With the influence of 75,000 troops in-country, the United States had -- and, sadly, missed -- an opportunity of integrating the rule-of-law into Iraqi Society by giving the Sunni minority a permanent stake in a society on-the-mend. Integrating those who had participated in the Sunni Awakening -- including the unsavoury members in support positions -- was practical and inexpensive. This slide-share ought to viewed in conjunction with these parting thoughts to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTCI). All conents in both documents was and is public and unclassified. https://lnkd.in/bpWPCvD

1. The Sons of Iraq:
Opportunity or Opposition
Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA
Saturday, April 25, 2009
“Those willing to stand and fight
ought to be allowed to read and
write.”
--BRIG. Bryan Watters, 2005.

2. CG’s SUMMARY
The Sons of Iraq (SoIs) were funded for two years by the Coalition Forces (CF),
primarily the United States Government (USG). In October 2008, the Government
of Iraq (GoI) committed to integrating the 100,000 or more SoIs into the Ministry of
Interior (MoI) or other national agencies. Thus far, progress toward that end
remains slow. The slipping away of these local guardians portends the type of
violence witnessed during the past two days.
With a carefully executed strategic communications policy and seed money equal to
roughly half a day’s cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CF can compel the MoI to
integrate these SoIs as active duty community police officers and support
personnel.
The resources available to the GoI easily permit this program. The social costs
imposed by a likely return to short-term secular conflict and the costs imposed by a
renewed insurgency – one similar to that which followed the liquidation of the Iraqi
Army. These costs, conservatively estimated would run at least 15-17x the cost of
integrating the SoIs.
This presentation lays out a strategy, its implementation and its economic
justification to catalyze the one critical element missing here: the will of the GoI to
protect all of its citizens.

3. Summary of U.S. Policy toward
Iraq
From the Department of State web-site:
“The focus of United States policy in Iraq remains on
helping the Iraqi people build a constitutional,
representative government that respects the rights of all
Iraqis and has security forces capable of maintaining
order and preventing the country from becoming a safe
haven for terrorists and foreign fighters. The ultimate goal
is an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and
secure, with institutions capable of providing just
governance and security for all Iraqis and is an ally in the
war against terrorism….”

4. The Fragile State of 2009
This briefing proposes one scenario aimed at harnessing
the Sons of Iraq to progress toward the security that U.S.
policy toward Iraq identifies as critical to that country’s full
maturation into democracy. By 2011, Coalition Forces
(CF) will have substantially drawn down their presence.
Hurdles confront the CF as we conclude Operation Iraqi
Freedom:
•sectarian tensions between violent Sunnis and Shi’ites;
•escalating ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs;
•a recent up-tick in violence with 150+ religious innocents
murdered in two suicide-bombings over the last two days;
and,
•Increasing trend of oppression rising against women.

5. Value-Based Proposition:
The Sons of Iraq (SoIs) can be recruited either as Agents of
Progress or Disenfranchised Extremists, depending upon
decisions taken by the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
RATIONALE
1. The SoIs are armed and battle-ready.
2. The SoIs, like members of the Republican guard once
dissolved, will be alienated from an already fragile democracy.
3. The SoIs, if absorbed and paid properly, are drawn from their
communities to provide effective neighbourhood policing.
4. The ability of Sunnis to defend themselves, through the SoIs,
strengthens moderates on both sides of the sectarian divide in
their desire to avoid mutually assured depredations.
5. The SoIs have succeeded in eradicating much of the cross-
border infiltration of non-state terrorists (e.g., Al Qa’eda).

