Session 2: Liberibacter solanacearum comparative genomics and diagnostics
1. biosecurity built on science
Liberibacter solanacearum comparative genomics
and diagnostics
Creswick, Science Exchange, 26-28th Oct 2016
Sarah Thompson, Chris Johnson, Rebekah Frampton, Kerry Sullivan,
Charles David, Falk Kalamorz, Neil Gudmestad, Grant Smith.
2. biosecurity built on science
Introduction to Liberibacter solanacearum
• Alpha-proteobacteria
discovered in 2008
• Phloem-limited in plants
• Vectored by psyllids
• 5 haplotypes described
• A – USA, NZ
• B – USA
• C – Scandanavia
• D – Europe
• E - Europe
3. biosecurity built on science
Liberibacter solanacearum haplotypes
A and B
C
D and E
4. biosecurity built on science
Liberibacter solanacearum haplotypes
A
A and B
C
D and E
5. biosecurity built on science
Implications for Biosecurity
Name-based biosecurity
Increased importance
of defining names
PB-CRC2002/PB-CRC2156
Genome-informed diagnostics
• Gain a better understanding of
Lso taxonomy
• Improve the current diagnostic
for Lso by including a non rRNA
target
• Develop assays to differentiate
the solanaceous-infecting
haplotypes from the rest.
Increased importance of sub-species
differentiation e.g.
Virulence (Psa)
Hosts (Liberibacter)
6. biosecurity built on science
ANI comparison of the draft genomes
Genus Species Subspecies
ANI 95%
CLsoA_NZ1 CLsoB_ZC1 CLsoD_Is CLsoE_CI2
CLsoA_NZ1 100
CLsoB_ZC1 97.69 100
CLsoD_Is 98.29 97.71 100
CLsoE_CI2 97.77 97.38 98.68 100
7. biosecurity built on science
ANI comparison of the draft genomes
Genus Species Subspecies
ANI 95%
CLsoA_NZ1 CLsoB_ZC1 CLsoD_Is CLsoE_CI2
CLsoA_NZ1 100
CLsoB_ZC1 97.69 100
CLsoD_Is 98.29 97.71 100
CLsoE_CI2 97.77 97.38 98.68 100
Benefit to biosecurity workers:
Moving towards identifying at-risk sectors or regions for emerging
diseases
10. biosecurity built on science
Origin of the New Zealand CLso incursion
29 New Zealand samples as extracted DNA
- From a range of hosts, times and locations
- Positive by 16S rRNA qPCR assay (Beard et al 2013)
Selected three loci (two variable, one consistent)
- D348 (17/20 American A)
- D406 (18/20 American A)
- D426 (19/19 American A)
Sample Sample Host Location Collected
M8e TPP Thorn apple Hawke’s Bay 3-Apr-14
W15 TPP Jerusalem cherry Hawke’s Bay 6-Jun-14
W23#36 TPP Jerusalem cherry Hawke’s Bay 8-Oct-14
tpp+n TPP (nymph) Boxthorn Canterbury 30-May-14
806 AB 2 TPP Boxthorn Hawke’s Bay 29-Feb-12
876 A8 TPP Boxthorn Canterbury 21-Sep-12
875 A2 TPP Boxthorn Canterbury 21-Sep-12
M15a TPP Potato Hawke’s Bay 3-Apr-14
M15D TPP Potato Hawke’s Bay 3-Apr-14
HBL1 TPP unknown Hawke’s Bay unknown
MHBN 6 TPP unknown Hawke’s Bay unknown
FMAN B8 TPP Potato Manawatu unknown
FMAN A3 TPP Potato Manawatu unknown
M RAK 7 TPP Potato Canterbury 4-Apr-12
F RAK 2 TPP Potato Canterbury 4-Apr-12
