Cómo los emprendedores de políticas interrumpieron el flujo eléctrico con la primera legislación de energía renovable de Perú para la red

Circuit Breakers: How Policy Entrepreneurs Interrupted the Electric
Flow with Peru’s First Renewable Energy Legislation for the Grid
By Hai-Vu Phan
A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Southern California
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Political Science and International Relations
May 2019

ii
Dedication
To all the advocates who put society’s future well-being before present gains.
Abstract
All countries face entrenched interests when political leaders seek a significant policy
change, and nowhere is this more obvious than in the quest to embrace renewable energy (solar,
wind, geothermal, etc.). Despite powerful domestic opposition, Peru recently passed its first
policy for large-scale electricity production using renewable energy, Legislative Decree (LD) 1002,
in 2008. What created this policy window despite vehement objection? This research finds that
in order for Peru to pass its first major renewable energy policy, the confluence of increasing
information, available technological solution, changing international political norms, and shifting
international economic norms planted interest within the minds of domestic actors (political
willingness). The opportunity came when a bilateral trade deal with the United States required
rapid policy accommodations from Peru’s central government. This need for speed shifted
legislative power from Peru’s Congress to a few hands within Peru’s Executive Branch, some of
whom were renewable energy enthusiasts. Prepared domestic actors seized this opportunity to
open a policy window. Understanding this policy-making process offers invaluable insights on
those conditions most conducive for passing difficult but necessary laws, some of which could be
transferable to other developing countries trying to contribute to the global effort on mitigating
climate change. Theoretically, this dissertation draws on models of political decision-making and
institutions to explain how local actors attain what they want. Globally, we are in an epic
transition toward renewable energy use. This research aims to promote this necessary
changeover within developing countries as quickly and seamlessly as possible.

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Table of Contents
Dedication ......................................................................................................................................ii
Abstract ..........................................................................................................................................ii
Table of Contents ..........................................................................................................................iii
Tables ............................................................................................................................................iv
Figures ...........................................................................................................................................iv
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................v
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................ix
Chapter 1. Preserving Artifacts and Progressing Cautiously ..........................................................1
Chapter 2. Institutions and Policy Windows: Opportunities for Major Policy Change.................34
Chapter 3. Status Quo Bias: Peru’s Pathways to Renewable Electric Energy...............................64
Chapter 4. Domestic Political Willingness: International Challenges Incite Strong Peruvian
Interest in Renewable Energy (1990s-2000s)...............................................................................90
Chapter 5. Circuit Breaking with a Policy Window – U.S.-Peru Trade Deal and the Legislative
Decree ........................................................................................................................................122
Chapter 6. Rural Electrification: Refining Past Efforts................................................................151
Chapter 7. Looking at the Potentials and Challenges Ahead......................................................180
Appendix 1: Legislative Decree 1002 (English)...........................................................................215
Appendix 2: Legislative Decree 1002 (Spanish)..........................................................................227
Interviews and Correspondences...............................................................................................240
Works Cited................................................................................................................................242

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Tables
Table 1: Top 10 Electricity Producers in Peru in 2016 (% of Market Total)..................................78
Figures
Figure 1: Marginal Reserve of Electricity in Peru............................................................................5
Figure 2: Political Willingness and Policy Window .......................................................................22
Figure 3: Frequency with which “renewable energy” is used in English texts ...........................105
Figure 4: Frequency with which “energía renovable” is used in Spanish texts ..........................106
Figure 5: Global New Investment in Renewable Energy – World, Developed, and Developing
Countries ....................................................................................................................................111
Figure 6: Installed Capacity of Renewable Energy (World Total) ...............................................112
Figure 7: Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy (World Total) ....................................113
Figure 8: Rural and Urban Electrification Rate of Latin American Countries (2016) ..................156
Figure 9: Electricity Production from Renewable Energy...........................................................191
Figure 10: Peru's Renewable Energy Auction Results: Average Prices of Bids...........................192
Figure 11: Global Renewable Energy Policy Landscape..............................................................207
Figure 12: RISE Overall Scores ....................................................................................................208
Figure 13: RISE Overall Scores and Average Scores by Region...................................................209
Figure 14: RISE Overall and Average Scores by Income Group ..................................................210
Figure 15: Renewable Power Generation and Capacity as a Share of Global Power .................211
Figure 16: Asset Finance in Renewable Energy in Selected Latin American Countries, 2015 ....212

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Abbreviations
Abbreviation English Native Language
APEGER
Peruvian Association of Renewable
Energies
Asociación Peruana de Energías
Renovables
APES Peruvian Association of Solar Energy
Asociación Peruana de Energía Solar y
del Ambiente
ARIAE
Iberoamerican Association of
Regulatory Entities of Energy
Asociación Iberoamericana de
Entidades Reguladoras de la Energía
ATPA Andean Trade Preference Act
ATPDEA
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CENERGIA
Center of Energy and Environmental
Conservation
Centro de Conservación de Energía y
del Medio Ambiente
CEPLAN National Center of Strategic Planning
Centro Nacional de Planeamiento
Estratégico
CER Certified Emissions Reduction
CER-UNI
Center of Renewable Energies at the
National University of Engineering
Centro de Energías Renovables de la
Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería
CIPENC
Center of Research and Promotion of
Non-Conventional Energies
Centro de Investigación y Promoción
de Energías No-Convencionales
CNCC
National Commission on Climate
Change
Comisión Nacional de Cambio
Climático
COES
Committee of the Economic
Operation of the National
Interconnected System
Comité de Operación Económica del
Sistema Interconectado Nacional
CONAM National Council of the Environment Consejo Nacional del Ambiente
CONASUPO
National Staple Products Company
(Mexico)
Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias
Populares (México)
CONCYTEC
National Council of Science,
Technology, and Technological
Innovation
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia,
Tecnología, e Innovación Tecnológica
COP Conference of the Parties Conferencia de las Partes
CSP Concentrated Solar Power
DGER
General Directorate of Rural
Electrification
Dirección General de Electrificación
Rural
Endev Energizing Development

vi
EUR Euro
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FISE Fund for Social Inclusion in Energy Fondo de Incusión Social Energético
FONER National Fund of Rural Electrification Fondo Nacional de Electrificación Rural
FOSE Electrical Social Compensation Fund
Fondo Social de Compensación
Eléctrica
FTA Foreign Trade Agreement
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environmental Facility
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GIS Geographic Information System
GIZ
German Society for International
Cooperation
Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit
GoP Government of Peru
GPAE
Office of Policies and Economic
Analysis
Gerencia de Políticas y Análisis
Económico
GTZ
German Organization for Technical
Cooperation
Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit
IADB Interamerican Development Bank
IEA International Energy Agency
INAEN
Research Institute on the Applications
of Natural Energies
Instituto de investigaciones de
Aplicaciones de las Energías Naturales
INAES
Institute of Applications of Solar
Energy
Instituto de Aplicaciones de la Energía
Solar
INDC
Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions
INDECOPI
National Institute for the Defense of
Free Competition and the Protection
of Intellectual Property
Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la
Competencia y de la Protección de la
Propiedad Intelectual
IPE International Political Economy
IRENA
International Renewable Energy
Agency
KfW Reconstruction Credit Institute Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
kV Kilovolt
kW Kilowatt
kWh Kilowatt hour

vii
LD Legisltive Decree Decreto Legislativo
LUTW Light Up the World
MAS Movement for Socialism Movimiento al Socialismo
MINAM Ministry of the Environment Ministerio del Ambiente
MINEM Ministry of Energy and Mining Ministerio de Energía y Minas
MS Multiple Streams
Mtoe Million Tons of Oil Equivalent
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt Hour
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement
NAMA
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Actions
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NTP Peruvian Technical Standards Normas Técnicas Peruanas
OAS Organization of American States
OECD
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
Organización para la Cooperación y el
Desarrollo Económicos
OEFA
Agency of Environmental Evaluation
and Enforcement
Organismo de Evaluación y
Fiscalización Ambiental
OPEC
Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries
OSINERGMIN
Supervisory Agency of Investment in
Energy and Mining
Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión
en Energía y Minería
OSINFOR
Supervisory Agency of Forestry and
Wildlife
Organismo de Supervisión de los
Recursos Forestales y de Fauna
Silvestre
OW Opportunity and Willingness
PEFoDo
National Photovoltaic Household
Electrification Program
Programa de Electrificación
Fotovoltaica Domicilaria
PHEP
National Photovoltaic Household
Electrification Program
Programa de
Electrificación Fotovoltaica
Domicilaria
PNER National Rural Electrification Plan Plan Nacional de Electrificación Rural
PPA Purchase Power Agreement
PTPA Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
PV Photovoltaic
R&D Research and Development

viii
REN21
Renewable Energy Policy Network for
the 21st Century
RISE
Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable
Energy
RPS Renewable Portfolio Standard
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SD Supreme Decree Decreto Supremo
SE4All Sustainable Energy for All
SEIN
National Electric Interconnection
System
Sistema Eléctrico Interconectado
Nacional
SERVIR National Authority of Civil Service Autoridad Nacional del Servicio Civil
SHS Solar Home System
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SNV
Netherlands Development
Organization
SPR
Peruvian Society of Renewable
Energy
Sociedad Peruana de Energías
Renovables
SUNARP
National Superintendent of Public
Registries
Superintendencia Nacional de los
Registros Públicos
TTN Technological Transfer Network
UN United Nations Organización Naciones Unidas
UNDP
United Nations Development
Program
Programa de las Naciones Unidas para
el Desarrollo
UNEP UN Environment Program
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization
Organización de las Naciones Unidas
para la Educación, la Ciencia, y la
Cultura
UNFCCC
United Nations Framework
Convention for Climate Change
Convención Marco de las Naciones
Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático
US United States
USAID
United States Agency for
International Development
USD United States Dollars
VAT Value Added Tax
Wp Watt Peak

