This is the presentation that I sent to the U.S. Congress as malfeasance evidence at WR-ALC. My intent is to prevent another tragedy like the KC-130T fatal, Class A mishap on 10 July 2017, near Itta Bena, Mississippi. It lays everything out. My articles will support the presentation. Take it seriously..!

2. Alarming!
This implicates is that there are KNOWN unknown conditions of the
affected aircraft’s canopy longeron(s). “The Air Force Knows about
It…” said anonymous source.
The instigating mishap [Animation] is here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2R7BWrqmgac
This is NOT a “documentation” alarm. This is a CRITICAL FAIL. Why? Because
the aircraft’s canopy longeron(s) exist in an unknown state and the fastener
size s are unknown without performing duplicate inspections at the
operational unit.

3. 2 November 2007: F-15C-28-MC, 80-0034, c/n 0687/C183, of the 131st Fighter Wing, Missouri Air National Guard) crashed during air
combat maneuvering training near St. Louis, Missouri. The pilot, Maj. Stephen W. Stilwell, ejected but suffered serious injuries. The crash
was the result of an in-flight breakup due to structural failure. On 3 November 2007, all non-mission critical models of the F-15 were
grounded pending the outcome of the crash investigation,[56] and on the following day, grounded non-mission critical F-15s engaged in
combat missions in the Middle East.[57] By 13 November 2007 over 1,100 were grounded worldwide after Israel, Japan and Saudi Arabia
grounded their aircraft as well.[58] F-15Es were cleared on 15 November 2007 pending aircraft passing inspections.[59] On 8 January 2008,
the USAF cleared 60 percent of the F-15A-D fleet for return to flight.[60] On 10 January 2008, the accident review board released its report
stating the 2 November crash was related to the longeron not meeting drawing specifications.[61] The Air Force cleared all its grounded F-
15A-D fighters for flight on 15 February 2008 pending inspections, reviews and any needed repairs.[62] In March 2008, Stilwell, the injured
pilot, filed a lawsuit against Boeing, the F-15's manufacturer.[63]
Reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_F-15_losses

4. History: watch this animation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2R7BWrqmgac St Louis 2K7…
The F-15’s Canopy [Sill] Longeron(s) are just that. Long. Critical structural components with aircraft skin attached to
form the nose of the aircraft. The longeron is the canopy sill, most oft seen with elbows on it before the canopy is
closed. The canopy rides the longeron until it rests in its forward-most position, up against the windscreen. Physical
and hydraulic lock…

5. “The service conducted a nearly three-month inspection of the F-15 fleet.
According to the Air Force's fiscal 2018 budget request, it asked for roughly $7 million just for service life extension, or
SLEP, on the support beams.
"The longeron SLEP entails replacing 14 primary tension members in the structure of the forward fuselage and is critical
to the safety of flight of these aircraft," according to the budget documents. "There are other structural issues with the F-
15Cs besides the longerons, and full-scale fatigue testing is ongoing to assess these matters."
Brackens said the F-15 Program Office plans to begin the longeron replacement program for the F-15C/D fleet in 2020.
https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/07/05/misplaced-depot-paperwork-led-f-15-grounding-officials-say.html

6. "Until the [Longeron] program is ready to execute, the aircraft are kept safe through regular inspections and repairs
by field and depot personnel," he said.”
Not so much. The documentation is crucial in ascertaining the longerons’ health. Why? Because the
longeron fastener holes are hidden under the attached aircraft skin. This is NOT a routinely-removed
access door, but the skin of the aircraft that must be separated in order to assess the longeron itself.
Bear in mind that there have been reports of undersized fasteners utilized in larger longeron holes. This
in of itself can lead to cracks. The fastener fits through the skin and through the longeron as [4] layers.
(Fastener, skin, longeron, and fastener retainer.) (I need a dry-erase board)

7. BLUF (Bottom Line up Front) In the case of the subject F-15, it FLEW from Robins AFB, probably to Iceland and then on to
Great Brittan with A CRACKED CANOPY SILL LONGERON. What? Not only then but the aircraft must have completed
Functional Check Flights locally! The same defective longeron that caused an F-15 crash in 2007.
The repair is like : remove the subject fasteners as identified by TCTO (Time Compliance Technical Order) 1628. Perform
NDI (Non-Destructive Inspection) (Dye Penetrant) around their holes to rule out cracking in the longeron, not the skin. If
cracks are found ream the hole until the crack no longer exists or until the maximum hole size (as dictated by the TCTO),
after which the longeron must be replaced. These results MUST be reported back to the F-15 Depot…The depot
failed…Get it? The CSL (Canopy Sill Longeron) replacement is a very extensive maintenance procedure: a depot function
and it is the depot function that has failed. Repeatedly…Get it?

