httpsdoi.org10.11771745691618804187Perspectives on Ps

https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691618804187
Perspectives on Psychological Science
2019, Vol. 14(1) 16 –20
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DOI: 10.1177/1745691618804187
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ASSOCIATION FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
As I look back over the past 65 years, my professional
life has been filled with what I can best describe as a
continual series of adventures. For the most part, the
challenges that I’ve confronted were of my own mak-
ing: Like Theseus in the labyrinth, whenever I seemed
to find a solution to a problem, I was confronted with
another problem. My initial difficult confrontation
occurred when I was a fellow at the Austin Riggs Center
in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. I was assigned to work
with a young man with a pervasive delusion of being
followed by government agents. To my surprise, even
though the therapy was for the most part supportive,
the delusion disappeared. In 1952, I subsequently pub-
lished this case history as the first reported successful
psychotherapy of an individual with schizophrenia
(Beck, 1952). This case report is of particular interest
since 50 years elapsed before I returned to the psycho-
therapy of schizophrenia: a form of mental illness that
is considered, then and now, to be relatively impervious

to psychotherapy.
In 1956, fresh from having passed my boards in
psychiatry, I initiated my first major undertaking: vali-
dating the various propositions of psychoanalysis. Hav-
ing undergone a personal analysis and completed the
other requirements for admission to the Philadelphia
Psychoanalytic Institute, I was totally committed to the
theory and therapy of psychoanalysis, but I felt that for
psychoanalysis to be accepted by the larger scientific
community, it would require a solid base of evidence.
On the basis of that conclusion, I decided to test out
the central psychoanalytic proposition that depression
was caused by inverted hostility. That is, if the patient
experienced unacceptable anger toward a close person
but repressed this unacceptable anger, it would come
out in the form of self-criticism, negative expectancy,
suicidal wishes, and depressed mood.
I teamed up with Marvin Hurvich, a psychology
graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. I
prepared a scoring manual for hostility in dreams, and
Marvin blindly scored a sample of dreams from patients
with depression as well as a control group of patients
who were not depressed. To our surprise, the patients
with depression showed less hostility in their dreams
than did the nondepressed individuals. This negative
finding posed a dilemma for us: It would seem that the
absence of manifest hostility in dreams, which had been
characterized by Freud as the “royal road to the uncon-
scious,” invalidated the theory of inverted hostility.
However, after examining the content of dreams for a
second time, we found that the dreams of the patients
with depression consistently portrayed the dreamer or
the action in the dream in a negative way. Conversely,

this consistent finding was not evident in the dreams
of the nondepressed patients. We then reasoned that
the hostility was unable to penetrate through the
dreams, but it still existed at an unconscious level and
assumed the form of a need to suffer. Because of this
theme, we labeled these dreams as “masochistic” and
found that using this negative portrayal of the dreamer
as a symbol of the need for personal suffering clearly
differentiated the patients with depression from those
without (Beck & Hurvich, 1959).
In the early 1960s, I teamed up with Jim Diggory and
Sy Feshbach from the Department of Psychiatry at the
University of Pennsylvania. Although our empirical
articles weren’t published until years later, I conducted
a number of experiments at that time based on the
premise that if patients with depression had a need to
suffer, they would perform better after a negative expe-
rience than after a positive experience (Loeb, Beck, &
Diggory, 1971; Loeb, Beck, Diggory, & Tuthill, 1967;
Loeb, Feshbach, Beck, & Wolf, 1964). For example,
failure at a task or continuous negative feedback would
lead to better performance than would a positive expe-
rience on a task.
804187PPSXXX10.1177/1745691618804187BeckEvolution of
Cognitive Theory and Therapy
research-article2018
Corresponding Author:
Aaron T. Beck, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Pennsylvania
Perelman School of Medicine, 3535 Market St., Office 3093,
Philadelphia, PA 19104
E-mail: [email protected]
A 60-Year Evolution of Cognitive

Theory and Therapy
Aaron T. Beck
Department of Psychiatry, Perelman School of Medicine,
University of Pennsylvania
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/pps
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Evolution of Cognitive Theory and Therapy 17
The results of these experiments turned out to
oppose our hypothesis. Compared with nondepressed
individuals, the individuals with depression performed
significantly better after a positive experience than they
did after a negative experience. I then realized that the
concept of masochism as an explanation for the nega-
tive content in the dreams was probably a fallacy and
that it was necessary to think of a another explanation
for the negative finding. I then came to a rather sim-
plistic explanation for the negative content in the
dreams: The dreams simply represented the way the
dreamer perceived the self. In other words, the dream
content was a replication of the individuals’ self-image
that was actualized in the waking state. I then initiated
a much larger study of dreams of patients with depres-
sion and found that the dreams did consistently portray
the dreamer in negative images, consistent with the
conscious negative self-image (Beck & Ward, 1961).
The findings of the dream studies and experimental
research inspired me to explore the supportive evidence

for the various tenets of psychoanalysis. I first reviewed
the basis for the concept of the unconscious and repres-
sion and the other defense mechanisms. The uncon-
scious as described by Freud consists of a jumble of
unacceptable impulses and fantasies that are held in
check by repression and other defense mechanisms.
Although it was clear that cognitive processing can take
place without awareness (as indicated by various experi -
ments on subliminal bias, etc.), I could find no substan-
tial evidence for the kind of drives and fantasies alluded
to by psychoanalysts nor evidence for the frank exhibi -
tion of the supposed unconscious material. Beginning
to doubt this keystone of psychoanalytic theory, I
decided to examine the bases of psychoanalytic therapy,
such as infantile memories and the existence of transfer-
ence of parental images onto therapists. Here again, the
data were weak and subject to other interpretations. As
I pursued my investigations, the various psychoanalytic
concepts began to collapse like a stack of dominos.
In a talk before the more liberal Academy of Psycho-
analysis, I attempted to maintain some of the psycho-
analytic hypotheses. In this talk, titled “There Is More
on the Surface Than Meets the Eye” (Beck, 1963a), I
tried to demonstrate that many of the patients’ ideas that
were regarded as unconscious were actually conscious.
I also described how I discovered the existence of what
I termed automatic thoughts. I described how one of
my patients undergoing formal psychoanalysis regaled
me from session to session with stories of her sexual
escapades. I finally asked her whether she had any other
thoughts besides these. When she focused on her stream
of consciousness, she reported that she had a separate
series of thoughts: She was afraid of boring me and thus
had to entertain me with stories of her escapades. I then

checked with other patients and similarly determined
that when they focused on everything that was going
through their minds, they had similar thoughts that they
had not been very much aware of previously. In the
course of time, I observed enough of these previously
unreported thoughts to recognize that they played an
important role in the person’s affect and attitudes about
the self, others, and the future. In 1960, I finally became
disillusioned with the formal psychoanalytic approach
of patients lying on the couch and free associating, I
decided to ask the patients to sit up. At that point, we
would carry out more of a collaborative conversation.
After this slight shift in therapeutic approach and deliv-
ery, it became obvious to me that these thoughts often
constituted an important bridge between the external
stimulus situation and the individual’s emotional experi -
ence and their behavior.
A New Theory and Therapy of
Psychopathology
The elucidation of these automatic thoughts then laid
the groundwork for a theory of human psychopathology.
In parallel to noticing my clients experiencing automatic
thoughts, I also noticed that when I focused on my own
reactions to a particular stimulus, I became aware of
these thoughts. They appeared to emerge automatically
(hence the label of “automatic thoughts”). When I expe-
rienced either anxiety or anger, I would have an inter-
vening automatic thought, the content of which explained
the particular emotion. Thus, themes of threat or anxiety
led to anger, loss led to sadness, and gain led to exhila-
ration. When I was able to put all of this together, I had
an “a-ha” experience. I felt as though I had discovered
something new. I also observed that the automatic
thoughts actually were exaggerations or even miscon-