6. Opportunity Costs of Not Harnessing the SoIs
What IF…a minority of or no SoIs are integrated into
the MoI?
The GoI saves $300-500 million annually. The burdens of the following
social costs – in terms of dinars and quality of life – will be have to be tallied by
the GoI and endured by Iraqis.
1.possible rate of 15,000 to 30,000 sectarian murders per year and 100,000+
injuries;
2.little likelihood of SoIs integrated into MoI arresting neighbours and tribal
members not integrated into the MoI and re-joining local AIF;
3.costs of 25% or more of GDP associated with ISF combatting and
prosecuting such crimes as well as medical costs for the injured;
4.lost commerce and tourism of up to $5 billion per annum;
5.forgone foreign direct investment of up to $20 billion (2008 vs 2007); and,
6.Annual costs of sustaining an enlarged police force of $3-4 billion.
Should the program be initiated but abandoned at a later date, the above
itemised costs will be lower but still outweigh savings by at least 5x to 10x.

7. Strategy & Implementation Overview
of Value-Based Proposition
(per frame-work proposed to MG Walid)
GOAL = End State of three safeties: safe neighbourhoods; safe
community policing; and, safe markets.
OBJECTIVE = Milestones: education & literacy; employment of
all Sons of Iraq (SoIs); and, sustained provisioning of police.
TASKS = Roles assigned within community to grow toward end-
state of security through trained and equipped force levels.
ACTIVITIES = specific actions assigned to specific roles / tasks
to accomplish the milestones required for civil end-state

8. ASSUMPTIONS:
1. 125,000 SoIs enrolled under U.S.-sponsored program to be absorbed by the
Ministry of Interior (MoI);
2. 25,000 SoIs currently placed but not on payroll of MoI;
3. MoI commitment to take in 25,000 additional SoIs;
4. current salaries paid to the 50,000 SoIs to be absorbed = NIL;
5. estimated 1st-year payroll of $375 million for all SoIs (i.e., $250 per month);
6. many SoIs recruited from anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) with recidivism likely;
7. SoIs recruited from local populations and known to residents;
8. half of SoIs of questionable literacy and, therefore, unqualified for MoI;
9. SoIs untrained in specialised labour (e.g., auto mechanics or construction);
10. cost-per-SoI of literacy education = $325;
11. cost-per-SoI of training for plant-&-equipment maintenance = $1,000; and,
12. former J-TERP training program permanently cancelled by the Government of
Iraq (GoI) over reservations of the U.S. government (USG).

9. From SoI to Community Police
125,000
Sons of Iraq
Ministry of Interior
hiring & 16 weeks
of training
50,000 local police /
first responders
MoI Human
Resources
and local
nominating
committees
Court of
Cassation OR
Iraqi Criminal
Justice System
Return to
Communities, trained
for operations &
maintenance
CRISIS
SITUATION
FIRST Responders, with
Emergency Response Unit (ERU)
and / or National Police (NP)
Contractors to MoI; back-up
responders until ERU / NP arrives
Top 40% hired by MoI
felony convictions;
no amnesty from GoI
Others train for O&M
contract work with MoI;
four weeks of contingency
response training

10. Strategy Analysis: GOAL
The GOAL remains an IRAQ secure for all citizens, Sunni or
Shi’ite and Arab or Kurd. This GOAL entails an end-state of:
1.democratic policing under which each citizen can reasonably
trust the police in the area to be mindful of his or her rights;
2.community policing under which the citizens and the local
“neighbourhood cops” work together to re-establish order;
3.accountable policing answerable to the citizenry and to the
MoI;
4.visible policing to assure safety of access to markets by
suppliers and consumers; and,
5.publicly engaged policing to empower citizens to restore and to
take pride in their neighbourhoods.

11. Strategy Analysis: OBJECTIVES
To sustain security, certain OBJECTIVES, defined by clearly identified
milestones, must be achieved:
1.immediate short-term training for the 50,000 SoIs identified by the
MoI for integration;
2.clarification of training and educational needs of the SoIs not
scheduled for immediate integration;
3.funding authority sought and obtained by MoI to hire outside
contractors for augmentation of logistics;
4.needs assessment completed for training resources required for
transition of SoIs into the police force or as contractors; and,
5.quality control by local citizenry of community policing implementation
and sustainment.