ix
Acknowledgements
This dissertation received the helpful contribution from a village of people. While it is not
possible to name them all, I would like to pause here to highlight a few noteworthy contributors.
I owe an enormous amount of gratitude to:
My dissertation committee members. Patrick James, my dissertation co-chair and advisor.
Pat helped me navigate the labyrinth of graduate school, ensuring that I was prepared to meet
all challenges, requirements, and deadlines. Once I entered the research stage, Pat encouraged
me to pursue topics and use methods that I was most comfortable with, allowing me to discover
myself as a researcher. I am grateful for the freedom he entrusted in me while always being
present and available to guide. Carol Wise, my dissertation co-chair and mentor. Carol
encouraged me to apply for the Fulbright, research Peru, and actually go there. What crazy ideas!
A Latin American expert, she provided the substantive advice that I needed to successfully
conduct research in and present my findings on Peru. Amy Below, my dissertation committee
member. I am grateful to Amy for being a strong and supportive role model who breaks academic
norms. Conversations with Amy always helped affirm that I was on the right track. Each
committee member is an exemplary scholar whom I aspire to emulate.
Political Science and International Relations (POIR) friends for providing me with a
community of support. One of the highlights of my Ph.D. career was when ten of my colleagues
came to visit me in Peru during my field research year. Our many hiking trips, camping trips, study
sessions, drink sessions, movie nights, dinner parties, and conversations – all of these experiences
helped make the Ph.D. process feel less lonely. I want to especially thank Güez Salinas for

x
constantly supporting and pushing me to continue. Güez also served as a tireless sounding board,
helping me think through and bring clarity to nebulous ideas.
The various institutions that made this possible. I owe so much to the University of
Southern California for all the resources and support that made this Ph.D. worthwhile. While
there were many obstacles during my Ph.D. path, administrative issues were not one of them,
thanks to the attentiveness of the very capable Veri Chavarin, POIR leadership, and faculty. The
Fulbright Public Policy Fellowship, for funding my year in Peru and all the connections it afforded
to ease my work in the field. The Supervisory Agency of Investment in Energy and Mining
(OSINERGMIN), coworkers, and friends in Peru, for creating a home away from home. I am
astounded by everyone’s generosity to help me in my pursuit, such as allowing me to accompany
official agency visits, interviewing with me, and steering me towards helpful resources.
My family and friends. I cannot thank my parents, Trang Phan and Huyen Tran, enough
for their constant encouragement. I am very fortunate to have parents who have always
supported and helped me pursue all of my dreams. My brother, Hai-Lam Phan, for being a great
role model, always. He understood my internal struggles and provided sound advice to help me
overcome them. My extended family, constantly providing a community of love and where I go
to seek comfort. My best friend, Alexis Yu, who sat through many difficult phone calls, patiently
listening to my grievances and never wavering as my cheerleader. My friends, Simone Barclay
and Nicholas Kole, for pointing out my moments of silliness and keeping me grounded.
So many more people offered words of encouragement or guidance throughout the
process, every little bit of which were building blocks that I used to construct this dissertation.

Chapter 1 | 1
Chapter 1. Preserving Artifacts and Progressing Cautiously
The Nazca region in southern Peru is an endless expanse of desert covered in beige sand
and spotted with prickly tumble bushes. The region is most famous for the Nazca Lines, giant
figures drawn into the desert floor by removing the top layer of gravel to reveal the underlying
bedrock. No other geoglyph exceeds the impressive figures in size, quantity, nature, or continuity
anywhere in the world. They are believed to have been created between 500 B.C. and 500 A.D.
and depict various figures including a tree, spider, and monkey (UNESCO, 2018).
Extremely surprising to sightseers is how these lines have been well preserved for
thousands of years despite natural elements, especially because Nazca is one of Peru’s windiest
regions and the site of its newest wind farm. One day in April of 2017, a team of four engineers
on behalf of the Supervisory Agency of Investment in Energy and Mining (OSINERGMIN), Peru’s
energy regulator, drove seven hours from Lima to conduct a regulatory visit of a wind farm under
construction. After driving for hours through nothing but desert wasteland, they turned right
onto a nondescript dirt road. After more time passed, bungalows emerged in the distance, and
holes several meters across appeared sporadically on the horizon.
The wind farm was being built by Enel, an Italian energy company, and would produce a
total of 132 megawatts (MW) of electricity, making it the largest wind farm in Peru. Needless to
say, completing this farm would be a logistical feat. Peru does not have the technical capability
to manufacture every part of a wind turbine. Parts of the turbine came from Spain, India, Vietnam,
and Germany, among other countries. The parts were then shipped to the ports in Callao (near
Lima) or Pisco. Then they rode on trucks for hours to reach the construction site in Nazca.

Chapter 1 | 2
Impressive photos show turbines with arms three meters wide on the back of a truck, driving
slowly through Nazca’s narrow roads.
Enel had to go through many labor-intensive steps to reach the point of building the farm.
About two years before it received construction rights, Enel began to conduct studies to find the
ideal location for the farm. It collaborated with geologists to find the best wind patterns and with
archeologists to ensure that construction would not destroy any archaeological sites. After it
located a suitable site, ENEL applied for a land concession from the Ministry of Culture and the
Ministry of the Environment (MINAM). Once it got the concession, it waited for the Ministry of
Energy and Mining (MINEM) to open the biannual competition for renewable energy contracts,
in which Enel competed with many other companies with the hope of winning construction
tenders. Enel won three projects during the 2015 auction, and this Nazca farm was one of them.
Construction started in early 2016. Enel engineers gratefully acknowledge that the terrain
was adequately windy and cooperative, the ground was soft enough to install foundations for
the wind towers, and they have not found too many fossils that would interrupt their
construction. They continued to work with geologists and archaeologists to make sure that their
project met the standards laid out in the state contract. Seeing that the construction project was
progressing rapidly and according to plan, the OSINERGMIN regulators left reassured.
As Enel’s experience shows, building a renewable energy plant in Peru is no easy task, but
companies all over the world are vying to be able to enter this virgin market. In 2015, Peru’s last
renewable energy auction, 111 applications were submitted, out of which only 13 applications
were selected (OSINERGMIN, 2016a). This interest exists because Peru has many natural
resources suitable for renewable energy, including strong solar radiation, winds, rivers, and

Chapter 1 | 3
geothermal vents. Peru is also an upper-middle-income country with a stable economy. To top it
off, the Peruvian government guarantees companies a fixed return rate for twenty years,
regardless of the market price. Given these conditions and an untapped market, many investors
look upon the Peruvian market with lusty eyes.
Misalignment between Intention and Action: A Policy Puzzle
At first glance, Peru looks like a dream country for renewable energy enthusiasts. Aside
from great natural conditions that are necessary for renewable energy production, Peru appears
to be one of the most supportive countries of the environment and renewable energy. It is part
of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), it was an early
signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, and it even hosted the 20th Conference of the Parties (COP). All
of these international efforts aimed to mitigate climate change, in large part through promoting
renewable energy. In Lima, there is even a national theme park dedicated to educating citizens
about climate change, the only one of its kind in Latin America.
But upon closer look at policies, one is struck by the dearth of policy support for
renewable energy providers. The auction that Enel won to build the Nazca wind farm is the only
way that renewable energy producers can sell electricity on the electric grid. Outside of these
official auctions that happen every two years, renewable energy producers are prohibited from
signing long-term purchase power agreements (PPA) with electricity transmitters and
distributors. As a result, renewable energy can exist on a small scale but cannot be
commercialized for the general public without going through the auction channel. Given how
internationally vocal Peru has been on the climate change front, the imbalance between
expressed intent versus political action is especially glaring.