structions or misinterpretations of a situation. Thus, for
example, I might misinterpret somebody’s brief response
to a question as a slight and become angry. I found that
when I looked for the evidence for the thought, it was
either very weak or nonexistent. I then found that my
patients’ automatic thoughts were similar to my own,
and this formed a bridge to their affective experience.
In the case of my patients, these automatic thoughts were
generally distortions that fit their diagnosis. My first con-
certed venture was to examine these thoughts in patients
with depression, who constituted the majority of my case
load (Beck, 1963b).
For the most part, I found that automatic thoughts
served a useful function, even though they were gener-
ally covert. For example, when driving, I was able to
multitask: carry on a conversation, listen to the radio,
or engage in my thoughts about a forthcoming lecture
and at the same time, change lanes, increase or decrease
18 Beck
the speed, and circle around obstacles. When I focused
on these thoughts, I perceived self-instructions that
guided my actions whether I was driving or participating
in other activities. When I asked my patients to focus
on their automatic thoughts, I found that the content
varied according to the major psychiatric problem or
diagnosis. In fact, the more severe the disorder, the more
conscious these automatic thoughts became. For exam-
ple, the automatic thoughts of patients with depression
had a general theme of self-criticism or regret. When
the depression was more severe, the automatic thoughts
occupied a good portion of the stream of consciousness.

Likewise, the thought content of patients with anxiety
were filled with fears in either the physical or psycho-
logical realm. Individuals with an obsessional neurosis
tended to have repetitive, conscious automatic thoughts
of an imperative nature (e.g., “wash your hands again”).
There was no specific diagnostic category for problems
with anger, but these generally had the theme of unjusti-
fied loss, challenge, or threat.
My initial application of the construct of automatic
thoughts was to train the patients to focus on and rec-
ognize them. In the interview sessions, I trained the
individuals to examine the validity of thoughts, which
generally constituted either misinterpretations or exag-
gerations of a situation. I had noted that these thoughts
often reflected cognitive distortions—misinterpretations
or exaggerations of situations. In teaching the patients
to evaluate these distortions, I was influenced in part
by the volume by Albert Ellis (1962) titled Reason and
Emotion in Psychotherapy. When the patients were able
to correct their misinterpretation through procedures
such as looking for the evidence, considering alterna-
tive explanations, or evaluating the logic of the conclu-
sions, they began to get better. In reading Ellis’s book,
I noted that he had also recognized the existence of
automatic thoughts, which he labeled self-statements.
His description of self-statements was almost identical
to what I had previously labeled as automatic thoughts.
This constituted a kind of confirmation of the existence
of these phenomena. Albert Ellis and I also recognized
the difference between the automatic thoughts, often
labeled hot cognitions, and the more deliberate, reflec-
tive, and consciously directed thinking, sometimes
labeled cold cognition. Our recognition of these phe-
nomena was later mentioned by Daniel Kahneman
(2011) in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Attempts to Create an Innovative
Theory and Therapy
The next step in my evolution of cognitive theory and
therapy was the recognition that individuals had a
system of beliefs that, when triggered by a particular
situation, yielded the interpretation or misinterpreta-
tion, generally in the form of an automatic thought. I
then attempted to construct a theory of normal thought
processes and psychopathology (Beck, 1976). The
question was how to label the individuals’ beliefs and
automatic thoughts. Having read George Kelly’s (1955)
volume titled A Theory of Personality: The Psychology
of Personal Constructs, I first considered using the term
construct to label the beliefs. However, the term
schema, derived from Piaget’s work, seemed to offer
more possibilities. I thus used schema as the name for
the more or less durable structure that, when triggered,
produced the automatic thought. Following from Piaget,
I ascribed the following characteristics to the schemas:
permeability/impermeability, magnitude, content, and
charge. Permeability/impermeability indicated receptiv-
ity to change, magnitude was the size of the schema
relative to the person’s general self-concept, and con-
tent described the basic theme. When the charge of
the schema was low, the schema was essentially deac-
tivated but became activated again when a stimulus
congruent with the content of the schema became
activated or, in psychopathology, when the schema
was activated to varying degrees during the course of
the episode.
Application to Specific Psychological
Disorders

Expanding on the concept of schemas, I developed a
number of instruments that measured the idiosyncratic
beliefs for the major depressive disorders and problems
such as depression, suicide, anxiety, substance abuse,
anger and hostility, couples problems, and, more recently,
schizophrenia (e.g., the Beck Depression Inventory;
Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988; Beck, Ward, Mendelson,
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Because these various psycho-
logical variables were poorly defined, in each instance
I developed a measure of the psychiatric disorder before
attempting to identify the beliefs, the characteristics of
each disorder, and the therapy adapted to modify the
maladaptive beliefs. Examples from the different diag-
nostic tests are as follows: depression: “I am so sad or
unhappy I can’t stand it”; suicide: “I would end my life
if I could”; anxiety: “I am anxious all of the time”; anger
and hostility: “If someone offends me I should strike
back.” For each disorder, the diagnostic instrument
would be used to identify the primary psychopathology
and would be a partial outcome measure.
In developing a diagram for each disorder, I tried to
focus on the typical maladaptive beliefs of the disorder.
For example, the addictive behaviors (drinking, using,
etc.) were characterized by the same beliefs facilitating
the addiction. When experiencing a craving, common
Evolution of Cognitive Theory and Therapy 19
maladaptive cognitions could be “it’s OK this one time”
(permission giving), “I can go to the corner to get a hit”
(facilitating), and/or “I will quit after this one time”
(promising). For anger and aggression issues, the typical

pathway is as follows: The individuals feel diminished in
some way, leading to a momentary hurt feeling. They are
generally not aware of the hurt because it is overshad-
owed by anger and the impulse to counter attack. In
another paradigm, particularly when the individuals feel
vulnerable, they may react to a perceived attack or threat
by becoming anxious. Finally, individuals, particularly
those who are depressed, may respond to the assault by
reinforcing the notion that they deserve it (Beck, 1999).
I also studied anger and aggression extensively in
couples and found consistently that most of the anger
could be attributed to cognitive process (Beck, 1988).
They tended to show a wide range of biases, particu-
larly attentional (observing only negative behaviors and
not positive), interpretive (making negative interpreta-
tions of neutral behavior and exaggerating minimal
negative), and finally globalization (seeing the partner
as the enemy). Here it was possible to observe first-
hand the dysfunctional beliefs in the interactions
between the two individuals. Each individual saw the
self as vulnerable and victimized and the other as over -
powering and victimizing. In any case, it was possible
to restore the individuals to a better condition provided
their animosity had not gone beyond the point of no
return. Note that the same types of images and cogni-
tive distortions are present in conflicts between other
individuals and between larger groups such as ethnic
or religious groups and nations. These kinds of cogni-
tive processes and distortions help to explain the origin
of the killings in war and genocide.
Once the maladaptive beliefs were identified for a
given disorder, I then proceeded to develop a therapy
for that disorder. To test the clinical utility of the
assigned beliefs for a given disorder or problem, I con-

