India Bangladesh border poses for our national security

• The National Investigative Agency (NIA) has arrested the deputy chief of
Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Mohammed Jahidul Islam alias
Boma Miyan for allegedly carrying out the blasts in Bodh Gaya in January
this year ahead of a visit by the Dalai Lama.
• NIA officials have also arrested another accused Adil alias Assadullah, a
resident of village Elsiabad in district Murshidabad of West Bengal in
Bangalore on Tuesday. The police have recovered mobile handsets, bank
slips, handwritten notes in Bangla language and a note containing chemical
formulas for preparation of IEDs.
• The NIA registered a case under IPC Sections 120, 121-A, 122, 123 &
153(A); Sec 16, 18 and 20 of UA (P) Act, 1967; Sec 14, 17 and 19 of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery System, UA (P)Act, 2005; and
Section 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substance Act to investigate the recovery
and explosion of IEDs near Kalchakra Maidan, Bodh Gaya, in Bihar.

• “The two people arrested were part of the group of around half-a-
dozen JMB men who planted the IEDs. Their associates were
involved in the Burdwan incident of 2014 when an accidental blast
revealed the presence of a huge JMB network in the border region of
Bengal. We have reason to believe that a wanted accused in the
Burdwan case is the mastermind of the January Bodh Gaya incident,”.
• The intelligence agencies have warned the state governments that
the JMB terrorists based in Bangladesh may enter states of West
Bengal and Assam to increase its presence in the country by recruiting
Indian Muslims into their organisation to inflict terror in the country.

• Special Task Force of West Bengal police has nabbed two operatives of Jamaat-ul-
Mujahideen Bangladesh from state’s Murshidabad district, with possession of
explosives materials, taking the number of arrested operatives this month to six.
• Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh or JMB is a terrorist organization which
operates from Bangladesh. It was reported to be behind the Dhaka Terror attack of
2016. They have been active in Bangladesh, and demand formation of an Islamic
theocratic state based on sharia, replacing the constitutionally secular republic of
Bangladesh.
• Moshibur Rahman alias Farooque, age 35, and Ruhul Amin alias Saifullah, age 26,
were nabbed by collective efforts of Kolkata Special Task Force and Murshidabad
area police.
• “Both Moshibur and Ruhul, residents of Murshidabad district, are active members
of the outlawed JMB. A cache of explosive materials, including aluminum dust,
Calether (spirit of ether) and sulphuric acid, have been recovered from their
possession,” An official was quoted by Press Trust of India.

• Earlier too, JMB operatives, Paigambar Sheikh (24) and Jamirul Sheikh (31),
both residents of Murshidabad district, suspected to be involved in the
Bodh Gaya blasts, who were apprehended by Kolkata Police Special Task
Force (STF) from Murshidabad and Darjeeling districts of West Bengal,
revealed that Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is attempting to seek
revenge of genocide of Rohingyas in Buddhist-dominated Myanmar by
targeting Buddhist pilgrimages across India.
• Based on the inputs, received by the two accused police raided a house in
Dhuliyan in Murshidabad district and recovered more than 200 kg
ammonium nitrate, 50 detonators, timers, sockets and tiffin boxes. Police
suspect that the bombs exploded in Bodh Gaya last month were
manufactured here. However, the owner of the house is on the run.

The threat of jamat
• The Jehadi threat to India has three routes Jammu & Kashmir, North East
including Bengal and the Southern Peninsula.
• The threat from the North East especially Assam and Bengal has not yet evolved
into an armed conflict or terrorism.
• However, Al Qaeda affiliates from Bangladesh were reported in the past for
having crossed over many times into Bengal when Bangladesh authorities were
hot on their heels.
• Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh
(HuJI-B) and Ansarul Islam, dominate Bangladesh’s jihadist landscape today.
• These organisations will endeavour to have a safe haven in South Assam and
West Bengal. Ansarul Islam is linked to Al Qaeda and JMB is close to ISIS. HUJI –B
has the backing of Taliban and was also supported by ISI of Pakistan.
• It has carried out terror attacks in Bangladesh and India. It has been targeting
temples, bloggers and Hindus in Bangladesh. They have known to have recruited
cadres from Rohingya Muslims and radicalised youths from Bangladesh and are
now making inroads in Assam and Bengal

• The possibility of more number of radical youth still operating as sleeper cells cannot be
ruled out. The call by Anwar al-Awlaki was that Al Qaeda cadres should not rush to Syria
or Iraq but should start consolidating their positions in their own country.
• There may be large number of radicalised youth who were willing to join Jihad in West
Asia but now waiting in India to start operations when called upon to do so. There is a
threat that is manifesting from the home-grown Jihadi terrorists that is formed by the
breakaway faction of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).
• Indian jihadism primarily by reference to Pakistan. The IM threat is a response to Indian
domestic failings, including political malfeasance, economic inequality, and a widespread
sense of injustice. However, it is one far more lethal as a result of external support. India
has been confronting jihadist violence for decades. Yet these dynamics remain
underexplored and difficult to comprehend, particularly in terms of ties to either the
Pakistani state or nonstate Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadist groups.
• Expeditionary terrorism by Pakistani militants typically receives the most focus, but
indigenous actors benefiting from external support are responsible for the majority of
jihadist attacks within India. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) network that announced its
presence in 2007 is only the latest and most well-known manifestation of the indigenous
Islamist militant threat. A few Indian Muslims have been launching terrorist strikes—
often with Pakistani support and sometimes on their own—for more than twenty years.
The threat of jamat