Chapter 1 | 4
The juxtaposition of the ancient Nazca lines with the technologically advanced Nazca wind
farm is an apt analogy for the political debate over renewable energy in Peru. On the one hand,
people want to preserve Peru’s culture, heritage, and existing institutions. In the energy field,
this means a reliance on large hydroelectric plants and natural gas recently extracted from Peru’s
abundant fields. This also means maintaining the existing organization of the electrical system
and current players. On the other hand, the global wave toward renewable energy places
pressure on Peru to use more renewable energy sources, but doing so carries the risk of
destroying long-established institutions. Although Peru realizes that change is coming, it is
proceeding cautiously.
In 2008, Legislative Decree (LD) 1002 created the auction system so that renewable
energy could be sold on the electrical grid. Peru was in an especially surprising position to pass
such a groundbreaking policy at this time. In the early 2000s, Peru was in a position of electricity
surplus. Figure 1 shows the marginal reserve of electricity that producers maintain each year. In
2007, while the maximum electricity demand was about 4,000 MW, the effective capacity of
production was 5,500 MW. In 2008, the demand was 4,200 MW, while production capacity was
5,400 MW (See Figure 1). The effective production capacity has consistently been higher than the
maximum demand, ensuring that consumers would not be left without electricity for the present
day.
Before the passage of LD 1002, there was no immediate energy crisis to make this issue
urgent. The last energy crisis occurred in 2004, when a major drought revealed the many
shortcomings of relying heavily on hydroelectricity, even though the 2004 drought did not shut
down the system (Comisión MEM-OSINERG, 2005). Once the Camisea gas fields started

Chapter 1 | 5
producing in 2004, Peruvians were assured that they would have enough reserve for domestic
consumption for thirty or forty years without fear of shortage (Merco Press: South Atlantic News
Agency, 2008). In other words, Peru did not have an “energy security” problem, which is a driving
force for other countries, such as Brazil and Chile (see Bonilla, 2012; Forero, 2013; Hoffman, 2010;
Jagger, 2013; Murphy, 2011), to explore renewable energy.
Beyond the capacity surplus, Peru’s electricity was already “green" in the sense that
hydroelectricity constituted 80% of Peru’s electricity production. This mix changed when the
natural gas fields in Camisea began production in 2004, but in 2008, hydroelectricity was still
Figure 1: Marginal Reserve of Electricity in Peru
3305
3580
3966
4199
4322
4579
4961
5291
5575
5737
6275
6565
4799
5064
5533
5444
6246
6875
6868
7755
8680
9083
10088
12078
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Megawatt
Year
Marginal Reserve of Electricity in Peru
Maximum Demand Effective Production Capacity
Source: BNAmericas, 2018

Chapter 1 | 6
producing 61% of Peru’s electricity (COES, 2008, p. 10). Compared to other countries, Peru was
already taking advantage of renewable, clean energy.
In addition, renewable energy was several times more expensive than the energy sources
that Peru was already using, and introducing it would force consumers to pay higher electric bills.
In 2008, solar energy cost over United States dollars (USD) 200 per megawatt hour (MWh),
compared to market price for fossil fuel energy, which was around USD 50 per MWh (Quintanilla,
2016). Consuming energy from solar would have made consumers pay higher electric prices when
there were cheaper options available.
Finally, the major players in Peru’s energy market — generators, transmitters, and
distributors — already had an established natural monopoly, and they opposed renewable
energy for fear that it would disrupt the current functioning electrical system. A report by Ernst
& Young (2016) writes, “In both developed and developing countries, utilities have clung to
outdated business models and have been on the wrong end of the spectrum with respect to
renewable energy growth, suffering as a consequence” (p. 6). Utility companies resist the entry
of renewable energy because it disrupts their traditional way of doing business. Suddenly, they
have new competitors and must adjust their pricing calculation if renewable energy is allowed to
enter into the grid. There was also the fear that renewable energy producers would not be able
to produce stable energy over time, and thermal electric producers would have to work harder
to compensate.
Peru did not have any immediate need to introduce a renewable energy policy at this
time. In fact, it had strong reasons to oppose it, which many people did. Economically, politically,
and environmentally, Peru appeared to have no urgency to push for renewable energy. Despite

Chapter 1 | 7
the opposition and a calm year for the status quo of energy operations, Peru passed its first law
to allow renewable energy to feed into its national electric grid in 2008. What allowed Peru to
make this policy decision despite a disagreeable political context?
Peru is an optimal case to study this question as it is a signatory to numerous international
agreements related to climate change and renewable energy. This suggests the government’s
awareness of the benefits and need for alternative fuels. Yet domestic policies to support the
actual implementation of renewable energy practices are scarce. To date, LD 1002 is the only
formal renewable energy legislation that supports large-scale production. Peru is also an
interesting case because of the level of opposition that it received in the national level as well as
the unlikely context within which it was passed. This makes for a useful case to study how an
environment highly unfavorable to the passage of a certain type of policy can still provide such
opportunities.
Renewable Energy Patterns in Latin America and the World
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “Renewable energy is energy derived
from natural processes (e.g. sunlight and wind) that are replenished at a higher rate than they
are consumed. Solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, bioenergy and ocean power are sources of
renewable energy. The role of renewables continues to increase in the electricity, heating and
cooling and transport sectors” (2017a). The International Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA)
2016 report on renewable energy writes, “The analysis of regional and sub-regional dynamics
clearly demonstrates the crucial role of renewable energy policies at the center of deployments”
(p. 16). There is much potential for renewable energy in Latin America that is yet to be tapped.

Chapter 1 | 8
Oil and natural gas have traditionally played a large role in Latin America’s energy mix.
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador comprise the region’s main oil-exporting countries,
with the region as a whole holding about 20% of the world’s reserve for oil. Latin America does
not have a large reserve of natural gas, accounting for about only 4% of the world’s reserve, but
this fuel does play a major role for some countries, especially Bolivia and Argentina, and
increasingly Peru. Natural gas is the main source of electricity generation in Bolivia, and the
second source of electricity generation in Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru. Coal reserves are
concentrated in Colombia and Brazil, with Colombia being one of the world’s top five net exporter
of coal (IRENA, 2016, p. 29-30).
The Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) objectives show that electrification, especially from
renewable sources, is a priority for many political actors in the world (2017). The President of
France, Emmanuel Macron, has an initiative called “Make Our Planet Great Again,” which focuses
on climate change, sustainability, and energy transition issues (Mufson, 2017). Germany has
Energiewende, its program for energy transition that focus heavily on promoting wind, solar, and
hydroelectricity (Energiewende, 2018). Sweden is racing to be the first country in the world to
use only renewable energy (Climate Reality, 2016).
Aside from developed countries, renewable energy targets are being adopted in many
developing countries. In 2015, 99% of Costa Rica’s electricity came from renewable sources, and
it plans to be carbon-neutral by 2021. Nicaragua’s president, Daniel Ortega, began setting the
country on a different path by investing heavily in renewable energy starting in 2007. After less
than ten years of heavy investment, Uruguay now produces 95% of its energy consumption from
renewable sources. In another part of the world, Kenya produced 13% of its energy using

Chapter 1 | 9
geothermal in 2010, but geothermal accounts for 51% of its energy mix in 2015 (Climate Reality,
2016). There is an international trend — an unofficial international competition, even — to see
who can be the cleanest energy producer.
Renewable energy is increasing in importance in Latin America and other regions due to
several factors. First is the realization that traditional fossil fuels — oil, natural gas, and coal —
will soon be completely depleted. Because fossil fuels are a finite resource, the competition for
access to them will grow fiercer as they grow scarcer. Indeed, we have already seen some
geopolitical conflicts break out due to fossil fuels, including the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo in the 1970s (Mann, 2013), Gulf War (Aarts & Renner,
1991), Russia-Ukraine gas dispute (BBC News, 2009), and international oil sanctions on Russia
when it annexed Crimea (Makortoff, 2016). Second, renewable energy is believed to help
mitigate climate change. In COP 21, which took place in Paris, attending countries agreed to limit
global warming by two degrees Celsius by scaling up their renewable energy consumption
through Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) (REN21, 2016, p. 27). Third, since
renewable energy is a relatively new market and growing rapidly in demand, these factors are
drawing an increasing amount of investment each year (ibid, p. 25). Finally, some forms of
renewable energy function well as small-scale standalone systems, which are ideal for remote
areas distant from the grid. This characteristic makes it an increasingly used method of bringing
electricity to rural areas (ibid, p. 24). China has been the world leader in renewable energy, and
it continues to do so to meet energy demand, combat severe pollution problem, and support
domestic manufacturing industries (ibid, p. 60). Brazil has traditionally been the largest investor
in renewable energy in Latin America. Between 2005 and 2009, Brazil accounted for 70% of

Chapter 1 | 10
investments in renewable energy in this region (IRENA, 2016, p. 10). While Latin America is not a
world leader in renewable energy, it is increasingly consuming and investing in renewable energy.
Challenges to Renewables in the Free Market
Without government policy to support renewable energy investment, it is highly difficult
for renewable energy companies to compete in the free market. There are three main general
barriers to renewable energy investment: macroeconomic factors, structure and organization of
the energy sector, and finance sector. Most renewable energy investors in Peru are foreign
companies, which are discouraged by several macroeconomic factors that increase the risk of
doing business in other countries. These factors can be a history of investments with bad
outcomes in the past. This could come from policy changes that changed the profitability of a
project. Inflation rates have at times run wild in Latin American countries. A lack of history of
investments in certain technologies in the past can also intimidate investors as they do not want
to be the first. Latin Americans have also had higher economic growth rates than other regions
of the world, but their high dependence on commodities make for a volatile market. Overall, the
macroeconomic economic conditions of Latin American countries have in the past proven volatile,
which can discourage investors.
Energy subsidies for traditional fuels embedded in the structure of the energy sector can
decrease the competitiveness of renewable energy. Administrative procedures that are unclear
or lengthy can discourage private players from entering the market. Some structures have certain
companies already serving as monopolies in the area, and there is little market space for private
investors. Unclear contract terms can make it difficult for investors to invest. Countries have
counteracted this issue by issuing PPAs for periods of twenty years so that investors can feel