ducted clinical trials along with my postdoctoral stu-
dents. After a successful randomized controlled trial, I
would typically prepare a book so that the defined
therapy could be used to replicate the initial findings
and also provide material for the practitioners. In addi -
tion to identifying the primary problem and working
to rewire maladaptive beliefs and biases into more
adaptive ones, another key factor in the success of any
of the adaptations of cognitive therapy is the working
relationship with the therapist. In the most severe prob-
lems, such as personality disorders—borderline person-
ality disorder and schizophrenia, for example—the
forging of the connection with the patient involves a
kind of partnership or comradeship in many cases.
Our team has managed over the past decade to make
real progress in the treatment of schizophrenia. In the
course of this treatment, we have found that even the
most severe cases, involving long periods of hospital -
ization, bizarre behavior (e.g., undressing in public),
poor urinary and bowel behaviors, self-injury, and
aggressiveness, are amenable to treatment and subject
to positive change (Grant, Bredemeier, & Beck, 2017;
Grant, Huh, Perivoliotis, Stolar, & Beck, 2012). Most
notably, we have found that psychotic features such as
delusions, hallucinations, and bizarre behavior actually
disguise a normal personality. The task of the therapist
is to activate this normal personality through the rela-
tionship, pinpointing the individual’s strengths, talents,
and aspirations and then drawing on these to jointly
form a therapeutic plan. Although there are notable
differences between traditional cognitive behavior ther -
apy (CBT) and our therapeutic approach for schizo-
phrenia (i.e., recovery-oriented cognitive therapy, or
CT-R), this therapy uses many of the basic tenets of

CBT, including personalizing a cognitive formulation
for each unique individual, working through negative
and dysfunctional beliefs, and discussing strategies to
achieving meaningful goals.
The worldwide expansion of CBT is due largely to
its transdiagnostic efficacy, demonstrated in thousands
of research studies (Brown et al., 2005; Rush, Hollon,
Beck, & Kovacs, 1978; Waltman, Creed, & Beck, 2016;
for a review of studies of CBT effectiveness, see Beck,
1993). Furthermore, in the 1990s, I coauthored a critical
book (D. A. Clark & Beck, 1999) that summarized my
early work in developing a novel theory and therapy
for depression (as discussed in this article) as well as
newer scientific evidence for the efficacy of CBT in
treating depression. There have also been major clinical
advances in the implementation and dissemination of
CBT. A 2015 worldwide survey indicated that CBT is
the most broadly used form of therapy in the world
(Knapp, Kieling, & Beck, 2015). In addition, in the
United Kingdom, CBT has been employed as the domi-
nant modality of therapy in the Improving Access to
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) program under the aus-
pices of the National Health Service (NHS), treating more
than 500,000 people per year with a variety of mental -
health concerns, including depressive and anxiety-
related disorders (D. M. Clark, 2018). This substantial
focus on dissemination and training of quality CBT cli-
nicians from every continent has been fundamental to
the overall acceptance of CBT as the “gold standard”
of therapy (David, Cristea, & Hofmann, 2018). Although
my personal research has been focused primarily on
psychological disorders, it is also necessary to give
credit to the innovative researchers who have success-
fully used CBT to treat a number of medical disorders
that even I would have previously written off as impos-

sible to target with psychotherapy. These include dia-
betes, dementia, hypertension, irritable bowel syndrome,
insomnia, and skin diseases.
20 Beck
In this article, I have tried to touch on some of the
highlights of my 60 years in psychiatry and mental
health. Hopefully these efforts demonstrate my com-
mitment to making a better world through the applica-
tion of psychological principles.
Action Editor
Darby Saxbe served as action editor and June Gruber served
as interim editor-in-chief for this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of interest
with respect to the authorship or the publication of this
article.
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APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW,
2002,
51
(2), 269 – 290
© International Association for Applied Psychology, 2002.
Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA.
mBlackwell Science LtdOxford, UKAPPSApplied Psychology:
an International Review0269-994X© International Association
for Applied Psychology, 200220025121000Original
ArticleSocioCognitive Theory in Cultural ContextBandura
Social Cognitive Theory in Cultural Context

Albert Bandura*
Stanford University, Stanford, USA
La théorie socio-cognitive adopte une perspective d’action pour
ce qui est du
développement, de l’adaptation et du changement humains.
Cette théorie dis-
tingue trois types d’action: l’action personnelle exercée
individuellement,
l’action par procuration où l’on s’assure de bénéfices désirés en
incitant autrui
a intervenir en sa faveur, et l’action collective où les gens
agissent ensemble
pour construire leur avenir. Des dichotomies conflictuelles
parsèment notre
domaine, opposant l’autonomie et l’interdépendance,
l’individualisme et le
collectivisme. Les déterminants et les doses d’action
individuelle, par pro-
curation et collective varient culturellement. Mais tous les
modes d’action sont
nécessaires pour parvenir á ses fins quel que soit le contexte
culturel. Les
cultures sont diverses et dynamiques, ce ne sont pas des
monolithes statiques.
La diversité intraculturelle et les écarts dans les orientations
psychosociales
mettent en évidence la dynamique aux multiples facettes des
cultures. La glo-
balisation croissante, la pluralité des sociétés et l’immersion
dans un monde

virtuel qui se joue du temps, des distances, des lieux et des
frontières incitent
à élargir la portée des études interculturelles. Les
préoccupations se focalisent
sur la façon dont les forces nationales et globales interagissent
dans la création
de la vie culturelle.
Social cognitive theory adopts an agentic perspective to human
development,
adaptation, and change. The theory distinguishes among three
modes of
agency: personal agency exercised individually; proxy agency
in which people
secure desired outcomes by influencing others to act on their
behalf; and col-
lective agency in which people act in concert to shape their
future. Contentious
dualisms pervade our field pitting autonomy against
interdependence; indi-
vidualism against collectivism and communality; and personal
agency against
social structure. The determinants and agentic blends of
individual, proxy,
and collective instrumentality vary cross-culturally. But all
agentic modes are
needed to make it through the day whatever the cultural context
in which one
resides. Cultures are diverse and dynamic social systems not
static monoliths.
Intracultural diversity and intraindividual variation in
psychosocial orientations
across spheres of functioning underscore the multifaceted
dynamic nature of

* Address for correspondence: Albert Bandura, Department of
Psychology, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA 94305 - 2130, USA. Email: [email protected]
Preparation of this article and some of the cited research were
facilitated by grants from the
Grant Foundation and the Spencer Foundation.
APPS_08.fm Page 269 Wednesday, March 13, 2002 1:29 PM
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cultures. The growing globalisation and cultural pluralisation of
societies
and enmeshment in a cyberworld that transcends time, distance,
place, and
national borders call for broadening the scope of cross -cultural
analyses. The
issues of interest center on how national and global forces
interact to shape
the nature of cultural life.
INTRODUCTION