• The Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, although founded in 1998, came
to prominence in 2005 after the group successfully carried out almost 500
near simultaneous bomb blasts in 63 out of the 64 districts of Bangladesh
on 17 August 2005.
• These attacks came six months after the JMB was proscribed by the
Khaleda Zia led Bangladesh Government of the day. Jamaatul Mujahidin
Bangladesh (JMB), an indigenous terrorist group founded in 19981 and
committed to establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh through violence,
stormed onto South Asia’s jihadist scene with a synchronized, country-wide
bomb assault on August 17, 2005.
• The group detonated approximately 460 bombs within a 30-minute period
at 300 locations in 63 of the 64 districts in Bangladesh. Later in 2005, JMB
targeted the country’s judiciary—court buildings, judges, and government
officials—with suicide attacks in an effort to intimidate authorities into
releasing around 400 JMB suspects arrested after the August countrywide
blasts.
The threat of jamat

• At peak it had strength of 10,000 full time and almost 100,000 part time
cadre. Shortly after the incidents, authorities apprehended more than 700
suspected members of JMB and its affiliate party, Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh (JMJB).
• Terrorist groups do not usually go underground and then come back as
different factions following different ideologies. It is unclear why the JMB
resurfaced as three separate factions after the group was presumed to be
wiped out by law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh. A possible reason
for this could be the fact that the group lacked any kind of leadership after
the government crackdown that led to the arrest of its top leadership and
those militants who were still free, found other radical groups to ally with,
in the absence of a leader.
• India should not only be worried but should also be aware and careful of
the impending threat. The Ideal option is having situational awareness,
proactive stance and systems on ground to handle the threat in being.
The threat of jamat

• Political patronage to any of the radical organisation will be damaging and can threaten
national security. At the same time India should not forget that Pakistan will continue to
give impetus to spread radicalisation and Islamic terrorism especially in Kashmir and
other parts of India to create instability.
• Thus, Al Qaeda and ISIS is making inroads from North East, Bengal, Southern Peninsula
and cyber space. Simultaneously LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed are penetrating through
J&K to spread their foot prints in India.
• Thus, it is sending a message that India is a soft state and as a result has emerged as a
most- friendly nation to the terrorists. The threat to India is real and enduring and the
nation cannot ignore this threat for long. The threat will become lethal if Indian
authorities and political leadership continue to mollycoddle the terrorists.
• Cyber space has become the biggest threat and requires no physical contact to radicalise
youth. The numbers of youth who have joined Al Qaeda or ISIS may be less than 100 but
it is unknown how many have been radicalised and waiting to start acts of terror with in
India. India needs to guard the three physical corridors of peril but it should be very
careful of the fourth corridor and that is cyber.
The threat of jamat

• The presence of JMB militants in India can be attributed to the counter measures adopted by the
Bangladesh government, which drove them out of Bangladesh and to the porous nature of the Indo-
Bangladesh border, allowing militants to pilfer into India without much trouble. Between 2014 and 2017,
more than 3,000 militants belonging to terrorist groups JMB and HUJI-B entered India through West Bengal,
Assam and Tripura.
• Investigations carried out by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) revealed that the JMB has not only
found secure places to live, but have also set up recruitment camps, madrasas and training camps in areas
close to the international border, as was also confirmed in the MHA notification that banned JMB. The NIA
recovered IED’s, training manuals and several documents encouraging killing foreign nationals and Buddhists
in India and Bangladesh in response to the atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.
• Furthermore, the rough terrain of India’s international border with Bangladesh makes it difficult for border
forces to prevent infiltration through irregular routes such as with the help of boats through the rivers and
streams at the border. Therefore, the ability of CIBMS’s to stop illegal migration is something that will have
to been seen over a period of time.
• The Islamic State backing to the JMB has given a massive boost to their operations in India — ideologically
and logistically. The Indian government needs to have better Center-State coordination when it comes to
border management to make sure illegal migration of terrorists into the country is checked and erode the
conducive environment that currently exists at the border for terror groups to find haven and, with time,
expand.
• The Indian government, along with the government of Bangladesh, needs to continue its concerted effort to
eradicate the group and ensure regional security.
The threat of jamat

The peculiarities of the Indian
Jihadist terrorism
• All terrorist activities in the indian peninsula have been result of the direct
or indirect aid from the external intelligence agencies from neighboring
countries and the strikes are planned, choreographed and guided from
outside.
• All the Indian counterparts are hybrid organizations who used the
radicalized criminals of Muslim faith who were also involved with organized
crime.
• So of these extremist youth I recent times have illegally infiltrated in to
India through the porous borders in India they are motivated the PAN
Global Islamic Jihadist ideology from the IKWANUL MUSLIMIN.
• Normal penal provisions in law INEFFECTIVE as deterrent to these
ideologically motivated organized criminals and predators.

Radicalisation
• India must focus counter and anti-radicalisation so that potential terrorists are
prevented before they are radicalised by unarmed Jihadis. De-radicalisation is
only theoretical because it is near impossible to reclaim a radicalised youth.
• The second important aspect is that India needs to further improve the
intelligence grid and states should not allow Al Qaeda affiliates to establish foot
prints on the ground as these organisations are ruthless and uncompromising.
• There is a need to monitor the activities of Wahhabi and. Jamaat-e-Islami
activists. It will be difficult to control spread of Al Qaeda and ISIS ideology if it
finds support base because terrorism often attracts extreme among the
extremists.
• India must gear up to take on the Jihadi elements in the North East and establish
an active intelligence grid with the capability to neutralise the terrorists of the
above Jihadi organisations.
• India, Myanmar and Bangladesh could work out a joint strategy to monitor cyber
space and share intelligence about the movement, activities and recruitment of
cadres in real times basis. There is also a need to make border guarding forces
more accountable for prevention of infiltration

