1. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CITY OF OAKS GROVE,
Petitioner,
-against-
RHETT DARCY,
Respondent,
No. 11-5309
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
L.M. Student 9722, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
123 Connecticut Avenue NW
Suite 45
Washington, DC 20123
(201) 555-1234

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................................iii
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED.......................................................................... 1
STATUTE INVOLVED ................................................................................................................. 1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1
QUESTION PRESENTED............................................................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................................... 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 5
I. SWORN TESTIMONY BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE IS PROTECTED
FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE
ALLOWING FOR ITS PROTECTION WOULD NOT UNDERMINE
CURRENT LAW AND WOULD PRESERVE ITS LONGSTANDING
IMPORTANCE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE............................................................................................................. 7
A. Distinguishing sworn testimony as protected free speech does not
interfere with prior holdings that protect speech made by a public
employee that is of public concern. ........................................................................ 8
B. American jurisprudence is fundamentally based on the well-
established duty of every citizen to testify when compelled to do
so............................................................................................................................. 9
II. IN THE PRESENT CASE, MR. DARCY’S SWORN TESTIMONY
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PROTECTED FREE SPEECH UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL
SHOULD BE UPHELD ALLOWING FOR MR. DARCY’S § 1983
CLAIM TO GO FORWARD............................................................................................ 10
A. The proposed alternative remedies for Mr. Darcy do not afford
consistent or effective relief.................................................................................. 11
B. Upholding the Thirteenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the
present case promotes the ideals fundamental to our system of
jurisprudence......................................................................................................... 11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).................................................................. 5, 7, 10
Blair v. United States 250 U.S. 273 (1919). ......................................................................... 5, 7, 12
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)........................................................................................ 12
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). ............................................................................. 10
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)..................................................................................... 4, 5
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)............................................................................. passim
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011). ........................................................................ 7, 10
Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2012)............................................ 7, 9
Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007). ........................................................................ 7, 8
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty. 391 U.S. 563 (1968)............. 4
Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). ................................................................................... 12
Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008)...................................................... 7, 9
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russel, 499 U.S. 225 (1991)........................................................................ 7
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977)........................................ 5, 7, 10
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). .......................................................................... 5, 10
STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006)................................................................................................................. 11
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006)............................................................................................................... 1
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)................................................................................................... 1, 2, 7, 12
Cal. Gov’t. Code § 8547 (2005).................................................................................................... 11

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MISCELLANEOUS
Adelaida Jasperse, Constitutional Law—Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: A Public
Employee’s Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 623 (2011)... 6
Caroline A. Flynn, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue Exception to Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 759, (2013).................................................................................... 6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................... 2
Leslie Pope, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of Police Officer’s Subpoenaed
Testimony After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 Yale L.J. 2143, (2010). ........................................... 7
Matt Wolfe, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1473, (2010)........................................................................................................................ 6
Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory
Protection for Public Employees, 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 22, (2010). ................................. 6, 12

5. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. Const. amend I.
STATUTE INVOLVED
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On January 5, 2010, Rhett Darcy filed a complaint against the City of Oaks Grove in
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alagada alleging employment
discrimination under the Americans for Disabilities Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006)
alleging that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. (R. at 11.)
Mr. Darcy filed a complaint against the City of Oaks Grove pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)
alleging that the defendant retaliated against him for his sworn testimony before a grand jury,
constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
thereby depriving him of rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States. (R.
at 12.) This brief focuses exclusively on the second issue; the first issue is addressed in a
separate brief submitted for respondent.
On May 17, 2010, defendant filed a motion for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Procedure 12(b)(6) because Mr. Darcy’s sworn testimony before a grand jury is not protected