The present article addresses human functioning in cultural
embeddedness
from the agentic perspective of social cognitive theory. To be
an agent is
to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life
circumstances. Social
cognitive theory distinguishes among three modes of agency:
direct personal
agency; proxy agency that relies on others to act on one’s
behest to secure
desired outcomes; and collective agency exercised through
group action. In
personal agency exercised individually, people bring their
influence to bear
directly on themselves and their environment in managing their
lives. In
many spheres of life people do not have direct control over the
social con-
ditions and institutional practices that affect their everyday
lives. Under
these circumstances, they seek their well-being and valued
outcomes through
the exercise of proxy agency. In this socially mediated mode of
agency,
people try to get those who have access to resources, expertise
or who wield
influence and power to act at their behest to secure the
outcomes they desire.
People do not live their lives autonomously. Many of the things
they seek
are achievable only through socially interdependent effort.
Hence, they
have to pool their knowledge, skills, and resources, provide
mutual support,
form alliances, and work together to secure what they cannot
accomplish

on their own.
Successful functioning requires an agentic blend of these
different modes of
agency. The relative contribution of individual, proxy, and
collective modes
to the agentic mix may vary cross-culturally. But all of these
agentic modes
need to be enlisted to make it through the day, regardless of the
culture in
which one happens to reside. People’s efforts to manage their
everyday lives
cannot be reduced to polarities that arbitrarily partition human
agency into
individual and collective forms. Cross-cultural variations are
differences in
relative emphasis in agentic patterning rather than cultural
exclusivity of
agency to individual or collective modes.
Among the mechanisms of human agency none is more central
or pervasive
than beliefs of personal efficacy (Bandura, 1997). Whatever
other factors
serve as guides and motivators, they are rooted in the core
belief that one has
the power to produce desired effects by one’s actions, otherwise
one has little
incentive to act or to persevere in the face of difficulties. Self-
efficacy beliefs
regulate human functioning through cognitive, motivational,
affective, and
decisional processes. They affect whether individuals think in
self-enhancing
or self-debilitating ways; how well they motivate themselves
and persevere

SOCIOCOGNITIVE THEORY IN CULTURAL CONTEXT
271
in the face of difficulties; the quality of their emotional life,
and the choices
they make at important decisional points which set the course of
life paths.
Numerous large-scale meta-analyses have been conducted on
findings
from studies with diverse experimental and analytic
methodologies applied
across diverse spheres of functioning (Boyer, Zollo, Thompson,
Vancouver,
Shewring, & Sims, 2000; Holden, 1991; Holden, Moncher,
Schinke, & Barker,
1990; Moritz, Feltz, Fahrbach, & Mack, 2000; Multon, Brown,
& Lent, 1991;
Sadri & Robertson, 1993; Stajkovic & Lee, 2001; Stajkovic &
Luthans, 1998).
The converging evidence from these diverse lines of research
verifies that
efficacy beliefs contribute significantly to the quality of human

functioning.
As previously noted, in social cognitive theory efficacy beliefs
are not
confined solely to judgments of personal capabilities. The
theory also encom-
passes perceived collective efficacy representing shared beliefs
in the power
to produce desired effects by collective action (Bandura, 1997,
2000). Perceived
collective efficacy is not simply the sum of the efficacy beliefs
of individual
members. Rather, it is an emergent group-level property that
embodies the
coordinative and interactive dynamics of group functioning.
A group, of course, operates through the behavior of its
members. The
locus of perceived collective efficacy resides in the minds of
group members.
It is people acting in concert on a shared belief not a
disembodied group mind
that is doing the cognising, aspiring, motivating, and regulating.
There is no
emergent entity that operates independently of the beliefs and
actions of the
individuals who make up a social system.
Although beliefs of collective efficacy have a sociocentric
focus, the func-
tions they serve are similar to those of personal efficacy beliefs
and they
operate through similar processes (Bandura, 1997). People’s
shared beliefs
in their collective efficacy influence the type of futures they
seek to achieve

through collective effort; how well they use their resources;
how much effort
they put into their group endeavors; their staying power when
collective
efforts fail to produce quick results or meet forcible opposition;
and their
vulnerability to the discouragement that can beset those taking
on tough
social problems. Meta-analysis of laboratory and field studies
corroborates
that perceived collective efficacy enhances group functioning
just as per-
sonal efficacy enhances individual functioning (Stajkovi c &
Lee, 2001).
CROSS-CULTURAL THEORETICAL GENERALISABILITY
Because of the expanded conception of human agency, social
cognitive
theory is well suited to elucidate human personal development,
adaptation,
and change in diverse cultural milieus. Cultural analyses must
address the
basic issue of whether there is a universal human nature or
many human
natures spawned by diverse cultural milieus. This calls for a
brief discussion
of the nature of human nature in social cognitive theory.
Viewed from the

272
BANDURA
sociocognitive perspective, human nature is characterised by a
vast potential-
ity that can be fashioned by direct and vicarious experience into
a variety of
forms within biological limits. Biology provides potentialities
and sets con-
straints but in most spheres of functioning biology permits a
broad range
of cultural possibilities. Gould (1987) argues cogently that
evidence favors
a potentialist view over a determinist view of biology. In this
insightful ana-
lysis, the major explanatory battle is not between nature and
nurture as com-
monly framed, but whether nature operates as a determinist that
has culture
on a “tight leash”, or as a potentialist that has culture on a
“loose leash”.
For example, people possess the biological potentiality for
aggression, but
the answer to the cultural variation in aggressiveness lies more
in ideology
than in biology. There is wide intercultural and intracultural
diversity in
aggression and entire nations, such as Sweden and Switzerland,

have trans-
formed from warring ones to pacifist ones (Alland, 1972;
Bandura, 1999;
Moerk, 1995).
People have changed little genetically over recent decades, but
they have
changed markedly through rapid cultural and technological
evolution in
their beliefs, mores, social roles, and styles of behavior. As
Dobzhansky
(1972) puts it succinctly, the human species has been selected
for learnability
and plasticity of behavior adaptive to remarkably diverse
habitats not for
behavioral fixedness.
The plasticity, which is intrinsic to the nature of humans,
depends upon
specialised neurophysiological structures and mechanisms that
have evolved
over time. These advanced neural systems are specialised for
channeling
attention, detecting the causal structure of the world around
one, trans-
forming that information into abstract form, integrating it and
using it for
adaptive purposes. The evolved morphology and informatio n
processing
systems provide the capacity for the very characteristics that are
distinctly
human—generative symbolisation, forethought, evaluative self-
regulation,
reflective self-consciousness, and symbolic communication
(Bandura, 2001).

Through agentic action, people devise ways of adapting flexibly
to remark-
ably diverse environments. Moreover, they use their ingenuity
to insulate
themselves from selection pressures. They create devices that
compensate
immensely for their sensory and physical limitations,
circumvent environ-
mental constraints, redesign and construct environments to their
liking,
create styles of behavior that enable them to realise desired
outcomes and
pass on the effective ones to others by social modeling and
other experiential
means. Through development of biotechnologies, people are
now chang-
ing the genetic make-up of plants and animals, and even toying
with the
prospect of fashioning some aspects of their nature by genetic
design. The
accelerated growth of knowledge is greatly enhancing human
power to con-
trol, transform, and create environments of increasing
complexity and to
shape their social future.
273