MWAI 9 TPP unknown Auckland unknown
343 Plant Potato Auckland unknown
JA Pot+ Plant Potato Auckland 1-Jul-09
M7 Plant Potato Canterbury 20-Mar-14
M4 Plant Potato Canterbury 20-Mar-14
M6 Plant Potato Canterbury 20-Mar-14
A7 tom Plant Tomato Marlborough Jan-12
Is5 Plant Tomato Marlborough unknown
Is4 Plant Tomato Marlborough unknown
Wat Tom 1 Plant Tomato unknown unknown
FZ 3B2 Plant Tomato Marlborough unknown
TAM3 Plant Tamarillo Northland unknown
tpp+ (C22) TPP (colony) Potato Auckland 2011
tpp- (C20) TPP (colony) Tomato Auckland 2006
11. biosecurity built on science
Origin of the New Zealand CLso incursion
29 New Zealand samples as extracted DNA
- From a range of hosts, times and locations
- Positive by 16S rRNA qPCR assay (Beard et al 2013)
Selected three loci (two variable, one consistent)
- D348 (17/20 American A)
- D406 (18/20 American A)
- D426 (19/19 American A)
Sample Sample Host Location Collected
M8e TPP Thorn apple Hawke’s Bay 3-Apr-14
W15 TPP Jerusalem cherry Hawke’s Bay 6-Jun-14
W23#36 TPP Jerusalem cherry Hawke’s Bay 8-Oct-14
tpp+n TPP (nymph) Boxthorn Canterbury 30-May-14
806 AB 2 TPP Boxthorn Hawke’s Bay 29-Feb-12
876 A8 TPP Boxthorn Canterbury 21-Sep-12
875 A2 TPP Boxthorn Canterbury 21-Sep-12
M15a TPP Potato Hawke’s Bay 3-Apr-14
M15D TPP Potato Hawke’s Bay 3-Apr-14
HBL1 TPP unknown Hawke’s Bay unknown
MHBN 6 TPP unknown Hawke’s Bay unknown
FMAN B8 TPP Potato Manawatu unknown
FMAN A3 TPP Potato Manawatu unknown
M RAK 7 TPP Potato Canterbury 4-Apr-12
F RAK 2 TPP Potato Canterbury 4-Apr-12
MWAI 9 TPP unknown Auckland unknown
343 Plant Potato Auckland unknown
JA Pot+ Plant Potato Auckland 1-Jul-09
M7 Plant Potato Canterbury 20-Mar-14
M4 Plant Potato Canterbury 20-Mar-14
M6 Plant Potato Canterbury 20-Mar-14
A7 tom Plant Tomato Marlborough Jan-12
Is5 Plant Tomato Marlborough unknown
Is4 Plant Tomato Marlborough unknown
Wat Tom 1 Plant Tomato unknown unknown
FZ 3B2 Plant Tomato Marlborough unknown
TAM3 Plant Tamarillo Northland unknown
tpp+ (C22) TPP (colony) Potato Auckland 2011
tpp- (C20) TPP (colony) Tomato Auckland 2006
Benefit to researchers and in incursion response:
tools for assessing genetic diversity within a haplotype
12. biosecurity built on science
Industry submission to MPI Risk Assessment of CLso B
Provide information for Market Access Solutionz submission to MPI on implications of CLso B for potato, tomato
and capsicum industries
1. CLso B does appear to be more pathogenic to both plants and psyllids than CLso A
2. There are significant genetic differences between these two haplotypes (genome organisation, unique
genes, prophage sequences)
3. There is genetic variation within both the A and B haplotypes in the USA, evidenced by presence/
absence of putative haplotype differential diagnostic loci (genes)
