Presentation by Russell Pittman, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, at a RIA workshop for the transport infrastructure regulator of Peru (OSITRAN) which took place in Lima 20-22 February 2017. Further information is available at www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/
Finance strategies for adaptation. Presentation for CANCC
Definition of the problem and public policy objective
1. Russell Pittman
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Training Workshop on Regulatory Impact
Assessments
OECD and OSITRAN
Lima, Perú
20-22 February, 2017
The views expressed are not purported to reflect the views of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
Session 4: Definition of the
problem and public policy objective
2. Important to define the problem
or objective, clearly and carefully
In US, OMB (White House Office of Management
and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs), “Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer”
An RIA “should include ... a statement of the need
for regulatory action.”
Is this a “natural monopoly” sector?
Is this a sector with significant “externalities”,
positive or negative?
Are there policy goals that an unregulated market is
not meeting?
For example, “improving government processes, protecting
privacy, or combating discrimination”
2 Pittman on Compliance Strategies
3. Important to evaluate proposed government
“answer” to problem, including possible
alternative answers
An RIA “should include ... a clear identification of a range of
regulatory approaches” – that is, what are alternative strategies?
State/local regulation
Antitrust enforcement
Other litigation, for example privately brought product liability
claims
Voluntary actions by private sector, perhaps supported by
information-disclosure requirements (e.g. auto fuel efficiency
standards, appliance efficiency standards)
An RIA “should include ... an estimate of the benefits and costs –
both quantitative and qualitative – of the proposed regulatory
action and its alternatives”
Quantification and/or monetization where possible
But non-quantifiable goals may be included: The analysis of
these alternatives may also consider, where relevant and
appropriate, values such as equity, human dignity, fairness,
potential distributive impacts, provacy, and personal freedom.”
3 Pittman on Compliance Strategies
4. Some broader issues to keep in
mind
Most fundamentally, are Regulatory Impact
Analysis and Cost/Benefit Analysis:
a) a tool for objective policy analysis and evaluation,
useful for the public and their representatives to rein
in over-zealous regulators?, or
b) a tool for corporate and monied interests to delay
and block important regulatory restraints that they
dislike?
Answer: YES.
Pittman on Compliance Strategies4
5. A (brief) case example from the US
Pittman on Compliance Strategies5
“Positive train control” mandated by Congress in
2008 in response to fatal train accidents
Rail industry fought unsuccessfully, though
succeeded in delaying deadline
Industry:
6. Recommended Reading
Pittman on Compliance Strategies6
OMB Circular A-4
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/omb-circular-no-4
“Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer”
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/i
nforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-
primer.pdf
Art Fraas and Randall Lutter, “The Challenges of
Improving the Economic Analysis of Pending Regulations”,
Annual Review of Resource Economics 3 (2011), 71-85
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-
resource-083110-120042 (published version, paid access)
http://www.rff.org/research/publications/challenges-improving-
economic-analysis-pending-regulations (working paper
version, free)