This presentation by the OECD secretariat was made during the discussion “The Future of Effective Leniency Programmes: Advancing detection and deterrence” held at the 137th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement on 13 June 2023. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/felp.

1. The future of effective
leniency programmes
Gaetano Lapenta
OECD Competition Division
Working Party No. 3
13 June 2023
Advancing detection and deterrence of cartels

2. Research questions
2
Effectiveness of leniency programmes and
recent trends
Reasons behind the trends
Complementary detection tools
1
2
3

3. OECD jurisdictions with leniency programme
(1978- 2021)
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45

4. Total number of leniency applications, by region
(2015 – 2021)
4
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
All jurisdictions Non-OECD OECD Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East and Africa
Total
leniency
applications

5. OECD jurisdictions according to number of
applications
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Zero Less than 50 Between 50 and 100 More than 100
Number of OECD jurisdictions
Number of leniency applications

6. Is the decline a threat to cartel enforcement?
• Caveat
1. Quality of application also matters
2. Deterrence effects on cartels?
• BUT some jurisdictions have heavily relied on leniency
applicants, also when looking at long period
• OECD survey (2017)
– Majority considers leniency programme the most effective
detection tool
– 57% considered leniency programme as “very effective”
– 7% found it “effective”
6

7. Examples of possible
reasons behind the trends

8. The impact of time and the risk of overreliance
on leniency
8
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Number of
Leniency Applications
Age Leniency Programme

9. The impact of private enforcement
9
Top-20 jurisdictions (in terms of leniency applications) that recently introduced private damages (all EU).

10. Additional potential reasons
10
Criminal sanctions
Costs from
administrative burden
Growing cartel
complexity and the
predictability of the
leniency process
Settlement
procedures
Multi-jurisdictional
investigations and
the risks of
uncoordinated
leniency programmes
Risk of investigations
in other enforcement
fields (anti-
corruption,
procurement)

11. The future of detection: beyond leniency
programmes
11
Cartel
detection
Reactive
methods
Complaints
Competitor
Customer
Agency
Employee
External
information
Whistleblowers
Informants
Leniency
applications
Proactive
methods
Use of
economics
Collusion
factors
Industry
studies
Market
screening
Case analysis
Cartel cases
Other cases
Industry
monitoring
Infiltration
Tracking
individuals
Press and
internet
Industry
representatives
Technology-led
screens
Structural
screens
Behavioural
screens
Agency co-
operation
Competition
authorities
Other agencies