The document discusses the IAEA's state evaluation process for ensuring compliance with nuclear non-proliferation agreements. It outlines how IAEA safeguards have evolved from focusing only on declared nuclear sites and material to evaluating entire states using information from additional protocols, open sources, and other means. The state evaluation process seeks to determine if states' nuclear programs are fully declared by analyzing all available information and resolving any inconsistencies. Drawing the broader conclusion that all nuclear material has been verified now requires the additional transparency provided by additional protocols.

1. The State Evaluation Process
Therese Renis
Section Head
Division of Operations B
Department of Safeguards
08 February 2007

2. 2
Outline
• IAEA Safeguards – past and present
• Strengthening the Safeguards System
• The Model Additional Protocol

3. 3
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Global, Regional
and Bilateral
Agreements
Export Guidelines Physical Protection
International
Safeguards
Control of the
supply of nuclear
and non-nuclear
material, technology
and equipment
Protection from
seizure, theft and
criminal activities
International
Safeguards

4. 4
IAEA safeguards inspectors verify States’
compliance with their Safeguards Agreements
• Safeguards implemented in 153 States with
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (based
on INFCIRC/153 Corr.) in force
• Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreements (nuclear
weapon States)
• Item-specific Safeguards Agreements (based on
INFCIRC/66)

5. 5
Model Protocol Additional to
Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/540)
• New legal instrument approved by Board of
Governors in May 1997.
• Provides Agency with more rights of access to
information and to locations in a State.
• Concluded by States on a voluntary basis;
becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement.
• As of 1 February 2007, additional protocols (AP)
have been approved by the Board for 118 States
and 78 States have APs in force.

6. 6
Safeguards conclusions are reported in the
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)
• … the declared nuclear material and other items
remained in peaceful nuclear activities …
For States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements and additional protocols:
• … all nuclear material remained
in peaceful nuclear activities …
For States with safeguards agreements:

7. 7
States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements
• Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear
programme consistent?
• Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned
nuclear programme complete?
• Is there sufficient information available
on which to draw a conclusion?
The State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions:

8. 8
Evaluation of “State as a whole”
to draw Safeguards Conclusions
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information

9. 9
Evaluation of “State as a whole”
to draw Safeguards Conclusions
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information
CSAs focus on verification of declared nuclear material and facilities

10. 10
IAEA Board of Governors March 1995
“...the safeguards system for implementing
comprehensive safeguards agreements should
be designed to provide for verification by the
Agency of the correctness and completeness of
States’ declarations, so that there is credible
assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear
material from declared activities and of the
absence of undeclared nuclear activities.”
Safeguards strengthening measures were
needed.

11. 11
Evaluation of “State as a whole”
to draw Safeguards Conclusions
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information

12. 12
Evaluation of “State as a whole”
to draw Safeguards Conclusions
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information
Some strengthening measures could be introduced under existing
safeguards agreements

13. 13
Strengthened Measures under
Inspections
• Unannounced/short-notice inspections
• Remote monitoring
• Environmental sampling
• Enhanced cooperation with SSACs
or regional systems
• Early provision of facility design information

14. 14
Additional Information Requested from States
Under INFCIRC/153
• Information on closed-down and decommissioned
facilities
• Information on past activities
Voluntarily-Offered
• Responses to State System of Accountancy and
Control (SSAC) questionnaires
• Periodic reporting on exports and imports of
sensitive equipment and non-nuclear material
• Holdings and exports of separated americium
and neptunium
• Response to Agency requests for further information

15. 15
State evaluation includes the use of open and
other sources of information
• IAEA information
• Scientific and technical literature
• Academic and research institutions
• Trade publications
• Newspapers/radio/television/magazine reports
• Satellite imagery
• Third party sources

16. 16
States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements
• Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear
programme consistent?
• Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned
nuclear programme complete?
• Is there sufficient information available
on which to draw a conclusion?
Under comprehensive safeguards agreements alone,
there is insufficient information and access to
answer these questions.
The State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions:

17. 17
Evaluation of “State as a whole”
to draw Safeguards Conclusions
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information

18. 18
Evaluation of “State as a whole”
to draw Safeguards Conclusions
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information
Under an additional protocol the Agency has
more extensive information and access.

19. 19
Measures Contained in the
Additional Protocol
• Information about, and inspector access to, all
aspects of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle
- From mines to nuclear waste -
• Information on, and short-notice inspector access
to, all buildings on a nuclear site
• Information about, and inspector access to, other
locations where nuclear material is present
• Information about, and mechanisms for inspector
access to, fuel cycle-related R & D

20. 20
Measures Contained in the
Additional Protocol
• Information on the manufacture and export of specified
equipment and non-nuclear materials
• Collection of environmental samples beyond declared
locations
• Information on future plans to develop the nuclear fuel
cycle
• Administrative arrangements
– Visas
– Inspector designation
– Access to communication means

21. 21
In addition, the Agency can request:
• Amplification and clarification of
declared information
• Information to clarify and facilitate
the resolution of questions and
inconsistencies
• Operational activities of safeguards
relevance

22. 22
Complementary Access under an Additional
Protocol
• On a selective basis to assure the absence
of nuclear material and activities
• To resolve a question or inconsistency
related to the declaration
• To confirm the decommissioned
status of a facility

23. 24
State evaluation has become the basis for
safeguards implementation
Analyze
all information
State
Declarations
Results of
activities
Other information
Plan safeguards
activities
Conduct
safeguards
activities

24. 25
Safeguards activities are implemented in
a flexible manner, based on evaluation
• Verification of declared nuclear material and
activities - according to Safeguards’ criteria
• Conduct complementary access
• Find and evaluate more information to complete
the picture of the States nuclear programme
– open source
– request from State
– conduct further activities
• Resolve questions or inconsistencies with regard
to State’s declarations
• Follow-up on issues of safeguards significance

25. 26
Strengthened Safeguards Measures
Traditional Measures under CSAs
Nuclear Material Accountancy
Containment and Surveillance
Design Information Verification
Additional Protocol Measures
Expanded declaration
Complementary Access
Broader Environmental Sampling
Strengthening Measures under CSAs
Environmental Sampling
Remote Monitoring
SSAC Cooperation

26. 27
Integrated Safeguards
• Optimum combination of all safeguards measures
available to the Agency under CSAs and additional
protocols.
• Broader safeguards conclusion allows for reductions
in verification effort for some categories of declared
nuclear material.
• Involves a redistribution of resources from nuclear
material verification activities to the implementation
of additional protocol measures.

27. 28
Despite strengthening measures, limitations
remain
• There are limits on information and access that States must
provide
• The Board recommended modification of small quantities
protocol (SQP)
• An Advisory Committee of the Board (Committee 25) is
considering further improvement in the effectiveness and
efficiency of safeguards
• Within existing legal framework
• Voluntary
• Expanding technical capabilities
Cooperation and transparency of States facilitates safeguards
implementation

28. 29
Conclusion
• Drawing the broader conclusion that all nuclear
material has been placed under safeguards
requires the additional information and access
under the additional protocol.
• Ensuring that this conclusion is credible requires
a rigorous State evaluation process.
• Implementation of integrated safeguards will
result in savings in inspection effort.