The common human nature is at the level of basic capacities and
the
specialised mechanisms through which they operate, but
cultures shape
these potentialities into diverse forms. For example, humans
have evolved
an advanced capacity for observational learning that enables
them to acquire
knowledge, attitudes, values, emotional proclivities, and
competences through
the rich fund of information conveyed by actual and symbolic
modeling
(Bandura, 1986). It is difficult to imagine how cultures could
develop and
replicate themselves if their language, mores, customs, and
social practices
in diverse spheres of life had to be gradually shaped in each
new member
by direct consequences of their trial-and error performances
without benefit
of models who display the cultural patterns. Modeling is a
universalised
human capacity but how it is used varies in different cultural
milieus.
The present article focuses on the cross-cultural commonality of
agentic
capacity rooted in beliefs of personal and collective efficacy to
produce
effects by one’s actions. Although efficacy beliefs have
generalised func-

tional value, how they are developed and structured, the ways in
which they
are exercised, and the purposes to which they are put, vary
cross-culturally.
In short, there is commonality in basic agentic capacities and
mechanisms
of operation, but diversity in the culturing of these inherent
capacities. The
cultivated identities, values, belief structures, and agentic
capabilities are the
psychosocial systems through which experiences are filtered.
Some people live in predominantly individualistically oriented
social sys-
tems, others in more collectively oriented ones (Kim, Triandis,
Kâgitçibasi,
Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Triandis, 1995). A high sense of personal
efficacy is just
as important to group-directedness as to self-directedness.
Group pursuits
are no less demanding of personal efficacy than individual
pursuits. Nor do
people who work interdependently in collectivistic societies
have less need
or desire to be efficacious in the particular roles they perform
than those in
individualistic societies.
Personal efficacy is valued, not because of reverence for
individualism,
but because a strong sense of personal efficacy is vital for
success regardless
of whether it is achieved individually or by group members
putting their
personal capabilities to the best collective use. A firm group
loyalty creates

strong personal obligations to do one’s part in group pursuits as
effica-
ciously as one can. Members are respected for their personal
contributions
to group accomplishments. Efficacy beliefs operate in complex,
multifaceted
ways, regardless of how the cultural pursuits are socially
structured. All too
often the complexities and subtleties get lost in oversimplified
cross-cultural
comparisons. We shall return to this issue later.
Earley’s (1994) cross-cultural research on organisational
efficacy and
productivity in the United States, Hong Kong, and Mainland
China attests
to cross-cultural generality of the functional value of efficacy
belief. In
each of these settings the organisations were manufacturing the
same
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BANDURA

telecommunications equipment and offering the same service. In
each place,
half the managers were trained in an individually oriented
management system,
the other half were trained in a group-oriented management
system. Managers
from the United States, an individualistically oriented culture,
achieve the
highest perceived efficacy and organisational productivity under
the indi-
vidually oriented system. Those from collectivistic cultures,
Hong Kong, and
China, judge themselves most efficacious and achieve the
highest organisa-
tional productivity under the group-oriented system.
There are collectivists in individualistic cultures and
individualists in
collectivistic cultures. Acknowledging intracultural diversity,
Earley ana-
lysed the functional relations between training focus, efficacy
beliefs, and
organisation productivity in terms of whether the inhabitants
favored an indi-
vidualistic or collectivistic ethic, regardless of geographic
locale. Managers
achieved the highest personal efficacy and group productivity
when their
personal orientation matched the organisational social system.
Thus, Amer-
ican collectivists did better under a group-oriented system,
whereas Chinese
individualists did better under an individually oriented system.
The personal
orientation rather than the geographical cultural locale was a
major carrier

of the effects. Analysis in terms of key psychosocial dimensions
has greater
explanatory import than categorising people by geographic
locale because
the former is grounded in a theory about the psychosocial
factors posited
to account for cultural differences and addresses diversities in
cultural
groupings. Both at the societal and individual level of analysis,
strong per-
ceived efficacy fosters high group effort and performance
attainments.
INTRACULTURAL DIVERSITY
People live their lives in sociocultural milieus that differ in
their shared
values, customs, social practices, and institutional constraints
and oppor-
tunity structures. Dichotomous cultural groupings, such as
individualistic–
collectivistic types, mask much diversity between cultural
systems assigned
to the same type and within a particular culture. Such
classifications rely
on a disputable homogeneity assumption. For example,
collectivistic systems
founded on Confucianism, Buddhism, and Marxism favor a
communal ethic,
but they differ significantly from each other in particular
values, meanings,
and the customs they promote (Kim et al., 1994). Nor are so-
called indi-
vidualistic cultures a uniform lot. Americans, Italians, Germans,

French,
and the British differ in their particular brands of individualism.
Even
within an individualistically oriented culture, such as the United
States, the
Northeast brand of individualism is quite different from the
Midwest and
West versions and the latter differ from that of the Deep
Southern region of
the nation (Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Even the informativeness
of regional
comparisons is questionable because of a substantial ethnic
heterogeneity
275
within them. Cross-ethnic comparisons, such as Latinos,
African-Americans,
and Orientals, can be highly misinformative because of the
diverse nature
of ethnicity. For example, to lump Puerto Ricans, Cubans,
Chicanos, and
Spanish, who have quite different cultural origins, into a Latino

category
imposes homogeneity on intra-ethnic diversity. Hence, cultural
contrasts,
in which members of a single collectivist culture is compared to
those of
a single individualist one, can spawn a lot of misleading
generalisations.
Cultures are diverse and dynamic social systems not static
monoliths. There
is substantial heterogeneity among individuals within both
individualistic and
collectivistic systems. Thus, for example, there are generational
and socio-
economic variations in communality in collectivistic cultures
with younger
and more affluent members adopting more individualistic
orientations
(Matsumoto, Kudoh, & Takeuchi, 1996). Under the sway of
global market and
media forces, entrepreneurship is supplanting communality in
collectivistic
cultures. Conversely, some of the excesses of individualism are
prompting a
resurgence of efforts to restore a sense of community and social
responsibil-
ity in individualistic cultures.
There is even greater intraindividual variation in communality
across dif-
ferent types of social relationships. Members of a
collectivistically oriented
society are highly communal with ingroup members, such as
family mem-
bers, friends, and colleagues, but members of an
individualistically oriented

society are more communal with outgroup members (Matsumoto
et al.,
1996). Indeed, variation in communal style of behavior across
classes of rela-
tionships swamps variation across cultural milieus. Analyses
across activity
domains would undoubtedly reveal that people behave
communally in some
aspects of their lives and individualistically in many other
aspects. Moreover,
people express their cultural orientations conditionally rather
than invari-
antly depending on incentive conditions (Yamagishi, 1988).
Thus, members
of a collectivistically oriented society are active contributors to
collective
effort with ingroup members, but slacken their effort in groups
composed
of outgroup members. But when negative sanctions against free
riders are
instituted they become as communal with outsiders as do people
in individual-
istic cultures. Freeman and Bordia (2001) further confirm that
people vary in
individualistic and collectivistic social orientations depending
on whether
the reference group is familial, peer, academic, or national.
Cultural measures
cast in terms of faceless others and disembodied from domains
of activity,
social contexts, and incentive conditions mask this diversity on
which human
adaptation is conditional. Global, decontextualised measures
shrink psycho-
social variability to uniform polarity that lends to be ascribed to
entire cultures

and their residents.
Intracultural and interdomain variability, and changeability of
cultural
orientations as a function of incentive conditions underscores
the concep-
tual and empirical problems of using nations as proxies for
culture and
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BANDURA
then ascribing psychosocial attributes to the nations and all its
members as
though they are static monoliths (Gjerde & Onishi, 2000). This
is culturalism
by bounded territory rather than by psychosocial orientations
and social cus-
toms. All too often, a selected cultural factor that yields a small
difference
in group averages is generalised to all individuals in the cultural
grouping
as though they all believed and behaved alike as dichotomously
classified.