12. Strategy Analysis: TASKS
The following TASKS specify key means to attain the intermediate ends
(i.e., objectives) required for an Iraq unthreatened by AIF:
1.16-week police training for 50,000 SoIs to remain near their family
centres-of-gravity;
2.training in specialty maintenance and construction skills focussed on
the needs of the home territory of the 75,000 SoIs not transitioning
immediately to the MoI;
3.use of these trained mechanics, electricians and construction
specialists as contractors to the MoI;
4.provision of equipment for contractors provided through MoI;
5.training to guarantee minimum level of literacy for SoIs not
immediately transitioning to the MoI; and,
6.swearing in by Minister of 75,000 SoIs not transitioning as civilian
reserve police in their communities.

13. Strategy Analysis: ACTIVITIES
Aside from class-room training, other activities ought to occur to usher
in the community police-&-support programme:
1.village and neighbourhood citizen committees to assess and
nominate the allocated number of police officers from area SoIs;
2.MoI human resources to amass bio-metric / biographic data on all
SoIs joining the GoI at Ministry of Defence Centres;
3.SoIs identified as violent criminals referred to justice system;
4.SoIs tested as illiterate slotted into separate education programme;
5.facilitation of immediate transition of 50,000 SoIs into MoI per
October 2008 commitment;
6.identify teachers, trainers and resources for specific sustainment
contracts for the MoI and literacy;
7.begin contractors’ relationship with MoI with full pay for three days’
work each week; and,
8.balance of work-week in continuing education in democratic policing
or in literacy training to qualify all SoIs for MoI

14. Strategy Analysis: RESOURCES
Proposed requirements include, but are not limited to:
1.$375 million for the 1st year salaries (maximum);
2.$285 million for 1st year salaries more likely;
3.$75 million for technical training;
4.$30 million for literacy and police training; and, therefore,
5.total first year costs of $390-480 million.
High requirements in a year during which budget reduced by 25% and
GDP likely to contract materially. Resources available include:
•$32 billion of net liquid reserves from recent budget surpluses in bank
deposits or USG-issued T-bills;
•$5 billion of Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) deposits in Federal Reserve
Bank of New York;
•$3.6 billion of unobligated funds for ISFF;
•up to $1 billion of Economic Support Fund (ESF) unspent; and,
•up to $200 million of State Department funding.

15. Strategy Analysis:
CONSTRAINTS
Beyond the fiscal strain imposed by resource requirements upon
a commodity-dependent economy suffering from material pricing
contraction, institutional constraints confront the proposed
programme:
1.sectarian tensions with a Shia-dominated government and
predominantly Sunni-affiliated SoIs;
2.partisan control of MoI human and material resources
restricting intended flow of resources;
3.failure of the former jobs-training program intended primarily
for SoIs due to transfer of irrelevant skills; and,
4.too few SoIs to be integrated for adequate policing.

16. Overview of Funding
Payment of
Instructors for O&M,
Literacy and Civil
Defence
$1MM
CSP
grant
SoI Transition
Assistance:
Pilot
Programme
SoI Transition
Assistance:
Full
Implementation
Renovation of
Education Facility
Technical O&M
Training for 75,000
non-MoI
Lessons
learned
$25,000
QRF
grant
Training of 50,000
MoI employees
Lower of
20% or
$100MM
seed funds
from ESF
and ISFF
Up to
$100MM
Up to
$50MM
1st year compen-
sation for police &
contractors
Up to
$400MM

17. Outline for Immediate Tasks:
1. re-establish credibility of jobs-training with focus on skills
immediately usable by SoIs as contractors to MoI;
2. creation of Literacy-First program to make all non-criminal SoI s
eligible for eventual integration; and,
3. secure allegiance of all SoIs to rule-of-law in Iraq and deputise
contractors as reserve corps to join other local police as first
responders in times of emergency or disorder.
Activities for Immediate Tasks:
• $25,000 State Department Quick Response Funds funding to
renovate local education centres;
• up to $1 million of USAID / Community Stabilization Program (CSP)
and ESF funding to train or educate SoIs in Al Ala’am (Salah ad
Din);
• upon success of pilot programme, roll-out of national programme
with first 10-25% from ISFF and ESF funding and the balance from
the Development Fund for Iraq, if permissible.