6. 2
under the First Amendment as it was made pursuant to his official job duties as a police officer.
The district court held that Mr. Darcy’s sworn testimony was not protected under the First
Amendment, and thus provided no basis for his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) and
granted defendant’s motion for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (R. at 17.)
Mr. Darcy appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Thirteenth Circuit. (R. at 19.) The Thirteenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order
granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings , holding
that sworn testimony was protected free speech regardless of whether the speech at issue was
made pursuant to an employee’s official job duties. (R. at 21.) The City of Oaks Grove then
petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. This Court granted the
Defendant’s petition on October 5, 2012. (R. at 23.)
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the sworn testimony of a public employee is protected free speech under the
First Amendment when the sworn testimony, compelled by a judicially enforced subpoena, is
made pursuant to his job duties as a member of an investigative task force into police department
corruption.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rhett Darcy, veteran of the United States Marine Corps, was a decorated police officer
for the City of Oaks Grove for over twenty years, ending his distinguished career with the rank
of Sergeant. (R. at 3-4.) During his tenure as an officer of the law, Mr. Darcy distinguished
himself on several occasions. In 2004, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his
off-duty assistance in the pursuit and capture of two men charged with multiple assaults on
college-age women.. His integrity and performance as a public servant reached its nadir in 2007

7. 3
when the Alagada Bureau of Investigation (“ABI”) chose Mr. Darcy to participate in a special
task force created in response to concerns about internal corruption within the Oaks Grove Police
Department related to the criminal activities of the Unknown Vice Lords (“UVL”) gang. The
task force was primarily created due to an unusual decrease in closed cases relating to the UVL
and an anonymous tip that asserted certain Oaks Grove Police Department officers were
accepting bribes to effectuate the UVL’s avoidance of prosecution for various drug-related and
violent offenses. (R. at 4.) Darcy was tasked with monitoring specific police employees
suspected of wrongdoing and implicated five police officers for accepting bribes and informing
UVL members of pending search warrants.. (R. at 5).
In December 2008, a grand jury was convened to investigate the allegations of corruption
in the Oaks Grove Police Department. Mr. Darcy was subpoenaed and subsequently testified at
length to the grand jury regarding his work with the ABI task force and its findings. In the same
testimony, Mr. Darcy indicated his delivery of the results of the investigation to Chief Collins
and Collins’ apparent failure to report these allegations to Oaks Grove Police Department
Internal Affairs—an act contravening department policy. (R. at 8-9). One day subsequent to his
sworn testimony, Darcy was approached by Chief Collins and questioned about his testimony,
with Darcy only stating that he “told the truth”. Some three weeks later, Darcy overheard a
conversation between Chief Collins and another Oaks Grove police officer. Chief Collins
disparaged Darcy’s role in the ABI task force and expressed disbelief in any officer testifying
“against the department.” (R. at 9).
In February 2009, Mr. Darcy was served with three written disciplinary warnings. The
first two alleged his inability to follow proper police procedure on the night he sustained his
career changing injury. The third related to Darcy’s alleged failure to timely submit paperwork

8. 4
relating to a domestic violence call from earlier in the month. To this point in his career, Mr.
Darcy had a flawless service record. (R. at 10). Pursuant to Oaks Grove Police Department
policy, Mr. Darcy was dismissed from his position with no chance to appeal the decision. It is
his belief that these warnings were simply a pretext for his dismissal. Mr. Darcy believed his
termination was retaliation for his grand jury testimony and contends that his freedom of speech
under the United States Constitution was violated, prompting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action
against the City of Oaks Grove.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
We ask this Court to distinguish sworn testimony made by a public employee pursuant to
his job duties as protected free speech and allow for Mr. Darcy’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to go forward. Public employees do not relinquish their rights and duties that they hold as
ordinary citizens; however, the context of public employment allows situations which the
employee’s rights and duties are balanced against the needs of the government as an employer.
This Court’s most recent interpretation of this issue created a standard by which a public
employee, speaking pursuant to his official job duties loses First Amendment protection.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). If this threshold test determines that the public
employee is not speaking pursuant to his job duties, a test balancing the public’s interest and
concern in the speech at issue with the employer’s interest in maintaining the efficiency of
services provided via its employees. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); see also
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In
addition, by distinguishing sworn testimony as protected free speech, this Court would maintain
its longstanding deference to the sacred place that sworn testimony occupies within our system
of jurisprudence and the assertion that it is the duty of every citizen to provide it when properly