Chapter 1 | 11
assured that their investment will have long-term returns. Latin American countries also face the
issue of lack of human capital and expertise as many renewable energy technologies are
technologically advanced. Especially prevalent in the African continent is the shortage of skilled
labor for the installation, operation, and maintenance of solar energy systems. In addition to this
factor, the issue of not having the right standards and certification of equipment makes buyers
unsure of products, which makes investors unsure of their future buyer’s market. There are also
issues with high cost of capital, diversification of capital sources, and limited finance knowledge
and capacity (IRENA, 2016). Thus, the existing structure of the energy market, and lack of
structure for renewable energy, can be barriers that make market penetration difficult.
Renewable energy, as a nascent market, faces some of the same financial challenges of
any new industry. There is a high cost of entry. There is the difficulty with attracting investors
and high rates of failure. The high rates of failure make it difficult to access financing. Finance
conditions differ from country to country, with some offering plentiful options and others few
options (FS-UNEP & BNEF, 2016, p. 19). Indeed, historically, finance in renewable energy
technology has come from government assistance (direct investments or subsidies) or from
development banks. As the market, companies, and technologies mature, the failure rate
declines and accessing credit is much easier.
Finance players in the renewable sector have become more diverse. Commercial banks
play the biggest role in financing wind and solar farms in 2015. Bonds are used but to a lesser
extent in the U.S., Germany, Japan, Brazil, and Mexico. Development banks continue to provide
funding for many projects. In 2015, the International Finance Corporation loaned money to
support the 36MW Malvern wind farm in Jamaica, and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)

Chapter 1 | 12
loaned USD 125 million to Tunisia for solar and other clean power projects. KfW reported lending
euro (EUR) 4.5 billion in 2015, up from the EUR 4.1 billion in 2014. The most active development
banks for renewable energy, broadly defined to also include efficiency projects, transmission and
distribution projects, and reporting, are KfW of Germany, providing USD 28.3 billion, the
European Investment Bank with USD 11.7 billion, the World Bank Group at USD 9.4 billion, the
Brazilian Development Bank at USD 6.3 billion, and the China Development Bank at USD 6 billion
in 2015. Other notable banks include the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, African Development Bank, Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, and Export-Import Bank of China (FS-UNEP & BNEF, 2016, p. 44-45).
Many governments have tried to assist the renewable energy market, but many investors
want more supportive policies. While the U.S. has standard regulations for renewable energy
technologies sold on the market, Peru, for example, still has yet to pass industry standards.
Without proper standards and regulations, it is difficult for investors to know whom to trust, and
concerns arise whether investors’ technology can be incorporated into the existing power grid to
expand their consumer base. Governments are also testing out various policies to see which work.
Fiscal incentives such as subsidies, tax relief, and grants have long been a part of the
government’s package to help the young market. Other policies include auctions, passing
standard regulations, incorporating net metering, and giving preference to renewable energy for
certain times of the day in auction processes. To increase consumption from renewable energy,
some governments like Japan, Germany, and states in the U.S. have enacted laws that require
utility companies to incorporate renewable energy (FS-UNEP & BNEF, 2016, p. 19). However,
policy makers do not know exactly how much these policies will help the sector, and there is

Chapter 1 | 13
constantly a trial-and-error process, learning how to improve policies as time passes. Now, with
some solar and wind markets reaching the same cost of production as traditional fuels, people
are starting to question the need for continued government support of renewable energy, since
this creates a disadvantage for traditional fuels. These advocates make a fair point, but with the
ongoing predominant concern over climate change, it appears that support to grow the
renewable energy market will continue.
The variability of renewable energy production makes it a less desirable alternative than
traditional fuels. Consumers’ energy consumption pattern is relatively predictable. Electricity is
used throughout the day, but there is a general drop during the daytime while most people are
at work or school and increase in the early mornings and night times when people are at home.
Renewable energy is more unpredictable. People are at home in the nighttime when solar energy
systems cannot produce electricity. Sometimes the wind blows and sometimes it does not.
Seasonality also plays a role. People use more air conditioning in the summer time and more
heating in the winter time, but rivers are usually fuller in the winter time and drier in the summer
time. This creates a mismatch between supply and demand as renewable energy producers
cannot control when there will be sunlight or wind to meet the demands of their customers.
Because of this unpredictability, there is a growing corollary market in making better
batteries. The idea is to make batteries that can store excess power when the natural processes
are strong and which can be tapped into when they are weak, which would help power
generators to meet the demands of customers at all times. Better batteries can also help with
the issue of grid variability.

Chapter 1 | 14
Currently, many areas still face difficulty with grid integration. Most countries deliver
electricity to their customers using a complex grid system that consists of power lines and poles.
Some of these wires are only able to transport a certain amount of energy at its maximum
capacity. When there is a storm, wind turbines spin wildly and generate a lot of electricity,
overloading the power lines. This situation places stress on power lines, and some may explode
or malfunction after a certain limit. China and India are two countries whose grid congestion
poses a problem for investments in renewable energy (REN21, 2016, p. 60). Because of this issue,
many grid operators are reluctant to connect power from renewable sources to the grid. A proper
battery system would cut down on this concern and allow energy producers to control how much
electricity they feed into the grid. However, energy storage technology at an affordable price is
still in want, and until then, grid systems that are not properly constructed with a large power
capacity are still unable to integrate renewable energy into its mix. The current situation is still
difficult for renewable energy producers, with some finding that they cannot sell the electricity
that they produce because they have no way of transporting it to their consumers without the
help of the grid system.
Some areas are working around this issue by looking toward distributed systems. These
range from single systems that produce electricity for a single appliance or household, or they
can be connected to a mini electricity grid. The main characteristic of the distributed systems is
that it is not connected to the larger national or regional electricity grid. There are several reasons
to prefer these distributed systems. First, as mentioned above, there are difficulties with
connecting with the main grid. Since reliable and cost-effective batteries are still not available on
the market, electricity producers still run into difficulty when they try to connect to the grid.

Chapter 1 | 15
Some places still lack the proper policies, such as the ability to net meter, without which
producers cannot keep track of how much of their electricity versus electricity from other sources
is consumed.
Second, policy makers realize that some places are too remote to make grid extension to
these areas an economically worthwhile option. In order to decrease the time it takes for these
areas to have electricity, policy makers and private investors look toward smaller systems that
do not need to be connected to the grid because they are cheaper. Lee, et al., (2016), in an
experiment in Western Kenya, estimated that the cost to connect to the grid there was about
USD 1,000 per connection, while distributed systems can start as low as USD 10 for smaller
systems. The problem with these distributed systems, usually using solar energy, is their capacity
and reliability. These systems usually have smaller capacities. However, people living in remote
areas generally have smaller energy demands and these systems can serve at least their basic
needs. These distributed systems at least provide rural families with some access to electricity.
Small-scale projects received USD 67.4 billion in finance in 2015, representing about a quarter of
all new investment in renewable energy (FS-UNEP & BNEF, 2016, p. 54).
Countries that are likely to incorporate more renewable energy are those with markets
that are not monopolistic and in which consumers already have a choice of suppliers. Other
promising markets are those that already have a high level of participation from renewable
energy companies, and countries that have regulators and policymakers who see the value of
renewable energy and are champions of it (Ernst & Young, 2016, p. 6). Wise (2007) argues that
the reason that explains Peru’s natural gas consumption pattern, despite how much natural gas
they can produce, is the high politicization of the energy sector policymaking and that “the

Chapter 1 | 16
interaction of domestic politics with the technological complexities and socioenvironmental
sensitive intrinsic to the exploitation of this resource also accounts for the long gestation period
in bringing gas to the Peruvian market” (p. 305). Similar technological challenges face the
exploitation of renewable energy technologies.
Institutions and Levels of Analysis
The above-mentioned developments in the renewable energy sector are embedded in
domestic and international institutions that give context to renewable energy as an option for
the future of electricity production. Douglass North defines “institutions” as “the humanly
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (1991, p. 97). These
can be both formal or informal, explicit or implicit. The basic idea is that human interactions need
to be constrained because doing so facilitates cooperation. Traditionally, institutions are
generally restrictive, but depending on institutional design, institutions can be enablers of
desired behavior.
One way that institutions constrain behavior is through the status quo bias. Because
actors prefer stability and predictability of future outcomes, they prefer the status quo. The
status quo bias exists in the field of energy policy as well because conventional energy sources
are the safer and more certain choice. By coupling climate change with energy security, there is
the potential to redefine the energy security problem and find solutions that are more
environmentally friendly. However, change can only come as a compromise of various actors and
politicians who are in charge of voting, and they will only put this issue high on the agenda if they
are convinced that it is an important issue.