4. New Zealand (and Norfolk Island) appear to have extremely limited genetic diversity of CLso A, based
on the research we have undertaken to assess diversity
5. There are three other CLso haplotypes (C D E) that we know of.
6. There are at least four biotypes of TPP described in the USA. New Zealand (and Norfolk Island) only
have one of the biotypes, so keeping these other variants out is also important
13. biosecurity built on science
Industry submission to MPI Risk Assessment of CLso B
Provide information for Market Access Solutionz submission to MPI on implications of CLso B for potato, tomato
and capsicum industries
1. CLso B does appear to be more pathogenic to both plants and psyllids than CLso A
2. There are significant genetic differences between these two haplotypes (genome organisation, unique
genes, prophage sequences)
3. There is genetic variation within both the A and B haplotypes in the USA, evidenced by presence/
absence of putative haplotype differential diagnostic loci (genes)
4. New Zealand (and Norfolk Island) appear to have extremely limited genetic diversity of CLso A, based
on the research we have undertaken to assess diversity
5. There are three other CLso haplotypes (C D E) that we know of.
6. There are at least four biotypes of TPP described in the USA. New Zealand (and Norfolk Island) only
have one of the biotypes, so keeping these other variants out is also important
Benefit to end-user: MPI
Understanding of the taxonomy contributing to informed regulatory
decisions
14. biosecurity built on science
Summary
• Genome assemblies including the first haplotype A assembly
• Tools for assessing the within haplotype diversity
• qPCR assays for differentiating the solanaceous-infecting
haplotypes
• Provide science input to inform the decision around
deregulating haplotype B in NZ
15. biosecurity built on science
End-User’s Perspective
“The team have clearly established the value of bioinformatic tools
to identify diagnostic targets in an unculturable bacterium.
In doing so they have revealed a level of genomic plasticity and
complexity in a pathogen only first identified in 2008.
The identification protocol the team will recommend via a National
Diagnostic Protocol will have a substantial amount of information
and critical analysis supporting the new diagnostic”.
- Barbara Hall Chair of SPHD
17. biosecurity built on science
Future work
Psyllid mitochondrial genomes
- ~200 genomes at various stages
of assembly
- Metagenomic not PCR assembly
- Diversity, origin
Access to new CLso samples (eg
Honduran)
- Diversity, origin
- Improved diagnostics
Technology
Sequencing options (DNA and
RNA)
Assembly strategies
Diagnostic systems
Looking forward
Finalise/ conclude ~40 CLxx
assemblies
Validate the diagnostic assays
Finalise international diagnostic
protocols
Basis of CLso pathogenicity
CLso targets for control options
Editor's Notes
This work was carried out under project CRC2002 and 2156 Genome-Informed diagnostics for bacterial pathovars. Our culprit of choice is Candidatus Liberibacter solanacearum. The story begins in the mid-90s when a disease in potatoes first started appearing in the US where potato chips were presenting with darkened arrays or stripes giving the disease its name zebra chip disease.
The putative causal agent Liberibacter solanacearum was described in 2008. Its an alpha proteo bacteria that is vectored by psyllids – phloem feeding insects. There are 5 haplotypes of Lso reported - A through to E – defined based on differences in the ribosomal RNA operon.
The 5 haplotypes are associated with different hosts. A and B are found on solanaceous plants, C is reported on carrots and and D and E are on carrots and celery.
They are also found in different geographical ranges. A and B are found central and North America and are vectored by Bactericera cockerelli (TPP). A is also found in New Zealand and the Australian territory of Norfolk Island. C is in Scandinavia and vectored by Trioza apicalis while is D and E are in Europe and North Africa and their main vector appears to be Bactericera trigonica.
At present Lso is not reported on Mainland Australia. It has been identified as a major threat to the Australian potato industry and is considered by many to be its no1 biosecurity threat. It is on Plant Health Australia’s list of High Priority Pests. Jim did a good job of highlighting the importance of understanding what the names we use in biosecurity represent. At the start of this project little was known about the Lso haplotypes beyond the rRNA sequence and the only way to identify the haplotype is through sequencing part of it. Aside from the time factor this technique does not detect dual infections which there is growing evidence for.