JAMATS HYBRID NATURE
• Makarenko posits that the crime-terror nexus occurs in four different forms:
alliances, operational motivations, convergence and the black hole. The alliance
between criminal groups and terrorists could be one-off, shortterm or long-term.
• It could result in seeking expertise (for example on bomb making), operational
support (for accessing smuggling routes) etc. Secondly, an alliance could be
forged to trade in traditional operations. For example, criminal groups could
engage in political activities whereas terrorist groups could engage in criminal
activity.
• Convergence is a form of merger where each side displays the characteristics of
each other. Black holes are essentially safe havens where the thin line that
separates their activities disappears in a permissive ‘failed state’ environment.
• Mullins and Wither have developed a neat categorisation of the crimes that are
committed by terrorists and the nature of the relationship between the two
groups which they have delineated as follows – Interaction, Appropriation,
Assimilation and Transformation.
• The nexus between terrorism and organised crime presents a major challenge for
India

• The increasing scrutiny of state-sponsored terrorism after 9/11 dried up funding
for terrorist groups by states and pushed these groups towards crime-related
activities for funding.
• Terrorist groups need a steady stream of funding to finance their operations, and
often resort to a plethora of illegal activities which includes the hawala system,
abuse of charities or donations from diasporic communities, credit card fraud and
illegal arms sales.
• Therefore, crime and terrorism have a symbiotic relationship with organisational,
operational and ideological links that are cultivated through close coordination, or
in some cases, through fostering strong linkages.
• Rapid advances in telecommunication technologies, particularly social media
platforms, the dark web on the Internet and illegal payment channels have
bolstered the crime-terror nexus which, at times, can acquire a transnational
character depending on their geographic spread, the expectations of the groups
involved and the nature of the nexus.

• the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group’s recruitment targets criminals, with data that
shows up to 50-80% of IS recruits have a criminal record.
• There are several conditions that make India particularly prone to transnational
organised crime and terrorism. These include, among others, proximity to major
heroin producers and exporters, regional drug trade through overland routes and
the sea.
• Moreover, groups willing to take risks, pervasive poverty and the protracted
nature of ‘low intensity’ conflicts have also created a permissible environment for
the crime-terror nexus in India.
• Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar is the Muslim leader of South Asia’s largest crime
syndicate, known as D-company. His criminal associate, Tiger Memon, engineered
a lethal series of thirteen car, scooter, and suitcase bomb blasts in Mumbai
(Bombay at the time) in March 1993. Expatriate Indian smugglers based in the
United Arab Emirates financed the attacks.
• The attacks, which hit the Bombay Stock Exchange, three hotels, and a host of
other targets, killed 257 people and injured more than seven hundred. This
remains the largest and most deadly coordinated terrorist incident in India’s
history.

• Memon spearheaded the recruitment of Muslim youths to execute them.
Nineteen of the youth were sent via Dubai, where D-Company has robust
networks, to Pakistan for training in the use of weapons and bomb making. It is
unlikely an attack of this magnitude could have been executed without the
support of Dawood’s criminal infrastructure.
• Ibrahim, Tiger Memon, and others from D-Company relocated to Karachi. D-
Company is still mentioned frequently in media reports as supporting militant
activities in India, but little hard evidence supports its enduring importance.
• However, the link between organized criminality in general and Islamist militancy
did remain a lasting feature of the Indian jihadist movement. The Asif Raza
Commando Brigade (ARCF), formed by gangsters-cum-jihadists, constitutes one
of the two major building blocks of the movement.
• The Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (TIM), or Organization for the Improvement of
Muslims, is the other. Activists from the Gorba faction of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith
in Mumbai formed the TIM in the Mominpora slum in summer 1985

RISE OF ISLAMIC MILTANCY AND RADICALISATION
• The demonopolization of Islam subverted the authority of the Ulema (Muslim
scholars) and created space for radical actors, who took matters into their own
hands.
• A significant number of Indian Muslims who became involved in Islamist militancy
came from the Students Islamic Movement of India. SIMI was founded in 1977 at
Aligarh Muslim University in Uttar Pradesh as the student wing of the Jamaat-e-
Islami Hind (JIH), part of an effort to revitalize the Students Islamic Organization
(SIO) that had been founded as the first JIH student wing in 1956.
• SIMI built on SIO networks in Uttar Pradesh and conducted outreach to JIH-linked
Muslim student groups in other localities such as Andhra Pradesh, Bengal, Bihar,
and Kerala.
• From the outset, SIMI was heavily influenced by Sayyed Abdul ‘Ala Maududi, a
journalist and Islamist ideologue, who established Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941 to be
the vanguard of an Islamic revolution. He called for jihad to establish states
governed by sharia (Islamic law) and declared that those who tolerated living in a
secular state consigned themselves to hell in the hereafter

• However, though the Indian jihadist movement was homegrown, external actors encouraged and
abetted it.
• By the early 1990s, Pakistani jihadist groups established during the Afghan jihad were fighting in
Kashmir in greater numbers. The most notable of these included Harkat-ul-Jihadal-Islami (HuJI) or the
Islamic Jihad Movement, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba.
• These proxies were qualitatively different from those Pakistan had supported in the past in terms of
their intent and capabilities to wage a pan-Islamist jihad that included but was not limited to Indian-
administered Kashmir.
• Whereas indigenous Kashmiri groups, most notably the Pakistan-supported Islamist Hizbul Mujahideen,
were prepared to offer training to Indian Muslims from elsewhere in the country, these Pakistani
groups actively sought to build networks to support terrorism against the Indian hinterland.
• Working from Bangladesh, including via the Dhaka-based Islamic Chattra Shibir (Islamic Students
Organization), Karim coordinated the creation of a robust network throughout north India.
• It formed the backbone of LeT’s Indian operations branch, known as the Dasta Mohammad bin Qasim
and commanded by Azam Cheema. Karim became its top field operative, returning to India in 1996 to
begin putting his network into action. He engineered a series of bombings in Delhi, Rohtak, and
Jalandhar, each executed by a Delhi resident named Amir Hashim