Chapter 1 | 17
Bang (2010) notes the status quo bias in the U.S. Congress and how attention to energy
security and climate change issues helped to pave the way for a more environmentally conscious
vote in the 110th Congress. Bang argues that several elements are important to explaining policy
change in the U.S.: the design and structure of the U.S. political system, where change can only
come if members of the Senate and the House compromise and agree on a specific course of
action; and agenda setting and the number of feasible alternatives considered. The “oil-, coal-,
utility-, and auto industries are strong interest groups that continue to support the use of fossil
fuels, and they have the advantage of infrastructure that is readily available to provide energy
products to consumers. As a consequence, politicians are faced with traditional, well-known
alternatives when they consider climate and energy policies for the future” (ibid, p. 1649). This
quote argues that the status quo bias is strong because it is the safer choice. Also, when the issue
of climate change is coupled with traditional national concerns such as national security and
energy dependence, it leads to greater attention to newer issues on the agenda. Policies can
change from the status quo but only incrementally because of the need to compromise in a
democracy.
Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) argue that the policy outcome of policies to promote wind
and solar energy is due to growing coalitions of advocates pushing against the opposition of
entrenched coal and nuclear interests to change the status quo. The process starts with
institutional change, then creation of markets, and next the formation of advocacy groups
comprising firms, industry associations, and other entities such as universities and non-
governmental organizations (NGO). Fourth is the entry of new firms to solidify the market and

Chapter 1 | 18
proliferate the technology. Using process tracing, the authors provide a description of Germany’s
policy change tracing its various steps.
International participation appears to be encouraging more participation. Perhaps it is
because with international commitment, countries are thinking that international and
development banks will back this kind of effort. This was what occurred in the 1980s with the
Washington Consensus, and countries committed to develop in certain ways because doing so
would guarantee a loan from the development bank. Perhaps as more countries are moving in
this direction, countries feel more confident that if they pass policies that support the trend, they
will be able to attract more investment and develop.
The COP21 Paris Agreement has changed the renewable energy market even more.
Countries that have signed the Paris Agreement indicate that they are committed to mitigating
climate change, and part of this process involves investing in and supporting renewable energy.
When the political intention is clear, investors feel more assured to invest as the risk that the
government will likely change its political support is decreased. Furthermore, the Paris
Agreement extended the commitment of USD 100 billion a year by 2020 to 2025. The Paris
Agreement made it clear that there was government and world commitment to making cash
available to investors.
While most studies of international political economy recognize that there is an
interaction between the international and domestic levels (Frieden & Martin, 2003), the
individual level is also important. And with policy windows, usually there are one or a few
individuals who can be singled out to show their agency and impact on the outcome. The issue
with the individual level is that individuals are highly idiosyncratic, and it is difficult to make any

Chapter 1 | 19
predictions when one considers the individual level. This is why most scholars skip over the
individual level all together. Some authors (for example, Harvey, 2011) believe that the individual
does not matter; structural constraints would make the rational decision apparent to any actor
in the same situation. However, ideology of individuals has been shown to be important in
decision-making (Pastor & Wise, 1994), so individuals cannot be eliminated from the analysis
matrix.
Steinberg (2003) observes that international influence on domestic environmental
politics and institutions is great, but this is not highly recognized in the literature, and that there
is a lack of information about international influence on institutional change (p. 16). Indeed, this
dissertation finds that while Peru’s institutions have historically allowed the opposition to
successfully block renewable energy policies from moving forward, its design also allowed the
opening of a policy window where this groundbreaking policy was able to pass through. This
dissertation also traces the chain of how international influences started the motion at the
domestic level, and then the domestic level picks up this momentum, enacting changes that no
one could have predicted would stem from the international impetus. What is most surprising is
that this policy resulted from a trade deal with the U.S., and it was not even required as a piece
of compliance in the final deal. Yet domestic actors took liberties with the opportunity that
presented itself and framed the issue to their preference.
Methodology
This dissertation process traces LD 1002, the renewable energy policy that people thought
could not pass and is still strongly opposed today. This research relies on historical primary
resources such as government documents, news articles, and market data on electricity

Chapter 1 | 20
production in order to construct a profile of the pre-existing landscape that enshrouds this highly
controversial policy in Peru. Next, the study draws on interviews with relevant players who were
directly involved with this policy, including personnel within MINEM and MINAM; Peru’s energy
regulator, OSINERGMIN; local electricity companies; and key protagonists within Peruvian
academia and NGOs. Finally, it traces and triangulates the steps and strategies that players used
to circumvent the opposition and pass policies that favor renewable energy practices.
An inductive study has been proven helpful for theory generation in the past. Kingdon’s
(1984) groundbreaking book was also inductive, wherein he started with a set of questions and
used in-depth interviews and empirical observations to build a theory. It was not until after the
interviews were conducted that he came up with his theories about how the U.S. political system
works. Hermansen (2015) uses inductive research by carefully analyzing the case of Norway’s
REDD+ initiative to learn about policy windows and entrepreneurs. Dudley (2013) did an
inductive study on the London Congestion Charge to understand how narratives played a role in
opening and closing policy windows for this policy to pass. Given that the topic of passing the
first, controversial renewable energy policy is a topic that has been under-theorized thus far in
the literature, this study generates many new ideas for further exploration.
A single case study has also bred benefits for the rest of the field. Merilee Grindle’s (1977)
book focused only on one Mexican bureaucracy, the National Staple Products Company
(CONASUPO). From her study, readers are able to consider the many contextual
considerations — including international trends, institutional constraints, and resource
availability — that actors had to face that compelled them to take the actions that they took.
Such details would be lost in broader studies that do not dig as deep. One can also take better

Chapter 1 | 21
note of how institutions can produce similar behavior across very different actors. Yet within
those similarities, small idiosyncrasies can also be observed. These observations are possible with
a small-n, in-depth study.
Brief Sketch of the Argument
To explain how Peru was able to pass its first major renewable energy policy, theories of
institutionalism must be combined with the opportunity window model. Figure 2 illustrates the
relationships and connections between different events that brought about LD 1002. There is
political willingness on the part of domestic society, but it must wait for the right opportunity
with influential actors in place to pass this policy. However, for a developing country, there is a
clear international influence on domestic politics. Much of the international political economy
(IPE) literature tends to hold the international level constant and look at the domestic level or
vice versa (Frieden & Martin, 2003). This study holds the international sphere constant because
it is interested in how international influences affect domestic policy change. There is also a
dearth of studies that can explain how international influence affects institutional change
(Steinberg, 2003). Furthermore, developing countries are generally viewed as adopters of
international norms once they develop (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Thakur, 2001).1
Thus, this study
examines the international influence on domestic institutions.
1
However, some scholars are beginning to study the role that developing countries have on
shaping international norms. See, for example, Brzezinski (2010) and Jinnah (2017).

Chapter 1 | 22
Breaking away from IPE tradition, however, this study disaggregates the domestic level
by also looking at the individual level in addition to the state level. Studies about institutions
typically recognize the importance of ideas in the proceedings of institutions. Ideas, as we know,
come from people. By looking at individuals, this is not too far of a departure from current
institutional analysis. This inclination is also aligned with the opportunity windows scholarship.
As is commonly recognized in the literature of opportunity windows, the policy entrepreneur is
an important individual and can usually be identified as key to bringing about policy change.
Studying the three levels of interaction provides a more complete picture of the different forces
at play. This is in line with Buzan (1995), James (1988), and Mabee (2007), who argue that
multiple levels should be studied simultaneously to better understand interactions. Although
there could be a multitude of ways to categorize the different levels (Buzan, 1995), the Peruvian
case lends itself to be easily divided into three levels.
Figure 2: Political Willingness and Policy Window

Chapter 1 | 23
The willingness to advocate for a policy, or the preparation that actors put towards
advocating for their policy, starts at the international level. This was the source of both the ideas
for a renewable energy policy and the science to explain its need. The international sphere
provided Peru with technology options that use renewable energy sources. Simultaneously, there
was more information about energy issues around the world and at the country level. Globally,
there was a political norm change, in which many countries began to concern themselves with
climate change issues and signed on to these international agreements. There was, further, an
economic global norm change, because many companies began to invest in renewable energy
technology. These international trends were not lost on the Peruvian domestic audience.
International trends led the Peruvian state to create many new institutions that focused
on research and training and on implementing international agreements into which Peru had
entered. Aside from state institutions, universities also created new programs to research various
aspects of renewable energy as it relates to society.
Finally, international trends also likely inspired individuals in society to begin involvement
in studying renewable energy. These can be seen in the researchers, conference attendees, and
writers about issues of renewable energy and climate change in Peru. People began to speak
more about the benefits of renewable energy and the need for Peru to use more of it.
Once these international ideas enter the domestic sphere (which includes both state
institutions level and the individual level), a synergistic energy is created, whereby more
institutions attract more individuals. More individuals also fortify existing institutions and even
energize some to start new initiatives, such as form new institutions, conferences, or writings
about this topic. The state and individual levels reinforce each other. The momentum for more

Chapter 1 | 24
renewable energy continues to build in the international sphere, which in turn fuels activities
within Peru’s domestic sphere. However, despite the brewing and growing interest, and the
desire for the state to take concrete policy steps to promote and use more renewable energy
domestically, the institutions, structures, and interests that were in place were such that there
was much built-in opposition that succeeded in stopping such policies from moving forward.
Although there was political willingness, it had to wait for an opportunity to appear. The
opportunity also began at the international level, but this had to be filtered through state-level
response and then taken up by domestic elites. For Peru, this international impetus came in the
form of a trade deal with the U.S. This served as an exogenous “shock” to the system that
required domestic actors to change institutions in major ways. The trade deal required Peru to
make many institutional changes and also included a term on environmental protection. Policy
entrepreneurs took advantage of this criterion and were able to successfully frame the issue of
renewable energy as falling under environmental protection.
This trade deal started a chain of events within the state system. Here is where institutions
and the free spaces that the state system allows to individual actors once again plays an
important role. Usually, the Peruvian legislation process requires proposal and then debate
within the entire Peruvian unicameral congress, which has 130 members. In extraordinary
circumstances, the Peruvian system allows for congress to delegate legislative power to the
executive branch whenever it deems necessary, usually in situations that require swift action;
the hierarchical nature of the Executive branch allows for faster action than congress’ democratic
structure. Because Peru wanted to complete the terms of the trade deal quickly so that it could