I mentioned previously that Lso is the putative causal agent of zebra chip disease. We describe it as putative because it is unculturable: hence its classification in the family Candidatus. This means that we don’t have pure cultures of it and instead have used sample of the bacteria in host for sequencing. Then have to assemble the genomes from a background of host and endosymbiont sequence.
Future research: biological differences between haplotypes?
While sequenced Lso from samples from various European countries, North America, Central America and New Zealand here I have taken just a representative sequence for each of 4 haplotypes to summarise the results. These are the results of the average nucleotide identity analysis. This is a pairwise comparison where a genome is chopped into sections and each section is aligned to a second genome and the percentage identity of the alignment is calculated. The average percentage identity is then calculated giving the ANI. A threshold of above 95% is generally considered to be the same species. This type of analysis is used to give an indication of the evolutionary history of the genus/species.
Here you can see that haplotype A has 98,29% and 97.77% to the apiaceous-infecting haplotypes D and E while its identity to haplotype B is lower at 97.69%!
This is despite infecting the same hosts in the same geographic locations as haplotype B. This suggests that they have had either a different host or geographical range at some point in history. It raises questions around where they resided and in what prior to Lso emerging as a major potato disease in the last 20 years. Understanding what drives these changes and how they occur can help us identify future biosecurity threats
Following genome sequencing comparison of all the genomes allowed us to identify regions that were only found in the the solanaceous-infecting haplotypes – either A or B. We used these regions to target for haplotype specific qPCR assays.
In the interests of time here I have just presented the screening results for the haplotypeA targets against a panel of samples from around North and Central America. Some assays amplified products from hap B samples (in red) and some assays did not amplify all hap Atargets. This indicates that these loci are not fixed within the haplotype – its possible that some of these loci are or were on mobile genetic elements. It demonstrates that there is significant genetic diversity within the haplotypes in the Americas. However the ones in green did amplify all hap A targets and no hap B targets. These targets were subsequently subjected to extensive screening against a series of panels including other liberibacters, other microbes that infect solanaceous crops, healthy hosts and so forth.
How many people genome sequence their isolate these days for a biological experiment? How many people know what HGT/phage elements their organism has? So often genomic studies are criticised for not having biology but the it’s a two-way street – biological studies will increasingly need genomic data to characterise their work. Does this also apply to viral, fungal and insect studies?
While not all of the targets proved fixed across haplotype A samples they have proved useful for looking at genetic diversity. To assess the genetic diversity of the Lso in NZ 3 of the assays were chosen – 2 with variable regions and one fixed. These were tested against a panel of 29 DNA samples from a range of hosts, times and collection locations. All samples amplified with all 3 targets indicating that NZ has less genetic diversity than the states. This is consistent with a recent, limited incursion. They were also tested against samples from Norfolk Island. The Norfolk Is samples gave the same profiles as the NZ samples supporting the theory that the liberibacter in NI came from NZ.
While not all of the targets proved fixed across haplotype A samples they have proved useful for looking at genetic diversity. To assess the genetic diversity of the Lso in NZ 3 of the assays were chosen – 2 with variable regions and one fixed. These were tested against a panel of 29 DNA samples from a range of hosts, times and collection locations. All samples amplified with all 3 targets indicating that NZ has less genetic diversity than the states. This is consistent with a recent, limited incursion. They were also tested against samples from Norfolk Island. The Norfolk Is samples gave the same profiles as the NZ samples supporting the theory that the liberibacter in NI came from NZ.
At present MPI is undertaking a risk assessment of Clso B to investigate deregulating it as a biosecurity threat to NZ. Based on our research we have provided information for the industry submission. Given the substantial differences between haplotypes A and B and the genetic diversity within haplotypes we recommend that haplotype B remains a biosecurity threat as any additional genetic diversity in NZ could be problematic.
At present MPI is undertaking a risk assessment of Clso B. Based on
Subcommitte for Plant Health Diagnostics
Continuing research – field diagnostics – Rebekah’s talk
Understanding the mechanisms driving plant response/disease expression
Review: from genomics to application…