• In Sattar’s case, Karim leveraged his network to provide the Pakistani
operative with false identification papers, local guides, and a landlord who
allowed him to build a bunker for housing explosives inside a pottery kiln.
• In addition to using Indians for logistical support, Karim trained indigenous
recruits on target selection and the preparation of explosives using locally
available material such as urea, nitric acid, potassium chloride,
nitrobenzene, and sugar.
• In 1994, two Indian gangsters, Aftab Ansari and Asif Raza Khan, who
belonged to the other major building block of the jihadist movement, were
locked up alongside Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh in Tihar Jail.
• Sheikh was a British-born Pakistani member of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
Arrested and incarcerated for his role in kidnapping four foreign nationals as
part of a plot to free other HuM members imprisoned in India, Sheikh later
gained international notoriety when he engineered Daniel Pearl’s kidnapping
in Pakistan

• In December 1999, Pakistani militants belonging to HuM hijacked Indian Airlines
flight 814 en route from Kathmandu to New Delhi. The plane was rerouted to
Afghanistan, then governed by the Taliban, where the passengers were released in
exchange for three militants incarcerated in India: Sheikh and Maulana Masood
Azhar, both Pakistani members of HuM, and Mushtaq Zagar Latramin, a Kashmiri
member of the same organization. Maulana Azhar promptly split from HuM to
form Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).
• Ansari, Cheema, and Sheikh—began plotting to free more militants imprisoned in
India and to execute a series of kidnappings as a way of raising money to send
recruits for training with LeT and JeM in Pakistan.
• In return for recruiting foot soldiers and facilitating their travel, JeM allowed Ansari
to use its assets in India for criminal operations. To execute these plans, Ansari
liaised with Asif Khan and his brother, Amir Raza Khan, who he connected with two
Pakistani militants operating covertly in India. The men began their own recruiting
drive

• By the end of the 1990s, it was becoming clear that the guerrilla war in Indian-
administered Kashmir was not bearing fruit. At a November 1999 rally organized
by LeT’s parent, Markaz Dawat wal’Irshad, the group’s leader Hafiz Mohammed
Saeed announced the advent of a new phase in its pan-India operations.
• In December 2001, JeM launched an assault on India’s parliament. Whereas LeT’s
attack had failed to engender any significant response from New Delhi, JeM’s was
significantly more brazen. Equally important, it also came after 9/11.
• New Delhi used America’s invasion of Afghanistan to justify a more aggressive
posture against Pakistan. India launched a massive military mobilization, Pakistan
responded in kind, and the two countries came to the brink of war.
• the importance of Indian operatives who could launch their own attacks, attacks
against the hinterland and thus provide greater deniability to Pakistan and to
Pakistan-based groups, grew.
• Empowering Indian militants to launch their own strikes also provided the
potential to exacerbate already extant communal tensions in India, an objective
that took on added resonance after the 2002 Gujarat riots.

• The purpose of this Endeavor, since dubbed the Karachi Project, allegedly
was to help sustain a homegrown Indian network that could be more
aggressive than Pakistani militants about launching attacks without
incurring the negative international repercussions.
• David Headley, the captured LeT operative who performed reconnaissance
on all of the targets hit during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, revealed the
existence of the so-called Karachi Project, which he said included two set-
ups dedicated to supporting operations in India using indigenous actors.
• He alleges that the militants in charge of these set-ups were in contact with
and received assistance from ISI officers for their operations. Bangladesh
also remained a major transit point for Indian and Pakistani militants,
and ISI officers there were known to provide passports and money, and to
intervene with local authorities when necessary.

• Since the mid-1990s, control of the government in Dhaka has alternated between the Awami
League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). A military caretaker government was in place
from late 2006 through early 2009. The Awami League historically was friendlier to India and less
tolerant of Islamist-cum-jihadist actors than the BNP, but at different times both parties were
guilty of turning a blind eye to jihadist activities aimed at India.
• One year later he and a Pakistani commander known as Abu Hamza (an alias) launched a
fidayeen assault at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc). Abu Hamza escaped to Pakistan and
Sabauddin fled to Nepal, where he went on to become a top LeT commander and allegedly
oversaw the movement of operatives transiting between India and Pakistan. Sabauddin’s
experience was relatively exceptional—most Indian militants enlisted by LeT were used to
support or execute bombings, not high-profile fidayeen assaults.
• Syed Zabiuddin Ansari (aka Abu Jundal), a SIMI member also from Beed and one of Sheikh’s
recruits, was tasked to take delivery of a shipment coming into Aurangabad. However, in April
2005, the Maharashtra police intercepted the massive weapons cache, which included 24
kilograms of RDX, along with grenades, assault rifles and ammunition, all shipped across the
Indian Ocean by LeT. Additional, consignments were recovered in the days that followed. In total,
the Aurangabad arms haul, as it is known, included 43 kilograms of RDX, sixteen AK-forty-seven
assault rifles, 3,200 live cartridges, sixty-two magazines for the rifles, and fifty hand grenades,
making it one of the largest ever in Maharashtra. Incredibly, the Aurangabad arms haul was only
part of a larger quantity of explosives LeT was smuggling into western India.