Chapter 1 | 25
start to take effect, the Peruvian congress delegated legislative authority to the executive branch
to complete the terms of the trade deal.
Individuals who were interested in renewable energy and saw its value were well positioned
within the Peruvian government to influence policy. The Vice Minister of Energy at the time,
Pedro Gamio, was a big advocate for renewable energy. Even before this opportunity came along,
he had already assembled a task force to study the feasibility and benefits of renewable energy
for Peru. The legal language for this policy was already written and ready to go by the time
legislative power was granted. This policy entrepreneur did not know when for sure the
opportunity would come, but he was prepared to act whenever an opportunity looked promising.
Once the executive branch was given legislative power, the vice minister proposed the policy,
which the minister and the president approved by legislative decree. Another fortuitous
institutional design is that once a legislative decree passes the executive branch, it requires open
debate and vote within congress. This difference of 130 decision-makers versus the, at the
extreme, 3 decision-makers within the executive branch, meant that it would be much more
difficult to repeal this policy than to have the executive branch pass it. Furthermore, given the
international trend, few politicians wanted to spearhead the oppositional force and stand as an
opponent of renewable energy. Because of this, this policy stands today.
For Peru, this shock came from the international system. But one can imagine that these
shocks can come from domestic sources as well, such as a natural disaster or an economic crash
that originated from national sources. For developed countries, because they tend to set
international norms and lead in economic and political proceedings, exogenous shocks for them
are more likely to come from within their economy and then have rippling effects on other

Chapter 1 | 26
countries. This is not to say that Peru does not have its own influence. This particular case,
however, is a good demonstration of an instance in which international influence greatly
impacted domestic institutions of a developing country with lasting effect.
This framework follows the idea that for any outcome, both structure and agency are
simultaneously at work. As Karl Marx (1963 [1869]) has argued about history, “Men make their
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted
from the past” (p. 15). Cameron (1997), in trying to explain how Alberto Fujimori, one of Peru’s
former presidents, could have staged a coup and disband the Peruvian Congress in 1992 with
impunity, also notes that Fujimori was able to do so because of structural factors and human
agency. The Peruvian electoral system, economic decline, and growing insurgency movements
came together that created a political climate that allowed for an outsider to be elected. Once in
power, Fujimori had the agency to decide what he wanted to do. He could have decided to form
coalitions within Congress, despite not having many allies, but Cameron argues that Fujimori did
not try or even want to form political coalitions. Similarly, this event that allowed the Peruvian
government to pass a law major law about renewable energy worked within the institutional
confines, but actors within this space were able to exercise some agency and creativity in order
to pass the policy that they wanted.
Contributions of the Study
This dissertation adds to the body of literature on policy change by looking specifically at
one policy that represents a game-changer in a given sector and therefore invokes high levels of
opposition. This policy is transformative for Peru’s energy market because it was allowed for

Chapter 1 | 27
renewable energy’s first entry into the grid. Furthermore, this decree has radically changed the
mindset of political elites about renewable energy. Unlike before, political elites now have
evidence that renewable energy can contribute to national energy security without hurting the
market. Yet many people are unaware of the origin of this policy and how it came to pass. An
explanation of this process will allow for more recognition of this policy as a benefit for the
Peruvian government, and more awareness will let the public and political elites hold ministries
accountable for completing the mandates stipulated in this policy.
This study also elucidates the strategies that political elites have used in a politically
challenging setting and identifies those factors deemed most salient for passing renewable
energy policies within developing countries. Understanding this policy-making process offers
invaluable insights on those conditions most conducive for passing difficult but necessary laws,
some of which could be transferable to other developing countries trying to contribute to the
global effort on mitigating climate change. Although no two countries are the same,
understanding the specific issues that Peru faced and the political dynamics of overcoming them
brings researchers a step closer to theorizing about and enacting renewable energy and climate
change policies.
Peru’s situation is also not entirely unique. Despite much verbal support for mitigating
climate change, countries have been slow to act. Many face entrenched domestic opposition
when they try to enact necessary policies. Even countries that have passed many renewable
energy policies in the past still face opposition when they try to pass new policies because the
interests at risk of losing — fossil fuel companies — continue to fight to keep their market share.

Chapter 1 | 28
The case of Peru is even more complex as it represents a developing country setting,
where political institutions can be weaker. While renewable energy is important for the entire
world, it is more important for developing countries because their energy demand is growing
faster than developed countries. However, with concerns over climate change and shrinking
fossil fuel supplies, developing countries are harder pressed to look for ways to meet their energy
demand using renewable energy. Thus, understanding how developing countries can pass
difficult climate-related policies is even more urgent. Despite the need, there have been few
studies on policy change in developing countries. Many past studies on the policy process have
focused on conditions in the Western Hemisphere (for example, Baumgartner & Jones, 2009;
Kingdon, 2011; and Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). But Peru’s institutions are vastly different
from those in the U.S., for example. The comparative strengths of developing countries’ various
ministries, political tools available, and rules that are in place all pose different challenges that
should be studied so that theories about policy change can be more complete.
Government support through supportive policies is still recognized as a necessary action.
Deshmukh, et al. (2012) conclude that while prices of solar energy are decreasing, there is still a
need for government support by passing policies to support research and development (R&D)
and policies that would optimize the country’s energy objective while taking advantage of the
global drop in price. It is acknowledged that government involvement is needed for more
deployment of renewable energy. This study looks to see how certain actors can make their
governments more involved and supportive of renewable energy.
The findings in this study are not applicable only to the field of renewable energy.
Renewable energy is studied because it is a growing topic of importance internationally. But

Chapter 1 | 29
this finding can be applicable to any policy that society deems necessary but is still highly
opposed. One can imagine that there are a host of policies that, upon review, look beneficial to
society at large yet cannot be passed because a small, powerful group successfully block them.
Those issues can draw from the analysis in this study.
Finally, though Peru’s idiosyncrasies cannot be perfectly replicated in other countries’
contexts, there are still some key takeaways by looking at Peru alone. Peru’s opportunity window
opened because of a power shift within the major branches of government. Power shifts happen
regularly in politics, such as when there is a change of leaders, a branch is delegated certain
powers, or a branch may be experiencing some kind of dysfunction. It is important to recognize
that these are windows of opportunities so that actors can align their resources to act
immediately. Theoretically, this dissertation draws on models of political decision-making and
institutional design to explain how local actors attain what they want. Globally, the world is in an
epic transition toward renewable energy use. This research aims to promote this necessary
changeover within developing countries as quickly and seamlessly as possible.
Areas not Covered in this Study
There are several questions that this study is not designed to answer. First, it cannot fully
explain how important but highly opposed policies passed in other countries. This is a single study
on Peru meant to understand the context, constraints, and dynamics that took place for this
policy to pass. Its generalizability has not been tested in other contexts, but one can imagine that
there are similarities to be drawn to contexts of other developing countries as well, such as the
powerful influence that international developments can have on changing domestic views, the

Chapter 1 | 30
impact of trade deals on institutional changes, and domestic interests and institutional
constraints that are similar across many countries.
This study also does not focus as much on rural electrification policies that use renewable
energy. Rural electrification is also a very important topic, but given the significant impact of
policies promoting mass use of renewable energy, the political calculus for rural electrification is
best left for another study. However, briefly discussed in one chapter, Peruvian rural policies that
use renewable energy were also passed with high influence from international activities. Peru
relies heavily on international loans, especially from the World Bank, to fund its rural
electrification policies. It sets up programs and management offices to follow stipulations of
these international loans. These loans also give the Peruvian government flexibility in how it
wants to implement its programs. The policies that are passed, however, must closely follow the
loan terms, so there is less liberty to discuss how programs should be designed than policies that
are not tied to international loans.
This study also does not speak about implementation. Grindle (1980) looks closely at policy
implementation in the developing world. The authors in that edited book find that while it is
difficult enough to pass a policy, let alone a controversial policy, the implementation stage is
another issue. In particular, McClintock’s chapter (Ch. 3) notes that Peru’s agrarian policy reform
under General Velasco (1968-1975) was frustrated during the implementation phase for many
reasons. Initially, leaders were not united in the direction that they wanted to take these
reforms, which led to unclear directions. The implementors, many of whom were young
university graduates, had their own ideas of how they wanted the reforms to look. Subsequently,
different governmental departments did not communicate with each other and actually

Chapter 1 | 31
undermined each other’s work in some instances. Finally, people who lived on these farms had
their own idea of how they wanted to organize the reform. While Velasco had an idea about how
the policy should be reformed, this communication changed down the implementation chain
because messaging was unclear and members at different hierarchical levels also had different
ideologies about what they wanted to see.
LD 1002 also faced similar challenges during its implementation. Passing it was difficult,
but the implementation process has also been sluggish. Because within the government, only a
few political elites supported mass-scale renewable energy at that time, they dragged their feet
during implementation. For example, the quota for renewable energy has not been increased
since it was passed, and the auction that should have taken place in 2017 was completely
cancelled. This study, though, does not touch upon the politics of implementation; it only focuses
on policy passage.
Finally, this study does not continue the story of how Peru’s actions have had broader
regional and international impact. Some scholars are beginning to study the role that developing
countries have on shaping international norms (see, for example, Brzezinski, 2010, and Jinnah,
2017). The literature on norms talks about the norm cascade, whereby once a norm starts to pick
up speed, there is a tipping point and then everyone else quickly jumps on board (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998; Hadden & Seybert, 2016; Krook & True, 2012). Peru passing policies and increasing
efforts to promote more renewable energy also contributes to an international tide that pushes
a norm towards its tipping point and/or cascade. Furthermore, developing countries, in their
actions, can also alter the international norm. In the past, for example, policies such as tax
incentives were major mechanisms to promote renewable energy investment. Peru passing a