18. Next-Step Funding Strategy—
Supporting BRIG. Marriner
PRT
Team
LeadDoIA /
MoI-TT
MoI-TT
DEPT of State:
QRF Program
Provincial Recon-
struction Team
USAID:
Community
Stabilization
Program
USAID Mission;
U.S. Embassy
DiFD Mission;
U.K. Embassy
U.K.
Embassy
DoIA /
MoI-TT MoI-TT
DiFD USAID
Province
Rep.
$25,000
$1 million
intervention,
if necessary
MNSTC-I
intervention,
if necessary

19. First Year Funding Strategy:
Supporting BRIG. Marriner
Bureau of
International
Narcotic & Legal
Enforcement
DoIA /
MoI-TT
DoIA /
MoI-TT
MNSTC-I
U.S. Embassy
MNF-I
Lesser of $100
million or 20%
DoIA & SR
Civilians
Global
Strategic
Communi-
cations
Campaign
to exert
pressure
on MoI
intervention,
if necessary
DoIA and MNSTC-I
Officers / SR Civilians
intervention,
if necessary
Iraqi Security
Forces Fund

20. Comparative Contribution
Analysis
(assumes $500 million of first year costs to cover overages)
1. $25,000 QRF micro-grant equal to 2% of unobligated
PRT funds
2. $1 million USAID / CSP grant equal to 1% of
unexpended amounts
3. $100 million seed invt in first year compensation equal
to3% of unobligated ISFF funds
4. $100 million seed invt equal to 30% of unobligated
ESF funds or 7% of unspent funds
20% contribution
1. $400 million GoI investment toward the inte-gration of
SoIs equal to 1% of DFI reserves
2. $400 million GoI invt equal to 1% of GDP
3. $400 million invt equal to 8% of CBI deposits
4. $400 million invt equal to 3 days of oil production
5. $400 million equal to 7% of 2008 MoI budget
80% contribution

21. References
• http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm
• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:nneOwDLzX4gJ:www.afcee.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070724-
036.pdf+Iraq+construction+OR+electrician+OR+mechanic+%22training+cost%22&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk SEE
PAGE 19.
• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:joJ-LOYMg8J:unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001586/
158646e.pdf+Iraq+2008+construction+OR+electrician+OR+mechanic+%22cost+per+trainee%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct
=clnk SEE PAGE 5.
• http://www.fdi.net/bmi/bmidisplay.cfm?filename=MMEG_20081106_216192_xml.html
• http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/etp43.pdf SEE PAGE 32
• Letter from Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA to President George W. Bush dated June 2006.
• http://www.ajc.com/business/content/printedition/2009/03/21/iraq0321.html?cxntlid=inform_sr
• http://www.sigir.mil/reports/QuarterlyReports/Oct08/pdf/Report_-_October_2008.pdf SEE PAGEs 5 / 7 / 23
• http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan09/pdf/Report_-_January_2009_LoRes.pdf SEE PAGEs 28 / 35 /
79 / 92
• https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html SEE PAGE on Iraq
• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:eQgAfiAkD7IJ:www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2008/irq/112908.pdf+2009+CBI
+cash+OR+bills+OR+reserves+%22Government+of+Iraq%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk SEE PAGE 5
• http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/r041309a.pdf SEE SLIDE 18
• http://www.cfr.org/publication/16908/stabilizing_and_rebuilding_iraq.html
• http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090423/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iraq_death_toll
• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:Pi2XeBMYF9EJ:www.prio.no/projects/a25cost/COST0308_Brussels/Hall_E
CONOMIC%2520IMPACTS%2520OF%2520ARMED%2520VIOLENCE.ppt+gdp+2008+iraq+OR+iraqi+%22dispo
sable+income%22+-US+-US&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk
• http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/international_statistics.html EEE TABLEs 1314 and 1356
• http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/2716/Investment_soars_in_Iraq.html
• Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA; baseline police manning study 2005.