• Notwithstanding the 2006 Mumbai blasts, which may have been a joint LeT-IM attack, and
the 2008 Bangalore blasts, conducted by southern Indians with LeT and some IM support,
the Indian Mujahideen is believed to have been responsible for ten bomb attacks between
2005 and 2008:
1. the bombing at the Dasashwadmedha Ghat in Varanasi on February 23, 2005;
2. the bombing of the Shramjeevi Express on July 28, 2005;
3. the serial blasts in Delhi during Diwali on October 29, 2005;
4. the serial blasts in Varanasi on March 7, 2006;
5. the low-intensity blasts in Gorakhpur on May 22, 2007;
6. the twin bombings in Hyderabad on August 25, 2007;
7. the coordinated bombings of the Varanasi, Faizabad, and Lucknow courthouses on
November 23, 2007;
8. the serial blasts in Jaipur on May 13, 2008;
9. the serial blasts in Ahmedabad and failed attempt to bomb Surat on July 26, 2008; and
10. the serial blasts in Delhi on September 13, 2008.

MILIANT TRANSPORT ROUTES
• Indian militants who transit through or base themselves out of the
UAE and Saudi Arabia are known to travel on Pakistani passports. At
least until recently, if arrested in either country carrying a Pakistani
passport, militants would be sent back to Pakistan.
• On the other hand, the Gulf remains an important and sometimes
underappreciated support base and transit point for Pakistani and
Indian militants looking to launch attacks against India.
• Several captured operatives confirmed ISI facilitation for Indian
militants based in or transiting through Gulf countries. This included
the Shahbandri brothers, who allegedly shuttled back and forth from
Pakistan to Sharjah in the UAE before ultimately settling in Karachi.

• In the meantime, Bangladesh, historically a major staging and transit point for Indian
and Pakistani militants, became an increasingly difficult operating area. Bangladeshi
authorities began cracking down on domestic jihadists, including HuJI-B, after 2005
when some of them launched a series of bomb blasts across the country.
• As Bangladesh became a more difficult operating environment, concerns grew that
Nepal’s importance as a transit point for militants executing terrorist attacks in India
would increase. A serious lack of governance exists in Nepal, which shares a border
with India that can be crossed with little trouble for the right price.
• It historically had been a transit and logistical base and continues to be. However, little
evidence suggests that it has elevated to the degree feared after Bangladesh became
less hospitable to LeT.
• Moreover, the serious lack of governance in Nepal raises questions about whether the
ISI needs to play a role in facilitating jihadist activities there. Gulf countries, especially
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, remain more important transit points and logistical bases.

• Pakistan’s provision of safe haven to Indian operatives on the run has been a key
component of its support. The ability to find safe haven in Pakistan and to travel from
there to the Gulf, specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE, enabled IM leaders to regroup
and rebuild their networks.
• So far, India has had some 82 active cases of investigations on individuals suspected of
engaging in pro-ISIS activities. These include a small group of cases that involved people
travelling to or attempting to travel to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya with the intention
to join ISIS, or those who have shown intentions online to do so. A handful of cases have
also involved citizens’ intentions to finance pro-ISIS related activities, either in Iraq, Syria
or Afghanistan.
• The Islamic State in Khorasan (ISKP), the Afghan avatar of ISIS, has more territorial
presence in the vast ungoverned borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan along
the disputed Durand Line. Most of the fighters in the ISKP brand are former Pakistan
Taliban (TTP) members, who had been fleeing military operations conducted by the
Pakistani armed forces in the country’s tribal areas such as FATA and Waziristan.
• Pakistan offers an intertwined military-jihadist-civilian complex to accurately place ISIS’
presence or influence. However, in Kashmir, for both India and Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir (PoK), the influence of ISIS has some quasi-official narrative. According to one of
the ISIS cases being investigated in India, the accused pontificates on Kashmir.

• There are also concerns that JMB has a female “hit squad” trained to execute grenade attacks.
In early 2009, police arrested a number of alleged JMB female militants, accusing them of
belonging to a JMB female cell.
• If accusations that the group has a female suicide squad prove true, it would not be a complete
surprise; in 2004, JMB established a women branch with around 10-12 women in each cell,
although they were mostly responsible for da`wa activities and religious teachings—not violence.
• Although JMB is considered an indigenous group seeking to establish an Islamic state in
Bangladesh, its operational capabilities are not limited to the country. Evidence shows that JMB
operatives along with its leaders nurtured ambitions to have transnational ties, primarily for
fundraising and logistics.
• JMB’s past contacts with the UK-based Bangladeshi diaspora community in general, and ties to
the banned al-Muhajiroun group in particular, are well known.
• To raise funds for jihadist activities in Bangladesh, direct communication between al-Muhajiroun’s
Omar Bakri and JMB chief Abdur Rahman was coordinated by two al-Muhajiroun members
identified as Sajjad and Habibur Rahman, who were both UK-based Bangladeshis.
• It is not clear whether these ties exist today, but JMB likely maintains some links to the
Bangladeshi diaspora community in the United Kingdom.

• Since its founding, JMB formed ties with transnational militant groups such as
HuJI and Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) for training and funding purposes.
• LeT operative Mufti Obaidullah, who had close ties with JMB’s senior operative
Hasanuzzaman Hasan, once told interrogators that his task was to organize jihad
in Bangladesh in cooperation with HuJI-Bangladesh and JMB operatives.
• It is also known that LeT helped and facilitated JMB’s recruitment drive in India,
especially in the north-eastern and southern parts of the country.
• The interrogations with Maulana Saidur revealed that as of 2010 JMB has
managed to establish a significant presence in neighboring West Bengal (India),
especially in Malda, Nadia and Murshidabad districts with around 25 Indian and
Bangladeshi members. The Indian wing provides logistical support as well as guns
and bomb-making equipment.
Resurgent jamat