9. 5
compelled to do so. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175 (1977);
see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); see also Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); see also Blair v. United States 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
Allowing sworn testimony to be protected free speech would allow for Mr. Darcy’s §
1983 claim to go forward and would prevent an injustice. The City of Oaks Grove maintains that
other remedies are available for Mr. Darcy to seek relief from the court. They maintain that
current whistleblowing statutes and employee protection statutes better serve Mr. Darcy in his
cause of action. Without exception, the statutes in question are either inadequate to the task or
wholly inappropriate for a litigant in Mr. Darcy’s position. In seeking to undermine Mr. Darcy’s
free speech claim, the City of Oaks Grove undermines an ideal fundamental to American
jurisprudence—sworn testimony used as a means to achieving justice.
ARGUMENT
The Thirteenth Circuit’s holding that sworn testimony may be protected under the First
Amendment when given pursuant to a public employee’s job duties should be upheld by this
Court. By applying the threshold test established in Garcetti ad infinitum, far too much speech is
affected. The specialized context of sworn testimony is not directly addressed and should be
distinguished from the Garcetti blanket inclusion of all statements made pursuant to official job
duties. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
In distinguishing sworn testimony, this Court would not interfere with the continued
application of the test set forth in Connick, as it evolved from the holding in Pickering. The
public interest in allowing for sworn testimony given by a public employee unfettered from
concern for retaliation is plainly without question. The need for efficiency in the day-to-day
operation of a public employer’s working environment is not compromised by this distinction

10. 6
given to sworn testimony. Scholarly commentary has emphasized the need for this distinction
and the dilemma that its current absence has created in the courts. See Caroline A. Flynn,
Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue Exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 Mich.
L. Rev. 759, (2013) (employee speech that is analogous to protected speech made as a citizen
should be protected as well); Adelaida Jasperse, Constitutional Law—Damned If You Do,
Damned If You Don’t: A Public Employee’s Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W.
New Eng. L. Rev. 623 (2011) (arguing that truthful testimony, properly compelled, deserves
First Amendment protection when given as a function of a public employee’s job duties); see
also Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory
Protection for Public Employees, 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 22, (2010) (taking constitutional rights
away from public employees in the performance of their job duties does not allow for effective
whistleblowing protections); see also Matt Wolfe, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony
by Public Employees?, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1473, (2010) (concluding that the legal duty of
providing testimony when compelled is paramount and should be protected under the First
Amendment regardless of whether it is a public employee’s job duty); see also Leslie Pope,
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of Police Officer’s Subpoenaed Testimony
After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 Yale L.J. 2143, (2010) (sworn testimony should be eligible for
First Amendment protection under Garcetti).
Recent decisions in courts below have also emphasized this distinction, holding that
sworn testimony by a public employee pursuant to his job duties is protected free speech under
the First Amendment. This Court, in creating a rationale for this distinction, need only follow
the lead of its courts below. See Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.
2012); see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Reilly v. City of Atlantic

11. 7
City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007). As
the present case presents a question of first impression regarding constitutional law, a de novo
standard of review is applicable. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russel, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
In the case at bar, allowing for sworn testimony by a public employee pursuant to his job
duties would grant relief for Mr. Darcy’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) and
provides the only effective means to seek that relief. Contrary to the position of the Petitioner,
there are no effective whistleblowing statutes or other statutory means for Mr. Darcy’s use.
Also, in the present case, strict application of the Garcetti threshold test would deprive
Mr. Darcy of his constitutionally protected right to free speech and abrogate his paramount
duties as a citizen to duly offer sworn testimony when compelled to do so, an integral part of the
judicial process in the United States. This duty as a citizen regarding sworn testimony is long
established by this Court as being a fundamental duty and obligation, with precedent reaching
back for almost a century. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977);
see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); see also Blair v. United States 250
U.S. 273 (1919).
As the Garcetti threshold is not applicable in situations regarding sworn testimony made
by a public employee despite said testimony being pursuant to his official job duties and the duty
to enter sworn testimony when compelled is an obligation of every citizen, regardless of whom
they are employed by, this Court must uphold the decision of the Thirteenth Circuit
I. SWORN TESTIMONY BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE IS PROTECTED FREE
SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE ALLOWING FOR
ITS PROTECTION WOULD NOT UNDERMINE CURRENT LAW AND
WOULD PRESERVE ITS LONGSTANDING IMPORTANCE TO THE
FUNCTIONING OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE.
The decision in Garcetti created a broad rule that left a great deal of confusion regarding
the application of the threshold test. Many courts below struggled with what this Court meant by