The categorical approach also lends itself readily to
misattributing effects
to traits ascribed to the classification when, in fact, other
dynamic pro-
cesses may be at play. For example, collectivists tend to be
most efficacious
and productive when they manage things together. It is assumed
that this
is because the collectively oriented are disposed to place group
interest and
shared responsibility above self-interest. However, collectivists
are not
always group oriented as if driven by an all-reaching communal
disposition.
Indeed, they have a low sense of efficacy and perform poorly
when manag-
ing activities within an ethnically mixed group (Earley, 1993).
Psychosocial
processes triggered by perceived ingroupness–outgroupness
seem to be at
work.
There is a substantial difference between theorising based on
categorical
cultural trait ascriptions and process analyses. Human behavior
is socially
situated, richly contextualised and conditionally expressed. The
complex-
ities described above require analyses of psychosocial
determinants and
governing mechanisms grounded in a comprehensive theory of
human
functioning. Global decontextualised and nonconditionalised
measures of
psychological orientations mask the substantial intracultural
diversity and

intraindividual variation in self-conception. There is no
autonomous self
unless one is living the life of a hermit, nor is there an entirely
interdepend-
ent self completely submerged in collectivity without any
individual identity
or sense of personal capability. Such measures are ill -suited to
advance
understanding of the structure, dynamics, and functions of
sociocultural
factors that shape how people live their lives in given cultural
milieus.
CONTENTIOUS DUALISMS
Contentious theoretical dualisms pervade the cross-cultural
field, pitting
autonomy against interdependence; personal agency against
social struc-
ture; and individualism against collectivism and communality.
Most of the
current theorising and research on cultural variations is
structured around
these categorisations. One duality inappropriately equates self-
efficacy with
individualism and pits it against collectivism (Schooler, 1990).
A contentious
correlative duality regards any reference to self in
psychological theorising
as championing self-centeredness and self-indulgence in
contrast to com-
munal attachments and civic responsibilities (Seligman, 1990;
Sampson, 1977).
These jaundiced views are grounded in a number of erroneous

assumptions.
277
Perceived self-efficacy does not come with a built-in
individualistic value
system. Therefore, a sense of efficacy does not necessarily
spawn an indi-
vidualistic lifestyle, identity, or morality. If belief in the power
to produce
effects is put to social purposes, it fosters a communal life
rather than
erodes it. People with resilient efficacy and strong prosocial
purpose often
subordinate self-interest to the benefit of others. For example,
parents in
impoverished environments with a resilient sense of efficacy
refuse to have
their children’s development dictated by adverse circumstances
by bringing
their influence to bear on things that matter through resourceful
effort and
self-sacrifice (Bandura, 1997). The same is true for tenacious

social reform-
ers. Gandhi provides a striking example of self-sacrifice in the
exercise of
tenacious personal efficacy. He spearheaded the triumph over
oppressive
rule through unceasing nonviolent resistance and repeatedly
forced con-
cessions from ruling authorities by going on life-threatening
fasts. He lived
ascetically, not self-indulgently. Similarly, Mandella and King
spurred extra-
ordinary social changes that altered the course of sociopolitical
life in their
societies in the face of daunting challenge through an
enormously resilient
sense of personal efficacy. Without a robust sense of self,
people are easily
overwhelmed by adversities in attempts to change their lives for
the better
through collective effort.
A sense of collective efficacy is not disembodied from
perceived personal
efficacy. A collectivistic culture with members plagued by self-
doubts
about their capabilities to perform their roles would achieve
little. A strong
sense of personal efficacy to manage one’s life circumstances
and to have
a hand in effecting societal changes contributes substantially to
perceived col-
lective efficacy to shape their society’s social future
(Fernández-Ballesteros,
Díez-Nicolás, Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Bandura, 2002).
The conjoint influence of perceived political efficacy and trust

in the gov-
ernmental system predicts the form and level of people’s
political activity
(Craig, 1979; Pollock, 1983; Seligson, 1980). These belief
systems function
similarly regardless of whether the political activism is by
United States’
citizenry or Costa Rican peasants seeking social reforms. People
who
believe they can achieve desired changes through their
collective voice, and
who view their governmental systems as trustworthy, are active
participants
in conventional political activities. Those who believe they can
accomplish
social changes by perseverant collective action, but view the
governing
systems and office-holders as untrustworthy, favor more
confrontive and
coercive tactics outside the traditional political channels. The
politically
apathetic have little faith that they can influence governmental
functioning
through collective initiatives and are disaffected from the
political system,
believing it ignores their interests.
In political participation, people’s efficacy beliefs to achieve
social change
are put in the service of bettering their lives. In everyday socia l
relationships,

278
BANDURA
perceived self-efficacy is not antithetical to communality.
Indeed, a high
sense of social and empathic efficacy promote prosocialness as
expressed in
cooperativeness, helpfulness, and sharing (Bandura, Caprara,
Barbaranelli,
Gerbino, & Pastorelli, 2001; Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli,
Pastorelli, &
Regalia, 2001). As already noted, social cognitive theory
provides a theoret-
ical framework applicable to both individualistically and
collectivistically
oriented social systems through its expanded conception of
human agency
exercised individually, socially mediated, and collectively. Kim
and Park (1999)
further extend the cross-cultural applicability of self-efficacy
theory by adding
belief in one’s relational efficacy to promote positive communal
relations.
This facet of self-efficacy is well suited to capture the
communal aspect of
life, especially in the more collectivistically oriented cultural
systems.

Another disputable duality pits psychological theories of
personal agency
and sociostructural theories as rival conceptions of human
behavior or as
representing different levels and proximities of causati on. In the
social
cognitive theory of self and society (Bandura, 1986, 2001)
personal agency
and social structure operate interdependently rather than as
disembodied
entities. Personal agency operates within a broad network of
sociostructural
influences. In these agentic transactions, people are producers
as well as
products of social systems. Social structures are created by
human activity
to organise, guide, and regulate human affairs in given domains
by authorised
rules and sanctions (Giddens, 1984). The sociostructural
practices imple-
mented by social agents, in turn, impose constraints and provide
resources
and opportunity structures for personal development and
functioning. Given
this dynamic bidirectionality of influence, social cognitive
theory rejects a
dualism between personal agency and a disembodied social
structure.
A full understanding of human adaptation and change requires
an integ-
rated causal structure in which sociostructural influences
operate through
mechanisms of the self system to produce behavioral effects.
However, in
agentic transactions, the self system is not merely a conduit for

external influ-
ences. The self is socially constituted but, by exercising
directive influence,
human agency operates generatively and proactively on social
systems not
just reactively.
Nor are sociostructural and psychological determinants neatly
dichotom-
ised into remote and proximate ones. For example, poverty is a
socio-
economic factor that does not operate in multilayered or remote
causation.
Lacking the money needed to provide for the subsistence of
one’s family
pervades everyday life in a very immediate way. Analyses of
paths of influence
lend support for a multicausal model that integrates
sociostructural and
personal determinants. Economic conditions, socioeconomic
status, and
family structure affect behavior through their impact on
people’s sense of effi-
cacy, aspirations, and affective self-regulatory factors rather
than directly
279