• LeT was instrumental in sending Bangladeshi operatives for training in
Pakistan, working through such groups as JMB and HuJI.
• There are also cases of JMB members traveling to Pakistan to engage in
fighting there. Confessional reports of JMB’s explosives expert Boma Mizan
shed some light on how one JMB operative, Shahed, traveled to the Swat
Valley in Pakistan to “embrace martyrdom” through fighting against the
military during the height of Operation Rah-e-Rast in April-May 2009.
• JMB operatives are active in Europe as well. In September 2010, Jhenaidah
district police arrested a German expatriate identified as Faruk Ahmed Aruj
for his alleged link with JMB.
• Faruk had been living in Germany for the past two decades working as a
manager of a fast food chain, and he was a core member of a mosque in
Germany
Resurgent jamat

• In July 2019, India’s State Minister for Home Affairs G Kishan Reddy accused
Jama’at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) of using some madrassas (religious
schools) in West Bengal for radicalisation and recruitment activities.
• The claim came a week after Indian police arrested four members of the pro-
Islamic State (IS) faction of JMB in West Bengal. The ethno-linguistic space of
Bengal consists of independent Bangladesh in the east and the Indian state of
West Bengal in the west.
• Bangladesh is a Muslim majority country and West Bengal is a Hindu majority
state with Muslim majority districts along its border with Bangladesh. This
border is long, porous and poorly managed, resulting in trans-border crime and
the cross-border movement of terrorists.
• In several cases, JMB has used cross-border marriages to find shelter in West
Bengal. West Bengal’s state government has not been able to check the spread of
radical and extremist ideologies. The incumbent Trinamul Congress (TMC) party
has been accused by New Delhi of being soft on extremists because it looks at
the Muslim community as a vote bank.
Resurgent jamat

• Islamist militancy in eastern India remains relatively underestimated,
especially since JMB launched its India chapter in 2018. JMB originated
from the sub-group of a local Salafi movement known as the Ahle Hadis.
• They have followers in both Bangladesh and West Bengal. In 2018,
JMB opened a new wing in India — Jama’atul Mujahideen India (JMI). The
group proclaimed its belief in qital, armed struggle to ‘uproot polytheism
and establish Islam’.
• It also claimed that the Indian subcontinent is a future battlefield to
establish the Caliphate as per the Ghazwatul Hind prophecy. The Indian
chapter could be used to recruit from the Muslim community in West
Bengal and to send them to various parts of India for fundraising and
operations.
Resurgent jamat

• The JMB has spread its activities in states like Jharkhand, Bihar,
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Kerala in the guise of Bangladeshi
immigrants.
• The JMB has set up 20-22 hideouts in Bengaluru and tried to spread
its bases in South India. The JMB even conducted a trial of rocket
launchers in the Krishnagiri hills along the Karnataka border.
• Referring to other Jehadi activities, Mittal said so far 127 people have
been arrested in the country for their links with the Middle-East
terror group ISIS and majority of them have confessed that they were
influenced by the video speeches of Mumbai born Islamic preacher
and terror accused Zakir Naik and mastermid of the Easter bombings
in Sri Lanka Moulvi Zahran Hashmi.
Resurgent jamat

• Yet the issue of most concern to Western counterterrorism agencies is JMB members who
become involved in international terrorist plots, such as those planned by al-Qaìda.
• Rajib Karim in the United Kingdom serves as the best example of this threat. Rajib, an
alleged member of JMB, lived in the United Kingdom and was employed as an information
technology expert with British Airways.
• Rajib’s activities involved raising money and making propaganda videos for JMB. Yet Rajib
eventually came under the influence of AQAP operative Anwar al-Àwlaqi, the charismatic
Yemeni-American preacher based in Yemen and involved in a number of terrorist plots
against the United States.
• Rajib’s brother, Tehezib Karim, and two other unidentified Bangladeshis, possibly JMB
members, reportedly met al-Àwlaqi in Yemen in December 2009 and shared information
about Rajib as well as his position at British Airways.
• One can assume that they used the JMB name to help establish credibility and
commitment to the jihadist cause. In subsequent e-mails between al-Àwlaqi and Rajib, al-
Àwlaqi expressed excitement that Rajib worked for one of the world’s biggest airlines.
• As the case of Rajib Karim demonstrates, there is also the risk of radicalized members of
JMB joining more transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaìda. JMB’s ties to the
Bangladeshi diaspora community in the United Kingdom warrant concern.
Resurgent jamat

• At first glance, JMB’s strength and activities inside Bangladesh appear depleted,
especially following the arrests of senior leaders. It would be incorrect, however,
to assume that the group has been neutralized.
• The Rapid Action Battalion has yet to tackle JMB’s jihadist ideology and grassroots
support, which has helped the organization survive against the ongoing security
offensives and investigations.
• The biggest concern is that JMB will spearhead a conglomerate of different
jihadist groups and actors in Bangladesh in the years ahead. In the coming
months, the source of terror may not confine itself to the disgruntled Islamists
alone and may expand to other disenfranchised groups like the Rohingyas.
• There have been ample indications of Pakistan based terror formations like the
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) attempting to recruit and radicalise the Rohingya
community with an objective of carrying out attacks in India and Bangladesh.
• Bangladesh has about 3 to 5 lakhs disenfranchised Rohingyas. If a miniscule
minority of these are converted as terrorists, it can have serious consequences.
Resurgent jamat

• The “Neo JMB” has been active in northern districts of Bangladesh since its re-surfacing
in 2014.
• Notwithstanding the official claim that the country's northern region has remained a
stronghold of militants where most of the militant activities have been organised,
attacks have taken place throughout Bangladesh, implying a much larger spread of
radicalism.
• Militants have recruited not just from the working class and the traditional strongholds
of the Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing the Islami Chhatra Shibir combine, but have
successfully targeted campuses of private schools and universities.
• This trend is likely to continue well into 2017 taking advantage the political polarisation
in the country amid the AL's continued move to punish the people who collaborated
with Pakistan during the liberation movement.
• The Islamisation of the campuses and role of outfits like the Hizb-ut Tahrir in
radicalising students will ensure a continuous supply for radicals for the neo-JMB and
the Islamic State. The JMB had been initiated by persons who had some level exposure
to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and operational linkages with the al Qaeda.
Resurgent jamat