Chapter 1 | 32
policy that creates an auction mechanism is adding to the alternative trend of using this particular
policy to encourage more competitive, private financing of renewable energy. This mechanism
also removes the government from financial obligations and retains only administrative duties.
It also signals to other countries, especially those in the region, that they should feel pressured
to adopt these policies as well if they are one of the few remaining countries without strong
renewable energy policies. These considerations, though, are not covered in depth in this study.
Outline of Dissertation
The story behind Peru’s first mass-scale renewable energy policy will unfold in the following
manner. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of policy change in developing countries. It finds
that past theories — crisis, special interest groups, and leadership change — are not applicable
in Peru’s context at this time. The institutional framework provides the best starting point, and
connecting it with policy windows gives some traction to understanding the Peruvian case.
Chapter 3 traces Peru’s energy history and the framework of the energy market to demonstrate
the entrenched and powerful interests that wanted to maintain the status quo. Chapter 4
discusses political willingness, which began at the international level but then incited interested
players at the state and individual levels. However, despite much enthusiasm, these actors were
hindered by institutional constraints, like informal lobbying and well-organized traditional
players in the electricity sector, and they were not able to make any significant change. Chapter
5 shows how the policy window was able to open, which was a trade deal with the U.S. that
started at the international level, causing a delegation of legislative power at the state level.
Individual actors took advantage of this power shift to pass LD 1002. Chapter 6 provides a quick
snapshot of renewable energy as it has been used for rural electrification. Following a similar

Chapter 1 | 33
trend, rural electrification in Peru was highly influenced by international efforts. Peru, once it
received international loans, began with projects that were grid extensions, then free giveaway
distributive systems, and now, in a third phase, highly assisted distributive technologies. It has
learned from past lessons to create a more sustainable model of rural electrification. Finally,
Chapter 7 concludes with a few takeaways and ideas for future research that this study generates.
Before moving too far ahead, however, the next chapter provides some literature background on
the study of institutions and policy windows.

Chapter 2| 34
Chapter 2. Institutions and Policy Windows: Opportunities for Major
Policy Change
Social science scholars have long been fascinated by the policy process, especially during
periods of radical policy change. They note that there are long spans of time where policies
remain largely the same, interrupted by short spurts where policies change drastically (for
example, the Punctuated Equilibrium Model, see Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Given that LD
1002 was the first policy that supported mass generation of electricity using renewable energy in
Peru, it falls under the category of major policy change.2
This chapter provides a background to
understand why such radical changes are rare in routine politics and what scholars have found
to explain these critical moments. Several of the explanations — crisis, interest group politics,
and leadership change — are applicable to many instances in the politics of developing countries
but are inadequate to explain the dynamics that took place when this renewable energy policy
passed. The institutional explanation appears most suitable for understanding the constraints on
actors’ behavior but also the liberty that they were able to take when a window of opportunity
appeared. This review is divided into four sections. The first section discusses routine politics.
2
“Major policy change” here is used in accordance with Hermann’s (1990) classification. He
holds that, more than a mere adjustment change, a major policy change is either a change in
means (program), ends (goal/problem), or overall orientation. LD 1002 is arguably all three. It is
a change in means because it created a new auction program for renewable energy. It is a
change in ends because it establishes increasing clean energy as a national goal. Finally, it is a
change in orientation because it opens up the market to renewable energy producers for the
first time. Although Hermann used this system to describe foreign policy change, the same
scheme is also a useful way to categorize domestic policy change.

Chapter 2| 35
Section two talks about possible explanations for major policy change. Section three discusses
institutionalism and the policy window, and section four concludes.
Routine Politics
Major policy change does not happen every day. The daily proceeding of the policy
process is necessary but humdrum. Some days a few policies pass, but only to adjust an existing
law with a problematic section, extend a policy, or adjust an earlier measurement. Some days a
resolution is passed to make a public declaration, but it does not change how society operates.
Some days no new policy passes at all. Policy adjustments generally follow along the same path
that has been set and can be largely expected, causing no major upsets. This section discusses
why, during the normal course of the policy process, policies tend to stay the same. It also focuses
on if and when they do change, why they tend to do so slowly and incrementally.
Scholars theorize that it is difficult to change policies in a major way because of the status
quo bias. Status quo bias is the tendency to resist change, i.e. preference for the status quo.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) identify three mechanisms for why this bias exists: rational
decision-making, cognitive misperceptions, and psychological commitment. In thinking about the
evolution of policies, the status quo bias explains why most policy areas tend to remain stable,
even when they produce an inefficient outcome or process. Most policies passed in government
are likely to be small adjustments to existing procedures rather than structural overhauls. Policy-
makers like to stick to the policies that they know work. Passing policies that are radically
different or new compared to existing policies can lead to unintended consequences. The fear of
the unknown and possible future loss lead people to strongly oppose drastic changes. For these
reasons, major policy changes in politically stable countries occur infrequently.

Chapter 2| 36
One illustrative case shows the prevalence of the status quo bias. Huang and James find
evidence for status quo bias in explaining the constancy of Taiwan’s precarious relationship with
China. They write, “Any proposal to alter what effectively is a non-policy contains great risk of
rejection because an attempt to change any one aspect could open a Pandora’s Box of issues and
bring the adversaries to the brink of war or even beyond” (2014, p. 677). Because pushing for de
jure sovereignty carries great risks, while the status quo at least is a secure position, China and
Taiwan accept the unclear status of the other. This situation can be analogized to other instances
of policy-making, where shaking up the current political arrangement can lead to unexpected,
adverse consequences that actors are unprepared to confront.
The same can be seen in the politics of many developing countries. After the 1940s, many
Latin American countries followed the policy of import-substitution and export promotion. The
idea follows Modernization Theory, which believes that all countries follow the same
development path. First, countries start out as an agrarian culture, then they industrialize, and
finally they “modernize” when they reach a society characterized by sophisticated technology,
mass production of goods, and a strong service industry. Because Latin American countries were
largely still agrarian at the time, they believed that they should focus on the second step by
industrializing their industries. This, they believed, could be achieved by passing policies that
substituted the importation of goods so that domestic industries could be encouraged to develop.
Such policies included high tariffs, price controls, and state ownership of leading industries
(Grindle, 1986). By the 1980s, these import-substitution policies led many countries to
experience absurdly high inflation rates. Bolivia had an annual inflation rate of 23,455%, Mexico
had an annual rate of 159%, Argentina had a rate of 1,344%, Peru had a rate of 12,378%, and

Chapter 2| 37
Brazil had a rate of 2,103% (Rodrik, 1996, p. 26). It took about forty years of failing development
policies and uncontrollable inflation for countries to finally decide to change their policy. Even
though it was clear much earlier that these policies were not working, the status quo of policies
managed to prevail for a long time.
The status quo bias has kept business running as usual — meaning to keep renewable
energy producers out — for many years in the Peruvian electricity market. Many politicians
pushed against renewable energy because they did not know how introducing this new source
into the grid would affect prices, fearing that it would cause prices to increase (Espinoza,
Interview: 4 March 2017). Local governments, especially in the Amazonian regions, were familiar
with hydrocarbons, hydropower, and gold because these have brought them money in the past,
but these leaders do not fully understand the benefits that renewable energy can bring them
(Cady, Interview: 6 March 2017). This lack of knowledge makes decision-makers reluctant to take
steps towards change, and the status quo remains.
Despite the status quo bias, we know that policies do change. The public elects legislators
and governments hire public servants to revise and devise policies that better meet public
interest goals. Borrowing from economics, political scientists have tried to apply the Rational
Choice Model to explain political occurrences. Political actors, in the ideal sense, should make
decisions rationally by calculating and choosing the course of action that would maximize
expected payoffs (Green & Shapiro, 1994; Riker, 1995; Simon, 1995). Under these perfect
conditions, policies are thought to change incrementally after thorough assessment.
Incrementalism posits that policies change as a result of coalition building among various rational
actors who have differing interests in society. The policy is then tried, altered as interests change,

Chapter 2| 38
and then tried again in altered form (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). Kaimowitz (1996) sees such
coalition building and identifies seven groups that promote environmental policies in Latin
America: organizations from developed countries, local environmental organizations,
entrepreneurs involved in “green” businesses, farmers and communities affected by pollution,
indigenous communities, professional environmentalists, and political parties and social
movements concerned with social justice. Kaimowitz finds that some societies allow some of
these groups to have more bargaining power than others. For example, in countries where no
one industry dominates the economy, different environmental groups can push their agenda and
the government is more likely to listen because it is not afraid of backlash from one powerful
group. In society, many of these groups work together and form coalitions to change policies in
their favor. Because they have to take the interests of other members of their coalition into
consideration, and some interests may be different from their own, the change that they can
make is a compromise and is generally more moderate than their original proposal. Because of
this, policies change incrementally.
The Bureaucratic Model theorizes that policy change results from politicking and
bargaining among top leaders, and these leaders act based on their own set of preferences,
abilities, and position of power (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). In the Peruvian government, sometimes
there are tensions between the different public institutions in Peru. For example, MINAM wants
to minimize carbon emissions, but MINEM wants to expand natural gas production. These two
ministries must talk to each other and try to respect each other’s goal. But in Peru, MINEM is
clearly stronger, so gas exploitation continues.