(Baldwin, Baldwin, Sameroff, & Seifer, 1989; Bandura, 1993;
Bandura,
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996b, 2001; Elder &
Ardelt, 1992).
A major part of people’s daily life is spent in occupational
activities.
These pursuits do more than simply provide income for one’s
livelihood.
Occupations structure a large part of people’s everyday reality
and serve as
a major source of personal identity and self-evaluation. As an
interdepend-
ent activity, occupational pursuits also structure a good part of
people’s
social relations. Beliefs of personal efficacy play a highly
influential role in
occupational development and pursuits (Bandura, 1997; Betz &
Hackett,
1986; Hackett, 1995; Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994). The
higher the people’s
perceived efficacy to fulfill educational requirements and
occupational roles
the wider the career options they seriously consider pursuing,
the greater the
interest they have in them, the better they prepare themselves
educationally
for different occupational careers, and the greater their staying
power in
challenging career pursuits. People simply eliminate from
consideration entire

classes of occupations they believe to be beyond their
capabilities, however
attractive the occupations may be.
The career interests and pursuits of women tend to be
constricted by a
sense of inefficacy for quantitative activities and skills
necessary for occupa-
tions traditionally occupied by males. The gendered patterning
of perceived
occupational efficacy is similar in the United States and Japan
(Betz &
Hackett, 1983; Hackett, 1995; Lucas, Wanberg, & Zytowski,
1997; Matsui,
Ikeda, & Ohnishi, 1989). Moreover, gendered socialisation
exerts a compar-
able impact cross-culturally even on judgments of personal
efficacy for the
same activities performed in different contexts. Women both in
the United
States and Japan have a high sense of efficacy for quantitative
activities em-
bedded in stereotypically feminine activities, but low perceived
self-efficacy
when these same quantitative activities are embedded in
scientific pur-
suits (Betz & Hackett, 1983; Junge & Dretzke, 1995; Matsui &
Tsukamoto,
1991).
Perceived coping efficacy also affects stress and burnout in
occupational
milieus in much the same way cross-culturally. Occupational
stress arises
when perceived task demands tax or exceed perceived efficacy
to manage

them and when people find themselves in jobs below their
capabilities or are
plateaued in their careers with little opportunity to make full
use of their
skills or to enhance them (Brouwers, Evers, & Tomic, 2001;
Brouwers &
Tomic, 1999, 2000; Chwalisz, Altmaier, & Russell, 1992; Jex &
Bliese, 1999;
Jex & Gudanowski, 1992; Salanova, Liorens, Cifre, Martinez, &
Schaufeli,
in press; Salanova, Peiró, & Schaufeli, in press; Schwarzer &
Schmitz, 1999).
That perceived coping efficacy mediates the impact of work
demands on
occupational stress is replicated in diverse invidualistically
oriented social
systems cited above, including Germany, Netherlands, Spain,
and the United
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BANDURA
States at the level of both perceived individual and collective

efficacy. What
is experienced as an occupational stressor also depends on the
level of per-
ceived efficacy in the collectivistically oriented Japanese
culture (Matsui &
Onglatco, 1992). Japanese women employees who have a low
sense of coping
efficacy are stressed by heavy work demands and role
responsibilities. Those
with a high sense of efficacy are frustrated and stressed by
limited opportunities
to make full use of their talents.
So far the cross-cultural generalisability of social cognitive
theory has
been evaluated in terms of its explanatory power and its
predictive power.
The power of the theory to effect society-wide changes in
diverse cultural
milieus provides a third way of gauging generalisability. Mass
media dramat-
isations founded on social cognitive theory are being used to
reduce the most
urgent global problems, namely, the burgeoning population
growth. Global
applications of televised sociocognitive serials have proven
successful in
raising viewers’ perceived efficacy to determine their family
size, increasing
approval of family planning, enhancing the agentic status of
women, and
increasing use of family planning services and contraceptive
methods in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America alike (Bandura, 2002; Vaugha n,
Rogers,
Singhal, & Swalehe, 2000). These numerous global applications

speak to the
operative generalisability of social cognitive theory.
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY IN DEVELOPMENTAL
CULTURAL CONTEXT
Another line of research into the cross-cultural generalisability
of social
cognitive theory examines the origin, structure, and function of
perceived
self-efficacy and other sociocognitive determinants in child
development.
One such research examined the cultural embeddedness and
structure of
children’s perceived self-efficacy in Italy, Poland, and Hungary
(Pastorelli,
Caprara, Barbaranelli, Rola, Rorza, & Bandura, 2001). Although
these soci-
eties represent quite different sociocultural systems, the factor
structure
of children’s self-efficacy beliefs was essentially replicated.
These factors
include perceived efficacy to regulate one’s own learning
activities and master
academic coursework; perceived social efficacy to develop and
manage
interpersonal relationships; and perceived self-regulatory
efficacy to resist
peer pressure to engage in detrimental activities. Moreover,
children in the
collectivistically oriented Korean culture exhibit the same
structure of per-
ceived self-efficacy (Kwak & Bandura, 1997).

Although the factor structure is comparable, the different forms
of per-
ceived self-efficacy play out differently in the different cultural
milieus. Chil-
dren from the various countries have an equivalent level of
efficacy to master
academic subjects, but those from countries with authoritarian
educational
systems have a lower sense of efficacy to take charge of their
own learning.
281
A low sense of efficacy to regulate one’s own motivation and
learning act-
ivities bears importantly on intellectual self-development. A
major goal of
education is to equip students with the intellectual tools and
self-regulatory
capabilities to educate themselves throughout their lifetime.
Evolving educa-
tional technologies and the rapid pace of informational change
are placing

a premium on perceived efficacy for self-regulated learning.
In the socially oriented Italian culture, children judge
themselves more
socially efficacious than their counterparts in the Eastern
European societies
of Poland and Hungary. There are significant gender differences
in per-
ceived efficacy which are replicated cross-nationally. In all
three societies,
girls have a higher sense of efficacy for academic activities and
to resist peer
pressure to engage in transgressive activities.
Not only is the structure of efficacy beliefs comparable cross -
culturally,
but so are their functional properties. In the more
individualistically oriented
American social system, perceived self-efficacy to regulate
one’s learning
and master academic activities is a good predictor of academic
aspirations
and level of academic achievement after controlling for prior
achievement
(Pajares, 1996; Pajares & Miller, 1994; Schunk, 1989;
Zimmerman & Bandura,
1994; Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992). Belief in
one’s aca-
demic efficacy serves a similar function in academic
attainments in Chinese,
German, Italian, and Korean cultures (Bandura, Barbaranelli,
Caprara, &
Pastorelli, 1996b; Bong, 2001, in press; Joo, Bong, & Choi,
2000; Mayer &
Kim, 2000; Shih & Alexander, 2000). The cross-cultural
comparability of

function is evident as well in the impact of efficacy belief on
perceived occu-
pational efficacy and career choice and development (Bandura,
Barbaranelli,
Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001; Lent, Brown, & Larkin, 1986,
1987).
Perceived self-efficacy to manage one’s academic activities not
only oper-
ates similarly in the Korean culture as an enhancer of academic
attainment,
but even its mediating function is replicated cross-culturally
(Park, Kim,
Chung, Lee, Kwon, & Yang, 2000). Social support has been
shown to enhance
psychosocial functioning. However, mediational analysis across
diverse
spheres of functioning reveals that it does so only indirectly to
the extent that
it raises perceived self-efficacy to manage environmental
demands (Benight,
Swift, Sanger, Smith, & Zeppelin, 1999; Cheung & Sun, 2000;
Cutrona &
Troutman, 1986; Duncan & McAuley, 1993; Major, Mueller, &
Hilde-
brandt, 1985).
Park and her associates (Park et al., 2000) examined the causal
struc-
ture involving different sources of social support, perceived
academic self-
efficacy, life satisfaction, and academic achievement in Korean
children
at different age levels. In accord with the functional relations
reported in
studies in the American milieu, the impact of social support on

academic
achievement is entirely mediated through perceived self-
efficacy. Social
support raises perceived efficacy which, in turn, is accompanied
by higher
282
BANDURA
academic achievement and greater satisfaction with one’s home
and school
life. At the elementary school level, maternal, paternal, teacher,
and peer
support all contribute to children’s perceived academic efficacy.
At the
middle and high school levels, teachers’ support fades from the
picture, the
contribution of maternal support declines and that of paternal
support
increases. That latter finding reflects the growing role of the
father as ado-
lescents prepare for their occupational development. Although
the relative
weights of the different enabling supportive influences change