• The neo-JMB/ Islamic State sympathisers, on other hand, represent a capacity
leap. According to the official assessments, the neo-JMB, "is far more radicalized
and fearsome". Being inspired by the ideology of the Islamic State, skilled in
modern technology and equipped with sophisticated firearms it is capable of
causing damage more than the old JMB which a decade ago.
• The neo-JMB hot into fame after carrying out a robbery on the Bangladesh
Commerce Bank Limited (BCBL) in Ashulia, a suburban area near Dhaka city on 21
April 2015, leaving eight people dead, an incident demonstrates the lack of
adequate finance with the outfit. The new crop of militants, on the other hand,
are more closely aligned with the Islamic State.
• The escapades of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria inspires them. The acts of the
lone-wolfs acting on behalf of the Islamic State prepares them for undertaking
similar actions in Bangladesh. Moreover, investigations reveal that some of these
militants have also received substantial external assistance. Such symbiotic
relationship is bound to grow and manifest itself in various ways in the months to
come.
Resurgent jamat

• The Islamic State/ neo-JMB are increasingly taking recourse to suicide
terrorism, a pattern of terrorism that involves the highest degree of
radicalisation, such complacency may prove to be disastrous.
• Combined with tech-savvy youngsters, relatively unknown funding pattern
and external sponsors, the quality of attacks may undergo a huge leap in
no time.
• Even while conforming to the official narrative of the IS having no
presence in the country and the neo-JMB being responsible for the terror
activities, it needs to be accepted that the massive crackdown that
followed on the Islamists following the 2016 Gulshan cafe attack did not
eliminate them altogether.
• In fact, they lay low for sometime before regrouping and launching attacks
in 2017. The problem is far too deep rooted and publicity seeking
counterterrorism operations are inadequate to deal with the challenge.
Resurgent jamat

Critical infrastructure protection strategy
• The physical protection of critical infrastructure can prevent the
commission of high-impact terrorist attacks. Moreover, the
immediate response to a terrorist attack against critical infrastructure
can prevent the “cascading” effects frequently associated with such
attacks. In an interconnected world, we will not succeed in protecting
national infrastructure in isolation. This is why global initiatives
supported by the United Nations and INTERPOL - and the steps that
will be taken as a result by the international community - are
essential.
• Conflict zone tactics - such as simultaneous active shooter events;
armoured vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED); home-
made explosive vests; hacking attacks; or portable Unmanned Aerial
Systems with explosive payloads could be honed for use in our city
streets and against key facilities.

• Critical infrastructure acts as the life support system of our everyday existence.
Our societies are sustained by a highly complex and sophisticated network of
infrastructure systems. Our citizens expect and rely upon functioning institutions
and services for their health, safety, security and economic well-being.
• This life support system has become more efficient and productive due to
technological advances, the interchanges of globalisation, and the demands of an
increasingly urban population.
• However, with heavy reliance and real-time connectivity comes vulnerability to
threats. The interdependence of our infrastructure through sectors and
industries, between cyber and physical areas, and across national boundaries,
means that the consequences of an attack could be far-reaching.
• One attack on a single point of failure could lead to the disruption or destruction
of multiple vital systems in the country directly affected, and a ripple effect
worldwide. This creates an appealing target to those intending to harm us. And as
our cities and infrastructure evolve, so do their weapons

• The pace with which modern economies have become inextricably
interconnected over the past two decades, especially through the
great strides made by Information and Communication Technologies,
has exposed our societies to a set of unprecedented threats and
vulnerabilities.
• Many of these come from terrorist groups that seek to de-stabilize
communities and create widespread panic by interfering in those
very assets and processes from which our societies depend for their
survival.
• These assets and processes are central nodes called “critical
infrastructures”. The growing awareness that we are now confronted
with a new type of security environment, however, has not been
matched by corresponding levels of preparedness

• Between 2013 and 2015, ISIL launched around 20 major attacks against Syrian
and Iraqi targets.
• the 2016 simultaneous attacks on the Brussels airport and metro by two teams of
ISIL operatives. Overall, 32 people were killed and around 300 were injured.
• In some cases, attacks have been attempted on infrastructures containing
dangerous materials. On 26 June 2015, an individual crashed a car through the
site of a chemical plant near Lyon and into gas canisters, provoking an explosion.
• In 2016, two nuclear power plants in Belgium were locked down under the
suspicion of an attempt by ISIL to attack, infiltrate or sabotage the facilities to
obtain nuclear/radioactive materials.
• While massive attacks against CIs involving significant cascading effects/ failures
have not materialized, the threat posed by this type of scenario is still very much
present and calls on countries to set up adequate preventive and contingency
plans

• The notion of soft targets is commonly associated with places where
people gather in large numbers, such as museums, cinemas, religious sites,
shopping malls, etc.
• Soft targets are contrasted with so called “hard targets” which broadly
identifies sites where high level of protections are ensured, often by armed
people, and/or where access by the public is restricted or subject to severe
controls (e.g. military installations, embassies, airports).
• Although there are clearly overlapping features between CIs and soft
targets, with individual countries being responsible for defining and
developing related protection strategies for both, the two concepts cannot
be used interchangeably.
• A key element of distinct concerns the criticality issue; Soft targets do not
necessarily appear to be critical for the provision of essential societal
services.