12. 8
job duties and how that applied in certain situations. Most prominently, the role of sworn
testimony as a function of employment has caused a division among the Courts of Appeal. The
rule in Garcetti should be narrowed and an exception made for sworn testimony that is given by
a public employee pursuant to his job duties, thereby giving the public employee the free speech
protection enjoyed by all citizens of the United States regardless of their employment.
A. Distinguishing sworn testimony as protected free speech does not interfere
with prior holdings that protect speech made by a public employee that is
of public concern.
Recent decisions from courts below indicate a general confusion about the nature of the
Garcetti threshold and its application. The trend in a portion of the federal circuits is to narrowly
tailor the holding and find that sworn testimony given by a public employee pursuant to his job
duties is protected free speech. In doing so, the tripartrate test in Garcetti is maintained as good
law, as the balancing test between an issue of public concern and managerial efficiency leans
heavily towards sworn testimony being of utmost public concern.
Shortly after the decision in Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a
case involving the nature of a police officer’s subpoenaed testimony in a civil deposition during
the course of his job duties. In Morales v. Jones, the Court of Appeals found that such testimony
was not pursuant to his official duties as “it was not part of what he was employed to do.” 494
F.3d 590, 598 (2007).
One year later, a decision by the Third Circuit held that a police officer’s testimony
constituted citizen speech protected by the First Amendment as a matter of law. Reilly v. City of
Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008). In facts that are highly similar to the present case, an
Atlantic City, New Jersey police detective was part of an undercover investigation regarding
corruption within his department. Several years after the trial and his subsequent testimony at
the criminal trial of a fellow officer, Reilly alleged retaliatory actions by the department that

13. 9
forced him into an early retirement and filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Reilly court
did not directly address the official duties test from Garcetti, arguing that it did not specifically
address sworn testimony and affirming the “settled principle” that every citizen owes the duty of
testimony when so compelled. Id. at 231. When Reilly gave testimony, he did so as a citizen
first and as a police officer second. Id.
A police department employee was recently held to be a private citizen when testifying in
response to a subpoena that issued from a federal civil rights suit against her employer. Karl v.
City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2012). Karl alleged that subsequent job
demotions and her termination related directly to her testimony and filed suit claiming retaliation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The court held that her subpoenaed testimony on matters related
to her job was not dispositive and the testimony “cannot fairly be characterized as “created or
commissioned” by [her employer]. Id. at 1072, quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. The court
went further and stated that Garcetti did not in any way alter the plaintiff’s First Amendment
right to give sworn testimony, as she was acting in her role foremost as a private citizen. Karl,
678 F.3d at 1074.
B. American jurisprudence is fundamentally based on the well-established
duty of every citizen to testify when compelled to do so.
It has long been recognized by this Court that this duty is fundamental part of our
adversarial system. “[The] conviction that private citizens have a duty to provide assistance to
law enforcement officials when it is required is by no means foreign to our traditions.” United
States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175 n 24 (1977). Reaching further back in
time, the Court reiterated the import of testimony. “It is . . . beyond controversy that one of the
duties which the citizen owes his government is to support the administration of justice by
attending its courts and giving his testimony . . .”. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438

