2. 2
What is PAT?
Studies Managers’ Accounting Policy
Choices, As Part of the Overall Process of
Corporate Governance
That Is, Accounting Policies are Chosen
Strategically
Positive, Not Normative. Tries to
Understand and Predict Managers’
Accounting Policy Choices.
3. 8-3
ASSUMPTIONS OF PAT
Managers are Rational (Like Investors)
Conflict (Between Interests of
Managers and Investors)
Efficient Securities Market
Efficient Managerial Labour Market
But may be inside information about
manager effort and ability (moral hazard
problem)
A second major role for financial reporting--
to report on manager effort and ability
5. 5
Positive Accounting Theory
Teori akuntansi positif mengarahkan pemahaman dan prediksi
pilihan kebijakan akuntansi perusahaan, dinyatakan bahwa pilihan
kebijakan akuntansi adalah bagian dari kebutuhan perusahaan
untuk meminimalisir biaya kontraknya.
Kebijakan akuntansi ditentukan oleh struktur organisasi perusahaan
menurut kondisi lingkungannya dan pilihan kebijakan akuntansi
menjadi bagian dari pengelolaan perusahaan.
Dalam praktiknya kebijakan akuntansi akrual diterapkan lewat
perlakuan transaksi yang berkaitan dengan laba agar lebih
mendekati nilai ekspektasi perusahaan. Hal ini mengingat pihak
manajemen memiliki kompetensi untuk mengendalikan kuantifikasi
kejadian yang berpengaruh terhadap laba
6. 6
Agency Theory
The agent (like the principal) will be
driven by self-interest, and therefore the
principals will anticipate that the
manager, unless restricted from doing
otherwise, will undertake self-serving
activities that could be detrimental to
economic welfare of the principals.
8. 8
Positive Accounting Theory
Assumptions:
The accountants (and, in fact, all
individuals) are primarily motivated by
self-interest (tied to wealth
maximisation), and that the particular
accounting method selected (where
alternative are available).
9. 9
The Three Hypotheses
Bonus Plan Hypothesis
Derives from managerial incentive contracts
Debt Covenant Hypothesis
Derives from debt contracts
Political Cost Hypothesis
Very large firms minimize political “heat”
NB: Contacts are Rigid
10. 10
The Bonus Plan Hypothesis
Bonus based on net income
To get more bonus, choosing
accounting methods that
increase current reported
earnings
11. 11
The Bonus Plan Hypothesis
All other things being equal, managers
of firms with bonus plans are more
likely to choose accounting procedures
that shift reported earnings from future
periods to the current period
12. 12
The Bonus Plan Hypothesis
Because of the nature of of the accrual
process, this will tend to lower future
reported earnings and bonuses, other things
equal.
PV of manager’s utility from future bonus
stream will be increased by shifting earnings
toward the present
13. 13
The Debt Covenant Hypothesis
All other things being equal, the closer a firm
is to violation of accounting-based debt
covenants, the more likely the firm manager
is to select accounting procedures that shift
reported earnings from future periods to the
current period
14. 14
The Debt Covenant Hypothesis
Violation of debt covenant is costly
Restriction on dividends
Limit additional borrowing
Issuance of stock, …
Increase current earnings
Assets increase
To avoid violation
15. 15
The Political Cost Hypothesis
All other things equal, the greater the
political costs (taxes, regulations)
faced by a firm, the more likely the
manager is to choose accounting
procedures that defer reported
earnings from current to future
periods
16. 16
The Political Cost Hypothesis
Large firm with high profit attracts
media, consumers, and politicians
attention
Large firm trend to reduce profit reports
20. 20
PAT Concept
Agency Theory Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH)
Positive Accounting
Theory (PAT)
Bonus
Plan
Hypothesis
Political
Cost
Hypothesis
Debt
Covenant
Hypothesis
Accounting Standards and Practices
Normative
Theory