Chapter 2| 39
The Organizational Process Model states that the policy process is guided by people who
work within organizations. They are guided by protocols and their organization’s mission.
Grindle’s (1977) in-depth case study of CONASUPO traces how it fulfills its goal of rural
development strategy. It follows the relationship between personnel and the method they use
to devise a policy and decide about the best way to implement it. This model holds that personnel
within organizations follow protocols and further the goals of their immediate organization,
though not necessarily looking at the larger picture.
These three rational models have been shown applicable in different instances in the Latin
American context. They also explain why, generally speaking, politics in stable Latin American
countries change slowly and with much deliberation. There are systems and institutions in place
to safeguard rapid and radical changes until the policy idea has been vetted by relevant entities.
Still, dissatisfaction with the Rational Choice Model continue to brew because a purely
rational model is not applicable in any empirical setting (McCarthy-Jones & Turner, 2011). These
unsatisfied scholars see that the policy process is complicated and non-linear – not rational at all.
Jacobsson and Lauber write, “Policy-making is, however, not a ‘rational’ technocratic process but
rather one that appears to be based on such things as visions and values, the relative strengths
of various pressure groups, perhaps on beliefs of ‘how things work’ and on deeper historical and
cultural influences” (2006, p. 257). Scholars observe that policies do not always
change incrementally through thorough deliberation, as these above-mentioned models suggest.
Rather, they can sometimes change drastically, rapidly, and unexpectedly. What allows for major
policy change despite the status quo bias and the deliberate design of public institutions to be

Chapter 2| 40
measured and democratic? It is to these moments, when we are likely to see major policy
changes, that we now turn.
Major Policy Reform
Major policy reform is where politics become exciting. It is no surprise that this is where
scholars have given much attention as they attempt to explain why policies and politics are
thrown off their usual course. Several explanations could explain why major policy reforms occur.
However, as will be explained, these explanations fall short when applied to why Peru passed a
large-scale renewable energy policy in 2008.
Crisis and Policy Change
Policies do not always change incrementally, and crises have been found to be especially
fertile ground for new policies. Some researchers believe that a crisis is a requirement for policy
change. Norhrstedt (2005) writes, “...external perturbations are a necessary condition for major
policy change” (p. 1041). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) echo the same sentiment, stating
that major policy change will not occur in the absence of “significant perturbations external to
the system” (p. 34). Grossman’s book, US Energy Policy and the Pursuit of Failure (2013), traces
how the U.S.’s energy policies have tended to be reactions to perceived energy crises, starting
with the 1973 oil embargo by OPEC.
Why do crises lead to policy change? A number of propositions have been made. The
Advocacy Coalition Framework argues that shocks and crises can affect policy in three different
ways: it can redistribute political resources; minority members can exploit the situation to further
their own beliefs; and members of the dominant group might reconsider their position in light of
new events (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010). The Punctuated Equilibrium Model observes that there

Chapter 2| 41
are long periods of time when a policy attracts little attention, and then occasional bursts that
lead to dramatic policy changes. These bursts occur because an event, like a crisis, draws
attention to a specific issue. The media plays an important role by continuing to spotlight the
situation. Also important during these times are changes in ideas and the effects on agenda
setting (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The Ambivalent Majoritarian Model states that a crisis
creates a condition where a larger coalition is likely to form. This coalition is composed of
members who are ambivalent about the correctness or feasibility of a policy but only vote for it
as a response to a crisis. This provides opportunity for policies that have failed during non-crisis
periods to pass during a crisis (Ahrari, 1987). Finally, Grossman (2012) proposes the Do Something
Dilemma, which is when a threat leads to public demand for action. Politicians who do not
respond will encounter disgruntled voters who can jeopardize their chance of reelection.
Aside from these models about crises, there is a whole body of literature about crisis and
policy change. But the idea that crisis is necessary for major policy change has its problems. It is
natural that policy reform should follow policy failure, and a crisis is a severe form of policy failure.
Therefore, it seems natural that policy reform should occur when it is undeniable that it is failing.
Furthermore, this idea is practically non-falsifiable when one considers that when reform does
not happen, one can argue that the crisis is not perceived as severe enough. This leads to the
third problem, which is that of predictability — it is hard to tell when a crisis will or will not lead
to reform. Finally, this also leads to difficulty in predicting what kinds of policy will follow a crisis,
and some countries have been found to complicate macroeconomic stability with the policies
that they passed after a crisis (Rodrik, 1996).

Chapter 2| 42
Indeed, Peru does have a history of passing major policy reforms during times of crisis. In
1992, when the country was experiencing great hyperinflation, insurgency, and natural disasters,
there was a constitutional overhaul and a new constitution with new institutions was developed.
However, the crisis explanation cannot explain why Peru passed a major policy in favor of
renewable energy in 2008. At this time, Peru had an energy surplus. Macroeconomically, it was
stable. The president at that time, Alan Garcia, was in his second term and had a stable presidency.
There was no crisis to draw attention to this issue, or increase its urgency, or to show that the
current policy was failing. There was no natural disaster to foment any kind of national crisis. A
crisis cannot explain why LD 1002 passed when it did.
Special Interest Groups
Special interest groups are any collection of individuals in society who have concerns in
common. People may come together because they share the same factor endowment;
preserving this as a continuing profitable resource is a reason to come together and protect their
economic activities. Another reason could be that actors work in the same sector, which gives
them an incentive to cooperate to protect their economic activity. Finally, a third reason they
may come together is because they have a special social interest in common, such as the desire
to increase education funding (Frieden & Martin, 2003; Pastor & Wise, 1994).
The effectiveness and influence that these groups have on policies depends on their
ability to organize. These special interest groups can alter policies through two main mechanisms.
The first is through lobbying, which, in Latin America, can be formal lobby groups but usually
occurs informally (Thomas & Klimovich, 2014). Lobbying by special interest groups is most
influential when the country has a few key industries that dominate the economy. Because these

Chapter 2| 43
industries’ economic output greatly influences gross domestic product, and assuming that they
pay taxes to the central government (thus affecting the amount of revenue the government gets),
the government has an incentive to make sure that these companies remain profitable.
Furthermore, these key industries are likely major employers in the country, so their economic
well-being can influence the livelihood of their many employees. Finally, these industries likely
have many connections to political elites, either professionally or personally. This can also play a
role in how much they can sway political opinions to pass policies in their favor.
This theory would make sense to explain LD 1002 if renewable energy was a large and
influential industry in Peru in 2008. On the contrary, it did not have any of the clout that special
interest groups should have if they are to be politically influential. Renewable energy companies
had basically no presence in Peru at this time. They were not large, domestic employers, and they
did not have many advocates that are close to decision-making leaders. Their opposition,
traditional electricity companies, in contrast, had all of these qualities in their favor. The
electricity sector was a well-organized and oligopolistic sector that was under the principal
coordination of the Committee of the Economic Operation of the National Interconnected
System (COES). COES coordinates the supply of electricity to all consumers connected to the grid,
so it has a very influential presence within the Peruvian economy. Electricity generators using
traditional sources were COES members, and they worked to discourage the entrance of
renewable energy into the grid system. Therefore, there was no strong industry representation
for renewable energy to lobby for this policy to pass.
Another way that special interest groups can influence policy is through mass movements.
This has been especially prominent in Latin America over social issues, especially for

Chapter 2| 44
underprivileged groups. Indigenous mobilization has been successful at stopping policies and
projects that would hurt their livelihood, such as Chevron’s (operating as Texaco at the time) oil
pollution of forests in Ecuador (UDAPT, 2015), stopping the construction of the Belo Monte
hydroelectric dam in Brazil (Hall & Branford, 2012), and overthrows of presidents Jamil Mahuad
in 2000 in Ecuador and Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 (Cevallos, 2007).
Although indigenous identity has been shown to be a powerful unification factor in Latin America,
groups have also coalesced around other issues and/or characteristics, such as concern for the
environment, perception of social injustice, and religion.
Around the time that LD 1002 passed, the government of Peru was dealing with some
brewing social unrest arising from oil exploitation in the north of Peru between several
indigenous and oil companies in Bagua. This clash culminated in 2009 (Albán, 2015). However,
although these protests were against oil production that harmed the environment, there was no
such large movement by special interest groups to demand more renewable energy. Even though
the protesters did not want more drilling for oil as far as energy was concerned, they did not have
any demands for an alternative. They just wanted this activity to be removed from their land.
Therefore, this was not how LD 1002 was able to pass. Perhaps special interest groups interested
in promoting renewable energy were involved with the policy passage, but there was no strong
social movement to pressure the government to pass a policy in their favor. Special interest
groups may have been involved, but their strategy was not successful through lobbying or mass
movements. Other forces are at play in this story.

Cómo los emprendedores de políticas interrumpieron el flujo eléctrico con la primera legislación de energía renovable de Perú para la red

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Cómo los emprendedores de políticas interrumpieron el flujo eléctrico con la primera legislación de energía renovable de Perú para la red