8.  At the minimum, the aircraft affected by the “Paperwork” gaff, given the crash in 2007 of a 1980 serial
numbered aircraft (80-0034), should be immediately grounded and TCTO 1628 re-accomplished to ascertain the
longeron(s) status. There are two but I believe the right side is affected primarily. The oldest F-15E’s are 1986
model-year jets, not far removed from the mishap aircraft.
 On a single-seat F-15 (A and C models), the affected area is not pressurized but on the two-seat F-15 models
B/D/E, the area is pressurized because it encompasses the rear cockpit, hence extended time to inspect and or
repair. As such the physical forces are competing inside and out. Cockpit pressurization fighting G forces. The
stress must be tremendous.
This is a serious problem that the USAF acknowledges by sourcing new CSL’s from the F-15SA (Saudi Advanced)
production line. I saw them personally in the crate and read the accompanying documentation.

9. FWD
U
P
Due to the F-15’s design, the nose bears a substantial
weight load forward of the nose landing gear, meaning
the only support is structure, not landing gear. This
weight is constantly being pushed down with G-Forces.

12. https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=gAcKroyZ&id=F69A76FA40CCA59CEC7F2314486EC5229AE3
98A1&thid=OIP.gAcKroyZYSFiGwmTBShLlAHaFj&mediaurl=http%3A%2F%2Fslideplayer.com%2F12518470%2F75%2Fima
ges%2F6%2FProduct%2BSupport%2BHot%2BTopics.jpg&exph=768&expw=1024&q=f-
15+canopy+sill+longeron&simid=608030748702015805&ajaxhist=0&selectedindex=3
The F-15 Depot operation is comprised
of U.S. Air Force Civil Servants and
some contractors 95/5 maybe.
This is interesting…I had not heard of a
mishap involving an F-15E and the CSL,
only the one in 2007. This is directly
applicable to the aircraft reported in
slide 1 of this presentation.

13. I found the previous slide’s material on the Internet. I was not aware that an F-15E had experienced the same
catastrophic failure as the St Louis F-15C. It is difficult to say exactly what 700 EFH equates to in time due to complex
input factors. Each F-15 unit’s hourly and calendar utilization rates are different. They use a product called a TDI to
manage the 400-[flight] hour inspection cycle as not to cause a log jam. The depot cycle is calendar, not hourly, every
six years.
In the case of the Egress Time Change items not completed at depot, those are normally on a three-year cycle, hence
the opportunity to complete at depot’s six-year interval. By not doing so, the aircraft must be removed from
operational service for at least one week, if not longer. That is the mx concept. Do as much as possible during down
time to facilitate maximum flying utilization. Again, by not doing the maintenance at depot, the warfighter is deprived
of the asset because the work has to be done at the operational unit. That is UNACCEPTABLE and to me, could have
national security implications.

14. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/124906/f-15s-undergo-extensive-technical-inspections/
MY TAKE-AWAY FROM THIS SITUATION IS MULTI-FOLD:
• F-15 AIRCRAFT MAY BE FLYING WITH CRACKED CANOPY SILL LONGERONS. I HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE EFFECT IN THE
BOEING ANIMATION. IF THE LONGERON INSPECTION “DOCUMENTATION” IS WRONG OR NON-EXISTENT (AS PER THE
MESSAGE), THE JETS ARE FLYING WITH AN UNKNOWN CONDITION OF CRITICAL STRUCTURE
• F-15 AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE FLOWN WITH OVERDUE EGRESS TIME CHANGE ITEMS, MEANING THE EJECTION SEAT
ROCKET MOTORS (e.g.) AND OR CANOPY EXPLOSIVE MECHANISMS MAY HAVE BEEN IN USE PAST THEIR ANTICIPATED
SERVICE LIFE AND DIRECTED TIME CHANGE
• THE WRALC F-15 DEPOT HAS PUT LIVES AT RISK, (AGAIN) IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND, SHOULD THE
UNTHINKABLE HAPPEN AGAIN.
• I AM UNSURE WHETHER I WROTE THIS IN AN EARLIER COMPLAINT, BUT I SAW ANOTHER “FEEDBACK” FORM WHAT I
WAS EMPLOYED AT ROBINS DEPICTING AN F-15 CANOPY FLOWN TO MOUNTAIN HOME AFB, UT WITH ITS RIGHT
HINGE COMPLETELY DISCONNECTED FROM ITS TORQUE TUBE! IT IS ONLY DUE TO THE CANOPY SYSTEM’S DESIGN THAT
IT DID NOT COME OFF IN FLIGHT.

15. SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT ROBINS’ OPERATIONS BEFORE SOMEBODY GETS HURT OR WORSE!
• New hire OJT (On-the-Job Training) is accomplished via tribal knowledge
• The F-15 training aircraft are not in a hangar, rather on a concrete pad by
the museum without cover, electrical power, or any other means to escape
the elements. Trainees need the job, so they endure it, winter and summer.
Somebody is going to get hurt! I raised this concern but to date no
permanent remedy is in place.