14. 10
(1932). No citizen is exempt from this duty, the President of the United States included. Nixon
418 U.S. at 709. Mr. Darcy fulfilled two duties by giving testimony before a grand jury: as an
officer of the law, he performed his employee-mandated responsibility and, most importantly, he
satisfied his responsibility as a citizen to ensure the sanctity of our system of jurisprudence.
Accordingly, his speech is constitutionally protected citizen free speech. Jackler v. Byrne, 658
F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2011).
Similarly, the Court has stated that citizens who work for the government should not be
deprived of their fundamental rights. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 621 (1973) (J. Douglas, dissenting). (“Those who work for government have no
watered-down constitutional rights . . . I would keep them on the same plane as all other
people.”) The right to freedom of speech is one the United States’ most cherished liberties and is
only with great trepidation that it has been limited. The public interest is best served when
public employees can freely submit sworn testimony and know that the testimony they give is
duly protected under the First Amendment. Mr. Darcy should not be punished for exercising this
right in the course of his sworn testimony before a grand jury.
II. IN THE PRESENT CASE, MR. DARCY’S SWORN TESTIMONY SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED PROTECTED FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL SHOULD BE UPHELD ALLOWING
FOR MR. DARCY’S § 1983 CLAIM TO GO FORWARD.
Mr. Darcy presented grand jury testimony pursuant to a subpoena issued by the court. (R. at
8-9). This testimony reflected his involvement in an ongoing investigation into corruption within
the Oaks Grove Police Department by the Alagada Bureau of Investigation. His job duties as an
officer of the law were to execute the orders of his superior officers in the performance of the
investigation and to identify those police department employees responsible for the alleged
corruption. (R. at 7). As retaliation for his testimony, Mr. Darcy was terminated from his job, a

15. 11
job that he wishes to return to. Remedies offered up by the Petitioner do not provide relief for
Mr. Darcy’s cause of action. In addition, the testimony offered by Mr. Darcy is no different than
testimony that would be offered by an ordinary citizen in the execution of their civic duty to
appear before a grand jury when so summoned.
A. The proposed alternative remedies for Mr. Darcy do not afford consistent
or effective relief.
Petitioner argues that Darcy’s speech not be accorded First Amendment protection
because, in addressing official wrongdoing, he is eligible for protection under current
whistleblower statutes. Given that whistleblowing is defined as the “exposing [of] an official’s
fault to a third party or to the public,” Garcetti 547 U.S. at 440, (Souter, D., dissenting, emphasis
added), Darcy does not meet the criteria offered by Petitioner for relief. As Mr. Darcy was a
member of an undercover investigation to expose corruption within his police department, he
was unable to report these findings to any third party or a member of the public.
Justice Souter further indicates empirical studies in his dissent that show whistleblower
statutes to be patchy at best with little consistency in application and protection between
jurisdictions, with many providing no private right of action. Id. See Garcia, supra, at 35-38;
see e.g. Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006); see also California Whistleblower
Protection Act, Cal. Gov’t. Code § 8547 (2005). Darcy was subpoenaed and compelled to testify
before a grand jury and describe the findings of the ABI task force and the results of his
investigation within the Oaks Grove Police Department. He did not report these findings to a
third party or the public. Mr. Darcy presented testimony to a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena,
his duty as a citizen.
B. Upholding the Thirteenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the present
case promotes the ideals fundamental to our system of jurisprudence.

16. 12
The duty to testify before a grand jury is not limited to officers of the law or any other
employee of those public entities charged with the prosecution of law and order. This
responsibility is the duty of every citizen of the United States. Blair, 250 U.S. at 281. Public
employees are compelled to testify before a jury as citizens and not vice versa. The Court visited
this very question on two separate occasions and reached a concurrent conclusion in both
instances. In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 decision of thirty years ago, this Court opined that there is no
reason to distinguish law enforcement witnesses from lay witness and the police officer in
question may reasonably be viewed as acting like any other witness sworn to tell the truth. This
Court further found that nothing in the previously mentioned statute suggests that law
enforcement officials belong in a “narrow, special category.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
335-36 (1983). See Id. at 342 (“A police officer on the witness stand performs the same function
as any other witness.”); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1499 (2012) (emphasizing
the holding in Briscoe and affirming the lack of distinction between law enforcement officials
and ordinary citizens). There is no compelling argument that separates the status of the
Respondent in the present case from these distinguishing statements.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must affirm the court of appeals and find that Mr.
Darcy’s sworn testimony is protected free speech under the First Amendment and allow his
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to go forward.

17. 13
L.M. Student 9722, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
123 Connecticut Avenue NW
Suite 45
Washington, DC 20123
(201) 555-1234
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon opposing counsel by
placing same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on April 24, 2013.