• Security Council Resolution 2396(2017) stresses the need for Member States to
develop, review, or amend national risk and threat assessments to take into
account soft targets in order to develop appropriate contingency and emergency
response plans for terrorist attacks.
• In the same year, the European Commission set up a plan focusing on public
spaces as a key category of soft targets (European Commission 2017).
• A major consequence is that countries policies dealing with soft targets do not
automatically satisfy conditions and requirements for the protection of CIs,
particularly when it comes to implementing Security Council resolution
2341(2017).
• Some policies may not mention CIs simply because they were adopted at a time
when the notion itself of CIP had not yet made its way into mainstream policy
discourses, or for other reasons.
• If they impinge on CI-related issues in substance, they should be subject to close
scrutiny for the purpose of ensuring their compatibility and complementarity
with newly designed CIP national strategies

• Countries have elaborated many sets of indicators to identify certain
infrastructure as “critical”. These indicators normally seek to “measure” the effect
of the infrastructure breakdown or functional failure and include a
selection/combination of the following: -
• Geographical scope of the effect;
• Duration of effect;
• Severity of potential effects in terms of:
• economic consequences (impact on GDP, direct and indirect economic losses, number of
personnel employed, tax revenue);
• number of victims and extent of evacuated population;
• loss of authority by the government/ disruption of public administration; - damage to the
environment.
• The most intuitive physical threats to CIs involve the use of explosives or
incendiary devices, means of transport, rockets, MANPADS, grenades and even
simple tools (e.g. matches or lighters to induce arsons), etc., to achieve the total
or partial collapse or destruction of an infrastructure

• In modern economies, industrial production chains and the delivery of good and
services by both Government and the private sector are to a great extent managed by
computer-controlled systems known as Industrial Control Systems (ICS).
• Over the past few decades, ICS have progressively gained connectivity to the Internet
and to private enterprise networks. At the same time the ICS are increasingly linked to
companies’ computer system via the internet, has made them much more vulnerable to
cyber-attacks.
• Specific security challenges are posed by legacy systems, i.e those ICS that were
installed in the pre-Internet era and were not originally conceived for connectivity
purposes.
• Crucially, ICS are used in virtually all CI sectors as they often govern non-stop operations
in power plants, dams, bridges, telecommunication towers, etc. ICS are thus key
components of so-called Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs).
• Several national definitions exist of this concept. It is essential that CIP strategies
recognize and provide protection to CIIs on an equal footing to physical infrastructure.
Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs)

• Although cyber threats differ from physical ones in nature, the end result
may be the same. Cyber threats vary but may include, for example, attacks
that: -
manipulate systems or data- such as malware that exploits vulnerabilities in
computer software and hardware components necessary for the operation of Cis
shut down crucial systems such as DoS attacks;
limit access to crucial systems or information such as through ransomware attacks
• The delivery of essential goods and services to society is increasingly the
outcome of the interplay among multiple providers. These providers cut
across all CI sectors and sub-sectors, forming complex interlinkages.
• While the interconnectedness of assets, systems and processes is
predicated on a more effective management of resources, it increases
dependencies
Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs)

Interdependcies and vulnerability
• Dependencies can produce effects of varying intensity and be of
different types. Notably, following a terrorist attack, CIs may suffer
from:
• Physical dependencies: the functioning of one infrastructure depends on the
supply of material outputs from another infrastructure;
• Cyber dependencies: the functioning of one infrastructure depends on
information transmitted through an information infrastructure.
• Crucially, dependencies increase levels of vulnerability. The threat is
made more acute by the extensive reliance by Governmental agencies
and the private sector on information and communication
technologies, which exacerbate the effect of cross-sector and
transnational dependencies

• It is critically important for CIP strategies to leverage the causal relationship that
exists between CI interconnections, dependencies and vulnerabilities as a way to:
• Achieve an adequate level of understanding (on the part of all involved
stakeholders, whether from the private or public sector) of systemic vulnerability
points, which should be reflected in more accurate risk and crisis management.
• The task of integrating the concept of dependencies in risk and crisis
management processes is made more complex by the fact that dependencies can
change depending on the mode of operation of a given CI.
• CIP strategies should frame dependencies as non-static, but rather dynamic and
rapidly shifting relationships;
• Raise awareness of mutual dependencies through inter-sectoral networking
(based, for example, on the discussion of risk scenarios), in order to stimulate
further cooperation between the various players.

• CI protection ultimately depends on the coordinated activities of intelligence services, the law
enforcement community at large, etc. The extent to which criminal laws take a preventive
approach as well as the ability of investigative agencies to be proactive (as opposed to simply react
to the commission of terrorist acts) play a fundamental role in preventive efforts. CIP strategies
should build upon existing frameworks by concentrating on those policies and measures that are
directly relevant to step up the prevention of terrorist attacks which specifically target CIs. They
can, in particular:
1. Identify the main roles and responsibilities in the prevention field, including at the level of CI operators (i.e.
the overall role of top-level managers, of security officers and, more generally, establish the concept that
the implementation of preventive measures is a task for the entire company and requires support from all
levels);
2. Outline the working playground and methodologies for developing manuals and practical guidelines for use
by CI operators in the field of prevention;
3. Directly identify methods and approaches that should be broadly applied or considered by stakeholders. For
instance countries promote “security design” as a tool for achieving preventive objectives. Another example
is the requirement for CI owners/operators to maintain effective security arrangements to maximize the
likelihood that terrorist preparatory activity, such as site reconnaissance, is identified quickly. As part of its
CIP strategy, for example, the Government of Australia requires that any such suspicious activity should be
reported to the police and has established a dedicated National Security Hotline;
4. Encourage or mandate (depending on the chosen governance model) the adoption of specific sets of
preventive measures by CI operators, either cross-sectoral or in specific sectors.

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