with age,
perceived self-efficacy retains its mediating predictive value
throughout
the age span. Research by Cheung and Sun (2000) in Hong
Kong further
verifies the generalisability of the sociocognitive causal
structure at the adult
level in a markedly different adaptational domain. The
ameliorative effect
of social support on anxiety and depression is entirely mediated
through
enhancement of perceived self-efficacy.
Replicability of social cognitive determinants across both
individualistic
and collectivistic cultures is similarly verified in a markedly
different sphere
of functioning, namely the exercise of moral agency.
Psychological theories
of morality have traditionally focused heavily on the formal
character of
moral reasoning to the neglect of moral conduct. A complete
theory of moral
agency must link moral knowledge and reasoning to moral
conduct. This
requires an agentic theory of morality rather than one confined
mainly to
cognitions about morality. In the social cognitive theory of the
moral self
(Bandura, 1991, 1999) moral reasoning is linked to moral
conduct through
self-regulatory mechanisms by which moral agency is exercised.
It is one
thing to possess self-regulatory skills but another to stick with
them in the
face of compelling inducements to behave otherwise. A strong

sense of self-
regulatory efficacy provides the necessary restraining power.
In the development of a moral self, individuals construct
standards of
right and wrong that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct.
They regu-
late their actions by the consequences they apply to themselves.
They do
things that give them satisfaction and a sense of self-worth.
They refrain
from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards,
because such
conduct will bring self-condemnation. Moral standards do not
function as
fixed internal regulators of conduct, however. There are several
psycholo-
gical mechanisms by which moral self-sanctions can be
selectively disengaged
from inhumane conduct. Selective activation and disengagemen t
of self-
sanctions permit different types of conduct by persons with the
same moral
standards. The moral disengagement may center on the
cognitive restructur-
ing of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral
justification,
sanitising language and advantageous comparison; disavowal of
a sense of
personal agency for the harm caused by diffusion or
displacement of respons-
ibility; disregarding or minimising the injurious effects of one’s
actions; and
attributing blame to, and dehumanising those who are
victimised.

283
Children of weak self-regulatory efficacy and who are facile
moral dis-
engagers show high engagement in antisocial conduct regardless
of whether
they reside in an individualistically oriented or collectivistically
oriented cul-
ture (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996a;
Bandura, Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Kwak & Bandura,
1997). Facile
moral disengagement fosters aggressive conduct similarly in
these two types
of societies.
GROWING INTERCULTURAL COMMONALITIES THROUGH
GLOBALISATION AND PLURALISATION OF SOCIETIES
Cultures are no longer insular. Transnational interdependencies
and global

market forces are restructuring national economies and shaping
the political
and social life of societies (Keohane, 1993; Keohane & Nye,
1977). Because of
extensive global interconnectedness the actions of forces
operating remotely
now produce local effects. What happens economically and
politically in
one part of the world can affect the lives of vast populations
elsewhere.
Under the new realities of growing transnational influence,
nation states
seek to increase their controlling leverage by merging into
larger functional
units. For example, the nations of Western Europe formed the
European
Union to exercise greater control over their economic life.
Other nation
states will similarly be forced to merge into larger blocs;
otherwise, they will
have little bargaining power in transnational relations.
However, the regional
marriages do not come without a price. Paradoxically, to gain
international
control, nations have to negotiate reciprocal pacts that place
some constraints
on how they can conduct their national affairs and alter their
traditional
ways of life (Keohane, 1993). Imposed constraints generate
fragmenting
internal societal disputes between those who are adversely
affected by the
accords and those who benefit from them.
Some of the transnational market forces may erode or
undermine valued

cultural aspects of life when they are disregarded or considered
detractors
from profitability. Social bonds and common commitments that
lack market-
ability are especially vulnerable to erosion by market forces.
Telecommunications technologies also contribute to a new
collective
consciousness. Ideas, values, and styles of behavior are being
transmitted
transnationally at an unprecedented rate. Although these
symbolic environ-
ments feeding off communication satellites have not created a
transnational
culture, they are producing intercultural commonalities in
certain lifestyle
elements. Continued cultural cross-fertilisation may foster a
more extensive
globalisation of culture. The dawning of the electronic era in
this third
millennium underscores the growing role of electronic
acculturation in
people’s lives. With further development of the Internet world,
people will
be even more heavily embedded in global symbolic
environments.
284

BANDURA
People worldwide are becoming increasingly enmeshed in a
cyberworld
that transcends time, distance and place, and national borders.
By enabling
individuals to transcend their environment, these information
technologies
are placing a premium on the exercise of personal agency. For
example,
students can now exercise substantial personal control over
their own
learning. In the past, their educational development was
dependent on the
schools to which they were assigned. Students now have the
best libraries,
museums, and multimedia instruction at their fingertips through
the global
Internet for educating themselves independently of time and
place. Through
interactive electronic networking, people link together in
dispersed locales,
exchange information, share new ideas, and work
collaboratively on matters
of mutual interest (Robey, Khoo, & Powers, 2000). Worldwide
connectivity
is shrinking cross-cultural uniqueness.
In organisational life many activities are increasingly performed
by mem-
bers of virtual teams working together from scattered locations
in different

cultural milieus through computer-mediated transactions.
Working remotely
across time, space, and varied cultural orientations can be
taxing. Employees
with high perceived efficacy for remotely conducted
collaboration have more
positive work attitudes and achieve higher group job
performances than
those of low perceived efficacy (Staples, Hulland, & Higgins,
1998).
In addition, mass transnational migrations of people seeking a
better life,
ethnic intermarriages, and high global mobility of entertainers,
athletes,
journalists, academics, and employees of multinational
corporations with
more cosmopolitan orientations are changing cultural
landscapes. This
intermixing creates new hybrid cultural forms blending
elements from dif-
ferent ethnicities. Members of societies with enduring ties to
ethnic heritages
and homelands add further intracultural diversity. In short,
globalisation is
homogenising some aspects of life, polarising other aspects, and
fostering a
lot of cultural hybridisation (Holton, 2000). Growing ethnic
diversity accords
functional value to bicultural efficacy to navigate the demands
of both one’s
own ethnic subculture and that of the larger society. Efforts to
build a new life
elsewhere run up against untold stressors, especially when
migrations involve
radical changes in sociocultural customs and lifestyle patterns.

Migrants
who are assured of their coping efficacy feel challenged rather
than threatened
by the impediments to a new life (Jerusalem & Mittag, 1995).
Beliefs of per-
sonal efficacy enhance successful migratory adaptation.
These new realities call for broadening the scope of cross -
cultural analyses
beyond the focus on the social forces operating within the
boundaries of
given societies to the forces impinging upon them from abroad.
With growing
international embeddedness and interdependence of societies,
and enmesh-
ment in the Internet symbolic culture, the issues of interest
center on how
national and global forces interact to shape the nature of
cultural life.
Although globalisation is changing the power relations of nation
states, it
285

has not rendered them irrelevant (Lie, 1996). Transnational
systems still
have to operate through national institutional frameworks,
human resources,
and operational infrastructures. It is not as though there is little
or nothing
nations can do about transnational forces. As globalisation
reaches ever
deeper into people’s lives, a strong sense of collective efficacy
to make trans-
national systems work for them becomes critical to furthering
their common
interests and welfare.
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